The Doc, the Mock and the What?
To my philosophical friend A-M, for inspiring a life of freedom.
The Doc, the Mock, and the What?
Events of Realing, Mockumentalities and the Becoming-Political of the Viewing Subject
Abstract


This study aims at making inquiry into what happens when a viewing subject encounters a film where it proves difficult to recognize if it is factual or fictional. In order to meet this aim the dissertation offers an experimental approach of both theoretical and methodological nature. Drawing on materialist-affective theory and Deleuzian philosophy a method assemblage for mediamateriality is suggested. This offers a set of conceptual keys that makes it possible to trace the unfolding of actual encounters with blurred boundaries between the factual and the fictional. By performing a reception study whereby six data-producers engage with Exit Through the Giftshop, (Banksy 2010), I’m Still Here (Affleck 2010) and Catfish (Joost and Schulman 2010), a three-fold data is produced. Making this resonate through the method assemblage, the series of events of spectating is seen to have functioned as an event of destabilization of the relationship between the viewing subject and the discourse of factuality, what is called an event of realing. This functions as a challenge to the existential territory of the viewing subject-as-spectator, bringing forth a certain mockumentality that can give cause to practices of a becoming-political of the viewing subject, notably by serving as a reconfiguration of the regime of truth. However, as will be guarded against, mockumentality may potentially bring about practices that both flatten as well as hierarchize relations of power. Following this, the dissertation will end with a suggestion that the method assemblage for mediamateriality, besides as a tool for the analytic endeavour and an ethical practice for the viewing subject (inside or outside of academia), can also be put to work in a pedagogical aim, as a moving-image-pedagogics.

Keywords: mockumentary, reception study, method assemblage, spectatorial contract, Deleuze, Guattari, regime of truth, becoming-political.

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Acknowledgement

When I was interviewed for the position as PhD candidate I remember presenting my project as a ‘thesis looking for a home where it could become written’. I had the feeling that it was already in me, that it just needed the adequate place to come forth. In some ways I was right but in so many other wrong. Because however much I brought the desire to investigate certain problems to Örebro, it was really the years of studies, conversations, fikas, seminars, workshops, presentations, oppositions, conferences and hallway chats that made this particular dissertation come to life. More than a place where I could write, it has been a place where I have become a writer. The process towards a PhD is long, but the privilege to go through it in the MKV-environment in Örebro made sure it was not a lonely process.

To give proper due to all the affections, inspirations, conversations, sensations that has informed the unfolding of thinking and writing that combined have produced this work is impossible in its entirety but it is an ethical issue to do ones best in acknowledging the key moments and persons that have been part of this process.

Some have been formative encounters with texts, such as my first encounter with A Thousand Plateaus, a both violent and joyful event of thinking (thank you Anu Koivunen!). It felt like someone had cracked open my head, but in a good way if that makes any sense. Others have been encounters with embodied human warmth as with the lovely Rosi Braidotti who set the example of a generous, inclusive, sharp and witty scholar. I will never forget your exclaimed advice “Go undercover!” (2013). Yes, perhaps we, the dissident, at times need to go under cover in order to practice but we also need to be reminded that we are not alone.

Therefore my extended family of nomads have been so important all throughout this endeavour: Sean Smith and April Warn-Vannini who reminded me that philosophy is a practice and DoBF who graciously invited me and my son to be part of a group subject on a clear Harlem high-sky autumns day. Thanks Nick Bazzano for the telepathic moments. Helene Frichot my dear friend but also teacher, you have showed me the way around maps, paths and bridges while making it look like a dance or a song. Teachers I have had many, one that stands out when looking back is Fredrika Spindler. Thank you for bringing a measure of urgency to my engagement with Deleuze. To Malena Janson for a friendship that reaches from the professional to the personal in a seamless movement of trust and respect: thank you for believing in me, for backing me up and for walking besides me in different walks of life.
But first and foremost this work has geminated and been nourished throughout my years in the media and communications environment at Örebro University, and my cherished colleagues needs to be recognized for providing a safe and homely place for experimentation and creation. In so many ways, little and large, I felt I could always just go outside my room and find a generous ear and inspiring voice, the sense of community is one of the most precious experiences of this time as a PhD student. I have felt deeply supported and appreciated which has influenced my capacity to wander in both thought and spirit. Also the generous support, financial and other, of the heads of department; Leonor Camaüër, Michal Krzyzanowski, Åsa Kroon as well as from the faculty board, has enabled me to wander physically to summer schools and international conferences.

My main supervisor Göran Eriksson must be applauded for his patience and never-ending commitment, and for always making me feel worthy. Without your kind and generous guidance this work would surely have been different and certainly more difficult to write. Especially I want to thank you for always bringing a light atmosphere where laughter was never far away, that helps in a process that can sometimes feel overwhelming. Also praise to my first second supervisor Cecilia Mörner who always believed in me, I know I have you to thank for the opportunity given. My second supervisor Johan Nilsson must be thanked for doing a stellar job in catching up, providing solid and vital readings and clear thoughts in the intensive last stretch of the way. A warm thank you to Jakob Nisson for offering a valuable reading of my 60% manuscript, as well as to Frida Beckman for providing a lucid and attentive reading of my 90% manuscript. Your collective comments, as well as those from participants at the seminars, have much informed the way forward for me.

I feel blessed to have had such exceptionally warm and supportive colleagues in the department, working with you have always (no kidding!) been fun and stimulating; thanks to Åsa Jernudd and Helen Andersson (namaste!) Charlie Cronberg and Fredrik Sturzenbecker (thanks for bringing the realness to the reel), Ahmed El Gody, Mats Eriksson, Hogne Sataoen, Mattias Ekman, Fredrik Gustafsson and Agneta Wistrand-Rosendal (for great collegiality). I also extend a thankful recognition of stimulating conversations with former colleagues Ulrika Olausson, Anna Roosvall and Peter Berglez - imagine what a difference a fika can make! Thank you Joel Rasmussen for making me feel that support was at no time further away than a knock on your door. Big up to David Machin for heading our visual communications team with wit and energy. Also I want to recognize the valuable conversations with all the wonderful colleagues of the TRAIN network as well as with the community of the COST action on new materialism, a warm thank you to Iris van der Tuin and Felicity Coleman for making me feel welcome.
It goes without saying that this dissertation would have been impossible without my wonderful six data-producers whom I send humble and thankful recognition.

To my PhD colleagues, present and former I send the warmest thoughts, thank you for the solidarity and sharing. Many are the times when a simple word or two from you guys have put me back on track. To Petre Breazu, Irene Rapado and Vladimir Cotal San Martin, Mahitab Ezz El Din and Ernesto Abalo as well as Sofia Hort, Daroon Yassin, Helena Hansson-Nylund: thank you for giving me a sense of community. Into this community I have also had the joy of welcoming Lame Maatla Kenalemg and Cansu Elmadagli. A community functions as a family and this is really how I feel about my dear colleagues and friends Yuliya Lakew and Johanna Stenersen. I know our long and deep conversations on everything from method to soul searching have made this work stronger. For this and your friendship I cannot thank you enough, it has made all the difference having you on my side throughout it all and I thank you for making this experience and my life joyous.

To my family: for your unwavering support and proud cheers I am forever grateful. To Tove, Jorma, Noak, Rebecca, dad, Irina and Soyal, Tuli, Akke, and Beppe: I am happy and thankful for your presences in my life. Without you I would surely be another person, thank you for sharing life with me. To Jonas and the other Williamssons, gratitude for nourishing food and conversations. Thank you Sandra for listing without judgement and never failing to offer a shoulder to cry on. To my dear friends Terri, Emma, Frida, Fathia, Anna Emeli, Lisa, Annika and Inga-Bodil - thank you for leading with example, showing that it never has to be either/or, it is always both/and: both brains to pick, and hysterical laughs, both shared travels and shared silences, both joy and sadness but never loneliness. On that note I also want to extend an acknowledgment to my communities of yoga, meditation and urban gardening of both plants and children, thank you for keeping me grounded.

In a sense I write for my mother, but also because I owe it to my son. Mother, you were my first nomadic teacher and in more ways than one you are present in this work as well as in all I do. My son has persistently made me so proud, really pushing me to return the favour. I truly have you to thank for everything: for keeping it real, for telling it like it is, for showing me what is – and is not – important. But first and foremost I thank you for the endless love you give and accept from me in return. You are an everlasting inspiration Sachin, beautiful from the inside out, and without you this work would simply not exist. For your endless patience I thank you, this is your work too.
**Introduction**

“Something in this world forces us to think” (Gilles Deleuze 2004a, 176).

“We realized that the important thing was not the film itself but that which the film provoked” (Fernando Solanas, 1969).

During the spring of 2011, I was asked to be part of an on-stage moderated talk following a screening of *Exit Through the Gift Shop* (Banksy 2010) at the cinema Bio Rio in Stockholm. Having already seen the film a couple of times, my position was clear – *Exit Through the Gift Shop* was unquestionably a mock-documentary, that is, a film that looks like a documentary but ‘is actually’ fictional.¹ However, as the Q&A opened up, I was surprised to find that several people in the audience were opposed to the idea that this was anything but a documentary. Naturally, I was aware that as a cinema scholar, I had previous knowledge about the film and of film theory that perhaps not everyone shared with me (hence, the invitation to the talk). And I thought that as I would point out the overt play with numerous dogmatic ideas regarding street art and the play with the documentary mode of engagement, we could have a conversation about the mock-documentary as a playful commentary to the documentary. But this suggestion was met with dismay and even anger, and I found myself leaving the cinema with a pounding question: Why did this film and, perhaps more exactly, my suggestion that it was a mock-documentary, raise so much anger and disbelief? Admittedly, I had not anticipated a heated and affective response to a conversation I thought was simply about film genre. Perhaps, then, the conversation was about something else and/or there was indeed something affectively provocative about the suggestion that the fictional and the factual are less than stable categories.

Instead of claiming my own position right as opposed to the others being wrong (or vice-versa), or simply concluding that ‘wanting to know’ is a pre-given natural thought, I decided this was worth thinking further. In a contemporaneity in which we engage with audiovisual media on a daily basis and are accustomed to everything from pastiche to parody, why did an analysis pointing to blurred boundaries between the fictional and the factual in a feature film make people ticked off?

¹ Films that look like documentaries but are judged fiction are interchangeably referred to as mock-documentaries, fake documentaries or mockumentaries (Roscoe and Hight 2001; Juhasz and Lerner 2006; Lebow 2006). Variations within this corpus are the dramadocumentary, the docudrama and other docufictions. The choice of different terminology naturally places the focus of attention on different aspects of the film/event.
Embracing this episode at Bio Rio as a “problematic field” (Deleuze 1990, 56), I asked myself what was really at stake. If the problem is a room where a conversation is held, to what conversation did this episode correspond? By turning to French philosopher Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy of difference (Deleuze, 1990; 2001; 2004a), his joint philosophical oeuvre with Félix Guattari (Deleuze and Guattari 1994; 2004; 2009) as well as Guattari’s own brand of ethico-aesthetics (1995; 2009b; 2014) and other related relational process onto-epistemologies (Law 2004, Braidotti 2006; 2011, Barad 2007; Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012; Stengers 2011), it was possible for me to start thinking of an encounter with blurred boundaries as the production of a situated relational event (Stengers 2011, 64f; Deleuze 1990). The conversation was thus about the empirical encounter with film as the production of an event, where this event specifically gave rise to a problematics of boundaries and the blurring of these in reception.

I came to see this problematics as related to the relationship between the viewing subject2 and what Jane Roscoe and Craig Hight have called the discourse of factuality (2001). Judith Mayne (1993) drawing from Linda Gordon (1986) speaks of how “the relationship between the cinematic address and the cinematic reception opens up a space between the ‘ideal’ viewer and the ‘real’ viewer” (Mayne 1993, 79). What I was interested in, then, was the question of how events such as the one mentioned at Bio Rio can be considered as functioning as such an ‘in-between’ space of interactive (Barad 2007) de- and restabilization of the relationship between the discourse of factuality and a ‘real viewing subject’? The crux of the matter for Mayne is that there are limits to textual analysis since it posits an ‘ideal’ spectator who responds to ‘a text’ in accordance with ‘its address’, i.e., “ways that a text assumes certain responses” (1993 79). However, as Mayne argued, or as did for example Stuart Hall (1980), this might not be what actually happens in the context of reception.

In order to locate my inquiry in the ‘in-between’ of reception I realized that I needed to find a way beyond what Deleuze has called the model of representationalism (2004a, 174). According to Deleuze, this model produces a dogmatic image of thought whereby thinking begins with the pre-judgment of the naturally constituted separation of the object and subject (ibid., 167). That is to say a thinking that begins by a separation of ontolo-

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2 Vivian Sobchack (1992) introduced the term ‘viewing subject’ in The address of the Eye: a Phenomenology of Film Experience. However, I will use it following Panagia (2009) in an affective-materialist activation rather than in Sobchack’s phenomenological usage, although clearly, Panagia’s contribution is heavily indebted to Sobchack.
gy and epistemology where the real is ontologically opposed to the fake, the original to the copy, the true to the false. Since I was interested in working methodologically with the question of how these events functioned to stabilize or not the idea of stable entities in itself, as well as asking what effects these stabilizing or de-stabilizing practices have on processes of subjectification, I needed to find a way beyond the erection of an oppositional pregiven thought as already constituted through the very usage of terms such as the mock-documentary or fake-documentary as well as the hoax or the fake to describe what was at stake in these events. To do this, I turned to relational process onto-epistemologies, which enable me to speak of how these events function as what can be considered situated think-passages (Stengers 2011, 64), where the categories of the factual and the fictional are formed and re-formed through reception.

The focus of inquiry is thus asking not what is but rather how something comes to be in the time-space of a particular event, a question that makes a representationalist framework inapt. In a way, the question is thus to ask what “moves viewers to want to act”, as asked by Jane M. Gaines (1999, 89). But where Gaines is interested in the relation between the production of actions off-screen as these relate to the political topic of the on-screen account (what she calls political mimesis), I am interested here in the relation between the production of affection through the entangled becoming of an event and processes of subjectification, particularly as these pertain to a reconfiguration of the regime of truth.

The regime of truth is constituted through a set of regulated procedures for the production and validity as well as distribution, circulation and functioning of statements linking what we call ‘truth’ to circular systems of power that produce it and sustain it and the effects of power that it induces and guards (Foucault 2008, 178). Foucault argues that truth is “of this world”, produced “here” and that “each society has its regime of truth”, meaning (1) “types of discourses it accepts and causes to function as true”, (2) “mechanisms and instances enabling one to distinguish false statements from true”, (3) “a way in which each is sanctioned”, (4) “techniques and procedures which are valorised for obtaining truth”, and (5) “regulations for those in charge of defining what is to be held for truth” (Foucault 2008, 177, my translation). Conceptually I take the regime of truth to be rooted in Foucault’s concept of knowledge which is succinctly explained by Deleuze (2006, 44): “knowledge is a practical assemblage, a ‘mechanism’ of statements and visibilities.” This means that the regime of truth, like any knowledge assemblage, is constituted through practices.

A central question for this thesis is thus to ask how an event such as the encounter of a viewing subject with Exit Through the Gift Shop possibly
functions, in practical terms, as a de- and/or restabilization of a wider regime of truth (understanding this to inform processes of subjectification). In order to produce resonances of difference and repetition throughout the analytic series, I have chosen to also include encounters with *I’m Still Here* (Affleck 2010) and *Catfish* (Joost and Schulman 2010) in this study. This choice will be further discussed as this thesis progresses.

While working on this thesis, the problem of the regime of truth became even more tangible during 2016, as the word ‘post-truth’ was denominated as the ‘word of the year’ by *The English Living Oxford Dictionary* (2018), where it was defined as “relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief” — hence, circumstances where truth is conceptualized in an emotional rather than a factual ‘key’, or, taking the use of the word ‘personal’ as a guide, circumstances where one decides for oneself what counts as true or not.

In opposition to the suggestion that the ‘post’ prefix “implies an atmosphere in which a notion [truth] is irrelevant” (Wang 2016), I will argue that the notion of truth is not made irrelevant in the post-truth society — instead, it is changing. I hold that the discourse of factuality has served as ‘the expert’, that is, the authoritarian voice that guards and produces a particular notion of the true and real in relation to the particular realm of factual audiovisual content, but that this too is in a state of reconfiguration and change.\(^3\) If the notion of truth and the real is changing, it might appear as though it has ‘lost its meaning’, causing cries denouncing a ‘postmodern culture’ that has lost its connection to the true and real, because the new meaning is not clearly discerned at the moment. Nonetheless, the change is not loss, it is not lack, it is an othering. It is not that the discourse of factuality no longer produces, sustains and guards a notion of the real and the

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\(^3\) ‘The expert’ and its many roles in media discourse has been discussed in different settings; see, for instance, Eriksson and Thornborrow, eds. 2016. Importantly, the role of the expert in media discourse has been put into question, most notably so since the financial crisis of 2008 (Moran 2011), making this “collapse” of the cult of the expert a reoccurring topic in newspapers (see, for instance, Mallaby 2016). In addition, these conversations can perhaps be seen to have added extra spark to an already recurring conversation in scholarly work, as with Harry Boyte’s (2009) case for a civic democracy in which its members reclaim the expertise over their own society. Needless to say, the role of the expert can be said to overlap with innumerable conversations in most fields of social science as well as the humanities, since the question of the authoritarian voice and who gets to speak has not only been in play throughout the development of academia and its territories but can also be considered a core question in relation to the practice of the scholarly expert itself.
true – it most certainly does – but there are destabilizations going on in the conceptualization of these notions, and to dismiss them as wrong or fake is to miss out on an opportunity to understand what is really going on, the relations of power in action.

Understandably, if the notion of truth is changing, it is easy to call for stronger control over this notion, and it is understandable that there are cries of rally from the experts. However, as I will argue, if the notion of truth is changing, it is because the systems of power that produce, sustain and guard it are changing. Therefore, the question of what ‘circular systems of power’ produce, sustain and guard regarding such reconfiguration(s) of the notion of truth is prompted. As history teaches us, prohibition of, for instance, free speech does not stop speech; instead, insights and understandings of the mechanisms at play in relations of power as enacted throughout the socio-political spectra induce democratizations and an increased ethical awareness.

Speaking on the current system of power, Félix Guattari holds that today’s society is dominated and organ-ized through what he calls Integrated World Capitalism, or IWC. This is post-industrial capitalism that “tends increasingly to decenter its sites of power, moving away from structures producing goods and services towards structures producing signs, syntax and – in particular, through the control which it exercises over the media, advertising, opinion polls, etc. – subjectivity” (Guattari 2014, 31, see also Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 543). In other words, the sites of power of IWC are exercised through the production of subjectivity, a production where mediated communication serves a key function. Thus, speaking of these processes where notions of truth and reality are produced in tandem with processes of subjectification is, I would argue, also to find a measure of resistance to the integration, or organ-ization, of these relational processes into the organ-ism of IWC. According to Lazzarato, “Deleuze distinguishes between power relations and institutions. Power is a relation between forces, while institutions are agents of the integration and stratification of forces […] [i]ntegration is an operation that consists in tracing a general line of force which passes through forces and fixes them into

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4 As is suggested by the increased appearance of ‘seals of authenticity’ in newspaper articles and news media on-line. One example is the Swedish “Viralgranskaren”, which uses the alternate seals of “true” and “false”, respectively, stamped on top of an article.

5 Organ-ized, organ-ization and organ-ism are hyphenated to underline the importance of the morpheme organ. This will be of importance later in this thesis, since it is the organ-ization of organs that constitute a particular organism, what is called a ‘moving-image-body’ (see also von Schantz 2015).
forms” (2006, 173f). In this way, the encounter with a film that is difficult to recognize as either factual or fictional can be considered an ‘institution’ that integrates forces into a relation of power expressed through a subject.

As such, this ‘institution’ of the encounter can be considered a Foucauldian exclusionary/inclusionary system that functions to produce relations of power (Foucault 1993, 10-12). As the systems are changing, so also are the relations of power that produce them as they are produced. Just because operative concepts (such as ‘truth’ and ‘reality’) are in a process of changing shapes does not mean they lose their function as productive relations of power within the system that regulates them. Adding a stronger authoritarian voice or more experts does not address the relations of power at the heart of the regime of truth and the society it governs, the society that governs it. There is thus political potential in probing how these new relations of power are produced throughout events of de-/stabilization of the discourse of factuality, and in this dissertation, I will offer exemplifications of some events of this order. However, to do so, I realized I had to turn to the problem of methodology.

Because the problem that was signaled through the Bio Rio event was of epistemological as well as ontological character, if the encounter is to be considered an ‘institution’ that serves as an inclusionary/exclusionary system of integrating forces into relations of power, then clearly so must also the practice of documenting it as I do here. It follows that the Bio Rio event also prompted a methodological problem that questioned the discovery of “ways of making methods without accompanying imperialisms” (Law 2004, 15).

This slightly rephrased the question into how to investigate processes of de-/stabilization(s) of the relationship between the viewing subject and the discourse of factuality, understanding this to have an effect on processes of subjectification, as this is actualized and produced through events of encountering films that are difficult to recognize as either documentary or fiction in the actual (without accompanying imperialisms). As I saw it, the Bio Rio event was an invitation to practice “inventive methods” (Lury and Wakeford 2014, see also Coleman and Ringrose 2013).

To address this methodological problem in this thesis, I offer a method assemblage (Law 2004) that is attuned to the problem of an ongoing reconfiguration of the regime of truth as this is thus enacted and played out in the realm of events whereby the discourse of factuality is perceived as destabilized. The Bio Rio experience pointed to an affective irritation as the clear oppositions inherent in the established notions of truth and the real became blurred. As an invited ‘expert’, my suggestion that Exit Through the Gift Shop was a mock-documentary was received as an insult by some
in the audience. For others who were in agreement with me, it was a recognition of their own ‘rightful’ position. All the same, distancing myself from thinking of this experience along the lines of right/wrong and instead thinking of it as a productive relational space (an event), I can ask in what way events that were affective responses towards blurred boundaries between the factual and the fictive can be thought of in terms of an on-going reconfiguration of the regime of truth. In addition, I can thus ask what the effects of such reconfiguration are in terms of processes of subjectification.

Moreover, asking such questions pushes me into finding a measure of “inventiveness” in methodology, that is, a method with the “capacity to address a problem and change that problem as it performs itself” (Lury and Wakeford 2014, 7). The regime of truth is not something external to the very quest of asking these questions; it is, as it were, part of the fabric of academic practices. Therefore the method assemblage is crafted in order to be attuned and answerable to the productive flux and ongoing enactment of realities of both the object of study (the events) and the practice of so doing (the documentation thereof).

By experimenting with methodologies of reception – notably, making possible an empirical datum, The Study, which is thus made to resonate through the method assemblage – I will be able to argue that the here-investigated events enact a certain flux in the constitution of the regime of truth. Following this, I will be able to make the argument that this feeds into the circular flow of control exercised through the system of IWC. In a famous essay from 1992, Deleuze speaks of the society that follows on the ‘disciplinary societies’ that the body of work by Foucault has theorized extensively upon (Deleuze 1992, 3). This he calls the society of control, and it functions through modulations that are “continuous and without limit, while discipline was of long duration, infinite and discontinuous” (ibid., 6). Where IWC is the ‘machine’, the society of control is what ‘it does’. However, and of utmost importance, in the society of control, this doing is not done ‘to the citizen’ but ‘by the citizen’, notably by being a particular ‘citizen’. In short, the citizen is not disciplined into submission but is auto-subsumed, self-controlled, and self-modulated.

I argue that as an integral functioning of the machine, the regime of truth is practiced not (only) through disciplinary measures but is increasingly modulated through affective events. This modulation makes the discourse of factuality, as a ‘type of discourse that the regime of truth accepts and causes to function as true’, a strategic site for changes, both to the viewing subject and to how s/he practices the regime of truth.

It is a moment in time where a collective responsibility for realities produced can open up new venues for micropolitics, but it can also pose the
threat of an even more totalitarian control. As Deleuze and Guattari have warned against, “fascism is inseparable from a proliferation of molecular focus”. That is to say, in the possibility of emancipatory flow, there is also the potential for fascist determinations (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 236). Therefore, it is important to find ways to trace both the disruption to, as well as the re-stabilizations of, the ‘circulatory systems of power’, not the least to see when and how the conditions appear for what Deleuze and Guattari call microfascism (ibid.). As I have begun to argue, the society of control produced through IWC is not a society that has rid itself of the notion of truth. Rather, the society of control sustains a reconfigured notion of truth that I argue transcends the habitual practices of recognition, instead appearing nonsensical and difficult to grasp. In its wake arise processes of affections, in the case of Bio Rio, anger and dismay or else surprise and thinking. The current post-truth atmosphere is indicative of this process. As such, it is as much a promise as it is a threat.

To resolve these processes, other measures than the binary conceptions of opposites (exclusion/inclusion, true/fake, right/wrong) of representation-alism are needed. I argue that the notion of truth in the society of control, on par with the logic of modulations, needs to be grasped through its actions, not its appearance. Only by following what it does can its status as truth or reality be found: In other words, not by asking, Is this true? but What does this ‘truth’ do? Not by asking Is this real? but What affections are engendered through this reality, and What are their corresponding relations of power? To probe these questions of affective registers and their effects as these pertain to events whereby feature films that transcend the binarism of oppositional thinking are encountered, a new thinking pertaining also to the notion of truth and the real is needed. My contention is that through such thinking, the wider issues at stake in the post-truth society begin to take form.

Problems
In this thesis, I offer investigations into encounters among six so-called data-producers6 as well as myself and Exit Through the Gift Shop (Banksy 2010), I’m Still Here (Affleck 2010) and Catfish (Joost and Schulman 2010). I argue that because these films are perceived as difficult to recog-

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6 As I will explain further in chapter five, I propose this term instead of the more conventional (in reception studies) ‘respondent’ or ‘informant’, since I want to stress an emphasis on their productive capacity and function in this project (although I acknowledge that respondent and informant also allow for a certain agential capacity).
nize as either documentary or fiction, the encounter functions to produce an event where the opposition between the true and the false as constructed through the discourse of factuality is destabilized, thence also destabilizing the relation between the viewing subject and the discourse of factuality. Moreover, I argue that this problem of unrecognition in reception produces a political problem in that it will be considered as producing a reconfiguration of the regime of truth and, in extension, a becoming-other of the viewing subject-as-spectator.

Since this problem is taking place in the empirical realm, I need to develop a methodology attuned to the flux of empirical experience. I answer this need with the development of a method assemblage for mediamateriality. This places an imperative on what “we are aware of ‘in perception’” (Stengers 2011, 32), while focusing on the conditions for de-/stabilizations as they are produced in reception and as they affect the becoming of material relations. That is to say, in what way these events impact processes of subjectifications, notably by the de-/stabilization of the viewing subject-as-spectator. As such, it enables me to discuss these events as the production of assemblages of relations of power in the actual. Following Foucault and Deleuze, the method assemblage for mediamateriality thus makes it possible to ask not What is power? but How is it practiced? (Deleuze 2006, 59).

In line with my problem, I thus offer an experimental reception study where six participants produce mixed-methods data. These data are composed of written answers to questions I sent the participants through e-mail as well as the production of an on-line presentation, a Prezi. Additional data are composed of field notes taken by me throughout a series of ‘fikas’ where the data-producers and I got together for discussion, as well as my own initial documentation of encountering these films.

The method assemblage for mediamateriality that is here developed and put to the test therefore produces empirical data and makes this resonate in nuances of relationalities, confluences of forces and increases or decreases in power to act in the larger socio-political realm. In other words, the

7 What is at stake in this phrasing is to ask what commits us? It is to ask what am I aware of in perception, not ‘what do I perceive’, which is a question already imbued with the proposition that what I perceive is what is. To think the problem in such terms is to try to “resist[s] the pretentions of solution included in the usual modes of formulation” (Stengers 2011, 33).

8 Since “power is a relation between forces […] every relation between forces is a ‘power-relation’” (Deleuze 2006, 59).

9 The Swedish word ‘fika’ is used to describe an informal and relaxed meeting with coffee and perhaps a bun.
method assemblage here crafted suggest ways to enact and think about events of encounters with films in the empirical, offering an experimentation with methodology with the aim of suggesting how to map the flux of affections in reception over time. As such, my problem in this thesis is an intertwined theoretical and methodological problem.

By an analytic activation of the method assemblage, the viewing subject-as-spectator will be exposed as a particular relation of power, an exposure that will bring forth a reworking of the notions of truth and the real, making possible disruptive capacities that can function both as a flattening and as a hierarchization of relations of power, what I call a mockumentality. In other words, the problem corresponds to how and with what effect the events investigated partake in the reconfiguration of the regime of truth and in the connected development of mental ecologies through which contemporary forms of governance are enacted or else disrupted.

Throughout the mock-documentary corpus, it becomes clear, as I will discuss in the next chapter, how the play with the discourse of factuality enhances laughter, fright or disgust as it is recognized in reception. Following my inquiry, however, the reception of the films I am here looking at seems to enhance the need to problematize one’s own relation to the discourse of factuality. I will argue that this is so precisely because of the space of unrecognition offered. This relation as a particular problem related to the conception of both a universal and a relative truth suggests that the disruptive force of mockumentality makes possible practices of becoming-political of the viewing subject, ushering forth an emancipation of the viewing subject-as-spectator in an embrace of a responsive ethics, a responsibility to the realities and the worldings that we practice when ‘we see film’.

**Thesis outline and structure**

Considering the centrality of the problem of the relation between the viewing subject and the discourse of factuality, I will begin in Chapter 1 with a discussion of Roscoe and Hight’s (2001) suggestion that the mock-documentary intentionally blurs the boundaries that sustain what they have termed the discourse of factuality. A central criterion for definition, according to Roscoe and Hight, is that the mock-documentary *puts on a play* with the discourse of factuality, functioning as a “direct challenge to the discourse of factuality, to the underlying discourse of the documentary” (2001, 188). However, this play needs to be *recognized* for the mock-documentary to in fact come into effect (Roscoe and Hight 2001, 22; Lipkin, Paget and Roscoe 2006, 17).
As already described, the initial event that launched the problem of thought for me was one where this challenge was not readily recognized. By investigating the principles and practices that inform the recognition of films that relate to the extra-diegetic real either through a factual or mock-factual relation, I will use this chapter to ask how the viewing subject recognizes when a feature film is factual or fictional and what is at stake when this recognition is impossible. In addition, I will discuss how the term viewing subject as well as the concept of affect is put to work in this thesis, notably by thinking about the encounter at Bio Rio as a particular event of spectating\(^\text{10}\) that offered the problem of the mock-mode. This, as I will discuss here, means the possible problematization of a relation between the viewing subject and the discourse of factuality whereby the viewing subject is reiterated as a particular capturer and container of ‘knowledge’ as a ‘spectator’.\(^\text{11}\)

In Chapter 2, I turn to Deleuze’s philosophy of difference and his critique of representationalism in order to extend this thinking about the question of ‘spectatorship’. This choice\(^\text{12}\) is informed by the positioning of the central problem of the mock-mode, as this ushers forth the question of how to think about the act of recognition and unrecognition. In her seminal book *Cinema and Spectatorship* (1993), Judith Mayne offers a solid grip on the field of cinematic spectatorship, summing up the different theories that have formed the field, from the establishment of apparatus theory in the 70s through the cognitivism of the 80s, as well as the parallel historical perspectives where particular notions of time and place become important in thinking about questions of intertextuality, exhibition, the cinematic public sphere and reception.

Already in her introduction, Mayne questions the logic of either/or that she sees as a red thread throughout the development of the field: *either* a critical or a complacent spectator, *either* a passive or an active viewer

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\(^{10}\) Steven Shaviro’s *The Cinematic Body* (1992) has been formative in thinking of film as event. With the phrasing of ‘event of spectating’ however, my intention here is to focus a thinking of film-as-event as rooted in the actual practices of reception rather than the more dedicated theoretical work of Shaviro. In other words, my theoretical contributions are always intended as methodological keys first and foremost.

\(^{11}\) As I will discuss, this in itself implies a particular existential relation of power. Also in Sobchack’s discussion of a phenomenology of filmic experience the existential level of the act of viewing is central (see 1992, 129). Here however I am investigating this in a materialist-affective aim and not in a phenomenological aim.

\(^{12}\) That is, the choice of turning to Deleuze’s philosophy of difference (2004a) as opposed to, for instance, to his ‘Cinema-books’ (2005a; 2005b).
(ibid., 4, my italics). For Mayne, this is a paradox that points to the theoretical tension between the ‘ideal’ and the ‘real’ viewer, making her re-evaluate textual analysis as methodology. To resolve this tension, she asks that the issue of spectatorship be examined through its inherent paradoxes, “productively and critically at the same time” (ibid., 158, italics in original). Turning to Deleuze’s philosophy of difference to consider the act of unrecognition as productive of a potentially de-stabilizing event in an ever-so-humble way corresponds to Mayne’s suggestion.

To find a way to ‘examine spectatorship productively and critically through its inherent paradoxes’, I develop what I call a method assemblage for mediamateriality. The term mediamateriality speaks of the relations of materialities and connected processes of subjectifications, as these are produced through events whereby a viewing subject encounters mediated communication. With this concept, I am drawing from D. N. Rodowick’s discussion of a medium as “a set of potentialities from which creative acts may unfold” (2007, 85). Mediamateriality as a concept enables one to situate as the object of study the processes of materialization as produced through entangled media practices rather than media as an external object. It is thinking the materiality of “natureculture” (Haraway 2003) “as self-organizing aggregates that allow for the emergence of newness” (Herzogenrath 2015, 2). In short, media-practices as the becoming of ecologies (Guattari 2014; McLuhan 2001). This prompts a closing discussion pertaining to an ethics for the praxis of the method assemblage.

In Chapter 3 I expand the method assemblage for mediamateriality through the proposal of two concepts: moving-image-body, or mib, and the spectatorial contraction (see also von Schantz 2015). My proposition is that the event of Bio Rio functioned as an event productive of the particular mediamateriality – a mib – that in turn can be considered to have a particular capacity for affection. As such this concept is grounded in Deleuze’s Spinozist exclaimation that “we do not even know what a body can do” (Deleuze 1988, 17f, italics in original), meaning that it is not enough to think what the (moving-image-)body is, if we do not take into consideration what it is that it in fact can do (understanding this last through the affective capacity of bodies).

At Bio Rio the sudden de-organ-ization of the territories of stable knowledge and clear identity of the subject and object alike, ushered the present mib into a potential moving-image-body-without-organs, or mib-wos, which is to say a becoming-other. This way the mib as concept makes inquiry into how the event of spectating can be considered to function micropolitically (Guattari 2009b, 284), that is, as a specific “existentializa-
tion” (ibid., 289).\textsuperscript{13} The mib as concept is thus an attempt to, in likness to Maynes contribution (1993), expand the parameters of analysis “beyond the individual film-text” (68). Moreover, the mib highlights the ethico-political dimension not only of practices of spectating but also of documenting and analyzing the same since the documentalist is not separate from the formation of the mib. As expressed by Guattari, “you are a fascist or a revolutionary with yourself first [...] then][political action should become, in my view, synonymous with the analytical venture – and vice versa!” (Guattari 2009b, 31f).

Also the spectatorial contraction, I argue, corresponds to the ethico-political imperative as well as the central problem of unrecognition at work in this thesis in that it makes it possible to trace the fluctuation of affective processes and offer terminology for those instances when these produce frustration and exhaustion (as were noticeable in the initial problem where I started). Here I offer two contracts of stabilization, the doc- and the mock-contracts, which can be said to be the flipside of each other, working to sustain one another through the stabilization of a dichotomous logic. Then, I offer one contraction of de-stabilization, the missing contract, which is a contraction of what is yet to come. This contraction thus makes possible what can be considered an event of unlearning in that it is “an encounter with signs, in which the distinctive points renew themselves in each other, and repetition takes shape while disguising itself” (Deleuze 2004a) 26). It is a contraction that exhausts the possibility of recognition, making possible a new thought.

In conclusion, I offer a discussion of the context for actualizing the missing contract. In conjunction with this, the term affective mockumentary is suggested to denote the feature film that is difficult to recognize as either factual or fictional, although I stress that its ontology is dependent on the production of a missing contract; this, however, is not limited to or even inherent to a particular expression. Rather, its existence “is not guaranteed from the outside [...] it is not an object ‘given’ in extrinsic coordinates but an assemblage of subjectivation giving meaning and value to determinate existential Territories”(Guattari 1995, 94). As such the affective mockumentary is an elusive object that needs the porosity of the method assemblage for mediamateriality to become discerable as such. One in-

\textsuperscript{13} In the referenced essay, Guattari is highlighting Foucault’s contribution to the analysis of power, understanding this as a “microphysics of power”. This he understands to be sharing a function with his own and Deleuze’s analysis, which he calls “a micropolitics of desire”, in that both attempts share an attunement to the specificities of productive relations.
stance it exists, giving value to a determinate territory, however this very action changes the territory in question, thus also the capacity for the affective mockumentary to indeed exist as such.

Thus when I return in Chapter 4 to Exit Through the Gift Shop, making my (renewed) encounter with this film resonate through the method assemblage, my aim is to perform a test-run, tracing the fluctuation of spectatorial contractions and moving-image-bodies. To extend the analysis and exemplification of the method assemblage, I also turn to offer an analytic conversation pertaining to my encounter with I’m Still Here and a discussion thread on the IMDb website that discusses this film, as well as an analysis of Catfish. Concluding this chapter, I argue that events of spectating these three films make possible what Deleuze (1998) has discussed as exhaustion. This is to say that the capacity for stable contraction is spent, amounting to the possibility of a missing contract and the subsequent formation of a series of variant mibwos.

Where chapter 4 serves as a pre-study, I move closer to the question of actual experience in chapters 5 through 7, where I will produce an experimental reception study. Here, the flux of organization of multiple mibs will be traced, mapped and made to speak through the antenna of the method assemblage. The Study (referred to as such) is composed of a series of events of spectating these same films, as well as the production of documentation thereof. In Chapter 5, I offer a discussion of how I went about setting this up, i.e., detailing the particular research design that informs The Study, and Chapters 6–7 bring the different data produced through the study into the ‘resonating gong’ of the proposed method assemblage (Law 2004, 117). In other words, the method assemblage functions as an amplifier of patterns of repetitions and a flux of absences and presences as these are produced throughout the series of events. In chapter six, I focus on the data from the field notes and the e-mailed Q&A in order to trace the fluctuation of contractions. In chapter seven, I close in on the Prezi and the field notes in order to ask what mib(s) The Study can be seen to have brought forth, in other words, what capacity for affection has been made possible throughout these events of spectating where the mock-mode is indeed brought forth as a problem. This leads me to conclude that the ac-

14 Because the analysis of the encounters of this chapter are produced as part of this thesis, that is to say, in a sense produced over the course of several years, they need to be taken as a pre-study to the ensuing experimental reception study, not as an actual tracing of one specific spatial-temporal contraction since I have modified the writing throughout. In contrast, the data analyzed in The Study pertains to locally situated events of a defined temporality, as will be discussed in chapters five through seven.
ualized events of spectating affective mockumentaries have functioned as what I will call *events of realing*. These are events whereby the very *foundation* for producing a relation between the viewing subject and the discourse of factuality is exhausted to the degree that a new relation is produced.

In the ensuing final Chapter 8, I refer to this new relation as a *mockumentality*, which is argued to function as a capacity to re-arrange the relation of power inherent in the viewing subject-as-spectator. Mockumentality is consecutively discussed as a particularly resilient form of disruptive ‘mentality’ within Integrated World Capitalism (Guattari uses the acronym IWC, see for instance 2014, 31), since its capacity to disrupt the smooth and contingent processes of subjectifications within IWC function in accordance with the very same modulary logic of the society of control (Deleuze 1992), such as IWC itself. As such, the event of realing can be thought of as an event that re-arranges the relationship between the viewing subject and the discourse of factuality, and, in extension, enact a re-configuration of the regime of truth. Moreover, the event of realing can be thought of as the bringing forth of a becoming-political in that the viewing subject is momentarily made aware of its own power as part of a collective of viewing subjects. However, in relation to this, I will caution against the too-violent becoming of a mockumentality and/or this being brought forth in a non-responsive setting, since this can usher in a need for a (too-) strong stabilization, what can amount to a ‘desire for fascism’, “the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us” (Foucault in Deleuze and Guattari 2009, xiii).

This way there is an emphasis on an ethics of one’s practice (be it viewing films or writing texts) that rests “on the basis of a productive rather than restrictive notion of truth” (Butchart 2006, 431). Ultimately this demands a *response-able* practice of the viewing subject, as in an ability to respond to the realities it brings forth, as “a way to attend to power imbalances” (Barad in Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012). As a final conclusion, this then leads to a suggestion for the method assemblage for mediamateriality as a moving-image-pedagogics.

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15 This, as I will discuss further as this thesis develops, is connected with the question of the force of action and agency, hence, ethics. See also Barad 2007, 393; Haraway 1988, 583; Lury and Wakeford 2014, 7.
Chapter 1: The problem of unrecognition

“A useful principle of classification for discourse, then, should have some basis in the conventions of rhetorical practice, including the ways actual rhetors and audiences have of comprehending the discourse they use” (Carolyn R Miller 1984, 152).

In this thesis, I turn to discuss the discourse of factuality in order to measure the practice of reception throughout events whereby the fictional and the factual are blurred. As declared by Alisa Lebow (2006) the definition and disciplining of ‘the documentary’ are elusive, causing “most documentary theorists” as well as practitioners to “overlook the stubborn refusal of documentary to be properly disciplined” (226). Hence, every definition of the term “has proved partial and of limited use” (ibid.). On the basis of this nonconsensual situation in theory, I turn to Roscoe and Hight’s term the discourse of factuality, since this is constructed, contrarily to other theories of the documentary or fiction film proper, precisely in relation to films that aim at activating such blurring in different ways, what Roscoe and Hight (2001) call the mock-documentary. In fact, they highlight that they consider the documentary to exist “along a fact-fiction continuum, each text constructing relationships with both factual and fictional discourses” (ibid., 7).

Moreover, I chose to make my inquiry into the relation between the viewing subject and the discourse of factuality through the question of reception, hence, not making the question primarily about form, distribution or production (except when it is overtly related to the question of reception). In this chapter, I close in on what I see as the guiding principles of making events through encounters where a blurring of the boundaries between the fictional and the factual occurs, what I consider to be a casual receptive chain of foreknowledge, expectation and, finally, recognition.

I start with a detailing of the multiple overlapping discourses that make out the discourse of factuality in order to situate the principles and practices that inform the recognition of films that relate to the extra-diegetic real as either factual or mock-factual as well as make inquiry into what is at stake when such recognizability is not made possible.16

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16 How a viewer understands a film has been discussed by Noel Carrol (1983) as how a film is “indexed”. Following this, indexing practices have also been discussed as being ‘faulty’ (Eitzen 1995). This I take to be a representationalist way of thinking about the reception of film, notably in its strive towards taxonomy, classification, identification and evaluation (Deleuze 2004a, 167).
The discourse of factuality

In *Faking It: mock-documentary and the subversion of factuality* (2001), the to-date only monograph on the subject of the cinematic mock-documentary, Jane Roscoe and Craig Hight define the mock-documentary as “fictional texts which in some form ‘look’ like documentaries” (ibid., 49). To understand the particular tension that the mock-documentary introduces in this play with incoherent form/content, Roscoe and Hight introduce a term that attempts to encompass and detail the genealogy of the discourse of the audio-visual real, what they call the discourse of factuality (ibid., 6-23). This is an umbrella term composed of multiple discourses: the discourses of the moving image as scientific inscription, as indexicality, as materiality, as practice and as reception (Roscoe and Hight 2001, 6-23).

Elisabeth Cowie (2011) suggests that truth be thought as “not a quality of meaning that is immanent in reality; rather, it is an effect of human discourse” (26). The material world is not ‘true’, it simply is. It is discourses of the true that shape the way humans turn a thing into something, “‘objectivity’ itself is a construct of thought in relation to materiality” (ibid.). The multiple discourses that together construct the discourse of factuality thus need to be thought as such formative discourses shaping the way hu-

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17 Although there are many suggestions as to how to go about ‘indexing’ a documentary as well as differences within the realm of fiction films I choose the contribution offered by Roscoe and Hight, since this is crafted in response to what Roscoe and Hight call the mock-documentary to show that they consider these texts that are intentionally hybrid and blurred to be intrinsically tied to the documentary project and its reliance on the discourse of factuality. Important to note that there are different terminologies in use, Alexandra Juhasz and Jesse Lerner (2006), for their part, prefer the term fake documentary, suggesting it to be a queered documentary, of sorts. Alisa Lebow in contrast argues against the very existence of the documentary genre as privileged in its relationship to the transcription of ‘the Real’ and thus also against the ‘fake documentary’ terminology. She prefers the term mockumentary to point to these films as inherently constructing their own relationship to ‘the Real’, even terming it “the truer documentary form” (Lebow 2006, 236).

18 The use of ‘incoherent’ here corresponds to inconsistencies in the conditions for recognizing genre-affiliation in reception and not inconsistencies within the film, as in Robin Woods’ (1980) consideration of an “incoherent text” if displaying ideological inconsistencies.

19 Importantly, as expressed by Cowie and as will be discussed in this thesis, this does not mean that there is no such thing as reality or truth, only that it is through human discourse that these categories find form, just like documentary and fiction find specific forms through the discourses that produce them while they, in turn, produce the discourses.
mans think about the representability of the real and true in moving imagery. Importantly, the documentary “was never an ontological fact; it has always been a project, a polemic assault on the nondocumentary, however this has been defined” (Cowie 2011, 45). In other words, the factual has needed the fictive in order to come into relief.

The discourse of factuality can be summarized by a history of technology and epistemophilia, the desire to ‘see-know-believe’ (Cowie 2011, 13; 32); as such, it predates the moving image itself. Going through the different discourses enumerated by Roscoe and Hight, the discourse of scientific inscription is thence connected with the development of the photographic camera and its insertion into the class of instruments such as the “thermometer, barometer, hygrometer”, telescope and microscope”, which already existed in the 1850s (Winston 1993, 37). In the 1870s, different scientific experiments helped align technologies of representation with other technologies of survey of the natural world. Famous are the experiments performed by Muybridge and Marey (Doane 2002, 49-60) where bodies in motion, human and others, were photographed and then, through the cartography of multiple frames, offered for scrutiny.

The capacity of photographic technology to capture instances of the real (even more real because it captured things in a way the human eye could not) “helped condition the public reception of the new technique […] confirming] for the public that seeing is believing, and that the photographic camera never lies; or rather: the camera lies no more than does the thermometer, the microscope, the hygrometer, and so on” (Winston 1993, 39f). As such, the photographic camera became associated with the naturalist or realist aesthetics that was also “inexorably intertwined with progressive social concerns”, (ibid., 34) which made the “powerful argument, grounded in centuries of modern scientific inquiry, for seeing the camera as no more and no less than a device for representing the world of natural phenomena” (ibid., 140). What Winston (1993) refers to as the politics of realism (ibid, 34). This laid the foundation for the powerful discourse of indexicality, constituting a relationship with the indexicality of the photographic image as well as the moving image that followed suit.

Index is a term in semiotics that was originally offered by Charles Sanders Peirce. It refers to the link between a sign and that which it points towards: a footstep in the sand points to the foot that made it is an index; a palm print on a wall in a cave dated to the stone age that points to the hand that once made the sign is an index. This is the famous correlation of

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20 In his complex of semiotic signs, the triad symbol/index/icon speak of the relation between signs and their objects (see for instance Burks 1949 or Huening n.d.).
‘where there’s smoke there’s fire’. Thus, already before the famous invention by the Lumière brothers and the first screening of a motion picture in 1895, there was an established relationship between the image and the empirical world, a relationship that accorded the image a cultural belief in the image and, consequently, the moving image as a conveyer of an indexical link to the natural world (cf. Bazin 1971). Thus, the filmic image could bypass the notion of image as representation and instead situate an idea of re-presentation in the mind of a culture that developed in tandem with these technological inventions.

As such, the Idea that “the camera does not lie” (Roscoe and Hight 2001, 11) became established as the 20th century unfolded. That is, a photographic or filmic image could be used in an evidentiary sense, as not a mediated real, but the ‘real deal’ itself. This belief could consequently cooperate in producing the aforementioned discourses of the documentary apparatus as materiality and practice, that the moving image is a material trace of the social world and that the practice of recording the social and historical world is connected to other practices, such as the practice of journalism and the joint project “to present truthful and honest accounts of the social world” (ibid., 14). However, as is clear today, these discourses are connected to a technological reality no longer dominant in today’s digital turn. In The Virtual Life of Film, D.N. Rodowick (2007) offers a lucid and thorough discussion concerning the ontology of the analog and digital cinemas. He argues that a certain idea of the cinema connected with analog technology “is already dead” (93), although he suggests that the new media of digital technology is “inevitably imagined from a cinematic metaphor” (ibid., 97). As such, “an idea of cinema persists” (ibid.). That is to say, although the technological conditions for producing as well as receiving and distributing feature films and other moving images are changing, and changing rapidly, through innovations and developments of

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21 Discourses intrinsic to the documentary apparatus, such as materiality and practice, are thus discourses of journalism in that they “tend to reiterate the role that documentary has constructed for itself as an objective commentator on society, and an educator of masses. It continuous to draw on positivist practices in order to legitimze its modes of inquiry. Further, journalism’s perceived cultural weight also stems from other professional practices such as detailed and extensive research, another practice through which documentary similarly seeks to validate its claims”(Roscoe and Hight 2001, 14).

22 Just as analog cinema in its time was imagined through the metaphor of other technologies and expressions, such as the photograph, ethnography, the scientific project, the essay, the arts, to mention some of the most salient imaginaries.
digital technologies, the discourses of the image still persist in the cultural mind, that is, in reception.

As late as 2016, long after the digital advent, Swedish film professor Göran de Rees argues for the pressing need to deconstruct the discourses of the indexicality of the image, notably since this continues to inform the system of jurisprudence. Through the findings of his artistic research at the University of Gothenburg he argues that an unproblematized use of the idea of the indexicality of moving imagery leads the state prosecutor to present false evidence (de Rees 2016). There is thus still reason to take the function of these discourses into account when thinking about the reception of moving imagery. And reception is precisely the last discourse of Roscoe and Hight’s proposal for the discourse of factuality. This is thus where ‘ideas persist’, and this is where the problem in this thesis is found.

Because it is through reception that discourses of scientific inscription, indexicality, materiality and practice are familiarized, captured and ultimately accepted, it is there that “an implicit contract is made between the filmmaker and viewer in which the filmmaker promises to deliver a truthful and honest portrayal, and in return the viewer will not question the reality of the images presented” (Roscoe and Hight 2001, 22, my italics). Interestingly the use of the term contract implies a pregiven idea of an agreement between two sovereigns. In chapter 3 I will turn to Deleuze’s philosophy of difference in order to return to this idea of a contract. This will enable me to zoom in on on the flux of its formation, i.e. what can be thought of as the ontology of the contract. But first I need to continue to locate the variables that come together in such a contraction of the discourse of factuality.

For one I would argue that although the dominant technology for the production of films today might be digital, the ideas permeating the act of reception are still connected to the analog principles of indexicality, materiality, inscription, etcetera, notably through the idea of a contract (as mentioned in the previous quote by Roscoe and Hight 2001, see also Lipkin, Paget and Roscoe 2006, 17). Indeed, although digital developments have changed “our phenomenological relationship” with images (Rodowick 2007, 98), analog technology still functions as the frame of reference for “a

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23 He has analyzed the prosecutions connected to the riots in Gothenburg in 2001. Following de Rees’ work, Swedish courts now have a coda to use whenever invoking moving imagery as evidence. However, according to de Rees, this is still not applied to the extent that moving imagery can be claimed to perform the status of evidence in a sense that would grant a rule of law. A recent doctoral thesis in the field of legal informatics by Jonas Ekfeldt (2016) confirms de Rees’ warnings (Dept. of Law, Stockholm University).
certain kind of perceptual experience” (ibid.), i.e., what I would take as the relation between the viewing subject and the image informed by discourses of factuality. However, Rodowick argues that the “perceptual realism” offered by images of digital technology challenges the “spectators to reconsider the very concept of the image” (ibid., 102). Thus, an actual viewer might not activate a thinking of the image as either analog or digital in the space of mainstream reception; rather, it might be more adequate to think that analog ideas and digital practices co-exist as both living and imagined experiences in the viewer.

In this thesis, I will leave this question of technology behind in favor of focusing on the question of the relationship between the viewing subject and the discourse of factuality, as this informs the causal receptive chain of foreknowledge, expectation and recognition in reception, not as it relates to technology, although granting that the technological aspect informs the former. To keep the here-presented argumentation as focused and stringent as possible, I will not make any further technological digressions, although I believe that building on the scholarship of Doane (2002) and Winston (1993; 2008) for instance, in order to study this relationship as a technological narrative would be a very timely and important project.24 Thus, going forward, I will focus on the conditions for the contract of the discourse of factuality-in-reception; what is needed for its constitution and what happens when this is not made possible?

**Recognizing the play with the discourse of factuality**

Roscoe and Hight offer a taxonomy of the different ways that the discourse of factuality is subverted and put into play through the cinematic mock-documentary25, ranging from Parody (degree 1) to Critique (degree 2) to Deconstruction (degree 3) (Ibid., 64-75). The use of ‘degrees’ is thus indicative of the different degrees to which the discourse of factuality is challenged.

24 Also, as the data in chapters six and seven show, the technological aspect was not highlighted by the data-producers either, but this could also be related to the fact that neither did I through my questions. Including this perspective in a future project would be an interesting added point of entry into thinking about the evolving relationship between the viewing subject and the discourse of factuality.

25 In so doing, it can be said that the mockumentary, in contrast to many other sub-genres that were transposed from literary theory onto the realm of film theory, such as melodrama, e.g., stage, comedy, or vaudeville (see Neale 2000, 170), is modeled on the medium proper of moving images as developed throughout the history of film and television.
As a degree 1 mock-documentary, *This is Spinal Tap* (Rob Reiner 1984) can thus function as a parody of hypermasculinity, as discussed by Plantinga (1998). A critical degree 2 mock-documentary, for example, *Bob Roberts* (Tim Robbins 1992), can seek to “open more space for an audience to recognize the problematic nature of any appropriation of documentary codes and conventions” (Roscoe and Hight 2001, 70) in, for instance a satire over conservative politics and election campaign strategies in the Reagan/Bush era (Nilsson 2013). And a degree 3 mock-documentary, such as *C’est arrive près de chez vous* (Belvaux, Bonzel and Poelvoorde 1992), displays a higher degree of medium-reflexivity, hence challenging the audience to reflect on its own practice of spectatorship.

The system of degrees explains the aim of playing with the discourse of factuality – that is, in the first instance, parody, in the second, critique, and in the third, deconstruction – however, the prerequisite for a film to be ‘mock’ is the recognition as such by a knowing audience (Lipkin and Paget and Roscoe 2006, 24). In all the mentioned degrees, the fictional character of its content is made `obvious`, whether it be ridiculous (as in *This is Spinal Tap*), or feature famous actors (as *Bob Roberts*) or suggests the non-credible thesis that the filmmakers partake in grave criminal activities (*C’est arrive près de chez vous*).

However, Roscoe and Hight also mention a subcategory within the degree 2 classification. These are “mock-documentaries which deliberately look to create confusion within audiences over their factual status, and especially those which effectively perpetrate a *hoax*” (Roscoe and Hight 2001, 72, italics in original). The hoax is thus a mock-documentary that is not recognized as such. Considering the confusion at the Bio Rio event, *Exit Through the Gift Shop* could thus be thought of as a hoax.26 However, since the film is listed as made by a person that has a certain reputation in the historical world, that is, as a street artist, a cultural prankster and an

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26 The close relative of the hoax is the snuff. A famous example is, for instance, *Cannibal Holocaust* (Deodato 1980), where the discourse of indexicality is, as Julian Petley argues, overtly underlined in order to produce a “spectacle of the real” (2005, 178). Petley mentions another film that also many others have seen as speaking to *Cannibal Holocaust*, namely, *The Blair Witch Project* (Sánchez and Myrick 1999) since both films inscribe themselves into the ‘found footage’ subgenre of the documentary form. Where *Cannibal Holocaust* models its aesthetics on ethnographic film, *The Blair Witch Project* activated the shared values of the grainy imperfections of cinema-vérité and direct cinema movements (Fincina Hopgood 2006, 244). From another perspective *The Blair Witch Project* has been discussed as a ‘hoax’, similarly to *War of the Worlds* (Orson Welles, CBS radio 1938) (ibid., 248). This latter has also been discussed in terms of being ‘real enough’ to be believed (Lipkin, Paget, Roscoe 2006, 19; Catherine L. Benamou 2006, 150).
activist, it was easy for me (as a film scholar and a person who enjoys street art) to recognize the deconstruction of the discourse of factuality at play in the film. I would consequently label it a degree 3 mock-documentary. However, it could also be argued that it is a degree 2 mock-documentary in that it ‘opens more space for an audience to recognize the problematic nature of any appropriation of documentary codes and conventions’ (as quoted above). It could also be a parody (degree 1) of the discourses surrounding street art and the artists. Thus, it seemed to defy the unproblematic use of the hoax-classification, or at least make it deficient in answering what was going on in this particular event. In addition it could also be said that, in part, at least, also a straight fictional contract is difficult, since Banksy’s art and actions have been heavily reported and documented by multiple sources throughout the years. Thus, according to the prevalent taxonomy for the mock-documentary, Exit Through the Gift Shop could belong to different mock-categories simultaneously with the documentary category. Whatever it was and did, the only thing clear at the moment of viewing was that it was not recognizable as any one thing. Any one contract was not possible.

Cowie (2011) argues that the documentary film “sets out a contract with its audience by its self-declaration as a documentary” (45). This is to say that the documentary is a documentary because it says it is and the audience accepts it (Roscoe and Hight 2001, 22). Similarly, the mock-documentary comes into existence in the moment when the different degrees of challenges to the discourse of factuality are recognized and identified as such; “[w]hat marks the mock-documentary out from the ‘hoax’ or ‘fake’ is this contract set up between producer and audience” (Lipkin, Paget and Roscoe 2006, 17, italics in original).

On par with underlining the role of the causal receptive chain of foreknowledge-expectation-recognition is Michele Aaron’s claim that the respective spectatorship of the “real and the fabricated” only differs through “opposing kinds of foreknowledge” (2007, 121). Following this, it is not enough for the documentary to offer a contract it has to be recognized through the foreknowledge of a knowing audience to come into effect.

The heart of the matter that is coming into focus is that the importance is not the formalist organization of the documentary film, since this does not differ from that of a mock-documentary, but that all that stands between the collapse of firm boundaries between the factual and the fictional is the recognition and acceptance of a contract of trust, a certain ‘receptive regime’ (composed of the causal receptive chain foreknowledge-expectation-recognition). In other words, it would perhaps not be too much of a simplification to claim that the difference between a non-fiction
film that chronicles a rock musician on tour, such as *Dont Look Back* (D.A. Pennebaker 1967), and a fiction film that chronicles a rock band on tour, such as *This is Spinal Tap*, is not one of form or even content but of the specific receptive regime. Neale (2000) discusses how specific “generic regimes” cue the audience to recognize when the film is a documentary, drama, horror and so forth (157). The use of the term receptive regimes is thus not intended to contradict Neal’s term, it is simply to specify the focus on the receptive context in what could be discussed as producing generic regimes.

Thus, both the mock-documentary and the documentary alike need a *contract of recognition* in order to be set apart. This recognition not only constitutes the genres in reception but is also what attracts the viewer to it as a certain genre, according to Neale (2000, 160). Following this, I would then argue that in addition to being recognized as putting on a play with the discourse of factuality (hence, producing parody, or critique, or deconstruction, according to Roscoe and Hight), such play is activated in order to *enhance* the topics and aims of a mock-documentary film, whether it be to produce laughter (*What we do in the Shadows*, Jemaine Clement and Taika Waititi 2014), critique masculinity (*This is Spinal Tap*), parody work space life and the middle class (*The Office* BBC 2001-2003), parody rock stars (*The Rutles: all you need is cash*, Eric Idle and Gary Weis 1978), produce a fright (as with *The Blair Witch Project*, Sánchez and Myrick 1999), or tingle the sense for gore (as with *Cannibal Holocaust*, Ruggero Deodato 1980), among many things. This could all be done without the play with the discourse of factuality, but it would not make possible strong affections – it would not be as funny, disgusting or scary. Since the characteristics of a “generic regime” are dominated by a “horizon of expectations” (Neale 2000, 166-169), the recognition of the mock-documentary as play gives cause to an expectation in reception of a heightened sensibility, whatever that might be.

In short, it can be said that the recognition of a film as belonging to the realm of the fictional or the factual is intrinsically tied to the know-ability of the audience. Indeed, genres are not only produced in the text, but they

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27 By comparing documentary and fiction film on the basis of Metzian syntax, Kees Bakker (2008) proves that the same syntagmas (compositional arrangements) are present in film on both sides of the documentary/fiction divide.

28 An important indicator of the importance of receptive regimes is that different people can indeed receive the same film differently in different times. Context in this way thus seems key in explaining how reception shapes the classification of the mock-documentary (as well as other films).
also depend on the particular culture within which we are operating [that] Genre is what we collectively believe it to be” (Tudor 2000, 97, italics in original). Such generic belief and knowledge is conditioned by “a body of rules and expectations, shared by filmmakers and audience” (Gledhill 2000, 223). Thus, previous knowledge, expectations and recognition intermingle in a receptive regime to produce a consideration of, for instance, a film as documentary, a representation of our shared historical world, or a film as fiction, a representation of imaginaries (see Elisabeth Cowie’s discussion of the difference between representation of the world or a world, respectively; 2011, 25). In this way, different genres become a matter of common knowledge, “public opinion” (Neale 2000, 159), what “[e]verybody knows” (Deleuze 2004a, 164f). That is, what a documentary is, is considered given: ‘a film about something real’. And what a fiction film is about is equally given: a film about something not real’. Hence, the idea of proper identity is not solely a matter of formalism but of correct reception.

However, in approaching an event through thinking of it as a space where a receptive regime is activated (in line with van Dijck’s suggestion that genre is a ‘space’ where the ‘content’ is produced; see 2009, 43), one needs to acknowledge that foreknowledge and expectation as conditions for recognition are in a constant processual state of becoming. Every new (encounter with a) film extends, refolds, and transforms what we can think and say about any specific generic corpus (Neale 2000, 165). In short, experience perpetually changes the specificities and function of the receptive regime. Since the components of a receptive regime such as foreknowledge, hence expectation, hence recognition are fleeting concepts (i.e., once you know something, the limits of your knowledge, expectation and possibilities of recognizing are expanded), it makes little sense trying to place a correct label on, for instance, Exit Through the Gift Shop so that the reception could be measured as correct or not according to this label. If a person present at the event at Bio Rio were to encounter this film another time it could very well be that it would be recognized as playing with the discourse of factuality, notably because new foreknowledge and expectations were in play. Therefore, my choice in this dissertation, instead of

29 Neale (2000) uses the term verisimilitude, but I prefer presupposition, since verisimilitude has, as Neale himself makes reference to on page 159, been employed in different senses.

30 Neale uses the terminology of both difference and repetition in making this claim; however, he makes them antagonists and not accomplices, as in Deleuze’s philosophy of difference.
working towards the stabilization of boundaries, have been to follow what I see as the cause for spectatorial irritation in reception – the lack of offering a clear way to understand how to receive a film. In other words, the choice has been to focus on the problem of not recognizing and subsequently attempting to find a way forward to methodologically investigate the unfolding of such a fleeting object.

The problem of not recognizing
This problem of spectatorial irritation of not recognizing naturally has its own history. Generally stated, those encounters with films or other mediated content that were difficult to recognize, giving cause to irritation in reception in the 20s, 30s, 40s and so on, were in many instances reterritorialized into ‘knowledge’ of their ‘true identity’, either in their contemporaneity or at later times. When Orson Welles in 1938 produced the radio-theatre episode The War of the Worlds (CBS radio), the newspapers were full of alarmist tales of the mass panic it supposedly caused. Nearly one hundred years later, play with the ‘news bulletin’ format, as is done in many satirical and/or mock-documentary films and televisions shows, hardly causes mass-hysteria. However, there is still anger and discontent following in the wake of unrecognition. One famous example is Forgotten Silver (Botes and Jackson 1995). This film, which maintains the thesis that

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31 See, for instance, Winston’s (2008, 24) discussion of the reception of Flaherty’s The Man of Aran, or Jordana Medelson’s (1996) discussion of Luis Buñuel’s film Las Hurdes (1933). In her article, she shows how this film had an ambiguous reception at the time of its release. Received as a political commentary, a realist ethnography, or an ironic blow at politically conscious urban dwellers, this film displays an explicit “disruptive potential” that was suppressed in a political discourse that tried to use the film as a critical weapon against the dominant rule in 30s Spain. However, this film has later been entered into the surrealist canon, reterritorialized as ‘avant-garde’. Hence, I would argue that the edge of its potential disruptive spectatorial contract (a concept I will introduce and discuss in chapter 3) has been rendered less potent. Similarly, such reterritorializations are happening with the events of spectating that this thesis deals with, as I will discuss in chapters four through seven.

32 As Jefferson Pooley and Michael J. Socolow (2013) maintain in an article in Slate magazine, there is reason to doubt the empirical substance of these tales.

33 Joanna Doona (2016) has shown in her dissertation Political Comedy Engagement: Genre work, political identity and cultural citizenship that young people in Sweden today find enjoyment as opposed to fear in ‘the double mode of engagement’ (the formal challenges to the separate categories of “entertainment” and “information” in the mix of serious and silly) of political satire, such as The Daily Show (Comedy Central 1999-).
New Zealand played a much larger role in early film-production through the hitherto unknown New Zealand filmmaker ‘Colin MacKenzie’, was aired on the national television station, Television New Zealand, in their habitual documentary slot. After airing, the film was revealed to be fictional. The reactions were sometimes fierce, particularly because this program had been received as a moment of national pride (Conrich and Smith 2006, 230). To find out that there was little ground for this specific pride was terribly upsetting for many. People were outraged. Another interesting example is the work of Robert Flaherty, where people “in the immediate circle” already “used the term ‘mockumentary’ when they saw his Man of Aran (1934)” (Bayer 2006, 168). Yet, as Brian Winston (2008) has discussed at length, due to imperialist and colonial structures and discourses, Flaherty’s films and other visual ethnographies persisted as ‘visual evidence’ (2008 [1995], 24f; 189f), although they were increasingly questioned by the scientific communities as increased awareness of the fakery came into view (ibid., 192).

At the center of these conversations lies the discourse of factuality as a guarantee for the stabilization of contracts of trust; if the factual discourse is at work in the documentary or at play in the mock-documentary either way it serves “to reinforce documentary’s privileged position” (Roscoe and Hight, 7). That is, if the play with the discourse of factuality goes unnoticed, giving cause to a perception of a documentary ‘at work’, a certain relativity threatens to overthrow the ‘documentary’s privileged position’ for the viewing subject, shaking the stability of the notions of audiovisual truth and veracity claims not only in reception but also in analytic categories. This could indeed induce a need to index a film correctly – to in fact see the rightfully privileged position of the documentary – in order to stabilize such relativity. In other words, such play with the discourse of factuality can prompt demands for a new and improved taxonomy and for making decisive claims on both the moral and formal boundaries of veracity claims.

Without saying as much, Fiona Otway’s discussion of Exit Through the Gift Shop seems to approach this question of taxonomy. Her solution is to consider how its use of an “unreliable narrator” does not need to be a “falsification of truth” (2015, 3). Instead, she discusses how this film manages to expand the parameters of the documentary (and thus the discourse of factuality that sustains this as a stable category). It is not ‘wrong’ documentary, it is just documentary with a new take.

From the opposite angle, Mill’s (2004) discussion of The Office as ‘comedy vérité takes this instance of blurred boundaries between the factual and the fictional as expanding the realm of fiction. Trying to find a middle
way, Leshu Torchin’s (2008) discussion of a related film, *Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan* (Larry Charles 2006), aims at abridging the either/or conundrum by proposing that this film possibly belongs to multiple genres at the same time (documentary/mockumentary/narrative fiction). However, I would argue that neither of these suggestions offers a move beyond the concept of genre proper and of a taxonomic aim. Since these proposals still work from a representationalist frame, they ill serve my quest of investigating processes, however interesting in their own right.

Offering a valuable turning of the tables, Alisa Lebow (2006) rethinks the construction of differences between the documentary and the mockumentary (a term she prefers because it indicates a coming of age of this form) as a “fallacy” (228), suggesting instead that both forms participate in the “normative coding of reality” (ibid., 229). Lebow suggests that the mockumentary reveals “the impossible ideal” of the documentary (ibid., 231), exposing the “authoritative model [of the documentary]” as inadequate (ibid., 232). This way the documentary and the mockumentary are not considered as opposites but as two sides of the same coin. This informs the way I have addressed the problem in this thesis, but as much as Lebow puts me in the right direction with these insights, she leaves me to find my own path forward, notably to consider how such rethinking of the relationship between the documentary and the mockumentary might be discernable in the space of reception (the question of methodology), particularly when the difference between the two is precisely not recognized.

Because although a scholar such as Lebow or myself can theorize that ‘there are no differences’, clearly the actual affects produced in the reception of films that blur the boundaries between the factual and the fictive indicate that the idea of a difference has not disappeared. This relates to the way expectations function through the receptive regime. As a PhD dissertation from 2011 showed, a central expectation of the mockumentary, is *entertainment* (Wallace 2011).\(^3\) That a film is identified as a mockumentary because it is comedy is also something that the event at Bio Rio confirmed (as well as the data of chapters six and seven). If the criterion for classification is the affective response in reception, such as enjoyment of being entertained, the encounters with the three mentioned films produce events informed through much more complex and contradictory affectations. Whatever they do, enjoyment is not primarily it, although encounters with these films can be said to cause events of ‘laughter stuck in throat’. In such

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\(^3\) This is also supported by my data, as will be discussed through chapters six and seven.
a way, the affections pointed towards the play with the discourse of factuality enhancing not comedy or horror per se but the problem of the relationship proper between the viewing subject and the discourse of factuality (what I will subsequently discuss as the problem of the mock-mode).

Thus, for all the argumentation concerning the possible variations of the mock-documentary corpus that the discussed proposals of Otway, Mill and Torchin offer, I would argue that these still reinstate the dichotomous understanding of the factual versus the fictional. In this they do not take us closer to understanding the unfolding of affective processes in situations where the viewing subject find it difficult to ascertain if the discourse of factuality is at work in order to produce a documentary or at play as in the mock-documentary. These contributions deal with finding ways of recognizing what these blurring films ‘are’, but here, I want to ask how to trace and think about the outcome of not recognizing. Thus, even though I hold Lebow’s suggestion to consider the mockumentary to question the dichotomous and oppositional construction of the documentary as valid and is one that I will develop, this still does not explain how the affections in reception that are dominated by unrecognizing are produced and with what effect.

At Bio Rio, Exit Through the Gift Shop gave rise to equally convinced but contradictory understandings of classification. I’m Still Here was initially screened in the documentary section at the Venice film festival but was later talked about as ‘a performance’ by director Casey Affleck (although he did not use the word hoax or fake) (Cieply 2010). And although the makers of Catfish still adamantly adhere to the viewpoint that their film is “a documentary in that it is something that happened and we filmed it, and none of it is staged or fake” (Warner 2010), encounters with Catfish do produce, in likeness to the two other mentioned films, debate and unease regarding the claims of veracity. 35 The veracity of these films is also a continuous conversation piece, notably in discussions on-line (in chapter 4, I will offer a glimpse into an on-line discussion thread pertaining to this confusion as to how to classify and understand I’m Still Here).

I thus argue that it is important to find a way to speak of these events where unrecognition is central to the affections brought forth without resorting to a reductive boxing as a ‘hoax’ (since this does not really describe what and how affections are produced in reception and with what outcome for the viewing subject). Such a methodological/theoretical way forward needs to allow a consideration of the way that the context of reception, the

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35 This film has, for example, been discussed through its propensity to evoke ”realism”, a politically destabilizing realism (Jennifer Friedlander 2015).
particular receptive regime that is activated through the particular viewing subject, is in perpetual flux (as Neale has pointed out, see 2000). Thus, it needs to be fluid and in Law’s words, perhaps a bit ‘messy’ (2004). To start to produce a thinking of this receptive regime that is slightly more porous and open than the term genre, I suggest that Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of holey space might be useful.

The concept of holey space, which Deleuze and Guattari speak of only towards the end of *A Thousand Plateaus*, points towards “how the forces at work within space continually striate it, and how in the course of its striation it develops other forces and emits new smooth spaces” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 551). The holey space is what conditions porous leakage\(^{36}\) through different spaces, a quality of the non-impervious. Where smooth space is potential and striate space is capture, holey space is combinatory (Frichot 2007). It allows for thinking about the in-between of becoming rather than the actualized and striated but without the complete decomposition of a smooth space.

Therefore, I argue that a way of proceeding is to shift the conversation towards the holey spaces of receptive regimes. I would argue that encounters with films that are difficult to recognize function to pry holes, “intervals” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 158), through the discourse of factuality.

This suggestion also corresponds to the “paradoxes in spectatorship” identified by Judith Mayne (1993). Her contention is that cinema needs to be understood in terms of both dominance and emancipation, both address and reception, and the challenge for an investigation into spectatorship lies in precisely finding a way to work productively as opposed to reductively

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\(^{36}\) In a personal conversation with Barbara Glowczewski (2014), the terminology of the English translation of ‘line of flight’ (French: linge de fuite) was raised. She was concerned that this translation of the French ‘fuite’ (leakage) into ‘flight’ misses the liquid quality of this term. From now on, I will therefore use the term leakage where perhaps *line of flight* would otherwise have been used in English. This is also the preferred term by John Law (2004, 41). I will offer an additional comment on the meaning of this term in the next chapter.
with these inherent paradoxes in understanding “the complicated ways in which meanings are both assigned and created” (ibid., 81).37

Since the concept of holey space accounts for the momentarily becoming of a connective as well as collective compositional space (which is the specificity of context and a situated perspective), it acknowledges the existence of ‘real viewers’ without resorting to granting this as a position of ‘ideal resistance’ or ‘total domination’. My suggestion thus corresponds to finding a way to bridge the paradox that Mayne speaks of, to find a methodological way forward to resolve the tension between the text and the context.

This shift thus puts me in the direction towards finding a methodological approach that is capable of speaking of the function of the text through the context as one and the same object of research, or of ‘the space in-between’ as something that is done in a particular context (which has been informed through the text) but without resorting to the representationalist vocabulary of text and context, text and viewer as two separate areas of research.

Moreover, the move from using the term generic regime towards receptive regime (the triad foreknowledge – expectation – recognition as actualized through the event as a holey space) highlights the importance of the emotive expectation in the reception of a film (laughter, tears, etc). If a

37 In her proposal, Mayne (1993) offers a model of fantasy and negotiation. Another model, one that has been very influential in positing precisely the context of reception as crucial in the production of meaning, is the model of encoding/decoding offered by Stuart Hall (1980). Although a code needs to be shared by sender and receiver alike to be received as sent, Hall shows how there are several different ways to ‘read’ the message, whether in acceptance, opposition or negotiation of the dominant coding (i.e., a coding that supports the ideological hegemony). The codes and conventions of a certain genre can be considered part of the address or coding of a text, but Hall’s theory makes possible a first step of emancipating the viewer from the dominant coding, since the decoding also, in part, makes out ‘the text’ as it is produced in reception. However, since Hall’s theory still solidifies the viewer as separate and independent from ‘the text’, I have not activated this theory in my own argumentation. Moreover, this representationalist underpinning of Hall’s theory posits the receptive ‘space in-between’ as the negotiable space of the viewer, whereas my contention in conjunction with the problem at work in this thesis is that that space needs to be thought of – at least as far as encounters with films that activate a fact/fiction continuum – as an entangled space where both the decoding and coding occur in equal measure. It is not in either the space of reception or in the address of the text that meaning is made, particularly with what pertains to films that are difficult to recognize in the actual specific event of spectating.
viewer is interested in a film because the viewer wants to laugh or cry, these are qualities that one will be hard-pressed to locate in the actual film – different people laugh and cry about different things. This points to the ineffectiveness of investigating the reception of films through the identification of formal similarities and not the experiencing of particular effects. I argue that thinking about the encounter with films that are difficult to recognize as events that bring about holey spaces (instead of thinking of them in terms of establishing genres) allows for a consideration of the affective flux in the reception of the viewing subject. The next section looks more closely at these last terms.

The affective viewing subject

D.N. Rodowick posits that the very “condition of viewing [...] expresses the situation of the modern subject” (2007, 65). Yes, today more than ever, it becomes imperative to think about the political through the prism of visual perception (Panagia 2009, 5; 121). Thus, Davide Panagia (2009) suggests that we think of the contemporary citizen subject as a viewing subject (122). He explains this subject in relation to what he calls narratocracy, which he argues is driven by “the imperative of rendering things readable” (ibid., 12). This means that

“Narratocracy refers both to the governance of narrative as a standard for the expression of ideas and to the rules that parse the perceptual field according to what is or is not valuable action, speech, or thought. That an event may be rendered readable thus gives it a value and enables its mediatic circulation and access to the conditions that constitute its political legitimacy. [...] by insisting on their narrative qualities, we condition appearances to the perceptual expectations of readability, situating them within a system of visibility and sayability that insists on their capacity to make sense” (ibid., my italics).

However, Panagia raises the following question: “given the cacophony of democratic life it seems worthwhile to ask ourselves whether only one mode of address should be given normative priority in political communication” (ibid., 48). Instead, he suggests that it is perhaps in the encounter with what does not make sense – such as a smell, a sound or an affect, in other words, that which does not fit with narratocratic logic – that we have to “reconfigure the requisite conditions for perceptual attention” (ibid., see also note). With the term viewing subject, Panagia thus wants to highlight the need to find ways of working with the politics of affective resonances, and this is how I activate this term here.
Eric Shouse (2005) has offered a pedagogical explanation of affect through juxtaposition with the notions of ‘feeling’ and ‘emotion’. As he explains, feelings are personal and biographical, emotions are social, and affects are pre-personal. This entails that “a feeling is a sensation that has been checked against previous experiences and labelled”; it is thus constituent of the individual experience as individual. In contrast, emotions are a form of social communication (Ibid., paragraph 4), whereas affect “is a non-conscious experience of intensity; it is a moment of unformed and unstructured potential” (Ibid., paragraph 5). Affect thus precedes the actualization of the individual, and that which functions affectively produce resonances independent of meaning and content in a representationalist sense. Instead, it engenders a process of affection, that is, a process of transmission of affect between bodies that can produce an “increase or decrease of the power of acting” (Deleuze 1988, 49).

Since the transmission of affect is about affections between bodies (Shouse 2005), it is important to keep in mind that affect is autonomous (Massumi 2002, 35). It is an ‘echo in-between’ (ibid., 14) and, as such, is not ‘personal’. It is something that is done and exists in relations while impacting the on-going affective-agential constitution of modes (Spindler 2009, 139). Following this, I argue that the meaning of the term agency as having a certain power to influence one’s own conditions of life, as well as change the world near and far, is linked to a representationalist conception of a separate subject and object (this is also how it has been activated in, for instance, theories of the viewer/spectator; see van Dijck 2009, 42; Aaron 2007, 43-47). Here, however, drawing from a theory of affect, agency is considered the affective *intra-active* capacity for an onto-epistemological reconfiguration of the world, “an enactment, a matter of possibilities for reconfiguring entanglements (Barad in Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012, 54). Intra-action indicates something other than ‘interaction’, which presumes the prior existence of independent relata, since it expresses the becoming of the relata that compose the relation through its relationality (Barad 2007, 139f). Intra-action points to relata as not pre-existing relations but as “emerg[ing] through specific intra-actions” (ibid. 140).

This idea of an intra-active affective event thus shifts the thinking of engagement with media as an occupation of different positions of power towards thinking of the becoming of relations as part of an on-going intra-active mediamaterialization. This is to be understood as a particular *mode* defined by “a certain capacity for being affected” (Deleuze 1988, 49f). Agential power is, then, a capacity for affection, which is to say an intra-
active capacity to affect and be affected (Hickey-Moody 2013; Massumi 2002; Deleuze 1988).\(^{38}\)

Thus, the possibility of change of and in the world is connected to the production of increased affections through events of constituting phenomena (Dolphijn, 2014). Such re-arrangement of the concept of agency as capacity for affection hence also holds that the continuous actualization of the world is a collective process where phenomena are constituted through affective entangled practices or intra-active events. Arguing that the Bio Rio event functioned as a holey space through which a network of other events was structurally connected,\(^{39}\) I argue that it was an event of spectating.

The event of spectating

This is thus a site for producing relations of forces that move through the holey spaces of receptive regimes and by so doing increase or decrease the capacity for affection of the viewing subject. Drawing from Foucault’s relations of forces means relations of power, since power…

…”must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallizations embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies” (Foucault 1978, 92f).

As an event, the event of spectating is thus a site for “struggles and confrontations” (Bogue 1989, 67) that “transform, strengthen, reverse” (ibid.) processes of agential reconfiguration.

This conceptual movement from ‘film’ to ‘event’ is resonant of Steven Shaviro’s (1993) “guiding principle” (23) in The Cinematic Body where he posits “cinematic images are not representations, but events” (ibid.). How-

\(^{38}\) This intra-active and productive aspect of social life is also highlighted through other frameworks than the affective-materialist I here activate. Jesper Strömbäck (2009), for instance, describes political communication as an open and co-dependent system where changes in one part of the system produce changes elsewhere in the system (33).

\(^{39}\) Following Whitehead (quoted by Stengers 2011), the event is not only “the specific character of a place through a period of time […] But in discerning an event we are also aware of its significance as a relatum in the structure of events”(44).
ever, where Shaviro offers a theory for the cinematic image, I suggest a
discussion on the event of spectating proper. But although my aim, materi-
and method differ from Shaviro’s, I recognize that I am indebted to his
ground-breaking work that was a precursor in bringing Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s as well as Foucault’s theories to work on, in his case, the cinematic
image, making him (and in this I concur) understand the event as an abol-
ishing of the screen proper as the site of performance. As such, I also un-
derstand the event of spectating as an incorporeal materialism (Shaviro
1993, 24) in that it is about the becoming of materialities.40

What is at stake in an event of spectating is the possibility to embody the
problem in a present situation of reception and through such process of
actualization change the problem and, hence, the eventing of the event
itself. Following Conley it can thus be said that as an event, the event of
spectating “creates collision of ambulant bodies that meet at the center”
(Conley 2000). As such is becomes a possible “any-space-whatever”
(Deleuze 1998, 168; Frichot 2009). This is a space of pure potential “that
no longer even needs to be realized in a body or an object” (Deleuze 1998,
168). It is “a mental image” (ibid., 169). However, although perhaps not
‘in need of a body’ to be realized, an event of spectating may very well
become realized as a particular body, which will suggest that the event of
spectating becomes a particular space. As this thesis continues, I will move
more closely to the spectificites of the events actualized throughout the
process of producing this text. To do so however, I need first to detail
some of the specificities of these, starting with the problem brought forth
at Bio Rio.

The problem of the mock-mode
Thinking about the encounter with Exit Through the Gift Shop at Bio Rio
as an event of spectating leads me to see that the problem of this particular
event was the bringing forth of affections of the nonsensical, which I will
suggest is the problem of the mock-mode. This is to say that it became an
event that exposed the relationship between the viewer and the discourse of
factuality as a “normative coding of reality insofar as it compels audience
belief” either in the veracity of a film or else its fictive status (Lebow 2006,
40 Which is what, I suppose, is the meaning of Richard Rushton’s (2009) suggestion
that a Deleuzian film philosophy enables an understanding “that our engagement
with a film is not a process of becoming conscious of what is happening in a film,
but, rather, our consciousness is formed by what happens in the film” (48, italics in
original). However, the event of spectating is a term that wants to rephrase that
suggestion by exchanging ‘happens in the film’ with ‘happens in the encounter as
event’.
The mock-mode functions as a disciplining of the boundary separating right from wrong. An event of spectating in a mock-mode produces ‘the spectator’ as its “surface effect” (Bogue 1989, 67). Consequently, an event of spectating that produces the mock-mode as problem, notably, by bringing forth affections of the nonsensical, offers conditions for a reconfiguration of ‘the spectator.’

The mock-mode functions to establish ‘the spectator’ as an identity that conforms with the “discourse police” (Foucault 1993, 24), whose form is a constant reactualization of the rules (ibid., 25f). As such, films that are perceived to renew the form of a particular ‘genre’ are reterritorialized into the ‘correct’ territory as long as there is a clear statement of identity according to the rules. In this way, the mock-mode functions to capture power as a relation of correct knowledge and non-queered identity, that is, not in flux but stable and contained, striate (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 535). It becomes an enunciation of an outer limit of the disciplining borders of true/false, factual/fictive. By reinforcing a ‘real’ real as opposed to a ‘false’ real, the mock-mode in this instance functions as a capture of multiplicity, confining the “the virtual, the power of the metamorphosis, becoming” (Lazzarato 2006, 175), producing reality as ‘one’ or ‘another’.

In an event of spectating in a mock-mode, the general postulate of representation is enunciated through the recognition of error and the ‘correct’ identification and in so doing produces a thinking in terms of similarity and resemblance, habit and memory (intertext and the spectatorial foreknowledge of such clues at play). Indeed any practice of classification implies a continuous assessment of resemblances (Deleuze 2004a, 14). And resemblances lead to an idea of sameness and repetition of similar identity. Hence, the mock-mode is a particular power-relation that “determine[s] particular features (affects)” (Deleuze 2006, 63). As such power-relation, the mock-mode make for “practices or operating mechanisms which do not explain power, since they pre-suppose its relations and are content to ‘fix’ them, as part of a function that is not productive but reproductive” (ibid.).

Consequently, the term ‘the spectator’ as an effect of such a process already pre-supposes as well as reproduces the relations of power inherent in a representationalist epistemology. What the event of spectating in a mock-mode produces is thus a continuous dominance over the viewing subject. Because the relations that are stabilized through a mock-moding of correct

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41 Aristotle famously called this recognition, the repetitious reflection of a representation on stage enabling recognition of the representation as being the same as that which it represents (see Deleuze 2004a, 17).
knowledge are not just knowledge of the real but also knowledge of the realness of oneself as a knower, the existential meta-epistemophilia that draws a relation between the knower and what is known affirms not only that there is such a thing as reality but that the knower of said reality exists through the knowledge she/he has of reality.

My argument is thus that events of spectating whereby the narratocratic logic is re-stabilized by the actualization of a mock-mode decrease the affective capacities of the viewing subject through its becoming spectator. However, as Jacques Rancière (2011) argues, emancipation for the spectator is possible by understanding that “the relations between saying, seeing and doing themselves belong to the structure of domination and subjection. It begins when we understand that viewing is also an action that confirms or transforms this distribution of positions” (13). Otherwise put, emancipation, for Rancière, is not only the chance to emancipate one’s ‘reading’, but it is also to understand that being a viewer is to be a particular subject and through this insight become emancipated from the domination exercised in the viewing-subject-as-spectator. 42 This highlights the importance of taking seriously those events of spectating when the problem of the mock-mode is pressing forth, for example, not reterritorializing the mock-mode into a binary affirmation of a fakeness that serves as an affirmation that there is another realm where enunciations are real (as opposed to this one that only looks like it) (this argument is in par with Lebows’ discussion regarding the affirmative nature of opposites, see 2006, 229-232).

Importantly, “[e]very change in film history implies a change in its address to the spectator, and each period constructs its spectator in a new way” (Gunning 1986, 70). The specific event of spectating Exit Through the Gift Shop at Bio Rio indicated that the contemporary ‘period’ possibly ‘constructs its viewing subject’ through an affective becoming of regimes of truths, notably by destabilizing the capacity for reiteration of previously established genres. In other words, the mock-mode was the specific problem of this event of spectating, that is, the event of spectating as a practice of stabilization of a binary notion of truth, regardless of whether the film was received as ‘false’ or ‘true’, became the problem. This offered a possi-

42 This is why I argue that although making a highly valuable contribution to post-structuralist theories of cinema with The Cinematic Body, Shaviro still activates an ‘ideal spectator’. Although it can be argued that Shaviro succeeds in emancipating the affectations of the cinematic image from the “conservative, conformist assumptions –shared by most film theorists – that our desires are primarily ones for possession, plenitude, stability, and reassurance” (1993, 53), I would argue that the viewing subject is not emancipated from being a spectator in this account (see for instance ibid., 56).
bility to think about the relation of power between the viewing subject and the discourse of factuality as an intrinsic part of a tension between dominance and emancipation as an opportunity to unlearn and change something.

As stated, in working with a problem that asks how to think about an event that thwarts the possibilities for recognition and coherent expectation, giving cause for a rethinking of the relation between the viewing subject and the discourse of factuality, one needs to go beyond a representationalist frame. This is why I turn to Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, which begins with asking what it is to think. By this question, Deleuze precisely asks about the function of recognition: is thinking simply recognizing that something we already know is presenting itself in front of us? As in recognizing that “[…] this is a table, this is an apple, this is a piece of wax, Good morning Theaetetus” (Deleuze 2004a, 171)? Or can thinking be considered a creative and productive act that has material consequences, informing the becoming of the world(s), that is, thinking as becoming (not being)? In rethinking the ‘naturalized’ relation between thinking and recognizing, Deleuze’s philosophy makes it possible to conclude the inaptitude in equating a thinking-of-films with a recognition-of-films. Instead, it opens the way towards thinking-of-films with films-as-affection.

Hence, other approaches asking how different films subvert ‘the privileged position’ of the documentary (as do Roscoe and Hight) or strengthen it (as in the case of Otway’s text) or approaches asking how these films are to be understood either as this or that, or possibly many things at once (as Torchin suggests), remains in a representationalist analytic frame. As such, they will not be apt at tracing the affective capacities as produced through events of spectating where the mock-mode is brought forth as a problem. And although Alisa Lebow puts me on the path of considering the dichotomous relationship in theory between the mockumentary and the documentary to be a fallacy, her contribution stops just short of discussing the central concepts of recognition and expectation that I see as vital in prying open the problem of affective response in reception.

Thus, I will here suggest another approach. This deals with finding a methodological way forward in thinking about and investigating the increase or decrease in affective capacities as intra-actively produced through events of spectating where the mock-mode is brought forth. Hence, my approach here will deal with thinking about the flux in the formation (and the consequences of the same) of the relation between the viewing subject and the discourse of factuality. In doing so, I will focus on the practice of recognition and the influence of expectation, as these are navigated
through affective flux and affections, since I consider these key conditions for establishing a stable relation.

By following the problem of the mock-mode as brought forth through the event at Bio Rio there is an opening onto thinking processes of destabilization of the discourse of factuality and, as such, of a destabilization of the viewing subject-as-spectator.

To offer a theoretical discussion of the epistemological regime of stabilization that I argue is in play in the receptive-production of the mock-mode, I will in the next chapter turn to Deleuze’s critique of representationalism and his philosophy of difference. This, I suggest, offers the possibility of a theory and subsequent method assemblage for mediamaterialities, that is, how encounters with media can be thought of as events of becoming of affective-material assemblages.
Chapter 2: Theorizing the method assemblage for mediamateriality

“Being or relating, that is the whole question” (Michael Serres 2007, 224)

So far, I have argued that the specific events of spectating that I will here investigate offer the problem of the mock-mode. In other words, they are events that function as an affective relational space where the particular problem of the viewing-subject-as-spectator is brought forth. This is a subject constituted through the particular aesthetico-political organization of the sense-making logic of narratocracy.

In this chapter, I continue to deepen the theoretical frame for working with this problem. I draw from Deleuze’s philosophy of difference (2004a), but also from his collaboration with Guattari and Claire Parnet (1988-19989; 1996; 2002) as well as other theories of process onto-epistemology, such as the work by Karen Barad (2007) and Jane Bennett (2004), John Law (2004) and Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin (2012). I also draw on reflections on the contribution of Shaviro (1993) and the legacy of apparatus theory (for an overview see Mayne 1993). In so doing, this chapter furthers a thinking of film as event (as opposed to film as object), arriving at a suggestion of a method assemblage for mediamateriality.

Following Deleuze (2004a), it becomes clear how the idea of recognition works to produce repetition as the return of the same (17): ‘this is a documentary, this is a mockumentary, this is fiction, this is fact. How do you know? - I recognize it to be so.’ This operationalization of recognition in reception functions as an on-going constitution of a dogmatic image of thought (ibid., 167), giving the impression that the categories of the factual and the fictive are and have always been somehow stable and separate, that if they appear otherwise, it is because of some fault in the beholder. But this is a misconception that leads astray. It is not that the categories before were stable are now blurred and muddled. I would argue that they have always been in flux (as discussed in the previous chapter) and that the borders between these categories are and have been regulated through regimes of stabilization, of which the regime of truth is the ‘mother-type’ of regime, encompassing the discourse of factuality as a key discourse.

In this view, the regime of truth and the adjoined apparatuses (dispositives) have always been in processes of reconfiguration (as Foucault’s work continuously goes on to prove; see 1993; 1972; 1978), it is just that this is happening at an accelerated pace in the society of control, moving so fast that its contours are dissolving. This gives the impression that the concept of truth is somehow not in play when, in fact, it might even exercise an
even greater force on the system of governmentality precisely in its apparent invisibility. Turning to Deleuze’s critique of representationalism makes it possible to locate thought one step ahead of these processes instead of getting stuck in thinking ‘product’, since his philosophy begins in thinking thinking itself as already a process of individuation (Simondon 1980) and, thence, a regime of dominance and subordination.

Deleuze’s critique of representationalism

In Difference and Repetition (2004a), Deleuze posits thinking as the central question that in the Cartesian tradition of the Cogito has remained presupposed, that is, not asked, since the answer has been considered given: to think is to be - this “everybody knows” (164f). However, Deleuze argues that such a thinking of thinking functions to construct the ‘I’ who thinks as “the most general principle of representation” (ibid., 174). For Deleuze, representationalism thus produces an image of thought whereby difference is subsumed under a “conceived identity, a judged analogy, an imagined opposition or a perceived similitude”, hence also subsuming the idea of repetition as the return of the same, the similar, the analogous and the opposed (ibid., italics in original).43

Such a dogmatic image of thought functions as a regime of stabilization in that something can be bigger, better, smaller or rounder. It is difference as that-which-is-not rather than that-which-is. As such, it functions as a practice of judgment and morality (ibid., 167). This can also be seen as the foundation for the scientific project of taxonomy, classification, identification and evaluation. This is because such representationalism is the epistemological foundation for the logic of narratocracy in that the legitimacy of a sensation, experience or account is valued according to the way it makes possible practices of taxonomy, classification, identification and evaluation. Following this, I argue that also the legitimate position for the viewing subject is to classify, identify, evaluate, in other words, to be ‘a spectator’. However, as made clear in the event at Bio Rio, this position was for some difficult to sustain. Instead of an unproblematic recognition, there were also an affectively charged unrecognition.

Deleuze’s critique of representationalism therefore aims at liberating the concepts of repetition and difference from ‘the crucifixion’ he claims is performed by “the general principle of representation” (Deleuze 2004a,

43 Also, according to Deleuze (2004a) Foucault showed “the double subordination of difference to conceived identity and perceived resemblance” (footnote 7 p. 210).
Instead, he argues, “difference lies between two repetitions” (Deleuze 2004a, 97), which is to say that “in every moment new relations are produced and old ones dissolved” (Spindler 2010, 94). For Deleuze (2004a) the fetters of representationalism, “difference becomes an object of representation always in relation to a conceived identity, a judged analogy, an imagined opposition or a perceived similitude” (174, italics in original). Repetition becomes recognition (of sameness, the identical, the analogous), and difference is conceived as a negative (that which is not). Hereby, recognition serves the principle of identity defining the subject and object alike (ibid., 169). This means that Deleuze’s philosophy of difference exposes the primacy of “the identity of the self in the ‘I think’” (ibid.) as the foundation for a ‘common sense’ in which the object is recognized through the faculties of ‘the subject’ as Cogito. In short, the definition and delineation of the one is intertwined with the definition and delineation of the other, and this interdependency relies on repetition as the same, the similar, the analogous, and the opposed.

To structure his critique of the model of representation (representationalism), which he posits constitutes a dogmatic image of thought, Deleuze (2004a) locates its function through eight postulates (207): 1) the postulate of the principle itself (the good will of the thinker and the good nature of thought); 2) the postulate of the ideal, or common sense; 3) the postulate of the model of recognition; 4) the postulate of representation; 5) the postulate of error; 6) the postulate of logical function; 7) the postulate of solutions (problems being formally defined by the possibility of being solved); and 8) the postulate of the end, the result, knowledge.

With the eight postulates of representation thinking is described as incapacitated, turned infertile and ‘dogmatic’. What is at stake with the 8 postulates is synthesized in “everybody knows...” (Ibid., 165f), that is, thinking as a practice of the ‘common sense’, identifying what exists, as opposed to thinking as the creation of future becomings. The dogmatic image of thought is a loop where a ‘new’ image of thought is an opening into a hyphen, a line, something not yet actual.

An ‘image of thought’ is thus a conditional framework that guides the possibility of creation. Since the dogmatic image of thought rests on the model of recognition, the innateness of common sense and the morality of


45 Translation by the author of this thesis.
good sense as the guarantees of a ‘clear and distinct thought’, this is an image of thought that serves the status quo and the stability of the dominant relations of power, since it starts with its own consciousness of being a just thought. That which disrupts the dominant order is thence conceived ‘in error’, because

“[w]hat is error if not always false recognition? […] Error is only the reverse of a rational orthodoxy, still testifying on behalf of that from which it is distanced – in other words, on behalf of an honesty, a good nature and a good will on the part of the one who is said to be mistaken. Error, therefore, pays homage to the ‘truth’ to the extent that, lacking a form of its own, it gives the form of the true to the false” (Deleuze 2004a, 186).

The model of representationalism is thus a model of morality and judgment that, on par with the regime of truth, parses the true from the false. Similarly, as I will argue, the discourse of factuality enacts the false as the guarantee of the true. Such thinking is thus conditioned through a dogmatic image of thought that “internalizes, perpetuates and reproduces the norms and hierarchies whose genesis and structure it puts on display” (Shaviro 1993, 68).

In contrast to this model, Deleuze (2004a) proposes *repetition as difference*, which is a philosophy of duration that shows how the actualization of virtual attributes of the real is an on-going perpetual becoming (377), that is, how repetitions produce differences. In this way, Deleuze maps a futurity for thought, arguing that thinking is an act of production and not regurgitation.

Contrasting the ‘dogmatic image of thought’, a ‘new image of thought’ “[…] only thinks when constrained or forced to do so, in the presence of what gives cause to think” (Deleuze 2004a, 182). It is a method of necessity, of urgency one could say, and this necessity gives cause to change. Importantly, it is not by changing the model of recognition as such that gives cause to change, but changing the conditions for recognition. It is not to draw ‘a new’ dogmatic image – instead, it is to produce a “thought without Image” (Ibid., 168).

This image of the new comes into effect through a contraction of time whereby time becomes unhinged, “out of joint”, pro-

46 Shaviro is discussing the dogmatic image of thought as it functions through the model of psychoanalytical interpretation and as discussed by Deleuze and Guttari in the later volume 2 of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia: A Thousand Plateaus* (2004).

47 As Jakob Nilsson (2014) has shown, it is not a thought without an image but a thought without an Image, capital I, as in a dogmatic conception of such orthodox Image (98).
producing a caesura through which the repetition can return as “the absolutely new”, which is to say open time onto a futurity (Ibid., 111-113; 132-136).

With the introduction of the three passive syntheses of time, Deleuze explains how the past, present, and future interact to produce the notions of habit and memory as well as the bases for anything new to occur. By contracting time, the first synthesis works by contracting both past and future in a present. Using Hume’s example of the production of a series in “AB, AB, AB, A...” (Deleuze 2004a, 90f), Deleuze argues that the presumption that a B will follow is produced through a relating to past knowledge and the projection of a futurity of outcome. This is, for Deleuze, the “foundation of time” and is contained in the habit (ibid., 101). The second synthesis of time contracts both present and future in a past; here, “the former present finds itself ‘represented’ in the present one”. Both what is and what will come is thus contained in this synthesis, grounding the (passing) foundation (that is the present) and constituting memory (ibid., 102) as a condition for prejudging thought as opposed to producing it (ibid., 197).

The contribution Deleuze makes with Difference and Repetition is consequently both epistemological and ontological. This is because to say that repetition produces difference is to say something about the constitution of reality. He shows that if difference is difference in itself, that is, repetition as the return/arrival of the new, then the ontology of the real is a process of differentiating, of actualizing differences. In such a way, difference in itself is the element of reality, “the object of actualization, which has nothing but the virtual as its subject. Actualization belongs to the virtual. The actualization of the virtual is a singularity whereas the actual itself is an individuality constituted” (Deleuze and Parnet 2007, 149f).

To refer back to the example of the problem, it can be said that virtuals are actualized through processes of differentiation. The virtual is a multitude of differences, whereas the actual is a differentiation (Deleuze 2004a, 230-233). Hence, the virtual is not a non-existent; rather, it is the not-yet-actualized (potential). As such, it is the virtual that allows for a delineation of “the general typology of the problem” (Bogue 1989, 59). Through a process of differentiating, the virtual is thus actualized, falling “like a fruit from the plane [of immanence]” (Deleuze and Parnet 2007, 150), thereby engendering new movements on the plane, in other words, intra-actively changing the conditions of the virtual and thus the actual, and so forth. In short, the virtual is not something that lacks reality but something that is engaged in a process of actualization (as it relates to the location of its ‘real-ing’) (Deleuze 2001, 31).
It could thus be said that the event of spectating is producing difference through repetition. It is a process of different/ciation. Therefore, the opposition of dichotomies, the recognition of resemblance and analogy, and the Idea of identity do not impose themselves on difference. On the contrary, these are all effects of difference in itself as expressed through the production of an event (in this case, an event of spectating). The viewing subject-as-spectator and the film/text are thus surface effects of events of affective different/ciation that, in Serres’ (2007) words, function as a “quasi-object” (225). The quasi-object is “an astonishing constructor of intersubjectivity” that marks “how and when we are subjects” (ibid) (shortly I will give this particular quasi-object the name of the moving-image-body).

As such, the event of spectating has “no subject, only collective assemblages of enunciation. Subjectification is simply one such assemblage and designates a formalization of expression or a regime of signs rather than a condition internal to language” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 144).

Through the first synthesis of time, which is the production of the habitual, and the second synthesis of time, the production of memory, the event produces the subject as an effect, as a projection, as it were, of our expectations, anticipations, wishes, and beliefs as finding form through memory and habit. The subject is what repeats itself and, importantly, what repeats itself through the invention of durable time, that is, the repetition serves to produce not only the subject but also the subject as a temporal being (Spindler 2013, 133-136).

Depending on the on-going de- and reterritorializations of affections, relationalities and connections (the different/ciations of an event) the event of spectating is continuously renegotiating its own limits and capacities, extending a singular point through which reality as a passing effect is produced: “[...] reality is difference, whereas the law of reality, or principle of thought, is identification [...] reality is not the result of the laws which govern it” (Deleuze 2004a, 286). In other words, the identification of reality is not the same as “the physical world” (ibid.), since this is produced

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48 This contribution by Deleuze is indebted to George Simondon (1980), who speaks of this as processes of individuation. For a clear overview of Deleuze’s debt to Simondon, see Andrew Iliadis 2013.

49 This is a ‘real empiricist’ perspective whereby the “world is thereby laid out for the first time to the fullest: it is a world of exteriority, a world in which thought itself exists in a fundamental relationship with the Outside, a world in which terms are veritable atoms and relations veritable external passages; a world in which the conjunction “and” dethrones the interiority of the verb ‘is’; a harlequin world of multicolored patterns and non-totalizable fragments where communication takes place through external relations” (Deleuze 2001, 38).
not through identification but through processes of differentiation, bringing forth the new, the yet-to-come, which is to say, repetition as difference, an entangled actualization of simulacra.

To think about the constitution of the reality of the ‘physical world’, Deleuze claims that the concept of identity is inapt, since it crucifies difference and renders repetitions immobile. The constitution of identities functions as a binary conception of difference (Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012, 129). Thence, this is not an invalid concept, only that its particular expression and actualization of a power needs to be thought of as a passing effect of the difference of repetitions, the way that a difference differentiates other differences as it is in itself is differentiated (Deleuze 2004a, 68).

In this way, Deleuze posits the real as always a becoming-real. Reality as process, not stasis. It is literally “a repetition which ‘makes’ the difference” (Deleuze 2004a, 365). Through this, we can understand that as much as everything is real, everything is also a becoming-other. And if it is a becoming-other, it is simultaneously what it has not yet become.\(^{50}\)

In this, Deleuze’s philosophy functions as a \textit{minor} framework. The terminology of major and minor are used by Deleuze and Guattari to qualify different functions: a major framework is one serving as the standard measure, whereas a minor functions as a becoming-other of the measure. The majoritarian serves as \textit{the norm}, whereas the minor is the “potential, creative and created […] all becomings are minoritarian” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 117).\(^{51}\) Consequently the minor is not a question of size (although the standard measure can become ‘the standard’ by consensual practice of the many); it is rather a question of practicing a destabilization of the major.\(^{52}\) This said, the processes of becoming of both the major and minor are intertwined, and just as power is conditioned on how it relates to potentiality, potentiality becomes power. In other words, potentiality and power are not opposites but rather two sides of the same coin.

\(^{50}\) This is what is implied in the Deleuzian formulation of ‘the missing people’ as those who are not still or not yet (Deleuze 2005b, 208). I will return to this concept in chapter 3.

\(^{51}\) There are numerous proposals for theorizing these major and minor scientific frameworks. Gordon Coonfield (2006), for instance, refers to ‘instrumentalism’ in his analysis of a major epistemological framework and proposes the term ‘machinics’ for a minor rhizomatic suggestion.

\(^{52}\) Hence, it could be said that Panagia’s term ‘narratocracy’ (2009, 13–16). delineates the dominant rule of rendering everything readable, whereas the minor strategy is to expose this narrativization and its political consequences through events of disarticulation.
To follow Deleuze’s invitation to seek out the processes of different/ciation, the minor events and their de-/re-organizations, I will ask what do they do or perhaps more to the point, what is the becoming particular to this event? This approach stands in contrast to a representationalist “search for a clear and distinct” (Deleuze 2004a, 200) solution to the given problems. Instead, it explores “a method of invention” (ibid.) whereby the problem or question is practiced as a “transcendental empiricism” (ibid., 192) in that the condition for thinking is “a condition of real experience, not of possible experience. It forms an intrinsic genesis. Not an extrinsic conditioning. In every respect, truth is a matter of genitality, not of innateness or reminiscence” (ibid., 192). In other words, it is not a question of speaking about but of doing with by producing a relation with the empirical that is necessarily productive, not reproductive or representative. It is to explore doing by doing because,

“crier ‘vive le multiple’ [parce que] ce n’est pas encore le faire, il faut faire le multiple. Et il ne suffit pas non plus de dire: ‘à bas les genres’, il faut écrire effectivement de telle façon qu’il n’y ait plus de ‘genres’ etc.”

[“calling out ‘long live multiplicity’ is insufficient, one has to do the multiple. And it is not enough to say, ‘down with genres’, one has to, in effect, write in such a way that there are no more ‘genres’, etc.”, translation mine] (Deleuze and Parnet 1996, 23).

Hence, in my inquiry, I will focus on how “practices, doings, actions” produce “correspondence between descriptions and reality” (Barad 2007, 135). In short, the problem is of relations, but this has bearing on the question of identity as a particular relation of forces. The problem is the actualization, through events of spectating, of a certain relation of power in the constitution of the viewing subject-as-spectator.

In what follows, I will order the practices, doings and actions that are constitutive of realities through the term mediamateriality. Referring back to an event as the birthing of a problem, it can be said that mediamateriality is the actualizations of the virtual intensities of the problem (as this pertains to the mediated situation). If the mock-mode is the virtual as the subject of the actual, then mediamateriality is the term that refers to the actualized event as an embodied experience, perception, action. It can thus be an object of study as long as the practice of studying it also acknowledged as a mediamateriality. However, the activation of this term in conjunction with other mediated events (other than the feature film that is received to blur the boundaries between the factual and the fictional) will have to be left for other projects.
Mediamaterialities, the becoming of material-affective assemblages

The concept of mediamateriality is offered in order to speak of the becoming of assemblages through mediated encounters. As such, it relates to what Jane Bennet (2004) has called thing-power, which is a function within “some assemblage or other...A thing has power by virtue of its operating in conjunction with other things” (353f, italics in original). Hence, a ‘thing’, in Bennett’s conceptualization is not an ‘object’, as in separate from a ‘subject’, but a ‘world’ of “various materialities constantly engaged in a network of relations” (ibid., 354). As such, the viewing subject is ‘a world’ that, as part of an assemblage, has the power to do different things.

Assemblage is the term used by Deleuze and Guattari to designate a machinic coalition of forces that produce relations and are produced by and through them: “[a]ssemblages are necessary for states of forces and regimes of signs to intertwine their relations” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 79). Importantly, assemblages function as the in-between of layers and strata (ibid., 45). An assemblage is thus a set of agential relations of forces produced by its connections (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 439-441), “the causally productive (machinic) result of the intersection of two open systems, and their properties are [...] only discernable as a result of the intersection of both such systems” (Marcus and Saka 2006, 103).

John Law (2004) phrases an assemblage as “a process of bundling, of assembling, or better of recursive self-assembling in which the elements put together are not fixed in shape, do not belong to a larger pre-given list but are constructed at least in part as they are entangled together” (42). In short, an assemblage is the intersection of relational systems, only noticed in what it is capable of doing, understanding this through the equation 1+1=3.

Drawing from this, a method assemblage for mediamateriality focuses on the becoming of agential assemblages through the production of events of spectating. It focuses on “affect, force and movement [...] how the event unfolds according to the in-between, according to the intra-action” (Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012, 113). In other words, the concept of mediamateriality it is less concerned with the representation in film and more concerned with scrutinizing how events of spectating function to produce processes of subjectifications.

53 In this way, thing-power relates to what Jussi Parikka (2012), drawing from Braidotti, calls process-power (98. See also Braidotti 2006).
At first glance, this aim could be considered resonant of the aim of an influential film theory referred to as apparatus theory. The core concept in this theory is “the cinematic apparatus” (Baudry 2011). As a strategic machine the cinematic apparatus is thought to function in the particular interstices of relations of power and knowledge producing a particular ideological interpellation of the subject. In this conceptualization, Baudry was heavily influenced by Louis Althusser’s seminal theory of ideology and his concept of the ideological state apparatus (1971 [1970]).

However, apparatus theory manifests a stark incompatibility with the concept of mediamateriality, since the cinematic apparatus is considered an external influence on the passive interpellated subject, hence producing a strong dichotomy between the subject and the object whereas mediamateriality highlights, not the cinema as an apparatus, but the event as a becoming of an assemblage of which the viewing subject as well as the fact-fiction continuum (as captured through discourses of factuality, i.e., the ‘documentary apparatus’) enters into compositional connectivity with other assemblages.

Baudry’s text was seminal in the development of apparatus theory but was not the first. The idea that the ‘spectator’ could be theorized as a mental industry of social and psychic factors came to the fore in the aftermath of May 1968 (Mayne 1993, 35; 44). This reading of the relation between cinema-spectatorship and the increase of consumerist culture was a theoretical re-working of Marxist theories of mass-culture, especially those tied to the Frankfurt school (where the cultural industry was considered an apparatus for producing capitalist ideology and capitalist subjects as Horkheimer and Adorno’s (1993) work had stipulated), as well as psychoanalytic theories of processes of identification and subjectification (such as the ensuing work by Mulvey 1975 and Metz 1975).

Apparatus theory thus thought of cinema as an ideological apparatus, that is to say, as producing an ideological interpellation and dominance over the (monolithic ideal) spectator. The three cornerstones of the theory were a) the illusion of agency (Baudry 2011), which entails b) a position of disavowal (Comolli 1980) and, thus, c) ‘the spectator/Subject’ as a site for ideological identification, specifically an identification that is “rooted in (mis)recognition” (Metz 1975). In this sense, Marxist, semiotic and psychoanalytic theories heavily influenced apparatus theory.

In his critique of psychoanalysis as a model in film theory, Steven Shaviro (1993) argues that this theoretical model positions the subject by “propos[ing] a false interpretation of desire and functions effectively to manage and normalize desire insofar as it induces us to regard desire as essentially a matter of (true or false) interpretation and representation”
In other words, he argues that the model of psychoanalytic film theory stratifies and organizes desire. In such way it can be thought to produce a desiring-machine, that is, producing desire along the binary logic of representationalism: “[d]esiring machines are binary machines” (Deleuze and Guattari 2009, 5).

If apparatus theory thus spoke of cinema as the stratification of desire, the concept of mediamateriality aims at speaking of the becoming of assemblages through mediated encounters. This means that it can thus potentially speak of both the becoming as well as the becoming-other of assemblages. In this way it has the potential to function as the force of becoming-other (of the desiring-machine), as what Deleuze and Guattari (2004) call a “war-machine” (388). This functions as “a fundamental indiscipline” (ibid. 395). As Eugene W. Holland has stated (1999, 24), Deleuze and Guattari’s term of the desiring-machine brings together “the normally distinct regimes of libidinal and political economy”. This means that a desire-machine function as an intertwining of desiring-production and social production and a war-machine as a becoming-other of that dominant social order that

“[…] implies a definition of desire (of collective formations of desire) that is fairly disastrous: a flow that has to be disciplined, so that a law can be created to establish control over it. Even the sophisticated structuralist theories develop the premise that one must accept symbolic castration so that not only society but also speech itself and even the subject may be possible. I think that this conception of desire corresponds very well to a certain reality: it is desire as it is constructed and produced by Integrated World Capitalism” (Guattari and Rolnik 2008, 319, italics in original).

The production of desire through IWC thus already in its conceptualization, then, corresponds to its function as a binary force in the system. In so doing, desire becomes ‘castrated’, and the capacity for existing in the world is reduced to existing in IWC as ‘the only world’ alternative, the one to the zero. This designation of separation that sustains the stability of IWC also sustains, I argue, the binary composition of a viewing subject-as-spectator in the right/wrong, good/bad, recognition/knowledge dichotomies. This way the desiring-machine works as, what Deleuze and Guattari calls a “face” (2004, 194) that brings forth a certain assemblage of power. The face “is an affair not of ideology but of economy and the organization of power” (ibid.). In short, desiring-machines facialize mediamateriality, or in other words organ-ize it along a binary logic, whereas war-machines produce a becoming-other of a facialized mediamateriality. Importantly the concept of mediamateriality has the capacity to both speak about indisciplined events as well as produce indisciplined speech.
This way it can be seen how events of spectating where the mock-mode is rendered problematic and the foundation for the viewing subject-as-spectator is destabilized, can function as “war-machines” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 388), that is, as a force of becoming-other of the mediamateriality, that is the composite of assemblages that embody the event, of which the viewing subject is an intrinsic part.

Working with this concept is consequently not to set aside the problem of dominance but rather to see the arena for its practice, not only in, for instance, ‘the ideological interpellation of the cinematic apparatus’ but also in the very idea of ‘the cinema’ as separate from ‘the spectator’, ‘political film’ as separate from ‘non-political film’ etc. Hence, the activation of the concept of mediamateriality is done in the aim of finding ways to reclaim the power of desire as “the will to live, the will to create, the will to love, the will to invent another society, another perception of the world, and other value systems” (Guattari and Rolnik 2008, 318, italics in original). As such, the concept of mediamateriality moves away from film images per se towards images of thought, as these are produced in affective entanglement through events of spectating.

In short, the researcher-subject, the viewing-subject and the film-object are not so much subjects and objects but entanglements of becoming, specific assemblages where intensive singular points are extended relationally, through folds, producing what is here conceptualized as mibs.54 And, as has been argued, these folds “form an acting individuation or a highly specific and remarkable singularization which needs to be determined case by case” (Deleuze and Parnet 2007, 151), where the outcome is always specific (Bogue 2011, 82f).55 As such, it is also always situated in a particular context to which it bears responsibility as well as a need to be responsible.

The aim of thinking about the encounter with films that blur the boundaries between the factual and the fictive and that consequently are received as difficult to recognize as an event of spectating that produce a particular mediamateriality is thus to close in on the problem of onto-epistemology i.e., the becomings of the viewing subject. It is, following Deleuze and Guattari (2004, 480), to place an intense focus on the formation of the world, on forces, and its socius through machinic processes.

54 I thank Ronald Bogue (2014) for an illuminating seminar on the matter of the ‘singular point’.
55 Deleuze and Parnet write (2007, 152), “the relationship of the actual and the virtual forms an acting individuation or a highly specific and remarkable singularization which needs to be determined case by case”.
Hence, a theory for mediamateriality asks of the scholar to disrupt the smooth and contingent, the graspable and well placed. It offers the force to de-situate, displace, destabilize (and by so doing allow thinking to inform the becoming of world(s)). But as so it also demands a response-able practice, both in the taking responsibility for the power-relations that is enacted as well as striving towards a response-able practice that answers back to the way worlds speak back. Using a term offered by Karen Barad (2007), it is thus important to understand onto-epistemology as an “intertwining of ethics, knowing and being” (185), in fact, as an “ethico-onto-epistemology […] because the becoming of the world is a deeply ethical matter” (ibid). Therefore, I will close this chapter with a discussion of the ethics of mediamateriality as an ethics of praxis, what I call a method assemblage for mediamateriality.

The ethics of praxis, transversality of the method assemblage

The ethics of the method assemblage for mediamateriality underlines the need to pay attention to practices in the actual, understanding these to be intrinsic to the production of mediamaterialities as these take part in the becoming of the world and worlds. It is, in fact, to ask of “a relation to the outside, a little real reality” (Deleuze and Guattari 2009, 334), that what can be thought of as ‘the empirical’ is taken as a serious ethico-onto-epistemological matter.

Such a need to turn to practices has been stressed through John Law’s (2004) critique of what he calls “the metaphysical assumptions that Euro-American people tend to carry” when thinking about science or reality, ontology, as it were (24). Law argues that these metaphysical assumptions posit reality as out-there, independent, anterior, definite and the same everywhere, common and shared by all (ibid., 24-26). Moreover, he holds that this founds a moralist idea of ‘proper methods’ as well as a particular version of politics, what could be called a dogmatic image of political thought, in “the idea that unless you attend to certain more or less determinate phenomena (class, gender or ethnicity would be examples), then your work has no political relevance” (ibid., 9). But, as Law goes on to discuss, notably by drawing on the work by STS scholars (science, technology and society) such as Bruno Latour and Annemarie Mol, realities are in fact produced by practices, practices that need to be situated (ibid., 59), and the question of scientific method is consequently a political question. In fact, Law suggests that an acknowledgement of methods as discriminatively enacting realities should be considered “the end of political innocence” (ibid., 148f).
Importantly, this is not to say that ‘reality is relative’; on the contrary, it is to say that ‘reality’ is more than what “a class-politics of ontology” enacting a prohibition against fluid and multiple messy realities would admit (ibid., 149). It is to acknowledge that reality, both in the specific singular and the pervasive plural, is enacted through specific located practices, as repetition as the constant becoming, unfolding, folding, and unfolding of materiality.\(^{56}\) In this way, truths that may appear to belong to the categories of ‘mistake’ and ‘error’ (fifth postulate of the dogmatic image of thought) might appear so because the methods are ‘mistaken’ or ‘in error’.

This realization creates incentives to experiment with methodologies that “resonate in and through an extended and materially heterogeneous set of patterned relations [if it] is to manifest a reality and a presence that relates to that reality” (ibid., 148).

In other words, it is to acknowledge practices as constitutive of realities and, consequently, to deny an ‘untangled’ position for the viewing subject as well as the scholar. Instead, it is to point to the situated perspective of any knowledge or vision. In her seminal essay, Donna Haraway (1988) argues against, what she considers, a representationalist conception of ‘objectivity’. She argues that objectivity is not a vision from no-where but from some-where, and ‘truth’, in extension, is the outcome of an acknowledgement of this. Reality, truth and objectivity are seen not as relative but as situated, partial, enacting realities, that is to say, connective, productive entanglements of matter. In other words, knowledge or truth are never universal all-encompassing generalities, disembodied as a ‘view from no-where’ that claims “the power to see and not be seen, to represent while escaping representation” (ibid., 581). Knowledge and truth always constitute “a vision from somewhere” (ibid., 590). Hence the concept of objectivity as grounded in the idea of exteriority is not available. Instead, objectivity needs to be thought of by understanding ethics as an ont-epistemological praxis.

This is to take “the side of the idiot as though of a man without presuppositions” (Deleuze 2004a, 165). To practice what could be called a Socratic ‘ethics of the idiot’,\(^{57}\) knowing that whatever is known is never an absolute nor a relative, since knowledge, reality, truth is always grounded in a situated specific material location.

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\(^{56}\) To reference this, Deleuze (2004a, 81f) uses the term simulacra. Simulacra is thus not ‘illusion’ or something ‘void of meaning’; rather, it is a term that renders the use of terms such as original and copy meaningless.

\(^{57}\) In a presentation at minisymposium Frida Beckman (2013) also addressed the conceptual persona of the idiot as a point of entry into the methodological question.
This, then, is an ethics of response-ability (Barad in Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012, 55) as well as responsibility to causal chains, as these are always entangled with one’s own practices as they enact agential connectivities structuring the onto-epistemological becoming of existence. I believe this ethics to have the capacity to function as an inoculation against both fact-resistance and blind obedience towards the Fact (as produced through expert/authoritarian speech), notably since it grants knowledge a body, affection and story. It is ‘what we know as far as we know’, acknowledging that ‘we’ are always a composition of modes in a multiplicity connected through entangled webs of material relations (of power).

In methodological terms, the acknowledgement of an ethics of the idiot, of a situated perspective, therefore needs to start with the acknowledgement of concepts, such as the ‘I’ who speaks, the ‘what and who that knows’, and ‘the real, the true, the fake and the material’, as already imbued with a certain particular meaning that in itself functions as a productive cluster of relations of power. This is to expose the centrality of how-one-does in the what-one-does. In fact, whatever conclusions one might arrive at, these are already presupposed in the concepts and methodological as well as theoretical “cuts” (Barad 2007, 148). To then stake out a direction for the praxis of a theory of mediamateriality is to work through ‘transversal cuts’, that is, from within a territory in order to other it.

Transversality is a term that I take from Guattari (1984). It indicates the praxis of moving through planes and fields and territories in such way that connections between multiple levels and meanings are made possible (18). In other words, transversality is to materialize minor paths through a major territory and by so doing changing the possible connections and thus also the very plane, landscape, territory.

One suggestion of how to practice transversality comes from John Law, with his proposal to practice method assemblages. This means to find “a way of talking that helps us recognise and treat with the fluidities. Leakage and entanglements that make up the hinterland of research. This would allow us to acknowledge and reflect not only on what happens in laboratories or in the offices of social scientists, but also in the missing seven-eighths of the iceberg of method” (Law 2004, 41)

For Law, “if we attend to practice we tend to discover multiplicity” (ibid., 61), which makes visible and thus possible the becoming-other of reality (change) (ibid., 66). To practice a method assemblage is thus to produce a performative, or generative, transversal passage through a hinterland of research or a “crafting and enacting the necessary boundaries between presence, manifest absence and Otherness” (ibid., 161). The hinterland
“defines an overall geography – a topography of reality-possibilities” (ibid., 34). I will here call this a territory, and a transversal passing will ‘unearth’ the territory, making it other. To practice a method assemblage for mediamaterialities is thus to produce events and assemblages (while understanding this an intra-active practice), which makes the method assemblage function rhizomatically (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 23) “composed not of units but of dimensions, or rather directions in motion.” As such, the method assemblage works schizoanalytically, warping and transforming the onto-epistemological conditions of the object (Berressem 2011, 181; Biddle 2010, 18). Its aim, thence, is “know[ing] how a revolutionary potential is realized” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 377).

The praxis of transversality requires interventions from the outside (Shaviro 1993, 77), setting up a rhizomatic connectivity that produces deterritorializations inside (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 11). In methodological terms this means the creation of concepts as the becoming (-other) of an assemblage. This is also why the totality of conceptual proposals of this dissertation needs to be understood as part of the method assememblage. Since practices produce realities, it is by practicing the method assemblage that the embodiment of the concept can come forth. It is by working creatively with concepts, to experiment with deterritorialisations as a methodology where the concept is part of a “double articulation” of materiality (DeLanda interview in Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012, 39). Where the concept can speak the event and the event can become embodied through the concept.

In other words, the concept is a practice - not a noun that denotes something external to what it make possible. This is also why the conceptual development of the method assemblage will continue to unfold throughout the whole of this dissertation. In the next chapter I will first turn to present and discuss two concepts that are central to the practice of the method assemblage for mediamateriality: the moving-image-body and the spectatorial contraction. This will make it possible to perform an experimental reception study, the outcome of which will amount to a conceptual expansion of the method assemblage for mediamateriality in chapter eight.
Chapter 3: Concepts of the method assemblage for mediamateriality

“That we refuse the dualism between the real and the unreal, between realities and fictions, thinking instead, in terms of degrees of enacted reality, or more reals and less reals. That we seek practices which might re-work imaginaries” (Law 2004, 139)

In this chapter, I develop the method assemblage for mediamateriality through the concept of the moving-image-body (the mib) and the spectatorial contraction. These concepts, I argue, are capable of responding to the questions of the birthing of relations of power as well as the flux of their actual- and virtualizations as these pertain to the specificity of the events of spectating in a mock-mode.

The mib refers to the particular mediamateriality of the event of spectating. It is thus an assemblage, or ‘body’, of differences in expressivity and power and different agential capacities, i.e., capacities to be affected and to affect. These are thus formed through the flux of becoming of desiring-machines, war-machines and other-machines. The spectatorial contract is a measure to trace the on-going contracting of relations of knowledge and, successively, the unfolding of processes of subjectification, helping us think about the attributes of an event of spectating and the mibs made actual. I argue that these concepts are attentive to “the connections between different things that come to constitute an assemblage” (Ringrose and Coleman 2013, 125).

Since ‘the concept’ is what “apprehends the event, its becomings [...] the concept has a power of repetition that is distinct from the discursive power of the function” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 158f). In other words, I argue that through these concepts, the method assemblage for mediamateriality underlines the value of the active creation of concepts as “a

58 As I started working on this thesis, I had difficulties coming to terms with the prevalent concept of ‘text’ in film theory; however, ‘film’ was not a working term either, considering the changing media landscape and the proliferation of countless platforms for the production, distribution and display of audiovisual content. What a film and other audiovisual contents can do is possibly done in several locations, although the change of location changes the context of reception and, hence, the doing. The mib became my answer to the question of how to work with a concept that was not exclusive to a particular context, such as ‘cinema’, or material, such as ‘film’, nor oblivious to the affections of a context nor the materiality of an event.

59 What Deleuze (2005a, 108f) spoke of as the affection-image, thus, an image of pure expression and potential I therefore think of as event of expression and potential.
way of responding to the given, to experience, and is thus linked to the notion of the event” (Braidotti interview in Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012, 29). In fact, I hold that these are concepts that need to be practiced to become fully actualized. This makes them open and fluid to the specificity of different mediamaterialities, different events of becoming of agential assemblages. In this way, I would argue that the concepts of the method assemblage, such as the mib and the spectatorial contract of this chapter, are embodiments of the problem that gave birth to them. This means that they also correspond to the ethical imperative of a response-able and responsible practice. That is to say, as concepts they have the capacity to respond in the actual to the virtual, they make it possible to trace the materialization of affect. This makes possible, I argue, a responsible writing practice in that it is general in principle but always specific in practice.

The moving-image-body
Just like a human body can jump high or low, run fast or slow, a mib can have a strong or weak capacity for affection, it can return difference as the same or perhaps as difference in itself, it can produce different worlds populated differently. The mib is the combined unconscious and conscious increase/decrease of affection, the reconfiguration of relations of forces through an event of spectating. It is what a certain milieu, a relationality of forces, as folded (contracted) through an event of spectating, can do. The word ‘body’ indicates a non-anthropocentric body, it is “never your or mine. It is always a body” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 182). As such, the mib is a “schizoanalytic” concept in that it “concerns the analytis of self-organizing machines” (Barressem 2011, 181). That is, the mib rests on an understanding the body as a set of relations between elements that is “largely made through relations with others” (Hickey-Moody 2013, 83). In other words, the mib is an affective self-organizing machine that is informed through connectivity with other assemblages. It is a world, a milieu that designates the subject, “since without it, [the subject] would not be a subject” (Serres 2007, 225). In short, the mib is constituted through relations produced through an affective folding.

In the documentary Between the Folds (Gould 2008), scientists and artists, mathematicians and artisans passionately explain their fascination

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60 See also Hillevi Lenz Tagushi (2016) on how to practice the concept as method.
61 Similarly Barbara Kennedy (2002) has spoken about the “becoming-woman of the cinematic” which is thus a related cousin of the mib (see 84-107).
62 See also Gordon Coonfield’s (2006) proposal for a machinical thinking that begins in the middle (292f).
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with the art of paper folding called origami. From simple to infinitely complex forms, the participants in the film expound on the metaphysical, technical, scientifically revolutionary potential of this simple art of folding paper. What becomes apparent as the film progresses is that what the folding entails is in fact an actualization of shapes and forms already present virtually but actualized in the process of folding. In such a way, it can be said that the fold itself produces material form at the same time as the ontology of form is shown to be ‘nothing’ more than the process of becoming. There is a relationality on a plane of immanence, where “[t]he actual falls from the plane like a fruit, whilst the actualizations relates it back to the plane as if to that which turns the object back into a subject” (Deleuze and Parnet 2007, 150). Hence, there is no individuality as such, there is only a process of individuation, and in this process, the ‘actual’, as in a specific fold, is an ephemeral form, since it passes in the present, whereas the virtual forms are eternal. But the actual form, the fold, produces a new memory, changing the virtual forms and in turn consequencing the process of actualization. The fold is thus a concept that explains subjectification as a process of expressing specificity in a multiplicity ad infinitum (O’Sullivan 2010, 107f).

The fold as a concept is thus related to this two-way relationship between the actual and the virtual, and the mib is a ‘form’ produced through foldings, that is, through specific processes of individuation. As such, it is capable of following the flux of becomings, focused as it is on what the process makes possible in terms of happenings and actions and not what individuation might be a present ephemeral form.

Having said this, the mib as a concept is not a generality. One mib cannot speak other events, it can only speak its own locus standi, although this, as an interval connecting holey spaces, can connect with other mibs, since a mib is something that is done, then and there, here and now. As an affective assemblage, the mib is “[…] an enactment, not something that someone or something has” (Barad 2007, 178). It refers to a specific set of relations that generate specific passing effects. Importantly it is not an aggregate of part that can be taken apart and put back together. There is no before, there are only processes of continuous becoming. It is a movement, not a jigsaw puzzle. The passing effects feed back through the eternal return so that the virtual real (which will be actualized through affect) now is other, new. As I will subsequently discuss in chapters four through seven, the mib is therefore produced through an (extended) event that amounts to an affective intra-action. It comes into existence through the relations produced in the event of spectating. Thus, the categories of subject and object are actualized as a (machinic) result of producing difference (Marcus and
Saka 2006, 103; Barad 2007, 120; Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 79). And as much as these are actualized, they are re-actualized, and re-actualized, and re-actualized...

For Deleuze and Guattari (2004), this process of re-actualization can be transmitted through the concept of ‘becoming’. Becoming is not a succession or progression; rather, “[b]ecoming produces nothing other than itself [...] [w]hat is real is the becoming itself, the bloc of becoming, not the fixed terms through which that which becomes passes” (262). To become is thus not to become a subject (fixed term) but to function through a composition or assemblage (ibid., 78f). And this assemblage can, given other connections, relations and affective actualizations, become-other, thus producing other functions. Thus, matter is not essential, matter is not stable, matter is not, but matter does and through this doing becomes...and becomes. The moving-image-body is thus a realization of relations and intensive connections, “an evocation of emergence and heterogeneity” (Marcus and Saka 2006, 106), that is, an affective unfolding of virtuals into singular actuals. By definition, it is thus the effectuation of particular modi or a particular modus, that is, a fleeting phenomenon, a passing effect, however material its expression (Fredriksson 1999, 176). This means that the viewing subject, as an ontological modus, “is always in the process of entering into a set of relationships with other modes”; consequently, “to be a mode is, in turn, to mode-ify and be modified” (Bennet 2004, 353).

The mib as concept thus points to the continuous modifi-cation of the viewing subject and ‘what it can do’ and as such, it is always specific and located. In the following chapters a variety of mibs will become enunciated through analytic activation of the method assemblage. For example there will be an embodiment of a mi-boo! and a mib-what? and also a mibwo to just mention some of them. The point is that the mib as concept speaks to the specific actualizations through events of spectating, hence every event possibilitates a unique mib.

The concept of mib is therefore to be understood as a conceptual utter-ance, that is, a word that express its function in the specific location where it is put to work. In other words, the aim is to produce sense through non-sense, following Deleuze’s suggestion that “There is only one kind of word which expresses both itself and its sense - precisely the nonsense word: abraxas, snark or blituri” (Deleuze 2004a, 193).

Importantly, to investigate what it is that the mib can do, it needs to be understood through its “tendency to maintain and maximize the ability to be affected” (Deleuze 1988, 99), the active search for affirming and in-
creasing the power to exist. Spinoza holds that events that increase ‘sad’ affections decrease the capacity of affections (causing reactions), whereas events that actualize ‘joyful’ affections give cause to an increase in capacities for affection (creative compositionality). A condition for joyful affections is thus that the affection is adequate. When an affect is adequate, its characteristic is clear, its function visible and distinct (Spindler 2009, 177). For an affection to be adequate, however, it needs to ‘agree with the mode’ (Deleuze 1988, 103) lest it overpower the mode, giving cause to a decrease in affection, compositionality, power to act.

If an affect exceeds the power of the body, or if only a part of the body but not the whole of it is increased in power, that affective intra-action might lead to a decrease of that body’s power. Affection gives cause to an intensive relation, which, depending on the extensity of the body, might produce more or less power for that body.

Events of spectating individuate modes. The mib is a mode that becomes through compositional connectivity with a viewing subject (as spectator or other). Every mode (body, entity) is a singular form of the same substance (Bennett 2004, 353) and is, as such, individuated through “on-going, open-ended, entangled material practices” (Barad 2007, 168), such as events of spectating.

Following this, the intensities/virtuals, relations and extensities/actuals that produce the mib and that both affect and are affected by the mib need to be detailed and investigated in order to know the action, the agential capacity or the body’s capacity to increase or decrease, to affect and be affected. The body can become increasingly capable of affecting and being affecting as it is becoming increasingly complex, or it can become shut down, closed off, emptied out and, as a result, decreasingly capable of affecting and being affected (Spindler 2009, 156). It can function as a desiring-machine and reterritorialize the leakages, or it can become a sieve-machine leaking in all directions at once.

The difference between different bodies is thus not one of judgment but of function (such as capacity for affective entanglement). Consequently, different bodies are able to respond differently. They express different response-abilities, as I will go on to describe in chapters four through seven.

**Spectatorial contractions**

To find a way to think about how confluences of forces change the unfolding of a mib, I take the spectatorial contraction as a tool for the assessment

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63 Following Spindler (2009) this is what Spinoza call conatus, the momentum of existence that he considers linked to the capacity for affection (134f).
of affective mobility and minor potential expressed through the becoming of assemblages in an event of spectating. A spectatorial contraction can produce repetition as an eternal return as well as a difference in itself, as a ‘crucifixion of difference’ (Deleuze 2004a, 174). In short, this concept corresponds to the aim of tracing how difference is contracted in relation to an event of spectating.64

I will interchangeably use the shorter version of ‘contract’ understanding this to be what happens through a contraction. The term spectatorial contract is thus used in an expanded notion, reaching beyond an idea of the consensual practice of two separate units (the ‘spectator’ and ‘the film’) to and instead consider a contract the result of a contraction.65 A process of contraction occurs when a viewing subject starts his/her ‘inferential walk’ whereby he/she draws conclusions regarding what he/she is seeing based on previous knowledge (Eco 1984, 32). In this way, the viewing subject is always already present in the film, since it becomes through the practice of reception. The film, regardless of fiction or documentary, enacts a series of persuasive acts in order to realize the spectatorial contraction.

On a first level, the contract enables one to ascertain ‘who gets to speak’ in the Foucauldian sense (Foucault 1993), that is to say, where the power lies to decide the true from the false or the good from the bad, the right from the wrong, the superior from the inferior.66 Secondly, when a certain

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64 Although I develop this concept through Deleuzian philosophy I am greatly indebted to Roscoe and Hight (2001) for making the contract between the filmmaker and viewer central in their argument about the mock-documentary (22). In many ways I have developed my problem through engagement with their writing, attempting to not so much to go against as adding and filling in the blanks.

65 The terminology of ‘spectatorial contract’ is also used by Nikolaj Lübecker (2015) in his work on what he calls “feel-bad films” which he suggest “frequently offer a form of generic subversion that places them between the art film and popular cinema. [...] in the purest examples of feel-bad - the intensification of the feel-bad climate is so radical that the spectators begin to worry where things are going. [...] about the nature of the spectatorial contract” (2015: 3). Here however, Lübecker is focusing of the discomfort that is produced through a diegesis that give rise to unpleasant emotions such as Elephant (Van Sant 2003) and Dogville (von Trier 2003) and not films that blur the boundaries between the factual and the fictional specifically as I do here. Nevertheless I belive our work functions complementary if not overlapping, since also Lübecker centers on the spectator (albeit an ‘ideal’ spectator) and the notion of recognition (although not through Deleuze) and de-stabilization (although not through affect).

66 These ideas of morality and judgment are, as we have seen, consistent with the dogmatic image of thought and relate to the first postulate of the principle itself (the good will of the thinker and the good nature of thought).
contractual practice (hence, the specific power-relation related to that specific contract) can be purported to be produced (spectating film A produces a sense of something real, spectating film B produces fear, spectating film C produces laughter), the contract functions to assign an agreement. This is done through determining the specific event as rightfully produced according to the dogmatic image of thought and the morality and judgment of thought inherent in this image of thought.67 The contract thus offers the possibility to assert where and how such an image of thought is disrupted or else sustained.

The spectatorial contraction is thus a term that contains the operationalization of the syntheses of time as these are put to work in different events of spectating, and consequently, it is a conceptual understanding of the practice of spectating as a productive experiment.68 The seriality of events of spectating, inescapable in today’s omnipresent audiovisual landscape, “expresses states of change in the present” (Rodowick 1997, 142). Through the repetitions of events of spectating, differences in contractions produce differences in spectatorial relations of power. Consequently, the capacity for affection changes, making possible extensions of changing relations of power that enable processes of subjectifications that are productive of reality. This has political ramifications, considering that how we produce the real, as well as how we understand this production, has a bearing on the way we perceive of our own power to affect this world. How we come to understand where the power ‘lies’ (if it ‘lies’ anywhere to start with) and thus ‘who’ can ‘have’ the power contributes to what it is that we think that we, as a collective body, can do. The problem that my proposal of spectatorial contraction answers to is consequently the process of subjectification/de-subjectification of the viewing subject through the spectatorial contraction of time, which is understood as producing relations of power, possibly increasing or decreasing the capacity for affection (consequently enabling or disabling the flow of the wider existential territories of which the event of spectating may or may not produce flow or ebb; this will be further discussed in chapter eight).

67 That is to say, in what way the mib of an event is contracted through a dogmatic image of thought reasserting a Platonic separation of a model and copy, an Aristotelian division of genus, a Hegelian negativity (something being what it is not) and the essentiality of Leibnitzian monads. For a specific discussion of these thinkers, see Deleuze 2004a, 80; 41; 55; 56, for instance.

68 In this way, understanding experiment to be the productive outcome of experience. As such, the immanence of the event of spectating is its constitution of what Deleuze (2001) calls ‘a life’ (28).
Thus, a specific spectatorial contraction founds time in habit, grounds time in memory, or disrupts the first and second passive syntheses and leaks time onto the outside, making time out-of-joint.

To speak of contractions in the first two syntheses of time, I propose two terms that are the flipsides of each other: the doc- and the mock-contracts. I will begin to describe the doc-contract.

**First contract of stabilization, the doc-contract**

The first contract constitutes a dogmatic image of thinking the film/text as an anterior and exterior object of representation and the viewer a separate and external subject. It follows that the real as such is rendered an anterior object, which is thought of as merely re-presented, signaling a present that is instantly a present past (the second synthesis of time). In the conceptualization of repetition as the return of the same, the similar, and the analogous, the doc-contract posits that the agency of the subject resides in the capacity to recognize and accept what the object (the film) claims to be. This is the contract of trust already mentioned in chapter 1.

Considering that the right to define lies within the object, the doc-contract is neither a contract of equal status nor a contract awarding the possibility of agreement. It is a contraction of existing and prevailing relations of power, of status quo, it is a contract of totalizing judgment. Here, dichotomies are a prevalent measure to understand the political potential of expression. Repetition is understood in terms of recognition. The human is the Subject, according to the postulates of the *Cogito*, that is, a being naturally capable of recognizing the right and good from the false and bad. Films, which through the system of genre might be labeled documentary, action, drama, you-name-it, can all potentially provide the doc-contract. Here, the real is simply already existent, and as a contract, it is naturalized into the prevalent power-relations at work in the IWC, since the foundation of such ‘realism’ claims to be external to practices of producing it.

Since almost any film conforming to the system of genre is offering what I call the doc-contract, I offer no specific examples here. These films simply say: you know me already, and there is no space to produce me. The ‘people’ are already here, and I am already full. There are no leakages; the affective intra-action is rendered difficult. The available plane for flow that this contract offers the subject is through the ‘black hole and white wall’ of a representationalist frame, producing “[a] single substance of expression” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 198-200).

This contract thus produces folds and cuts along the habitual lines of movement, repeating the memory of other times these lines had been folded. It is thus a continuous re-instatement of the already-known, already-
folded, already-cut, although it is performed anew in a succession of
events. In chapter 1, I quoted Elisabeth Cowie (2011) speaking of the doc-
umentary as a film that “sets out a contract with its audience by its self-
declaration as a documentary” (45). The doc-contract activates such a
relation of power and knowledge, where the viewing subject unquestiona-
ibly accepts the self-declaration of the object.

**Second contract of stabilization, the mock-contract**

If the doc-contract is a contraction of acceptance of unproblematized iden-
tity, then the mock-contract is one of recognizing a problematized identity,
but in the end, they both reiterate a representationalist frame. In both cas-
es, the viewing subject stands in the either/or – accept or deny, be correct
or not, recognize or be in the dark, be privy to Knowledge or be ignorant.
Either way, the either/or logic prevails. As such, both contracts actualize a
representationalist mental ecology whereby thought is measured as correct
as long as it conforms to what is already known.

But where a doc-contraction sets up a relation through the event of spec-
tating as one of acceptance, the mock-contract is one of a more active pro-
duction of said relation of power and knowledge. It activates a playful
deconstruction of the discourse of factuality, and in extension the relation
of trust between the viewing subject and the same. This way the mock-
contract offers a certain amount of equality, since it demands intra-action
through the event for the contract to come into existence. In fact, as stated,
without an intra-action, the contract will remain a doc-contract. The intra-
action is performed through recognizing a formalist discourse of factuality
in conjunction with a narrative that is fictive, that is to say, recognizing an
intentional de-organization. The fictive nature of the narrative is often
based on this being in a total clash with rational knowledge since the sus-
tainability of argumentations is highly impossible due to overwhelming
empirical evidence to the contrary.

As such, it becomes quite difficult to produce a doc-contract through an
event of spectating *Trollhunter* (Øvredal 2010), since the idea that trolls
exist is difficult to sustain. And few will contract *Conspiracy 58* (Lövstedt
2002) in a doc-contraction, since the documentation of the world cup in
soccer in 1958 is vastly available. In a film such as the classical mock-
documentary *This is Spinal Tap*, formal requirements of the discourse of
factuality are used in constructing the story of the fictive rock band ‘Spinal
Tap’. The technique of using interviews, talking heads and direct address,
as well as sequencing ‘the ordinary events in a day’ of the members of Spi-
nal Tap and parodying sequences from the already mentioned *Dont Look
Back* (which portrays Bob Dylan on his 1965 tour of England), together
offer a contract that “asserts that what it presents is much like what we conventionally see in documentary” (Lipkin, Paget and Roscoe 2006, 23).

Through exaggerations of a playful nature, of both content and form, This is Spinal Tap asserts that it is actually not a documentary proper. This playfulness is importantly carried out tongue-in-cheek unless it will be understood as a missing-contract, as I will soon discuss. The recognition of the contract is key, but where the folds and cuts through the doc-contract are produced seamlessly, here, there is a meta-dialogue pertaining to the practice of folding and cutting. Such a meta-dialogue can in itself be conducive for further folding onto missing contracts, but in itself, such a dialogue merely reasserts the ‘natural thinking’ as in ‘recognizing and identifying’ and thus functions as a subjectification consistent with a dogmatic image of thought. Thus, the particular persuasion put to play through this contract, as it is received as such and accepted as legitimate (as is done in the case of This is Spinal Tap), reifies a mental ecology that consolidates prevalent power-relations. In contrast to the doc-contract, there is increased flow, withal a loop, a return of the Same and the Similar. There is thus flow but no leakages. The flow is steered through the stratifications of the desiring-machine. Therefore, the mock-contract can start out as (what I will shortly explain as) a missing-contract before it is recognized and reterritorialized through a mock-contraction.

For example, Animal Planet’s 2-hour special entitled Mermaids, the body found (2011) was produced in the form of a typical expository television documentary with talking-heads and its “impression of objectivity and well-supported argument (Nichols 2001, 107). However, except for the press-release (Couperstein 2011), it was nowhere indicated that the narrative was fictional (i.e., ‘mermaids are not real’). For those not reading the press release, the fact that Animal Planet frames itself as a television station focusing on programming of our shared natural world could produce a confused sense of the factual or fictional nature of the narrative (Shiffman 2013).

As already mentioned, such a sub-group in the mock corpus has, by the prevalent theory on the matter, been considered as comprising ‘hoaxes’ (Roscoe and Hight 2001, 72) by not enabling a ready identification of its generic identity. However, thinking about this through my method assemblage enables a re-evaluation of this idea of the hoax as error. If we only know what a body is by looking at what it does, we clearly need to understand that the doc-contract of these films, which do not have ‘legitimate’ factual content to go with such a contract, are making possible another doing than had it been a mock-contraction or a coherent doc-contract. As such, I claim that a mock-moment may have occurred, although the mib
remains intact in its organ-ization (as the notion of the existence of mer-
maids is cognitively defeated). The mock-contract offers conditions for a
production of a mib where a certain intra-action produces flow between
attributes but where the virtuality of the becoming-real of the mib is reter-
ritorialized onto the ‘proper’ channels designated for ‘flow’. No leakages
are offered, but the flow may have enacted a certain porousness in the
material (the mock-moment), making the event of the missing contraction
more possible in future extensions of events to come. As such, certain
events of spectating might have offered conditions for a missing contract in
a particular time and place, whereas the same film, but in another event, is
recognized and identified through a mock-contraction and through this
clogging of the previous leakages.

Moving-images, which signals these meta-levels – whether comic paro-
dies, classic mockumentaries, pastiche horror, DIY-videos on YouTube, or
ironically enacted ‘reality-TV’ forms similar to The Office (BBC, 2001-
2003) – can all possibly be understood as enacting the mock-contract (and
some can be seen to have initially offered the missing contract69). Whatever
the degree of mocking (following Roscoe and Hight) that is going on in a
certain film/audiovisual material, the contract is a mock-contract as long as
its fictional nature (even though it might range from obvious to discrete) is
received and thus rendered docile, stabilized, non-threatening.

This is noticed for instance in the case of the degree 3 mock C’est arrive
près de chez vous (Belvaux, Bonzel and Poelvoorde 1992), a detailed de-
construction of the formal codes of the observational mode known through
the direct cinema movement. Here, the viewing subject-as-spectator recog-
nizes the aesthetics of the ‘fly on the wall’, but at the same time, the inter-
action of the film crew with a murderer on a rampage whereby they end up
joining in (!) is unbelievable and exaggerated, thus signaling the humorous
play with this aesthetic (Roscoe and Hight 2001, 171-178).

Thus even though a spectator might accept the documentary contract at
first, by the end of the film, there is no choice but to either accept the
mock-contract or bring the film to court as a snuff movie.70 The repetition
is still a return of the same, but here, the recognition that what returns is
not the ‘true’ same, it is “a false recognition” of the real according to the

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69 Inger-Lise Kalviknes Bore (2009) offers an examination of how participants in a
focus group engaged with The Office simultaneously as comedic fiction and docu-
mentary. Such data could possibly be considered through the here-present method
assemblage, offering a consideration of these processes of fluctuating contractions.

70 As happened in the case of Cannibal Holocaust in which the director was forced
to show the actors in court lest he be accused of murder (Petley 2005; Rose 2011).
different as error (the fifth postulate of the dogmatic image of thought; see Deleuze 2004a, 186; 207). The essential rightfulness of a thought recognizing the Same is therefore never put in question. This is, then, a moral thought, as stipulated by the second postulate, in that the thought is good, consequently guaranteeing the common sense of the Cogito (ibid.). Consequently, even the most reflexive degree 3 mockumentaries, albeit deconstructing how the doc-contract is normally performed, do not deconstruct the notion of ‘the real’ as a representationalist and humanist notion of externality and transcendence (Colebrook 2010, 100). The agreement offered through the mock-contract reaffirms not only a know-ability of the specific contract at play (the mock) but also of the construction of the doc-contract (which the mock is playing with) and, consequently, the viewing subject as a knowing spectator. Following Foucault’s proposal that knowledge is a particular practical assemblage, the mock-contract can thus be said to make possible a particular knowledge-mib (Deleuze 2006, 44).

Importantly, as discussed, the inherent meta-level of the mock-contract needs to be recognized by the viewing subject for the contract to be accepted in full. Otherwise, a film such as Conspiracy 58 will be contracted in a doc-contract, convincing the viewing subject that the 1958 soccer world cup did not, in fact, happen. Once the viewing subject later learns that there is ample evidence that it did in fact happen, the contraction will fold and become a mock-contract. An event of spectating can thus give cause to an on-going process of different/ciation of a mib where the contractions affecting its becoming can change over time. But if it changes from a doc to a mock or vice versa, the contract still affirms an either-or image of thought. Repetition produces the same or the opposed, not the different in itself. Thus, the mock-contract remains in the dogmatic image of thought and becomes activated through the first synthesis of time in that it contracts the past (of foreknowledge through recognition) and the future (in that it captures what is to come into a return of sameness).

A contract of de-stabilization, the missing contract

In contrast to the stabilizing contractions of the doc- and the mock-contract, there is a contraction in what Deleuze calls a third synthesis of time, where the container of habit and memory is leaking (Deleuze 2004a, 369f). I use the terminology of leaking to indicate the porosity of the con-
tracting as organ-ization. A contraction that is no longer capable of organizing but is instead oozing is leaking. Leakage indicates a non-organized disruptive force. This I call a missing contract.

The term missing comes from Deleuze’s (2005b) discussion of a modern cinema as based in a people that no longer or not yet, exist: “the people are missing” (208). The missing contract points to the becoming of the virtual real of future realities, a real that can possibly become materialized through affective entanglement in the event of spectating. The missing contract offers conditions for, just like a war-machine, entering a process of non-alignment with the notions prevalent in the doc- and mock-contracts, such as recognition, foreknowledge, analogy and identity. This process is a ‘missing’ insofar as it is yet to come. In other words, the missing contract is a contract of becoming. It eludes both the model and the copy. It contracts simulacra (Deleuze 1990, 2), causing a fragmentation of the dogmatic image of thought and its temporality, a pulling in all directions at the same time, an exhaustion (Deleuze 1998, 160).

This is therefore a contraction of doubt, of unrecognition, causing “a fundamental indiscipline” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 395). The missing contract produces a caesura, that is, the foundation of time, habit, and the grounding of that foundation, i.e., memory, are arrested and released from the Ping-Pong match with the past and are opened up towards the future of the third synthesis of time (ibid.). Here, a stable and dichotomous spectatorial contraction is rendered impossible, that is, it pulls the conditions of foundation and ground from under the feet of the viewing subject (or, in a less elegant image, turns the viewing subject inside-out).

Working with the contract as a point of entry into thinking about the Bio Rio event, it can be said to have offered a possibility for a missing contraction. In this event, Exit Through the Gift Shop was not actualized as a recognizable mock-contract. Instead of producing a playful deconstruction of the discourse of factuality, which would re-instate a ‘real-real’ as opposed to its own ‘fake-real’, it came across for some as a self-declared doc-contract and for others was recognized as a mock-contract. The paradox of the event gave cause to a process of affection, whereby conditions for a missing contract were made possible, offering a subversion of the relation between the viewing subject and the discourse of factuality, a subversion

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72 For a lucid discussion on the third synthesis of time as “related to the creation of the new, to hope for the future, an eternal recurrence of ‘difference’” (Pisters 2011, 270).

73 In other words, a function according to the third synthesis of time pulling out of joint.
that makes possible the viewing subject as a-becoming-other-spectator. Not a knowing spectator, but a not-knowing-and-spectator.

Although interactions with news items or a bit of on-line research might reterritorialize the event through a mock-mode, the process of subjectification has already been set in motion (leading to the on-going folding and cutting of a particular evolving mib). Instead of reinstating the already-known as the correct territory for thinking, a process of unlearning through a mock-moment had occurred, that is, a re-organization of knowledge as an existential territory. That is to say, unlearning is the creation of new “alternative pathways that intersect with old neuronal patterns [such as habit, ideology, expertise] and thus make creative use of them in the project of living” (Fradenburg and Joy 2016, 162f).

My contention is that by disrupting the possible stable contractions through proper doc- or mock-contractions, such an event of spectating indeed offers conditions for reconfiguring the relation between power and knowledge and by so doing makes possible a break with the doxa of a dogmatic image of thinking (opening towards a reconfiguration of existential ecologies). Panagia (2009) argues that we need to regard the political act as one of rendering perceptible what had been previously insensible (151). The act of unrecognition can thus launch processes that function as political acts. If we recognize a thing, we already know what it is. It is not an ‘unknown’ that is in the becoming-known; it is a known confirmed to be so. Thus, rather than recognition, a true political act is a rendering unrecognizable, since this would indicate the process of making known that something is not as we previously knew it. Such acts indeed produce the conditions for a certain unlearning.

The missing contract hence offers no ‘agreement’, but it actually offers no equality either in that it obliterates equality as a relation of the event, or rather, it shakes the event into a new time. As doc- or mock-contracts are severed, the effect of a mat being swiftly pulled from under a standing person is induced. It is a contract born in a fall and disruption, in the shock of the unrecognizable.74 The missing contract is, in fact, where the repetition is at last a repetition of difference in itself; it is a contraction where repetition produced difference in itself, “non-representing and non-represented” (Deleuze 2004a, 357). It thus activates the third synthesis of time where the intensities and extensities of the body produced are leaking, setting out new coordinates, making new relations happen. This is to say, the intensi-
ties produce undetermined extensities whereby the missing-contract functions by parasitic logic (Pasquinelli 2008), offering conditions for an excessive and intensive event that parasitically feeds on the discourse of factuality in order to create new forms of production of the social, the subjective and the real (Zepke 2012, 222).

Following this, the missing contract is not to be understood as a protocol for giving answers pertaining to the real and the false. Instead, it is a contract of disrupting the idea of the possibility of such a dualist and representationalist understanding of the real as stable and external, and through this, the ‘subject’ as a separate unit. Instead, the missing-contract formats the space as a leaky web of entangled flow, allowing a new real to come. In other words, it produces conditions for a new image of thought, for a moving-image-body-without-organs, or mibwo.

In Cinema 2 (2005b), Deleuze starts to develop his concept of ‘the irrational cut’, a concept he claims “is a new stage” (239). Deleuze argues that “the cuts and breaks in cinema have always formed the power of the continuous” (Ibid., 175). The ‘cuts and breaks’ in cinema thus organize the moving-image according to the model of the rational separation of the one from the other (i.e., in par with the model of representationalism). Deleuze’s irrational cut, on the other hand, implies “a new stage”, new for cinema, new for the viewing subject. As such I see it as a conceptual tool for thinking the break to the rationality of a viewing subject as an identifier of the continuous and as the splitting of the One rational thought through the production of a multitude of ‘irrational’ thoughts. As such it serves as the advent of a new image of thought, and a new viewing subject.

The irrational cut is thus not so much ‘something’ as it is the force of de-territorialization of the missing contraction. This is why the concept of the image (what it is, where it is) needs to be disconnected to allow for new connections (Deleuze 1998, 165). The irrational cut is thus activated here as a concept that explains the newness of the missing contraction as a break from inside the event, and not as if the event would give cause to a break from the outside. It is an existential splitting of the conditions for a certain continuity that makes the missing contract instigate the indiscipline of a war-machine. Events of spectating contracted through the missing contract hence functions affectively, that is as “a simultaneous participation of the virtual in the actual and the actual in the virtual, as one rises from and returns to the other” (Massumi 2002, 35). This participation

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75 This is why Deleuze and Guattari speak of their method as schizoanalysis, an analysis by splits, cuts. See Barressem (2011) where he discusses the word ‘cut’ through the Greek ‘skhizein’ (180).
"may be too ‘small’" and the relationality "too large" to enter perception (ibid., 16), it might be over- or underpowering, adequate or not, in relation to the function of the particular body through which constitution it comes into effect. Be that as it may, the missing contract is ‘a new stage’ for the becoming of the image beyond itself, an event of becoming of a mib.

Conclusion: the affective mockumentary and its mibs

My contention is that the method assemblage for mediamaterialities is capable of producing conditions through which an event might become materialized. It “speak[s] the event” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 21). The concept of concept is consequently activated by the creation of its corresponding object. It is activated by producing a relation, not by denoting or representing a relation (which would entail a presupposition of the terms of relations; see Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012, 126f). In this way, the concept as a concept is never a ‘universal’ but must be understood as a singularity (Smith 2012, 178f; Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 12; Lenz Tagushi 2016). Practicing the creation of concepts as well as practicing concepts is “at the very least”, as expressed by Deleuze and Guattari, “to make something” (1994, 7). In this thesis, I take this as a call for turning to the world of material-affective processes of becomings and there ‘do something’.

Working with a method assemblage for mediamateriality, I can now argue that the event at Bio Rio brought forth the problem of the mock-mode as an existential relation of knowledge (i.e., a power-relation). To find a way to methodologically resolve this problem, I have presented a method assemblage for mediamateriality where spectatorial contractions affect the different capacities for affections of the mib. Subsequently, the mib is the enactment of relations of power. However, another event may launch a new flux of contractions, materializing another mib, producing new actions (and consequently changing the relations of power).

What I have called the doc- and the mock-contracts operate according to the first or the second synthesis of time, contracting the habit of the first synthesis of time (foreknowledge as the producer of anticipation and the repetition of the same) and the memory of the second synthesis of time (the reminiscence of what has been, entailing a return to what has been). As such, these contracts function to produce repetition as the return of sameness (the identical, analogous or opposite) and, more importantly, the viewing subject as a spectator, that is, as the identifier and recognizer of these identities. Contracts, which activate only the first or second synthesis of time, thus assert the possible agency of an individual subjectivity and its separateness from the object, which acts out the recognition of what is
already (the world divided). However, a contracting through the third synthesis of time, the missing contract, opens up the event for the missing people, the not yet of the new, for change (the possibility of worlds). This is, however, dependent on the affective stir of unrecognizability. Since Exit through the Gift Shop produces such unrecognizability and affective stir, I call it an affective mockumentary, a terminology that shifts from the more negative ‘hoax’ (that which is lacking truth) to a more affirmative understanding of the actions performed, disruptive affections.

I argue that the affective mockumentary potentially offers the missing contract, although naturally, the affective mockumentary can also become contracted; this is the point in a doc- or a mock-contract. As such, it makes it possible for the viewing subject to break out of the narratocratic logic and engage with the film beyond the issue of the truth/falsity prevalent in the discourse of factuality. In so doing, the affective mockumentary offers conditions for diffracting the problem of the mock-mode into a myriad of possibilities and landscapes, turning knowing into unlearning. Diffraction is “a material-discursive phenomenon that challenges the presumed inherent separability of subject and object [...] [it] marks the limits of the determinacy and permanency of boundaries” (Barad 2007, 381). The reconfiguration of connections through a diffracted mode can appear in many different mediated contexts. In fact, the missing contract is a matter of context, not content. This means that although I here offer the term affective mockumentary in conjunction with the feature film that is difficult to recognize as either factual or fictional, the missing contract is clearly not limited to the plane of distribution/production/reception of the feature film. In fact the term affective mockumentary speaks of something that has been done, but the missing contract speaks of how it is done. This way the term affective mockumentary should not be taken as a new taxonomy since, as I have argued at length, the event of spectating, particularly as the mock-mode is rendered problematic, is an ever-elusive object.

To explain further the challenging of the dogma controlling the fixity of borders of a specific territory, which I argue is performed through the missing contract, I will turn to the example of the avant-garde. Understanding the avant-garde, regardless of specific medium, as precisely that — experimental forms within different territories, whose aim is to challenge the doxa — would place the affective mockumentary within the avant-garde, if not for one quite distinct difference. The affective mockumentary offers a missing contract, not an ‘Avant-Garde-contract’. Following Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardis (2014) contention that at “the end of the avant-garde”, the informing context of the avant-garde is to be experimental (39), it can be argued that it function also to define a “suitable subject” (Rancière 2006a,
I would argue that this territory also encompasses the sub-territory of ‘art-film’, which is the categorization of films that are considered to have a subversive disruptive capacity, as, for example, described in Nadine Boljkovac’s (2013) book *Untimely Affects*, where she discussed the films of Chris Marker and Alain Resnais. However, as I hope I have made clear, in this dissertation, I am interested in a flux of spectatorial contractions whereby the disruption is performed in blurring the generic boundaries, not in the establishment of a territory where these disturbances are legion and expected. It is the flux and embodiment of not-knowing that I find interesting, not the principles of a certain knowledge, even of Disruption.

I have chosen to italicize ‘a life’ as a connective measure to Deleuze’s essay “Immanence: A Life” (2001) where he offers a thinking of ‘a life’ as “everywhere, in all the moments that a given living subject goes through and that are measured by given lived objects: an immanent life carrying with it the events or singularities that are merely actualized in subjects and objects” (29).
comes a place where the dogmatic image of thought forces the multiplicity of the world into neat little categories, gender and identities. Us and Them. This or That. We or them. Real or False. Avant-Garde or mainstream.

However, I hold that ‘the avant-garde’ is a queering action and that such queering can erupt throughout the holey spaces of events of spectating regardless of whether in the Mainstream or in the Avant-Garde, because in either context, dogma, dictation, classification and gendered identity rule. These straight majoritarian places can become-minor through a queering action that is not located in a particular territory because it exists only through its changing of territories and the conditions for their existences.

This is also why I have interested myself with events of spectating in the mainstream, because it is a straight place where ‘everyone’ (as in the universalist and idealist everyone of Deleuze) is invited. It is here, in the ‘everyone’ of the mainstream, that the missing contract appears as disruption. If the Avant-Garde territorializes the disruption of the missing, producing it as its subject, the people to come are reterritorialized as now unqueered, straight, correct subjects. The political force of the missing people only thrives as nomadism, it is always a body without organs, never a face. “All becoming is minoritarian” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 117).

Thus, while the mock-documentary de- and then reterritorializes the discourse of factuality, the mock-contract reaffirms the transcendental viewing subject of representational thinking. And where the documentary might produce ever-poignant representations and experiences of the real (that produce thoughts and become as the event of spectating is extended), it also affirms the viewing subject as subject-of-knowledge. In other words both the mock- and the doc-contracts, as well as the Avant-Garde contract, organize the body of knowledge. These organizations consequently lock down what it is that the event in that context can do. This is no longer a set of virtual actuals, of immanent emergence, but is rather a Face, an organized body whereby the action is programmed by its organization (this is real/this is false/this is The Avant-Garde).

However, as stated by Deleuze and Guattari (2004), this is not simply a partition of aesthetics; indeed, “The Face is a politics” (201). It follows a “phenomenon of accumulation, coagulation, and sedimentation that, in order to extract useful labor imposes upon it forms, functions, bonds, dominant and hierarchized organizations, organized transcendences” (Ibid., 176). The face is a landscape, organized so that ‘useful labor’ may become performed, a labour that makes the continuing landscapification possible. The landscape is a machine, and the vectors on the machine are what make it function as such-a-machine, just like the organs of the body make it such-a-body. Useless labor would be that which causes a disinte-
gration of the machine, a disintegration of facial traits, as it were. The doc-
and the mock-contracts thus potentially perform ‘useful labor’, which so-
lidifies a regime of truth as a relationality of hierarchical power. The doc-
and mock-contracts as extended through the events of spectating can con-
sequently be understood as producing potential faciality machines.

The missing contract as produced in an event of spectating the affective
mockumentary, on the other hand, because its territory is the mainstream,
brings the kernel of a reconfiguration of the affective, agential capacity of
the viewing subject, thus foregrounding the event of spectating as a site for
the production of the future real. As such it is not a negative, anti-
movement, rather it is a plea for a positivity of potentials. The political
nature of the partition of the sensible, as discussed in such terms by
Panagia as well as Rancière, is thus brought to the fore through the mib of
the affective mockumentary, offering the spectator an entrance ‘to attend
to the world’ (Panagia 2009, 19f). This involves a certain becoming-
minoritarian, that is, a becoming-estranged in ones own tongue. This does
not mean to talk another language but to talk the minor language inherent
in one’s own dominant tongue (Deleuze and Parnet 1996, 11).

The method assemblage for mediamaterialities actualized through this
first part of the thesis has necessarily involved a certain amount of experi-
mentation, since the only identity we can claim for ourselves as well as the
concepts through which we activate thought, “lies in experimentation, that
is, in their intrinsic variability and mutations” (Smith 2012, 176). In other
words, to understand this new territory, we need not name it, not claim it,
but we need to work it, activate it and see the many new ways it can move
in. This is the task for chapters four through seven.
Chapter 4: Analyses, foldings

“The cinema of the body is not a picturing of a literal body. Rather, its goal is to give expression to forces of becoming that are immanent in bodies, as well as the body’s receptivity to external forces through which it can transform itself” (Rodowick 1997, 154).

In the following chapters, I will produce documentation of events of spectating *Exit Through the Gift Shop, I’m Still Here* and *Catfish*, beginning in this chapter with a documentation of my own encounter with the films. To look at the spectatorial contractions, de- and restabilizations of the discourse of factuality and mibs brought forth through these events, the data will be made to resonate through the method assemblage proposed through this thesis. What then begins as a heuristics in this chapter (by use of the method assemblage for mediamateriality) serves as a pre-study for an experimental ethnography (also by use of the method assemblage for mediamateriality) in chapters five through seven.

Because my problem began with *Exit Through the Gift Shop*, this is also where I begin here. I will argue, as already hinted at, that the event of spectating *Exit Through the Gift Shop* establishes a paradoxical relation between the viewing subject and the discourse of factuality as the parallel and equally viable conditions, for both the doc- and mock-contractions are made possible. I will argue that this incessant paradox produces an exhaustion of the possibilities of stable contractions, which I will argue amount to a de-organization of the mib, opening onto a mibwo. By staying close to the chronological unfolding of conditions for contractions, such as the recognizability of the discourse of factuality either at ‘work’, as in the doc-contract, or at ‘play’, as in the mock-contract, I will be able to show the repetitions of similarities and differences as these inform the possibility for contractions throughout. I believe this at times rather detailed character of the documentation makes it possible to trace the flux of contractions as these make possible resonant patterns, something a more abrupt analytic diving in and out would be incapable of producing.

The documentation of the two following events of spectating *I’m Still Here* and *Catfish* will allow for a more concise and readable analysis, since I will find a similar exhaustion to be produced in these instances, although here through excess. In the first instance, this amounts to a leaking mib, a mib de-organized through a scare, what I will call a mi-boo! In the second instance, the mib is so overflown that there is little space for flow; it becomes an excessive subject-spectator, here termed a mi-bah. But first, I will offer a comment regarding the choice of joining these three films in a series of events of spectating.
Motivating the series

Considering that an event predates the specific moment of spectating and continues to unfold through a process of different/ciation long after the particular viewing has passed, the choice to view these three films in connectivity is not haphazard. As already explained in my introduction, it was a conversation with an audience in 2010 that pushed me into the problem at work in this thesis. Following this event, I became increasingly aware of the proliferation of strange mocking going on around me, hence my encounter shortly thereafter of *I’m Still Here* and a bit later of *Catfish*, also from 2010, arrested me and functioned as connective signals of the problem at work. The choice of continuing working with these particular films was thus made through my evaluation of them as functioning similarly (which I was later able to refer to as offering conditions for the missing contract – albeit in different ways, as I will subsequently discuss). It is worth mentioning that I was not the only one noticing an affinity among the three films; they were cross-referenced in the year that followed their releases by critics and commentators (Edelstein 2010; C. Campbell 2010; Toto 2011).

Another reason to choose these three films was their situation within the context of the mainstream, understanding this, as discussed in the previous chapter, as a context where a missing contract could occur more readily and with stronger affective force. *Exit Through the Gift Shop* had received much attention particularly for its perceived blurring of the borders between the factual and the fictional, both during the spring of 2010 when it was released and continuously thereafter as it went on to draw an Oscar nomination for best documentary (French 2010; Roston 2010). *I’m Still Here* was released to the theatres in the fall. By then, the ruffian looks of Joaquin Phoenix, as ‘JP’, had already become well known, as he had appeared on the popular *Late Show with David Letterman* in 2009. And as Thierry, the main character from *Exit Through the Gift Shop*, went on – in his reinvented persona MBW – to produce art works and gallery shows after the film had ended, his stylization could be seen as peculiarly patterned on that of JP (see Figure 1 and 2).  

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78 Although *Exit Through the Gift Shop* was released on the 24th of January 2010 (Sundance festival) – hence, before *I’m Still Here* was released at the Venice Film festival on the 6th of September 2010 – JP had appeared in numerous news and entertainment news media, as, for instance, the mentioned *Late Show with David Letterman* in 2009. Other actors had also ridiculed JP’s ragged looks and unusual behavior, most famously by Ben Stiller at the 2009 Oscars (Stiller also made a cameo in *I’m Still Here* and was later believed to have been ‘in’ on the supposedly performative aim of the film).
Figure 1, still of JP from I’m Still Here.

Figure 2, Still of Thierry Guatta from Exit Through the Gift Shop.

Taking into consideration that the director of Exit Through the Gift Shop is a known street artist who has made his name out of copying the style of other street artists (such as his French predecessor Blek le Rat) and, particularly, playing around on the counter-cultural territory of subverting cultural icons, I would argue that the styling of MBW can be seen as Banksy’s commentary on the Hollywood cult that the persona of JP can be seen to address, notably through his much spoken of appearance at The Letterman Show in 2009 as well as later in 2010 in I’m Still Here.
It could thus be said that there is a dialogue between the two films and that this outlines a rhizomatic assemblage of spectatorial contractions where the instability of the one affects that of the other. I have chosen to contrast these two films with *Catfish*, a film that was ardently proclaimed a documentary by its makers, although the reception of this film was similarly surrounded by doubts as to its veracity (Hutcheson 2010. See also Friedlander 2015). It was also cross-referenced in the press with the other two at the time of its release (Edelstein 2010).

Thus, I start here with re-actualizing my engagement with *Exit Through the Gift Shop*, giving a thorough account of the flux of contractions of the discourse of factuality and the mib brought forth, followed by a shorter documentation of contractions and mib in *I’m Still Here*, supplemented by a brief netnography of a discussion thread on the *I’m Still Here* page at the IMDb website in order to even now start expanding the material beyond my own personal engagement. I end with a short discussion concerning the contractions and mib made possible through an event of spectating *Catfish*. Importantly, as already discussed in chapter two, the concept of the mib is always specific. The mibs brought forth through the events of this chapter are thus indicative of the specificities of agential capacities and affections as occurred throughout the contractions of these specific events. However, as will become clear, the variation, the difference in repetition, of possible mibs is possibly endless. As such, the concept of the mib can be generally activated, although its actual application will always be specific and local.

**Exit Through the Gift Shop**

The event of spectating *Exit through the Gift Shop* can be seen to initially offer possible conditions for a stable relation between the viewing subject and the discourse of factuality. However, for this to happen, there needs to be conditions for either a doc- or a mock-contract. The crux of the matter with *Exit Through the Gift Shop* is that from the very beginning, there are equally strong conditions for both. Thus, on the one hand, these contractions are contradictory, since a viewing subject cannot think it to be both a documentary and a mockumentary at the same time; yet, as I will show, these contradictory contractions will come to depend on one another. In other words, the possibility for the doc-contract will also rest on the credibility of a mock-contract and vice versa. As I will argue, this happens through an incessant and eventually paradoxical use of what Roscoe and Hight (2001) call The Classic Objective Argument (21). This will produce an exhaustion that will threaten the stability of the doc and/or the mock-contracts, opening towards a missing contract whereby a leaking mib is formed. Through this, the relation between the viewing subject and the
discourse of factuality is re-organized, bringing forth a possible emancipation of the viewing subject-as-spectator.

The Classic Objective Argument is composed of the expository, observational and interactive documentary modes (since, according to Roscoe and Hight, these are the most easily appropriated of the documentary modes, see ibid.). These modes, defined as such by Nichols (2001), highlight the camera as a voicing the truth, either through the expert-voice, as in the expository mode, or through the fly-on-the-wall, as with the observational mode, or as an investigative testimonial style of the interactive/participatory mode (Roscoe and Hight 2001, 18-21; Nichols 2001, 105-125). In Exit Through the Gift Shop, techniques of an expository mode, such as the voice-of-god narrator, evidentiary editing and talking heads with written captions (Nichols 2001, 107), are employed. This is coupled with footage shot home-video style that resonates with the observational mode of documentary where the claim is paradoxically the opposite of the expository. That is, this is a mode that insists that the camera is simply a fly on the wall, recoding the stuff of life without participating in it (Nichols 2001, 112-114). Finally, the interactive (or participatory, per Nichols) mode is activated through the claim by Banksy and Shepard Fairy that this film is a sort of ethnographic film about a person and a period in which they too have lived, as they become the narrators of the same.

As I will show, the paradoxical conditions for contractions produced through an Objective Argument turned upside-down give cause to an exhaustion. Exhaustion is a concept that Deleuze (1998) elaborates in his essay “The Exhausted”.79 To be exhausted is not to be tired, it is to “exhaust the whole of the possible” (Ibid., 152). Paradox, for Deleuze (2004a), is what “breaks up the common exercise of the faculties and places each before its own limit [...] aligning them along a volcanic line which allows one to ignite the other, leaping from one limit to the next” (286).

In other words, I will claim that by going beyond its own limit, in fact, becoming its own other, the stable dichotomous contraction will become impossible. The possibility for a binary relationality will become exhausted. Instead, there will be the birthing of a missing contract, which is also to say a “constitutive ‘and’ of things” (Deleuze 2005b, 174). That is, instead of a disjunctive logic of either/or, a conjunctive logic of and...and...and... opens the event onto a creative and response-able future.

As I approached Exit Through the Gift Shop at the Bio Rio event, I found the presence of The Objective Argument to be abundant, and I came

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79 It also plays an operative role in Deleuze’s (1964) discussions concerning the systems of signs in Proust’s literature.
to consider its use to enforce a style ‘everybody knows’ equals documentary (hence, stabilizing a dogmatic image of thought, see Deleuze 2004a, 165). As I here think of the encounter of this film in terms of spectatorial contractions and the becoming of a mib, I will be able to speak further of how this is made possible as well as what effect on the evolving mib this can be seen to have. The paradoxical vacillation between the reliability of a doc- or mock-contract creates loops on which the salvation of any capacity for affection relies on crafting a way out, a flight and a leak, as it were. Because the to-and-fro’ing of contractual practices is increased, there is a tiredness from the incessant changing of foot that sets in. Instead of de- and reterritorializing binary contractions, there is an increased sensation of not knowing, distrusting one’s own instincts and knowing, on opening onto a becoming-other of the viewing subject, as it were.

Who speaks? The instability of the camera, parallel contracts

As stated, already from the beginning the film offers conditions for both a doc- and a mock-contract. But as the film continues these two parallel tracks will come to overlap and become dependent on one another. As I will show, this will happen through an initial instability in the identity of the camera (which speaks) followed by an instability in what is said, leading to a nonsensical, de-organ-ized mibwo of a missing contraction. From the first seconds of the film, Exit Through the Gift Shop is organized as an event of spectating. It opens with a jagged title claiming it to be “A Banksy Film”, followed by a sequence of shots, in video camera quality, of hands mixing paint, hands shaking spray cans, painters in action on the streets and shots of street artwork. This iconographic reel is shown as a projected/screened square with a thick, black frame, as if projected/screened within the film itself. This serves to distance the film proper from the sequence, aligning the camera of Exit Through the Gift Shop with the spectatorial space, whereas the initial archive-reel is what a ‘we’, composed of the camera of Exit Through the Gift Shop and the viewing subject, are watching.

Here, I am not claiming an automatic identification alignment between the perspective of the camera and the gaze of the viewer. Rather, I am claiming that the archive reel functions to situate the camera as a viewer alongside the viewing subject in the film and, thus, the viewing subject on equal footing with the camera – both camera and viewing subject are looking out together onto the ‘reality of street art life’ as contained in the archive reel of the initial sequence. It makes a ‘we’ that looks at a ‘they’, a ‘we’ that is gaining knowledge about ‘them’ – the historical past, that is to
say, the real. In this way, the temporal alignment of the viewing subject and the film proper conditions a doc-contract.

This rooting of the spectatorial temporality in a present looking at the historical past, which supports a doc-contract, is enforced through the visual association with other, what can be termed street practices, that are discursively linked with street art (von Schantz, 2009; Kimvall 2012), such as, in this case, skating or the notion of delinquency by being chased by the police. This last is effectively demonstrated through a parkour-like escape of a person being pursued by security personnel at the end of the reel. Drawing from visual clues, this escape has nothing to do with street art; rather, positioned at the end of the ‘archive-reel’ of paint and painters, it forcefully communicates the rebellious, semi-illegal identity of street-art. In this way, the dogmatic image of street art as ‘we’ know it, that is, connected with danger and delinquency, is recognized, because this is how ‘everybody’ knows street art. Augmenting this effect is the inclusion of the title song “Tonight the streets are ours”, which sets up a semantic relation of community between the film and the viewing subject. Recognizing the ‘nature’ of street art in this way will serve as an initial condition for a doc-contract — but, through foreknowledge of Banksy, it could also be considered a condition for a mock-contract, ‘typical Banksy, playing around.’

Following this reel, the title frame appears: “Exit” in red and “Through the Gift Shop” in black, on a black background. The use of red, which emphasizes the word Exit, in conjunction with the first jagged title of “A Banksy Film”, is already here a destabilization of a doc-contract. The foreknowledge of Banksy as a political activist, in conjunction with the knowledge that he was accused of being a sell-out when he started with the gallery-scene, makes the wording of Exit a strong indication that we are to be taken on a tour where we ultimately will be sold something. This happens very fast, but in affective terms, there is a slight sensation that with this film, perhaps not everything is what it might seem.

The contraction of such knowing viewing-subject makes possible an opening onto a mock-contraction, which paradoxically contradicts the stability of the ‘viewing subject on the same side as the camera’ of the doc-contract, since this would consider the camera fraudulent. In other words, a mock-contract would push the viewing subject behind the camera, looking not only at the ‘screen’ together with the camera but also on

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80 In Nolltolerans, kampan mot graffiti (2012, 46-53), art and graffiti scholar Jakob Kimvall displays the overlapping imaginaries framing street art and graffiti as criminal and a gateway to crime. However, he also shows how this is largely an imaginary and not supported by research or hard facts.
the camera as part of the ‘screen’. But this recognition of the play of a mock-contract is conditioned on an acceptance of a certain identity and history of street art that has in fact been presented by the camera; thence, accepting this construction of ‘street art’ is to accept the camera as not fraudulent. In short, the film starts off in a paradox – as if standing on the ground with two firm feet, only that the ground is shaking.

While the title is still present in the frame, the first sound is of a microphone as it is turned on and someone, with a distinctive Bristol accent, says – “Okay. Sound check”. In parallel, a spotlight brings light to the image, making visible what appears to be a stage. A person dressed in black pants and a black hoodie enters ‘the stage’ from behind the camera, and, as he says “one two, one two”, he sits down in the chair.

Figure 3, Still from Exit Through the Gift Shop.

The spotlight, visible at the lower right corner of the frame, is positioned such that it shines brightly on his hands while his face stays in the dark, creating a representation of ‘Banksy’ (following the caption), in par with his reputation for being a mystery man (see Figure 3).81 His voice is dis-

81 Banksy’s true identity is unknown, with speculations ranging from Banksy being a collective of artists to different persons of different gender; see, for instance, Neuendorf (2016).
torted, making it sound ‘disguised’ but without losing the distinct Bristolian accent.82

A voice coming from behind the camera says “So, I’ll start up asking you about the film, what is the film?” The person on the stage replies, “The film is about this guy trying to make a documentary about me. But he was actually a lot more interesting than me. So now the film is kinda’ about him”.

Since the camera and the viewing subject are already positioned on the sidelines together and/or behind/in front each other ‘looking in’, this recourse to classic expository documentary mode techniques, such as talking heads and textual introduction of the same, confirms the complicit relation between the (person behind) the camera and the viewing subject-as-spectator. However, since the first title frame claimed the film to be “A Banksy film”, the appearance of ‘Banksy’ in front of the camera, as opposed to behind, throws the whole question of ‘who really is the sender and what is this all about’ onto center stage. This makes the identity of ‘the person behind the camera’ an instant riddle that puts the possibility for a stable contraction in jeopardy.

However, this instability is paradoxically important for the possibility of a further stable mock-contraction, since Banksy is famous for being notoriously anonymous. Both the doc- and the mock-contracts need Banksy to be a ‘reluctant’ filmmaker. For the doc-contract, this serves as a condition for the ensuing unraveling of a ‘fascinating story’. For the mock-contract, this is proof of ‘typical Banksy’. In this way, the person behind the camera, anonymous and indistinct, becomes ‘anyone’, just a person looking on just like the viewing subject. In addition, the official director ‘Banksy’ is, from the very beginning, destabilizing ‘himself’ as a sender by being introduced in front of, not behind, the camera (with the caption reading “graffiti artist”, not director).

Thus, already in the very few first minutes of the film, a paradoxical doc- and mock-contraction is made possible: in alignment with the camera, the viewing subject accepts its Objective Argument that the film is a representation of what has happened in the world. But at the same time, this also serves as the condition for a mock-contract of recognizing the Banksyan play with the discourse of factuality, which, as it were, serves as a condition for a further doc-contract (Banksy telling a crazy story). Thus,

82 Although there are few known facts about Banksy, one undisputed piece of biographical detail is that his art work did first appear in and around Bristol, UK, making ‘everybody think’ that this is where he at least lived when he first started to paint (see for instance Pryor 2007).
when the ‘person behind the camera’ asks “So who is this guy?”, this question almost seems to be asked by the viewing subject-as-spectator. The one who will answer is the Narrator, Rhys Ifans (named in a caption). Over the sound of a typical French accordion tune and an image of a person polishing the lens of the camera eye (of the film proper), he introduces ‘this guy’ as “Thierry Guetta.”

The paradox of contradictory, yet dependent contractions
At this point, the conditions for both a doc- and a mock-contract are offered simultaneously. As the film continues to present Thierry, the extreme use of evidentiary editing constructing an Objective Argument is made noticeable. A shot of palm trees with sunlight bursting through the branches (iconographic of L.A.) and the caption “Los Angeles, 1999” brings the story and viewing subject back in time, positing the sequence that follows as an audiovisual archive, a glimpse into the past. With the Narrator’s voice-over informing the imagery, home-video style, the ‘story of Thierry’ is told: Thierry, with his ‘wife’ and ‘children’, immigrated to the US in the 80s. He is the owner of a vintage store “selling to L.A’s more fashion-conscious citizens.” Talking head style, Thierry is then seen in what looks like a sunny back yard, speaking of this period of his life and the money he used to make as ‘buying cheap and selling expensive’, “from 50 dollars sometimes I could make 5000 dollars”. In this way, it is argued that Thierry is well off (which will serve as an argument for him being able to spend the following years on the street-art trail).

By recognizing the discourse of factuality at work through the most familiar tools of The Classic Objective Argument, such as evidentiary editing and an authoritarian relation between audio and imagery (audio informing image), a doc-contraction is made possible (the ‘gullible fashion-conscious citizens of L.A.’ believe something is ‘designer’ just because it is expensive). However, if this sequence is received through foreknowledge of Banksy as a countercultural prankster (memory as it is produced through the second synthesis of time), this familiar form (identified through the first synthesis of time) could be contracted into a mock-contract (the ‘gullible’/unknowing person believes something is ‘documentary’ just because Banksy says so).

As the film continues, the activation of an incessant information logic of an evidentiary editing typical of The Objective Argument will now become even more tangible. The Narrator states that “there was a very unusual thing about Thierry, he never went anywhere without a video camera”, followed by evidentiary shots of Thierry filming himself. This is followed by a talking head of Thierry saying “it was like more than any drugs to
anybody, it was obsession! (sic)”, which cuts abruptly to a fast forward point of view-shot of walking down an aisle in a supermarket coupled with a music score reminiscent of the music used in a clown number in the circus. This is followed by Thierry’s voice speaking of his need to capture “everything” on film, which is subsequently evidenced through a shot of a toilet bowl flushing, filmed from the point of view of someone standing looking down into it, followed by Thierry’s voice saying, “I was filming and filming and filming myself filming. It didn’t stop”, upon which follows yet another sequence where several shots have ‘Thierry filming, and filming, and filming himself filming’ (see Figure 4).

![Figure 4, Still from Exit Through the Gift Shop.](image)

But the evidentiary editing is not finished here. Thierry continues to say that he filmed the kids all the time – this is followed by footage of the kids being filmed as well as of Thierry and/or his wife with the kids. The sheer quantity of evidentiary editing is now screaming so loud that there is need for quite a bit more attention to see that here again, the instability of the identity of the ‘person behind the camera’ is exposed. If Thierry is filmed together with his wife and kids, who is doing the filming, a filming that is supposed to evidence that Thierry was filming incessantly?

Finally the person presented as his wife is seen in a kitchen talking about how Thierry was filming constantly, upon which Ifans claims that “As time passed, those who knew Thierry even stopped noticing his ever-present camera”. This statement is followed by a shot of Thierry filming a grown man stepping out of the shower. Ifans continues to claim that Thierry was persistent in “getting what he wants”, which is then evidenced in the fol-
lowing shots where Thierry is heard behind the camera as Jay Leno, Shaq O’Neill and Liam Gallagher are seen bothered by his persistent filming.

The abundant evidentiary editing continues as Ifans Narrator explains how Thierry, on a family trip to France in 1999, got the chance to tag along with his “cousin, the famous French street artist Space Invader”, upon which Thierry got “bitten”. This statement is evidenced through a montage of a family sitting in a court yard and someone creating ‘space invader mosaique’ (as is familiar to the street art connoisseur). This is followed by the explanation by Ifans that Space Invader was part of a new generation of street artists using “hybrid forms of graffiti; stencils, stickers, posters and sculptures”, a statement that is evidenced through images of stencils, stickers, posters and sculptures. He continues to explain that with the aid of the Internet, “these once temporary works could be shared by an audience of millions [...] and Thierry had landed in the middle of it”.

Here again, a viewer with some foreknowledge about street art would recognize that although the temporary nature of street art in the streets might be true, street artists have always documented their own work, just like other artists. Moreover, methods such as posters and stencils are hardly a new occurrence. Posters have been around since the 19th century, graffiti even longer. And stencils, if a stencil is to blow paint around a template, have been around since the age of cave men. So most of the statements by Ifans would be difficult to accept for anyone with some basic knowledge of the history and practices of street art. Such foreknowledge would thus function to put the doc-contract in even more question, pushing towards a more probable mock-contract. Even if foreknowledge of street art was scarce but foreknowledge of the mock-documentary were ample, a viewing subject would perhaps recognize the typical tongue-in cheek validation of any kind of statement simply through the use of the Classic Objective Argument. As already stated, this is the trademark of the mock-documentary, and this is how it enables its often hilarious effects, such as the comedy in Trollhunter or the fright in The Blair Witch Project. However, if little knowledge of street art or the mock-documentary is held, a viewing subject could easily believe that the arrival of Thierry-the-nonstop-filmmaker would make him welcome as a “documenter” of this “new thing”. Then again, simply looking at the visual clues, a doc-constraction is equally as likely as a mock-contraction.

Rooting Thierry in a particular time-space is an immensely grainy shot by a handheld camera, home video style, with Thierry in a café speaking French, hence, ‘in France’/a francophone context. Through a sequence of shots contrasting Thierry’s talking head in the sunny courtyard with street artists in action in the night as well as Thierry filming street artists, Thierry
gives his account of how “he started seeing the city as a gallery” and that he “enjoyed the feeling of excitement and fear”. The shots are consistently grainy and of poor quality, consistent with the discourse of factuality as materiality. The sequence ends with footage filmed from behind a moped as smiling street artists on the mopeds are joy riding in the night (and ‘we do know how French youngsters love their mopeds’). The exuberance displayed by the moped scene, again reinforced heavily through a ‘youngish’ musical score, brings forth affective resonances of a dreamy seduction of the memory of youth, producing a desire to establish a doc-contract, although, as has been stated, both the doc- and the mock-contractions are equally plausible and possible at this point.

The viewing subject thus finds itself in a moment of indecision when the talking-head of ‘Banksy’ comes back to argue that street art has a short life span so it needs documenting, and “we all needed someone who knew how to use a camera”. Needless to say, this is a quite modest criterion – almost anyone would qualify as ‘knowing how to use a camera’. If the previous statement of the ‘new’ in street-art is received in a mock-contraction, then the statement of Banksy could be taken as further evidence of this being a tongue-in-cheek mocking. However, had the previous statement been considered through a doc-contraction, why wouldn’t Thierry be a good person to film the ‘new movement of street art’? In short, regardless of either contraction, the viewing subject-as-spectator remains intact.

Now enters another main character in the film, street/graphic artist Shepard Fairey, who, narrates Ifans, became well known after he designed the iconic Hope poster for the Obama campaign in 2008. Ifans goes on to expound Fairy’s success by stating that an André the Giant poster Fairy had created and widely disseminated throughout the USA “had already clocked around a million hits around the world”. Under the pretense of having been introduced through Space Invader (who supposedly knows Fairey, although this is not evidenced in images), the argument is that Thierry became a steady companion of Fairey’s during his nightly poster-runs after having briefly met. In a medium shot talking-head frame, Fairey is seen reflecting on that time ‘back when’: “Amanda [Fairey] always thought that he was weird, but I said, it’s great that we’re getting a lot of this stuff on tape. And for me to have someone there as a look-out was always good…”

As Fairey is talking, the image shifts to Fairey on the dark streets geared up for painting, looking left and right with his diegetic voice intersecting the narration from the previous talking head: “…keep your eye out for cops”. This will initiate an evidentiary editing where there is a statement in a voice-over, followed by an image where the statement is reinforced in a
diegetic statement, followed by the another statement in a voice over, followed again by an image supporting this with a similar statement diegetically. The contraction possibly becomes that of identification of the same, returning the present present of the event of spectating to a past of what has been, or a past into a present (following “the principle of representation”, see Deleuze 2004a, 102). The present and the past are thence interlocked in a loop, grounding a stable contraction regardless of whether this is a doc- or a mock-contract. However, the mock-documentary form is not made recognizable in form or content, only through overlapping foreknowledge of street art.

As has been discussed, the possibility of a mock-contraction relies on the recognizability of the play with the discourse of factuality. Here, this play is not recognizable unless one accepts Banksy as the sender of the film (activating foreknowledge of Banksy as a prankster). However, that would entail a contraction of acceptance – which would be a doc-contract. The possibility for the mock-contraction is thus also dependent on contracting the doc-contract, which in turn reterritorializes the mock-contract into a doc-contract. And so forth. This thus makes for an interdependent relationship between the conditions for the doc-contract and for the mock-contract. By producing contractions that are contradictory yet rely on each other, there is an investment in all the directions at the same time – an exhaustion (Deleuze 1998, 160).

Exhaustion
What begins as possibly either/or contractions will ultimately amount to a neither/both, de-stabilizing the mock-mode and de-organizing the mib. This will happen through increased interdependency of opposing contractions that are brought to the brink of exhaustion as the possibilities for stable contraction are extenuated. To exhaust is the end of possibilities “through inclusive disjunctions” (Deleuze 1998, 154). The exhaustive series makes itself known by breaking apart, by making rational connections impossible (the ‘falling apart’ of the analytic paragraphs on page 102 is indicative of this). The offering of the doc- and the mock-contracts at once will eventually amount to an accelerated vacillation between having a foot

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83 Fairey’s voice-over on images of a hooded person in the night, on a roof with the city behind: “[...]I finally did train him to not turn the light on while I was on a billboard or rooftop or anything [so] that he was gonna blow my cover”. The diegetic sound intercepts the voice-over as Fairey is seen in a medium shot, standing on a rooftop, looking at his poster on a billboard just as a light is turned on: “No, no! Don’t use that!”
in the one camp and then the other, eventually causing the stability of contraction to collapse in an impossible split.

Partaking in this is the construction of a dichotomous and oppositional relationship between Thierry and Banksy. When Thierry is constructed as a camera-crazy, possibly narcissistic person, he is portrayed as a clown. This is particularly cued through music, first the French accordion introducing Thierry as an exotic other (‘the Frenchman’) which is then linked to actual clown music in the supermarket.\(^{84}\) This underlines the motivation for Banksy to make a film about Thierry even though ‘Banksy is camera-shy’. In fact Thierry’s excessive love for the camera serves to support Banksy as a reluctant sender of this film; where Banksy is camera-shy, this guy is camera-happy, where Thierry is a self-absorbed person (filming himself even as he polishes the lens or goes to the bathroom), Banksy do not even want to show his face. Where Thierry is clumsy (not even knowing that he is filming himself), Banksy, by comparison, is suave. This oppositional relation serves as a condition for both the doc- and mock-contractions (and will eventually serve as an alibi for Banksy and Fairey for not seeing in the moment, what they will acknowledge in hindsight, that Thierry ‘is crazy’ – although they supposedly have spent years on the streets with him). However, as this oppositional relation is breaking apart, causing one to overlap the other, so also will the doc- and mock-contractions.

Importantly, this blurring of the personas and contracts has been in the making from the beginning, as I already argued, but the exhaustion produced by this is not made tangible until the paradox has been “leaping from one limit to the next” (Deleuze 2004a, 286), which I argue depends on the unfolding of a certain temporality through which there can be an exhaustion of possibilities for a stable contraction. Thence, the seed of the exhaustion is noticeable already in the alignment of the perspective of the viewing subject and the camera, because this is also an alignment with Banksy the director (although appearing in front of the camera). But as I have discussed, there is reason to ask: who is ‘Banksy’? The doc-contraction on offer is paradoxical in its very conception: the credibility of Banksy, famous precisely for not seeking personal fame, rests on the premise that he is an ‘involuntary’ director, that he has not really sought the attention or the position in which he finds himself. Hence, ‘he’ must be behind and in front of the camera at once, in turn aligning the viewing subject with a becoming spectator of the doc-contraction (I am learning

\(^{84}\) For a look at the role of music in producing ridicule, see Eriksson and Machin 2017.
about the world from Banksy) or a being spectator of a mock-contract (I see what Banksy is doing, ha-ha).

However, I argue that both contracts rest on the acknowledgment of ‘Thierry’ as the opposite of ‘Banksy’: if Banksy is camera-shy, Thierry is camera-happy to the extreme, if Banksy is suave and cool, Thierry is like an uneducated puppy, or as I have argued, a clown. Ultimately, it is through the production of Thierry as someone who cannot be taken seriously that the possibility for Banksy to be taken seriously occurs. In other words, it is a dichotomous logic that leads to a paradoxical production of contracts of acceptance, independently of whether or not they be doc- or mock-contracts. Either way, it is a question of accepting-because-Banksy-says-so. The recognition of play needed for the mock-contraction is still dependent on accepting Banksy’s word for it. What is lurking in the background is ‘Banksy’ not as an actual person but as a captor and stratifier of desire, a desiring-machine.

This production of Thierry as the opposite of a credible and trustworthy Banksy is obvious in the following sequences. In the first, Thierry acts the ‘filmmaker of a documentary about street art’ (a persona he is taking on in a response to a question by Fairey about why he is filming him and all this street-art going on 10 months). The sequence of images shows Thierry prepping Fairey in a chair, clumsily imitating a ‘filmmaker’ through a defamiliarization of recognizable ‘film-maker-moves’ such as holding up hands as a frame and clapping together hands in front of the camera (in an awkward fashion), propagating the character of Thierry-as-clown.

This clown status continues as Thierry proceeds behind the camera, upon which it starts zooming dizzily in and out while Fairey is talking. Excessive evidentiary editing follows with Ifans describing Thierry in his “new role as a documentary filmmaker” travelling the world with Fairey (with images of an airplane) and “recording every detail of the artist’s life” (with images of Fairey walking down an aisle on an airplane looking into the camera saying, “I knew that couldn’t be far away”).

At this juncture in the film, where Thierry is in the role of Fairey’s documentarist and follower, a key moment in the film arrives. Shepard is sitting in the interview situation of before, telling the camera about the power of images – how images gain power through perceived power. Fairey is making reference to his use of repetition with regards to the André the Giant poster, but the incision of this statement, following what has basically been 15 minutes of repetition of the same ‘score’, is impossible to ignore. In this moment, the film is telling its audience that, more than a story about Thierry/Banksy, this is a story about the relation between the viewing subject and imagery as a relation of power. That this film is really
about the mock-mode-as-problem. But this is left as a “Ping” (Deleuze 1998, 159) of a sign – something has happened, but its effects will not be actualized until later.

Instead, the excessive information logic continues with Ifans narrating over iconic city images with the captions “New York, 2002” and “Paris, 2003”. This, together with music reminiscent of Raiders of the Lost Ark (Spielberg 1981), signals that a great ‘street art adventure with Thierry and Fairey travelling the world’ is about to begin. This is followed by exciting footage of Fairey climbing out a window with the backdrop of a Parisian skyline and is confirmed by Thierry’s voice-over: “it was a big adventure, every night we were going on top of building and on top of something that was not only illegal, it was dangerous!” Then follows a tight sequence, in the same informational logic as before, where images, speech and music confirm that Thierry was not just a filmmaker now, he was an accomplice: “he carried buckets” (image of Thierry carrying bucket), “he climbed further up than Fairey” (shot of Fairey from above), he was “not only following Fairey but also many different street artists” (images of other street artists with their names in captions, in some but not all Thierry’s voice is present in the audio).

This evidentiary chain serves to confirm not only Thierry’s presence, i.e., that he is the one to have amassed the footage of street art at use in the film (although he is not actually named as cameraman in the credits), but also his clown-persona. This becomes obvious in scenes where he interacts with other artists such as the pop-artist Ron English. Thierry compliments him on his work: “Oh nice, I like the design. You know how to draw?” upon which English answers with a look of disgust on his face “it’s a painting…” This is followed by a talking head statement by Thierry: “When I go with an artist, I let them life [sic!]. I’m a ghost”. This ‘humble’ statement cuts to a grainy shot of the street artist Swoon putting up her poster on a wall as Thierry is heard asking her if she wishes she were taller. She instantly replies, albeit laughingly, “Shut the fuck up”.

Here, importantly for the first time, there is a discrepancy in the information logic of the return of the same that has thus far informed the conditions for contracting. Where before the evidentiary editing didn’t miss a beat, Thierry’s statements are here contradicted by the imagery. The evidentiary editing seems out of joint. If Thierry-the-clown is part of the play of Banksy, if the mock-contraction is to remain stable, then why is the camera at this moment laughing at Thierry? What has been a parallel possibility of the doc- or mock-contract now indicates a more reasonable doc-contract. But then the next segment reverses this movement in favor of a stronger mock-contract.
This is an archival televised news segment narrating a famous Banksy prank where he hung some of his own paintings at the Tate Britain. The newscaster’s voice continues over video footage depicting a man in a long trench coat with a hat and a covered face walking around in the museum and hanging pictures – the information logic implies that these are indeed pictures of Banksy hanging pictures. However, the origin of these images is unclear: either they are part of some sort of reconstruction (no caption stating this is provided) or it is some footage shot by Banksy and his crew.

Thus, it is through a de-stabilization of the foundation of the doc-contract and an arrangement of conditions for producing a mock-contract that Banksy is introduced as a character in the ‘story of Thierry’ (appearing the first time after the initial talking head), which is paradoxical to the scene that just preceded. That is, Banksy can clearly arrange for documentation by himself; consequently, the premise that Thierry would be needed is becoming highly improbable. This causes a sudden re-contracting of the whole of the film up until this point, since the origin of all the footage thus far encountered, ascribed to either Thierry or Banksy, is here becoming difficult to locate. This difficulty results in a losing-face not only of the becoming-spectator of the doc-contractor but also of the being-spectator of the mock-contract, since it becomes increasingly difficult to know whether this is about Thierry or Banksy or indeed the viewing subject him/herself. The instability of ‘who speaks’ with a paradoxical inconsistency in how this speech is organized (notably by making two oppositional contractions depend on one another) makes it increasingly difficult for the viewing subject to stay in balance. The de-stabilization of the event is becoming tangible, not primarily through the difficulty of asserting the veracity claims of Banksy/Thierry but through an affective disjunction where the film becomes nonsensical.

The increased paradoxical contractions expose the invisibility of the Classic Objective Argument; there is an exhaustion of the becoming-/being-spectator. This happens in the following sequence, where, after the film and the Narrator have showcased many of Banksy’s iconic works, Thierry’s talking head exclaims that he would “really like to film that guy”. However, as the Narrator will explain in the next sequence, Thierry was not in fact making a street art documentary, he was just filming to film, tossing everything he filmed, sometimes even without a label, into a box (as said over images of a room in a backyard with lots of boxes). Here, Thierry’s motive for filming street-artists is destabilized. But the same is also Banksy’s motive for appearing in the film as destabilized. The following sequence explains how Thierry came to be Banksy’s assistant as the famous street artist was coming to L.A. in 2006 and how Banksy now let
Thierry film him, although Banksy (talking-head on stage) claims “he had never let anybody film anything before” (in stark contradiction to the scene at Tate just displayed). The contradiction of statements and the dizzy sensation of rapidly changing footing produce a re-evaluation of one’s own relationality to the production of the real as something happening ‘over there’ and not ‘here’.

The folding of the viewing subject onto the dogmatic image of thought through the doc- and/or mock-contractions is uncovered as the production of an endless ritornelle (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 344), that is, a territory of the viewing subject-as-spectator. In this way, the event becomes a losing of face, “a disruptive deterritorialization” (Deleuze 2004a, 182; see also Spindler 2013, 197f). What follow are no longer conditions for stable contractions but a wild tearing apart, de-organization. Although the excessive information logic continues, it is no longer consistent and coherent. It is falling apart, opening towards a missing contraction to come.

When the film continues with sequences evidencing the relationship of Thierry and Banksy, it is like a shadow chasing itself: the repetition is seen as variations of difference – no longer similarities – going off in multiple directions. First, there is a shot of two persons who, lit by headlights, are standing on a roof putting up a recognizable Banksy stencil. Then, there is footage of Banksy taking Thierry around London and his large studio. Banksy’s voice-over argues that he did this because maybe he “needed to trust somebody”, but a knowing-spectator will here remember that Banksy is known to work, in the likeness of Damian Hirst, with a crew, a crew that is also seen in the film during Thierry’s visit, hence cancelling this very statement of trusting ‘somebody’. Then, Thierry is back home in L.A., starting to make stickers of himself holding a camera and slapping them all over L.A. In one sequence, the camera is positioned on a wall pointed towards a billboard where Thierry is seen gluing his sticker, in a huge variation, over Fairey’s André the Giant stickers, and someone else is gluing Andre the Giant stickers of smaller format in the upper left corner of the frame, again hinting at the complicity between Thierry and Fairey/Banksy. Then, a camera is seen placed in the foreground of the frame, and other people are seen gluing Thierry’s sticker under the clear light of a headlight, with camera flashes also disrupting the shot. Finally, the camera’s overwrought position, and grainy quality to boot, produces footage that is ‘not even trying’ anymore.

In this tired place at the brink of exhaustion, Banksy’s show Barely Legal comes to LA. The sensation of mystery and authenticity is accentuated
through the blurring of people’s faces (such as the elephant handler) and Banksy’s increasingly scrambled voice as he recalls how he and Thierry pulled off the “Guantanamo stunt” at Disneyland.

Here follows a sequence shot home-movie style. Thierry’s voice is really only present at the ticket booth at the entrance, and the person with him at that juncture (who is supposed to be Banksy) is not the same person we later see actually putting up the Guantanamo doll at the fence at the Thunder Mountain ride. There are also differences in the grain of the shots of the person seen together with Thierry’s voice at the entrance and the person attaching the doll to the fence (supposedly, this last is footage from the actual event, an event widely reported in the international press, see for instance BBC 2006). After Disneyland, Banksy vows to “trust Thierry with everything”. The doc-contraction of establishing street art as delinquent, dangerous and illegal makes this statement easy to accept and produces a mib where everything is indeed in its right place (Banksy is mysterious, Thierry was there, and the viewing subject as becoming-Spectator remembers the event and is now more knowledgeable about it). Consequently, in a paradoxical twist, the doc-contraction (this happened for real) is now affirmed by the mock-contraction (of the knowing spectator), since this stunt is well known and the images of the Guantanamo doll are notorious. Thus, the deterritorializing of the doc-contraction that was effectuated by the mock-contraction is now reterritorialized by the mock-contraction itself! It is not the contract anymore that is deterritorialized but the deterritorialization that is deterritorialized. This produces a facialization of the mib not in spite of but affirmed by the body. It thus becomes a neurotic mib, a mib in an incessant loop, a ritornelle stuck in itself. In its desire to annihilate itself (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 183) it is an empty mibwo. This finally exhausts the paradoxical relationality between the doc- and the mock-contractions, bringing forth an “any-space-whatever” (Deleuze 1998, 168)85 as offered through the missing contraction. This, then, becomes a possible event of renewed possibilities, freed of its object of reference, “somewhat like the smile without the cat in Lewis Carroll” (ibid., 168).

**A leaking body, the missing contraction of a mibwo**

Thus, there is a way forward. The loop can be opened onto a hyphen, three dots on a line, an in-between. The organization is deterritorialized through

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85 The any-space-whatever is discussed by Deleuze (2005a) in conjunction with the affection-image as a singular space of virtual conjunction. That is to say, a space of pure potential (112f).
an alternate placement of the organs. A new flow, a new thought, a new future for the viewing subject is made possible.

Whereas a doc-contraction would produce knowledge about Thierry the clown, and the mock-contract produce knowledge about Banksy the prankster, the missing contract exhaust the conditions for the viewing subject as a passive and apolitical spectator.

The conditions for a missing contraction are rendered almost bluntly explicit with the following scene. Banksy is sitting on stage, the shot even longer than before, a bottle of spirits can be seen by his feet (is he pissed?/taking the piss?). He speaks of his experience of Barely Legal. Ifans’ commentary, voiced over images from the famous auction house Sotheby’s, continuous to detail how this exhibition marked the beginning of street art as a commodity, and a brief segment from a tour of art collector Wendy Asher’s house follows. “But it was never about the money”, Banksy continues. Thus, he told Thierry that now was the time to finish his street art documentary, to tell “the true story”.

That it wouldn’t be about the money is primordial for the so-called street cred of Banksy. However, accepting the mock-contract would amount to also judging Banksy’s statement as being just as ‘fake’ as the film. However, the mock-contract – leading to a judging of Banksy as fake – builds on the foreknowledge of Banksy as a real street artist, albeit a prankster. Thus, the spectatorial foreknowledge of Banksy is deterritorialized. A direct effect of the exhaustion of Banksy the prankster through the paradoxical affirmation of two dichotomously posited contracts at the same time is that the doing of Banksy – which is the production of a widely distributed and hyped film that basically functions as PR for his own art – is exposed through the exhaustion of the statement that “it was never about the money”. Hence, the viewing subject is pushed from a knower of Banksy the prankster, through a critic of Banksy the sell out, to the diffractive thinking of oneself as an intrinsic part of the hype (I am watching this film, aren’t I?).

As Exit Through the Gift Shop now proceeds, Thierry explains how he went about making his film at the behest of Banksy: by taking a(n un-marked) tape here and another one there, he spent 6 months with an editor to assemble his film. Ifans states that “Thierry went to England to show the film” over images of Thierry jumping up and down on a trampoline. After a clip from Thierry’s film Life Remote Control, which is a rapid-fire montage of imagery mostly unrelated to street art, Banksy is heard saying from his talking head-stage, “ehem…it was at that point I realized that maybe Thierry wasn’t a filmmaker...he was maybe just someone with mental problems who had a camera”. Here, the informational logic of evidentiary
editing is reversed: first imagery, then speech confirming what the spectator is already thinking (Thierry is a clown). Then, for good measure, imagery that again serves as a plane for contraction of Thierry-the-clown-filmmaker, his silly questions, his unfounded idea of himself, his obsession. As another segment of Life Remote Control is replayed, the contraction of a past real into a present present in Banksy’s statement contracts the same onto a future, producing Thierry as a mentally retarded person. But identifying Life Remote Control as an elaborate piece of editing produces a de-territorialization of Banksy’s statement. In fact, Life Remote Control does not at all look like something a retarded person would be capable of. It does not seem to have much to do with street art, but then again, nothing is really what it seems in this film. What Banksy is saying doesn’t make any sense, but at this exhausted juncture, any statement could be credited a value unrelated to its own enunciation. There is an arrest, and when the film continues, it is through an increasingly resonant missing contract. Perhaps Thierry was in on it, perhaps he is Banksy’s best mate, perhaps Banksy has found the most perfect formula to make a lot of money yet keep his street-cred, perhaps the viewing subject knows (or not) what is going on but all the same s/he is becoming aware of the many ways reality is produced in entanglement with the production of the event of spectating event.

As Banksy confesses that Thierry’s material was amazing (referencing the material amassed in the first part of the film) and that he wants to get Thierry out of the picture to have a go at making ‘the street art documentary’ himself, he sends Thierry off with the suggestion to “go and put up some more of your posters, and make some art, you know, you can have a little show, invite a few people, get some bottles of wine”. Thierry is subsequently seen putting on the “Life Is Beautiful” gallery show in the massive old CBC studios in LA, directing a large crew of hired prop makers and graphic designers in their creation of ‘his art’ (Shelley 2008). He breaks his foot, has Banksy’s previous LA promoter come to the rescue, puts all his energy into creating the hype, and finally opens the show to a hungry 4000-head-strong crowd of LA’s finest.

In all the interviews with the people around Thierry in the totality of this part of the film, he is ridiculed and portrayed as a clumsy reality-severed retard. Banksy and Fairey are interviewed; saying that they had no idea what he was up to (still, someone other than Thierry is filming the whole thing). All the while Thierry is reinventing himself, notably through the mounting of a massive gallery show, Banksy is supposedly (if relying on a doc-contract) in the dark about the event enfolding. Using a mock-contract instead, the production of Thierry as MBW was the goal of the film all
along, and the different statements have all served as pieces of evidence to this effect. The price for attributing such elaborative and inventive skills to Banksy and his film-making team (of which Fairey is thus a part) is that Banksy and Fairey are sellouts who try to uphold ‘street-cred’ while cashing in through the buffoon persona MBW. And if the film is considered a potential PR-film for Banksy, a mock-contraction is making a separation between MBW and Banksy increasingly difficult to uphold. As to suggest the latter, here, towards the end of the film, the camera is set free. It is freed from Banksy, from Thierry, it is held by no one, by us all. Its gaze becomes a testimony of the irrationality and senselessness of a capitalist system run amok, of which the viewing subject-as-spectator is an intrinsic part.

Ultimately, however, by having a foot in both camps, being PR for Banksy and MBW, being about Thierry and Banksy, being a mock and a doc becomes non-response-able and leads to a negative we/them. The joke is on the 4000 people who flood MBW’s gallery, as well as the people who thus far have bought his art for millions of dollars, and probably also on me who sees the film and then goes on and talks about it, writes about it. Who should be laughed at and who should be laughing is even stated outright towards the end by Fairey (so that any eventual leakages may be reterritorialized): “it is a sociologically and anthropologically interesting thing to observe – all these suckers buying into MBW”. Banksy’s former spokesperson, Steve Lazarides, gets the final word: “I think the joke is on…I don’t know who the joke is on…I don’t even know there is a joke”. In lieu of thinking this is a joke (and experiencing the shame, the ressentiment that follows), embracing the missing contract allows for the critique performed throughout the event to diffractively disseminate and germinate, forming a pattern breaking out of the sterile pattern of yes/no, laughing at/being laughed at, instead asking questions pertaining to the commodification of everyday life and culture and our implicit responsibility to be response-able to the way we co-produce this reality.

Through an exhaustion of the foundation for stable spectatorial contractions, the missing contract thus comes into effect, making the veracity of the film a non-issue and instead bringing a joy of increased affection of the becoming mibwo. What at first could be considered a critical practice (through the displaying and deconstruction of the discourse of factuality) is facialized through the mock-contraction’s heavy notion of recognition. However critical, the mock-contraction cannot cause increased flow; rather, it organizes the virtual flow of the body into functional organs. But as the event of spectating Exit Through the Gift Shop exhaust the discourse of factuality, the mock-mode is de-organized through a missing contract,
bringing a moving-image-body-without-organ into effect. In its exhaustion and unrecognizability, the capacity for affection of the mibwo is increased, and there is a potential to shift the functionality of organs and the organization towards a porous and leaky body of a new function. The very ground for the organ’s materialization and organization into a viewing subject-as-spectator is removed. By de-organ-izing the foundation for the discourse of factuality as a discourse of factuality, the event of spectating Exit Through the Gift Shop has the potential of a minor event, of a becoming-other of the viewing subject as spectator, as a particular subject of knowledge, exposing the relations of power inherent in knowledge as Knowledge.86

I’m Still Here, excessive reality
In likeness to Exit Through the Gift Shop I argue that the event of spectating I’m Still Here offers conditions for an exhaustion of the possibilities for a stable contraction, opening the mib onto a de-organ-ization. But where this is made to happen through a paradoxical vacillation of contractions in Exit Through the Gift Shop, this happens through the erection of an overly excessive doc-contract in I’m still Here. Here, the body is flooded so that there can be no more flow. The inundation causes an arrest of movement, making for a becoming-animal that serves as an attunement to oneself as a ‘spectator’ and the relations of power inherent in such identity, ultimately making possible an emancipation of the viewing subject-as-spectator.

I’m Still Here details the life of actor Joaquin Phoenix as he decides to quit acting and start a career as rap artist JP. The film premiered on September 6, 2010, as a documentary out of competition at the 67th Venice International Film Festival. It took almost two weeks, until September 17, 2010, for director Casey Affleck to reveal in the New York Times that it had been a performance, that they had “wanted to create a space” where “[y]ou believe what’s happening is real.” All the same, he adamantly stated that it had not been a hoax (Cieply 2010). Hence, although making state-

86 This formulation is inspired by Fredrika Spindler’s (2009) discussion regarding the joint effort in both Nietzsche and Spinoza’s philosophy to “demask the motivation of knowing” (175-177).
ments about its performative nature, Affleck and Phoenix, in the same vein as Banksy a bit earlier that year, refuse to call it a hoax *per se*.

The excessive discourse of factuality is pounded in from the start of the film. Through a sequence shot home-video style, complete with the date on-camera, the grainy quality of the camcorder and a prevalent shaky amateur camera, the discourse of factuality as both indexicality and materiality initially grounds the relation between the viewing subject and the view of the camera of *I'm Still Here* as a peek into ordinary events of recording-a-day-in-the-life. This is followed by a fast-paced editing sequence with excerpts from recognizable celebrity TV shows – *The Tonight Show with Jay Leno*, *Late Night with Conan O’Brian* and *Late Show with David Letterman*, as well as red-carpet events, all featuring award-winning actor Joaquin Phoenix. This sequence appeals to the spectatorial foreknowledge of famous television hosts and Hollywood actors. Together with the ‘home-archive’ of the very beginning, these first minutes of *I'm Still Here* affirm the film as part of a historical continuum.

Through the first and second syntheses of time – that is, the contraction of memory and habit in the recognition of the stars and celebrity culture as well as the identification of the home video and television aesthetics – an expectation of what will follow is produced: the narration of a shared historical real as that which has unfolded some years prior. Hence, by understanding ‘knowledge’ not as a productive relation but as an external representation that is confirmed and conformed (Deleuze 2004a, 170) the doc-contract is effectively offered and easily accepted at this juncture. The viewing subject is thus learning about the ‘real events behind the scene’ and grounds itself as spectator in this recognition of the historical reality on display.

This sequence is abruptly ended when there is a cut to a dark location, lit by a single bulb, overlooking Los Angeles in the distance. The camera seems to be handheld, and the back of someone’s head is shown on camera, a bit too close, making it a poor-quality shot. As the person starts to talk it appears to be a man, and a while later, this person is revealed as

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87 Before seeing the film, I had not read or heard much about it. However, I became alerted to something being done that I needed to think through further as I engaged with the film the first time, notably thinking of it in conjunction with my previous experience at Bio Rio. Consequently, it was not until after that first screening that I went on to search the web for related articles as well as YouTube for relevant clips such as the sequel to the Letterman interview where Phoenix appears to admit it was a performance, etcetera.
Joaquin Phoenix. His handsome appearance from the red carpets and the TV shows is now exchanged for a gritty, wild, bearded, tired look.

As Phoenix starts to speak to the camera about why he “agreed to make this documentary”, the aim of the film is spelled out: “to tell the truth”. Just like the first scene in *Exit Through the Gift Shop* is about telling the viewing subject how to contract it, *I’m Still Here* similarly offers the contract of trust: accept this as a documentary. In so doing, the viewing subject is geared towards identifying similarities between *I’m Still Here* and previous factual forms, grounding a “fundamental expectation” (Nichols 1991, 27) that the film is documentary and, thence, that “its sounds and images bear an indexical relation to the historical world” (ibid.). This interplay between the recognition of factual form and expectation of the coherence and trustworthiness of the doc-contract at offer is dominant throughout the event of spectating.

In contrast to *Exit Through the Gift Shop*, the excessive discourse of factuality here relies more on an observational mode than an expository mode. This makes the doc-contract at offer almost poetic. Rather than a frantic pounding of alternate possibilities of doc- or mock-contracts, *I’m Still Here* only really makes possible a doc-contract; it says it is A, and it conforms to that statement in both form and content. The film does offer a documentation of events that have indeed happened insofar as they were played out in front of news and entertainment cameras all over the world. There is thus ample other documentation to confirm that the central events unfolding on the screen are not fiction.

*I’m Still Here* offers documentation of Phoenix appearing as JP at the numerous public events throughout the years it took to film it. The film is composed of the formal qualities of the documentary (making it possibly consistent with both the doc- and mock-contracts), but (much of) the material world on display is consistent with the documentary contract. Joaquin Phoenix is not fabricated for the film, such as speculation would have it for MBW or a particular conceptualization of ‘Banksy’. Phoenix has clearly existed before, and his career as a rapper is an affair that is monitored by the news media of the world. There should therefore not be a subversive thing to contract the event of spectating *I’m Still Here* as a doc-contract. Moreover, as the film progresses, the playful cues that would let the spectator sign the mock-contract are not provided. Nowhere does the film display the recognizable mockumentary trait of the parody and irony.

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88 Such statements, speaking with linguist J.L. Austin (2013), function performatively in that they *produce* the real (22f), thereby setting the stage for the doc-contract and mock-contract, respectively.
of *This is Spinal Tap* or *C’est arrive près de chez vous* (as discussed for instance by M. Campbell, 2007), or even the paradoxical exhaustion between the docking and mocking of *Exit Through the Gift Shop* discussed in this chapter (although the particular timeline presented in *I’m Still Here* is clearly difficult to verify and, when deconstructed in detail, most probably a fiction). In terms of contractions there is simply a continuation of the doc-contract, even though the reality it proposes is somewhat of an excessive reality.

The underlining of The Objective Argument through the observational and, in part, interactive modes makes for a less argumentative contract but also, in a way, a more convincing contract. In *I’m Still Here*, there are numerous scenes where it seems the camera is filming the most intimate events: vomiting, defecating, taking drugs, hiring prostitutes. As Roscoe and Hight (2001) have argued, it is possible to recognize that something is true even without accepting or adhering to it (22). In fact, it might actually be because we do not agree with something, because there is a strong affective resonance, that we find it convincing in terms of doc-contraction. Thence, it might be that because I find the vomiting, abuse, defecating, etcetera, so vulgar and immoral, I am more inclined to accept it to be true. However, when I first encountered the film, I found the camera a bit too ‘home-video’, the prostitutes-drugs-pornography activities of Phoenix overly vulgar and intimate, and his descent into madness and chaos a bit too well played, as it were. In this way, the excessive doc-contract makes possible a destabilization of the safe position of the viewing subject as spectator, as in knowing that one might not really know what is going on. In such way I argue it functions as, what Dolphijn and van der Tuin (2012) calls, a de-familiarization (35). It is an acceptance of things we do not want to accept and, in the end, wondering why we do this to ourselves.

In short, if this film consistently lays out the doc-contract and does not really offer conditions for a mock-contract, there should not be many reasons why this would be difficult to accept. Still, when I first encountered it, the excessiveness of its activation of the discourse of factuality made me think there was something worth looking more closely at. Also, this film was, from the very beginning, surrounded by debate concerning its veracity. To offer some examples of such debate, I will briefly turn to a discussion thread from the IMDb page on *I’m Still Here*. The discussion, as will be noted, initially revolves around the question of whether this is a hoax.
In the thread, the discussants hash out whether *I’m Still Here* was a planned hoax or whether it was framed as a hoax to cover up the bad reception of JP’s rap music and performance. The initiator of the thread, “jandm-10” wonders whether “there is any documented evidence that states this was intended to be a spoof prior to this being filmed?” (see Figure 5). The focus of discussion from the outset is thus on the intended identity of the film as a hoax or documentary. That the film is replete with the discourse of factuality, that it looks like a documentary, is not in itself questioned here, it is the intention that is being debated. It is thus assumed to offer a doc-contract, but the question is whether it is more sensible to make a mock-contract. As I will discuss the conversation come to function through a contradictory sterility where all grounds are covered at the same time while standing somehow still (Deleuze 1998, 160). By disturbances to the ability of good sense to forsee (Deleuze 1990, 75), binary contraction is rendered difficult with consequences on the stability of the distributive position of the viewing subject-as-spectator.

The first person to offer an answer argues blatantly that it must be a “backpeddle” (sic) because “what A-list actor pulling in 10’s of millions dollars is going to throw that all away to make a stupid mockumentary that grossed $400 k?” Since JP was unsuccessful in the capitalist marketplace, i.e., ‘bad’ in terms understandable to a dogmatic image of thought, it must have been an error (hence, advancing an analysis consistent with a dogmatic image of thinking). Almost immediately, the profile “irishaspad-dyspig” answers that the intention of the film was raised from Phoenix watching reality TV and contending “that people will accept anything as
real if they are told so”. Now, the discussion moves into the realm of form and whether people believe an audiovisual artifact to be true on the basis of it telling them so.

“irishaspaddypsig” says that Phoenix “observed that people will accept anything as real if they are told so” and continues to state that the reaction by people to the film seems to confirm such observation. “goodbyeemyairship” concurs by referring to interviews given by Phoenix during the production of the film. Here, the discussion is still within the domain of the true/false debate, but it drifts away from its original intention when “roofall” derides the film as a real failure, “regardless of whether this is true or false, it doesn’t matter, because it is not a good film”. This seems to suggest that in addition to the spectator as recognizer and knower of form and intention also the spectator as judge and recognizer of good taste is used to produce rational argument, on par with the first and second postulates of the dogmatic image of thought in that it draws an equal sign between the good will of the individual thinker and the common sense of the collective.

Consequently, the viewing subject is produced as a spectator-judge. To be a ‘true’ spectator is to manage the act of recognizing not only one genre from another but also good from bad, activating the third postulate of the model of representation (Deleuze 2004a, 207). What could have looked like a comment that pointed beyond the value of the true/false debate thus still produces the event through the same binary problem. This idea of a spectator-judge is reiterated by the following commentator, “Unknownian”, who insists he/she knows “the truth” (that the film is no hoax but a documentary), since he/she “is in the industry” (and thus privy to a deeper insight than others who supposedly are not). Seemingly concurring, “johnnydarko-1” enters the conversation, arguing that since he/she has “studied ethnographic film and documentary film theory”, he/she can tell that “the film is real” because (in reference to a scene where JP throws up) “from the time the actor leaves the stage to his arrival at the toilet, there are no cuts”. Here “johnnydarko-1” brandishes his/her education to validate the opinion that this sequence “doesn’t look too fake”. This debate surrounding the formal qualities of the film and whether or not multiple shots, the grain of the footage, etcetera, “prove” the realness or fakeness of the film arrives at an interesting exchange where “tylerisfat” simply states, “it’s obvious the way it is shot that it’s not real. Multiple camera angles, everyone is micced up all the time...not a hoax”, whereby “ferreria0665” snaps, “it was a hoax. It was obvious it was a hoax”, before proceeding to give quite the same argument “tylerisfat” had just made.
What is interesting about this dialogue is that these two profiles both agree that it was a staged film that looked documentary, but where one offers this as proof that it is not a hoax, the other for the same reasons claims it is (thus, like *Exit Through the Gift Shop*, there seem to be conditions for both the doc- and the mock-contractions simultaneously). Hereby, they put their finger on the central problem that *I’m Still Here* poses, which is the sterility of the real/fake debate as well as the inaptitude of the ‘hoax’ terminology to really explain what is going on in an event of spectating a film such as *I’m Still Here*.

The question this discussion actualizes, then, is no longer whether this film is real but rather of what kind of reality it enables, that is, what mib and viewing subject it makes possible. Similarly to *Exit Through the Gift Shop*, *I’m Still Here* potentially offers a missing contract. However, this is made possible not through the exhaustion of paradoxical contractions but through the overpowering affections of reality-in-the-making, a senseless push demanding attention and attunement to ones milieu, a becoming-animal, as it were.

**Becoming-animal, a mi-boo!**

Becoming-animal as a concept is “accompanied, at its origin as in its undertaking, by a rupture with the central institutions that have established themselves or seek to become established” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 272). Becoming-animal is alertness, stopping in one’s tracks, sniffing the air – from where will the wind blow?89

This indicated that the becoming-animal is a Barthesian punctum, the moment of becoming-attentive to the way we, as viewing subjects, partake in the production of conditions for both aesthetic and political affections (Panagia 2009, 154; Boljkovac 2013, 94). But becoming-animal is also becoming-beast, which indicates a loss of the specific human form of stupidity that is knowledge. Hence, a becoming-beast as a becoming-idiot is not to ‘be stupid’; rather, it is becoming-stupid-as-wisdom, an unlearning.90

The succession of sequences of awkward moments piled on awkward moments through *I’m Still Here* – the stacking of scenes centering on excrement on a sleeping JP’s face, excessive drug use and on-line porn (ab)use,

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90 The term bête has two meanings in French, stupid/silly and beast. Devenir-bête thus connotes both meanings. One application of this double connotation could be to see that the becoming-beast is not only loosing the human form of knowledge – a becoming-idiot, but also this in particular as a becoming-child, a reinvigoration of the joy of learning a language a new.
swearing and insulting as standard speech – excessively short-circuit narratocratic rule, not through a paradoxical eclipse of dichotomies as in Exit Through the Gift Shop but by threatening the good sense, truthfulness and tastefulness of the viewing subject as spectator-judge while not really offering any ways beyond it. This way it functions as a jumpscare (boo!), de-organ-izing the moving-image-body into a mi-boo! asking, how do we make stupidity when it is no longer excused as error? Who will take the blame (Deleuze 2004a, 189)? It is an event of ‘scaring the viewing subject straight’.91

By functioning as a violent encounter the event is brought to its limit (Deleuze 2004a, 182). This way the discourse of factuality is fragmented and disconnected “allow[ing] for a new connection”, exhausted through an excessive enforcement. The result is a disjunctive affect of and…and…and, which, instead of a bearing a conjunct meaning produces a diffracted affect. Throughout the event of spectating I’m still Here, the possibilities of constituting of the viewing subject as spectator(-judge) is exhausted and it becomes an any-space-whatever. As an excessive-exhaustive event the event of spectating I’m Still Here thus becomes “not a representation, but a movement in the world of the mind” (Deleuze 1998, 169), and by the movement of the mind, the image is already gone. Where is the image? It is missing, yet to come. And as we realize it has come, it has already left. Was it a (bad) dream? If so, it is “not like the dream of sleep, which is fashioned all alone in the depths of the body and of desire; it is a dream of the mind that has to be made, fabricated” (ibid., 172). This is the affection of an entangled production of a missing contract, the production of a subject whose language is yet to come. The missing contraction makes possible an escape, a tearing off the Face, finding relief in a becoming mibwo, the mib as a force, as a violent event, where the Face literally gets ripped off.

As the event of spectating I’m Still Here comes to a close, a pervasive effect of laughter-stuck-in-throat lingers. For me, it was a disruptive event rife with a sensation of immorality and baseness, making possible a mib pried open by a scare and a fright, a boo! As with the after-effect of a rush of adrenaline, as the viewing subject, I am left exhausted, a leaking mib. I am scared senseless and alert at the same time. In such a way, a missing

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91 This term ‘scare straight’ comes from the 1978 documentary Scared Straight (Arnold Shapiro) that documented the encounters between convicts from maximum security prisons and school children in the aim of persuading the children not to commit crimes. Here I take it to mean a scare that makes one rethink ones own position, actions and responsibilities.
contract is offered through which a reconfiguring of the foundation for thinking about the privileged position of the spectator-judge is made possible. Ultimately, this enables a responsibilization, an owning up to the way that one, as a viewing subject, is responsible to mibs that intrinsically produce an audiovisual regime of a material-discursive effect of which it cannot wrest itself free.

**Catfish, the making of an excessive subject-spectator**

Whereas I argued that the event of spectating *Exit Through the Gift Shop* exhausts the paradoxical tension between the doc- and the mock-contract (and thus the relation between the viewing subject and the discourse of factuality) and that the event of *I'm Still Here* produced an overpowering affection (consequently inserting an alertness and self-awareness in the same relation), *Catfish* offers an alignment between the relation between the viewing subject and the discourse of factuality and the relation between the film and the discourse of factuality, making the one depend on the other. To not accept a doc-contract thus equals annihilation. However, if a missing contract is produced, annihilation might actually come to be a new beginning for the viewing subject as well as for the reality she produces.

The story of *Catfish* begins as the New York-based photographer Nev (Yaniv) Schulman starts an Internet friendship with an 8-year-old girl, Abby, who supposedly likes to paint and has painted a picture of a photograph Nev published. His brother Ariel and a friend, Henry, both of whom share studio space with Nev, begin to film the developing friendship, claiming that the story of the 8-year-old art prodigy is interesting. As Nev sends more and more of his photographs to Abby, he in turn receives more and more paintings of them. But suddenly the filmmakers and Nev find themselves in an even more interesting story. Abby has a big sister, Megan, whom Nev falls in love with. The two begin an Internet romance that ultimately leads to Nev going out to Ishpeming, Michigan, to see Megan, only to find out that 'she' is just a cut-and-paste Internet-product by a desperate married middle-aged woman. This woman, Angela, has been posing as

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92 Discussing *Catfish*, Jennifer Friedlander (2015) has pointed to how this film makes visible the, what she calls, Real-ism oppressed by the symbolic framework of filmic realism as grounded in Lacanian notions of the Real. Thus, although her point of entry into discussing this film differs from the one I here propose with my new materialist methodology, her conclusions align with mine in that *Catfish* makes possible a disruption of the governance of the audiovisual real, notably through making possible a certain emancipation of the spectator.
both Megan and Megan’s mother over the long steamy telephone conversations with Nev.

Just like with *Exit Through the Gift Shop* and *I’m Still Here*, *Catfish* opens with a scene prompting the acceptance of the doc-contract. Protagonist Nev appears irritated at being filmed, exclaiming in the direction of the camera “…if this is your documentary, you’re doing a bad job” upon which a voice asks him “Why?” (this is presumably one of the directors, Henry Joost or Ariel Schulman) to which Nev grumpily answers “…because you’re catching me in a moment when I don’t want to talk about it” (see Figure 6). Interestingly, in this scene, the word ‘documentary’ is used *a total of 3 times in a shot 40 seconds long*, all while Nev is looking straight into the camera.

![Figure 6, Still Catfish, Nev talking to the camera/filmmakers.](image)

Following this first shot, there is a fast-edited sequence of Abby and Nev sending pictures and paintings to each other, images of Abby painting and close-ups of e-mails exchanged between them. The premise ‘Abby and Nev becomes friends’ is thus immediately set up through an excessive use of the discourse of factuality, excessive since every frame and every shot, more than communicating a specific story unfolding, is communicating that this story is happening in the ‘real’. Whereas *Exit Through the Gift Shop* enforces the Objective Argument through excessive use of evidentiary editing, talking heads, narrative voice and captions, and whereas *I’m Still Here* does the same through an alignment with events and people otherwise documented as part of historical reality, *Catfish* relies strongly on the discourse of indexicality as an intrinsic part of the more general discourse of
factuality as reception. That is, it is not a discourse of indexicality as materiality but as produced through reception, especially since the ‘indexical traces’ are of digital communication. Thus, instead of showing the ‘footprint in the sand’ to prove someone has crossed the beach, here, it is the familiarity of an aesthetics of social networks such as Facebook and Myspace that the viewing subject can identify the realness of the communication taking place.

The film is, as it were, composed of sequence after sequence where close-ups of ‘written digital communication’ as well as ‘photos posted online’, ‘telephone conversations’, and ‘text-massages’ are edited in an expository narrative where the budding long-distance relationship between Nev and Megan is set up.

**Becoming-affective mock, a mibah.**

As has been discussed in the previous section, there is a doc-contract at offer right from the start. I argue that this offering is dependent of the contraction of spectatorial time as overlapping with a temporality of the diegesis. It is happening as we see it. It is happening now. It is a present unfolding of the real. But at the same time, it is clearly not. It is a feature film, and a simple evaluation of its materiality would make both the mock- and dock-contract equally plausible. However, throughout the event, there is a paradox set up between, on the one hand, a prevalent representationalist image of thought, structuring the whole narrative around a strong opposition of the true and the false, and, on the other hand, a distinct temporality through which the viewing subject is constructed as a knowing spectator. This causes an interdependent relationship between the doc-contraction and the viewing subject-as-spectator. To jeopardize the one is to cancel the other. Thence, although a mock-contract could theoretically be equally as possible as a doc-contract (and could equally stabilize a ‘spectator’), it becomes difficult to actualize. As such, the mib becomes a mibah, as in a shrug of the shoulders. Through the event of *Catfish*, a missing contract never becomes more than a whisper of a possibility lost.

This overlap in temporalities is performed through a parallel and connected affirmation of the veracity of the unfolding of events on-screen through an increased knowledge of both the characters and the viewing subject-as-spectator. The excessive pounding of factuality-clues, which, as has already been discussed, is typical of the mock-contract, is thence refolded here as a doc-contraction, since this excess, in contrast to *I’m Still Here*, is produced as a shared search for answers between the characters and the viewing subject-as-spectator. In this way, *Catfish* manages to offer conditions for an experience of *liveness* (Couldry 2004), extending the doc-
contract as a way for the viewing subject to remain in the seat of spectator-ship and bypassing an otherwise rational conclusion that it could indeed be fiction. Therefore, although it is a feature film, *Catfish* manages, notably through the slightly oxymoronic notion of digital indexicality, to set up a sense of liveness otherwise particular to the medium of television.

Through the discovery by the film crew that a song Megan supposedly has recorded is actually sung by another person a collective search for knowledge about the veracity of Megan is launched. From hereon, the story centers on finding out whether Megan is really who she says she is. This leads the crew to travel to Michigan, only to find out the tragic story of Angela, which is portrayed as a lying and pathetic housewife. Interestingly, Henry and Ariel occasionally challenge Nev as he is discovering that Megan might not be all she says. These challenges function to assure the viewing subject that the protagonist on the screen somehow shares its own process of becoming-spectator through the unfolding of the present time of the event. There is a ‘we’ composed of protagonists on screen and the viewing subject-as-spectator, that is gaining ‘knowledge of the truth’ together as the film progresses (see for instance Figure 7). By initially accepting a doc-contract, the viewing subject is already invested in this truth telling. Thus, the quest for the truth becomes a common affair for the filmmakers and audience alike. When Nev asks why he should even continue bothering with that whole family if they are nothing but liars, it is Henry and Ariel who convince him “to get to the bottom of it”.

![Figure 7, Still Catfish.](image)

Nev thus displays a similar reluctance to ‘make the film’, as did Banksy in *Exit Through the Gift Shop*. In *Catfish*, Nev is continuously made out to be the reluctant dupe who just wants to leave the whole sordid thing be-
hind but who – notably through the setting up of irritation and tension between Nev and the other two filmmakers – gets coaxed into making the film by the others. The production of a shared temporality ‘we’ are all together, on- and off screen, ‘getting to the bottom of this’. The ‘we’ of the spectators (viewing subject and filmmakers) is ultimately sealed off and placed in the distance, ‘laughing at’ Megan, Angela and, at least initially, Nev.

In this way, instead of opening up as a leaking body as in *I’m Still Here* or an exhaustive body as *Exit Through the Gift Shop*, the leakages of *Catfish* are kept in check – the spectatorship-status of the viewing subject and the veracity-status of the film depend on it. These are intertwined constructions. The increasing arguments between Nev and his two filmmaker friends regarding the making of the film is, in fact, performing the kind of argumentation typical for the expository documentary mode – voices accompanying images in order to code what it is the image is about, although here, the voices are not of a Narrator (as Ifans in *Exit Through the Gift Shop*) but of the filmmakers in dialogue. This dialogue, all the while disguised as occurring with one another, functions as a speaking to the viewing subject. Again, these arguments assert that what we are seeing is a *documentary*, and as such, the statement is part of a process driven through affective investment of the viewing subject in its status as spectator.

In addition to this contraction of time into the present unfolding time of the event of spectating, there are other enforcements of the discourse of factuality, most notably shots of poor quality in terms of the audio and visual aspects of communication. Besides indicating the documentary apparatus as materiality, this produces a need for responsiveness for the viewing-subject-as-spectator (hence re-ensuring its ontology). Where, for instance, the sound is poor, there are English subtitles, as if we were eavesdropping on something so real, it is not even meant for ‘us’, as if what we are hearing is so real, it happens regardless of whether we are there to listen or not. This is very interesting because, as has been discussed in chapter one, the documentary value that the viewing subject will perceive exists only insofar as the mind of the viewing subject agrees on it. Moreover, if the three men were the only ones in the world, there would be no need to film what is happening because they already know it. The sheer filming is an act of offering a set of conditions through which we can think and thus produce the real.

Halfway into the film, Nev, Henry and Ariel travel 400 miles to check the veracity behind the persona of Megan and the others. When they arrive at Megan’s fake address, Nev reaches into the mailbox and finds the postcards he sent her still waiting there. He expresses consternation over the
paradox that ‘Megan’ and the others have created such an elaborate scam on Internet, and yet Megan hasn’t even bothered to drive to her fake mailbox to pick up the postcards. This produces an extensivity, a folding, as it were, of a virtual real that offers a stratum for the investment of the mib through which it will unavoidably face two sides at the same time; a virtual real/a real virtuality, an instance of facialization/a flux of de- and reterritorializations, an accusation of being fake/an expression of shock at not being real (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 45). In Exit Through the Gift Shop, the stratum of ‘Thierry’ is pierced through and through. As a shower-cap it is squirting from all sides, disorganizing the mib and the subsequent stratification of flow. ‘JP’, on the other hand, is a bucket gag, releasing the water into a becoming-wet, becoming-cold, becoming-angry, etcetera. In Catfish, alas, the flow is channeled, the face restored.

The becoming of both Thierry and JP functions as “something that forces us to think” (Deleuze 2004a, 176). However, in Catfish, this thought is not delivered as a disruptive event, it remains a ‘thought’ in the realm of representations. The Face is not shattered or deformed, it is minutely executed by the viewing subject and is thus worn as a self-made mask. As in the above case where Ariel, Nev or Henry are talking quietly, the listening party needs to be still and quiet, attuned, in order to hear...as if that were needed. The last thing this film does is whisper; on the contrary, it screams! It is the production of a becoming-animality as asphyxiation rather than affection.

Similarly to the two other films discussed here, in Catfish, there is an excessive use of the Classic Objective Argument. There are numerous shots of Nev speaking to the camera; of messages supposedly being exchanged on the internet in chat-boxes and on Facebook; of excessive use of Google Maps and global positioning systems (indicating the discourse of factuality as indexicality in a strange digital twist); of the frequent Googling of people and events, where the results are shown as indices of the ‘real fakery’ of Angela-Megan-Abby. Through these shots, the doc-contract is rubbed in so that even a viewing subject who is half-asleep would not miss it. Yet at the same time, following the extensive logic of the singular points offered through the film, the only doing being done is by Nev, Ariel and Henry, or in the case of Exit Through the Gift Shop, Banksy, or again, in the case of I’m Still Here, Joaquin and Casey. The mib is the territory of producing the real, and thus, the viewing subject-as-producer-of-the-real is key. The capacity for affection is thus the only territory of the real actually actualized through the event of bringing forth this mib. Without it, there would only be virtual reality.
Therefore, it is up to the viewing subject to in fact actualize the event any-which-way. There is an offering of a doc-contract but this is only grounded in the trust a viewing subject can bring to the event, if instead the excessiveness of the Classic Objective Argument enacted throughout would be contracted through foreknowledge of previous forms a mock-contract would be more logical.

Just like in *Exit Through the Gift Shop*, following many sequences with an excessive discourse of factuality, there is a significant shift when Nev, Henry and Ariel start to suspect that Megan is not the actual artist who recorded the songs she sends to Nev. From hereon, Henry and Ariel become more present on-screen, as they (and the viewing subject as spectator with them) are now upholding the doc-contract. They are now on the search to ‘know the truth’. Thus, they now appear on screen filming Nev, and from this moment of ‘revelation’, the one camera more continuously films Nev as he is either talking to the other filmmaker directly or as he too is filming Nev. As the ‘band of brothers’, cameras in hand, drive up to crash the family breakfast of Megan, Abby and Angela, Nev speaks with Megan on the phone. His face displays disgust, eyes rolling at the camera and even whispers “liar” after the end of the conversation. Nevertheless, he continues to talk to her and does not voice his suspicions that she is not all she says she is. As in *Exit Through the Gift Shop*, the filmmakers do not need to be responsible; instead, a culpable ‘they’ is produced. Unlike *Exit Through the Gift Shop*, the viewing subject is not part of the butt of the joke with the other ‘they’. In *Catfish*, a position of laughing at ‘others’ together with the ‘we’ of the filmmakers is produced. Where *Exit Through the Gift Shop* strikes any-which-way, *Catfish*, in a sad twist, strikes from above.

So, what are the relations of power produced in this event? If *Catfish* indeed is all that it says it is and the cameras rolling everywhere and all the time are just a display of some youngsters having too much money and too much time on their hands not to travel across the country to crash a breakfast in the aim of seeing why a girl lied about having sung a song or two, then this band of brothers sure look both obsessed with this family and quite the liars themselves. Why not confess their suspicions to the family – if indeed there is a reasonable doc-contract to make? In response to the instant rumors of its affiliation with the mock-form, the filmmakers replied that “[t]he only things we recreated were the close-ups on the computer screen”(Kohn 2010). This attempt at rectifying the rumors and whispers on the Internet appears to be performed for a specific reason: the team behind *Catfish* went on to pitch the idea of a reality-TV show to MTV. As the reality-TV show *Catfish*, it has become an enormous success that is currently in its seventh season.
As a piece of audiovisual communication inserted into an IWC, the production of an excessive spectator-subject reinforces the power-relations that make the machine function. It is ‘useful labour’. This is also a reason why it has been successful in the productive-economic system of the IWC. The event of spectating ultimately leaves the viewing subject with a virtually empty mib that despite the excess of the discourse of factuality and the temporal alignment of spectatorial time with diegetic time produces a flow that merely trickles, organized or not. There is a reversed missing contract, that is, instead of actualizing virtuals, as in I’m Still Here or Exit Through the Gift Shop, Catfish virtualizes actuals. This makes the mib a sly magic trick, where the magicians are talking to draw attention away from the card being pulled from the sleeve, where the right hand does not know what the left hand is doing (or does not want to).

“I don’t know what to say. What’s the next move? Does anyone have any idea?”, Arial asks halfway through the film. Well, regardless of what the next move will be, it will probably look almost like a materialization of a ‘spectator’s’ desire ‘to know’. But paradoxically, and this is the crux, ‘knowledge’ is founded on the first and second syntheses of time, contracting memory and habit to enforce a representationalist real/false-dichotomy while at the same time spectatorial time is literally contracted as an unfolding in a present (and thus, in principle, open) in the making. The viewing subject is thus here produced as the subject of the real, that is, as the very embodiment of reality through its affective contraction of the film. At the same time, the real is consistently discussed as external to the spectator. This is the paradox of Catfish. It produces a mib that is leaking in a contained way. It ‘is’ a flow, but it doesn’t flow. The dogmatic image of thought is undermined, but there is a reluctance to offer conditions for a new image of thought. It is a stalemate. It is a mibah.

A note on the three-body-problem
Understanding these events of spectating as offering contractions that constitute conditions for different moving-image-bodies, a series of mibs have been brought forth: the first, a paradoxically leaking mibwo; the second, a paradoxically empty excessive body a mi-boo!; the third, a virtually paradoxical face-body, a mibah. My contention is that the facialized mib decreases the capacity for affection of the body, whereas the mibwo increases it. However, a decrease in affections, the de-organization of a body per se, does not make for a free-flowing, affirmative and joyful body: “[y]ou don’t
reach the BwO,\textsuperscript{93} and its plane of consistency, by wildly destratifying” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 178). The sheer de-organ-ization is insufficient to produce flow; the de-organ-ization needs to be adequate to the particular capacity for affection of the particular body. This is what Deleuze and Guattari call “the three-body-problem” (ibid., 181, italics in original), which stipulates that the capacity of a body is increased to the measure of the adequacy of the affections. This means that a body can be without organs not only because it has been “looking for the point at which they could patiently and momentarily dismantle the organization of the organs we call the organism” (ibid., 178, my italic) but also because it has been emptied of organs. In other words, it is not the body-without-organs in itself that make for an increased flow of intensities, it is what the organs do once they have become de-organ-ized that impact what the body can do. The body still needs organs to function, an empty body is a body-without-organs but a non-functional body. In contrast a functional body-without-organs is a body where the organs have become re-distributed in such way as to increase the flow and capacity of the body (ibid., 182f).

Importantly, then, it is not the organs in themselves that are refused through a process of becoming-body-without-organs but a particular organization (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 175). It is not ‘knowing’ that is refused, it is knowledge as a particular stratified relation of power. It is the organization of a dominant power as dominant that is rejected through the body without organs. The aim of the body without organs is not to destroy itself but to open itself to connections beyond the hierarchy of the dominant organism, to in fact create a “bit of a relation to the outside, a little real reality” (Deleuze and Guattari 2009, 334, italics in original). Thus, what matters is not only freeing the body from the Face (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 190) but also understanding what the dis-organized body might be capable of doing once the organization of the organs has been actualized. Thus, one has to ask what the mibwos are: are they cancerous (destructive of compositional relations), neurotic (on an infertile loop), empty (incapable) or full (with complex capabilities for increased compositionality) bodies without organs? In this way, what they can do can also come into effect.

\textsuperscript{93} BwO is an abbreviation of ‘body without organs’, indicating a particular affirmative body in contrast to the empty, neurotic or cancerous body without organs.
Conclusion

In this chapter, I have spoken of the mibwo, the mi-boo!, and the mibah. The first increases the flow of the mib, the second resets the direction for flow, and the third empties out the body and overcodes it as a face. The concept of the mib, in its many variations, is used here in the aim of tracing flows of contractions through a series of events of spectating and saying something about what these bodies can do, importantly, as they, as part of me and this thesis, enter contact with the next leg of this experimentation. This is the upcoming second act in which six people were invited, over the course of approximately two months, to participate in a series of events of spectating involving the three films described and analyzed in this chapter.

In the current chapter, I began by discussing the excessive vacillation of conditions for contraction through the event of spectating *Exit Through the Gift Shop*. By making possible an exhausting paradox, this event can be said to have produced a contradictory ‘stretching of the face’. The conditions for the face offered through this event were, as soon as assembled, ‘pulling a face’ – producing a grimace. As such, the face was deformed instead of conformed, which made possible a becoming-mibwo, that is, a disorganization of the viewing subject-as-spectator. The de-organization increased its capacity for affection, which amounted to a leaky body whereby new nodes of connections were created, whereby it became an adequate body.

In the second instance, I traced *I’m Still Here* as an event of overpowering affection both for me and for viewers in a discussion thread on-line. Here, the event of both spectating and discussion became a difficulty to align with a representationalist notion of ‘error’. Through the rush of adrenaline, the viewing subject was halted in its tracks, becoming weary of itself. The excessive doc-contract literally made the viewing subject-as-spectator jump – not out of the body, but out of the Face, out of its identity as ‘spectator’. As such, it was a mi-boo! that offered a possible missing contract and a viewing subject becoming-animal.

In the third instance, I argued that *Catfish*, in theory, could have offered either a doc- or a mock-contract but that the particular temporality of the event of spectating made this difficult, so it amounted to virtual leakages. Instead of becoming actualized into a missing contraction and a possible opening of the mib, these leakages thence became reterritorialized, affirming a dogmatic image of thought. In this way, *Catfish* makes for a facialized mib that fails to offer the missing contract but also does not fully fall

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back on a doc/mock-contract. Instead, it is a virtual missing contract, and
the body produced is a virtual mibwo, since it is actualized as a virtual
body, thus suspending the organization as well as the flow. It leaks, but not
as in a flow, but through the black holes on the white wall of the face
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 201). What I mean to say is that here the
mibwo is possible, but it ends up actualized in a mibah.

So far, I have argued that the films chosen all make possible a destabili-
zation of contractual practice and, in different ways, the possible activation
of a missing-contract. The mibs actualized throughout this chapter have
brought forth intensities in flux, a continuous de- and re-organization of
the mib brought on by contradictory contractions. These de- and reorgani-
zations are also effectuated in relation to pre- or post-viewing statements in
the press by the filmmakers. The point is that the event is continuous, it is
not over when the film ends. Rather, the event of spectating and the mib it
produces is (most often) initiated before the act of spectating and continues
well beyond the screen turns black.

As I have argued, that which enters the body as a relation, in this case,
the forces of contracting, impacts what the body can do. Doing, as has
been discussed previously, is a matter of capacity for affective entangled
production of existence. So far, my investigation has brought forth a cou-
ple of mibs that have the force of the missing in various degrees. Any other
mibs to come, by other viewing subjects in other localities, are truly yet-to-
come.

Using this chapter as the first extended lines of a cartographer in action,
the ensuing documentation in chapters five through seven will be the con-
tinuation of a mapping of a territory of events where there is a destabiliza-
tion of the discourse of factuality giving cause the problem of the mock-
mode and disruptions to the receptive regime of recognition, consequently
challenging the viewing subject-as-spectator and what this, as part of a
mib, can do.
Chapter 5: The Study, experimenting with data-production and reception

“The condition for designation, or recognition must be a condition of real experience, not of possible experience. It forms an intrinsic genesis. Not an extrinsic conditioning. In every respect, truth is a matter of genitality, not of innateness or reminiscence” (Deleuze 2004a, 192).

In this chapter, I will explain how I have chosen to structure the research design of the experimental reception study, which I will simply refer to as The Study. The research design was constructed in order to be open and porous enough to, following John Law (2004), allow for the messiness of the empirical extended event (41) yet at the same time be attuned to the partial and situated (Haraway 1988). It is a question of making possible “a view from somewhere” (Ibid., 580), and as such, it is an ethical imperative of making possible “connections and unexpected openings” (ibid., 590).

To construct a research design that makes for data that is messy enough to allow for the simultaneously salient yet partial perspectives as produced through events of spectating, The Study is constituted through the production of a tri-fold set of data over the course of two months. This, I argue, made possible a collection of data through which a possible flux of contractions could be traced.

The proposal as it was conceived, as it stands in this dissertation, and as it was presented to the data-producers is a methodology of experimentation. To invite others into the experiment is to acknowledge the inherent collectivity involved in any knowledge production as well as take the risk of ending up somewhere unthought (at least by the academic).

I hold that there is an ethical need to experiment with methodology, notably since academic work itself integrates power-relations endemic to the system it aims to understand and critique. Thus, there should be spaces for rethinking our own practices, a venturing outside of the known and an expanding of the territories through which our practices become capable. It is to try to be response-able, as in acknowledging the practice of knowledge production as an inherently political practice in either a micro or macro sense (or both), as well as to find a way to offer conditions re-

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95 The construct of the design is forcefully influenced by Donna Haraway’s (1988) argument that it is not the splitting of the subject and object that is flawed in the “science question” but that it does not perform enough of a splitting (586). Objectivity in science can only, she argues, be obtained through an epistemology of “heterogeneous multiplicities that are simultaneously salient and incapable of being squashed into isomorphic slots or cumulative lists” (ibid.).
sponse-able enough to produce data that correspond to each particular location of becoming-animal, becoming-thinking, becoming-nomad.

**The Study, extending an event**

The data-production of The Study began in March 2016 as I first met up with the data-producers for a meet-and-greet with the distribution of the films on DVD (first fika). It ended approximately two months later, after a series of individual screenings and subsequent emailed responses to questions (the Q&As), three further fikas and the collective production of a Prezi. Around a year later, I sent the analysis to the data-producers and asked that they share some thoughts regarding their participation in hindsight.

The design of The Study was devised with the aim of tracing the constitutive flow of events understanding these to extend in time both forwards and backwards, thus also perpetually change. By producing a series of events where the mock-mode is realized and where documentations mapping the same can be constructed all the while understanding the intraactivity of these processes, The Study functions as the production of mental ecologies and a cartography of connective leaks and flows.

In thinking about the key factors that the research design of The Study needed to contain, I came to the conclusion that in working with events as material, the temporal aspect needs to be given attention, especially since the conceptualization of event here is influenced by Deleuze’s philosophy of difference. In other words, I need a design that allows for a tracing of the flux of contractions over time in order to map the difference in repetition. A weakness in the design is that I do not make it possible to account for the different degrees of foreknowledge that the data-producers bring with them into The Study. However, the scope of The Study was planned

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96 ‘Data’ is to be understood according to its different meanings in the English language, that is, evidence, testimony, but also experiment and fact. Hence, there is no discrepancy here between the more self-reporting status of data (as in testimony) or data as an observation made in experience (as in a common positivist notion of fact). Notably, this methodology does not try to excavate ‘how things are’ but ‘what is done’, although acknowledging that how the data-producers and myself understand what we do is an intrinsic part of what we, in fact, come to do.

97 As Sarah Dyke (2013) has clarified, working with “Deleuze’s notion of the event what is at stake is always already connected to multiple interplays: the potential and the actual; corporeality and incorporeality; bodies and language; the individual and that which is pre-individual” (146). My research design must therefore be fluid enough to be able to trace such a moving object of study.
to make possible a plugging in\textsuperscript{98} of the methods assemblage. I am not intending to offer conclusive and definite answers to the exactness of fluxes of these specific persons, only to address the practices of contractions in the series of events produced in the frame of this thesis.

Another aspect was how to present the films themselves. Since I wanted to allow for conversations among the data-producers that would cut to the core of what the encounter with these films was doing (without telling them that that is what I was looking for) – in other words to avoid their conversations getting stuck in narrative proper, as in discussing ‘what the film is about’ (which, according to my experience as a teacher, is the default point of entry for unguided conversations pertaining to film experience) – I chose to structure the screenings of the films in a particular way, as a series of events whose affections and actions would be recorded through a tripartite method for documentation.

**On data and documentation**

The documentation composing the data is constituted of three parts: a series of written questions and answers (Q&As), notes taken during fikas and the production of a Prezi (an on-line presentation software platform I will describe further). In the succeeding sections, I will describe and discuss these three sets of documentations and how they came about, but first let me offer a note on how to understand the term ‘document’ and ‘documentation’. In the field of documentation studies, the core question, perhaps understandably, is What is a document? Drawing from Suzanne Briet, who is considered one of the founders of the field, Niels Windfeldt Lund and Michael Buckland argue that a document can be considered ‘any concrete or indexical sign ([indice](#)) preserved for the purpose of representing, reconstituting, or proving a physical or intellectual phenomenon’ (2008, 162). Hence, any tracings made for the purpose of describing “events, processes, images, and objects as well as texts” can be considered (Buckland 1997). Importantly, if the people who participated in The Study had seen a film and then went on their merry way, there would be no documentation of the event (although the event would have occurred). But by asking them to answer a set of questions, meeting for coffee (during which time I was allowed to take notes), and having them conjointly produce a Prezi, the people (me included) become data-producers.

\textsuperscript{98} In discussing the relation between theory and method, Alecia Y. Jackson and Lisa A. Mazzei (2012) use the term ‘plugging in’, borrowed from Deleuze and Guattari (2009), to reference the processes of setting up a creative-connective web of relations, a ‘plugging in’ of theory as method (Jackson and Mazzei 2012, 1-5).
Consistent with a the ethico-onto-epistemology of the proposed method assemblage, the capacity of the document producer is understood not only as “[…] a mere conveyance, or channel, for the transmission of intentional substance from the mind of the sender to the mind of the receiver […]” (Frohmann 2004, 390) but as a documentation of thought in the process of being thought or even of thought not yet imagined. As such, the practice of document-production is understood as an added relation into a situated territory, a partial perspective that changes the territory through which it has become actualized.

However, intention is not the only operative concept in determining whether something is a document. Documentation can clearly offer a conveyance of something not intended, and this ‘not intended’ can be irrefutable. For instance, I might not mean for my diary to ‘become documentation of ordinary life in Sweden in the early 21st century’, but in 200 years this might be the case. In different contexts, documentation becomes capable of doing different things. Thus, a document can also provide evidence of something yet to pass, a mapping of a process still undefined, such as, drawing from the above example, the future context for historicizing ‘ordinary life’ in Sweden. In conclusion, the essential question to ask when assessing whether something is a document lies in considering the context and intention of its production as well as its reception. The context and intention of the production of the Prezi, the Q&A and the fika notes all make for a reception of these as documentations of a series of events of spectating that have passed (or, perhaps more adequately, are in passing). As such, I will take them to be data.

This understanding of the term documentation leads me refer to the participants in The Study as data-producers. This choice was informed by the explicit task I gave them: to produce and provide data to be flushed through the method assemblage here at offer. Moreover, I declared to them that my desire was to posit them as subjects in charge of the project rather than ‘objects of study’. To emphasis their productive nature I thus use the term data-producer throughout.

Setting it up
The data-producers were six in total, three women and three men.99 My original plan was to introduce the project to different classes of students at

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99 Considering that this study does not aim at investigating spectating practices in relation to gendered identity in particular – although I think this could clearly be done in a future application – this demarcation is only offered as a way to work with data that will bring forth somewhat varied perspectives and experiences. The terminology corresponds to the chosen pronouns of the data-producers.
MIRIAM VON SCHANTZ: The doc, the mock and the what?

Örebro University at the beginning of the spring semester of 2016. Since I wanted the project to enable a documentation of spectatorial contractions – and because these are informed, to a large degree, as has been discussed, through foreknowledge – I chose to exclude film students, considering that I give a documentary/mockumentary lecture to all new films students. This made me think they might automatically give me answers they thought ‘I wanted’. To invite people whom I had not had as students was thus one of the criteria for selection. I do want to point out, however, that I believe that an even deeper foreknowledge can be extended and traced through the proposed theoretical and methodological framework, but for the sake of producing an exemplification of said framework, I chose in this instance to work with a group of people who had not discussed mockumentaries academically beforehand.

During the first part of the spring semester, I started making rounds in different classes, introducing the project and myself. In the pitch for The Study, I asked for participation in an experimental reception-study, and I described in detail what they would be asked to do and the amount of hours and effort it would require. I explained the research design: The project would include a screening for each of the three films on DVD in a setting of their own choice. They would have two weeks each per film to complete the screening at their individual leisure before meeting together for a fika, of which there would be four in total (one to launch the project and then one after each of the three two-week periods). They would also be asked to collectively produce a Prezi. I made it clear that entries into the Prezi could be made at any moment in time or from anywhere they wanted throughout the period of time The Study would last; the only thing needed was an Internet connection. Before and after seeing each film, they would also receive questions through their e-mail (one to answer before each film and several after), and they were asked to respond to these before the next fika. In addition, I explained that I would send them the analysis during the next academic year and that they would be invited to write an evaluation of their participation in the project. I promised them anonymity in the analyses.

I also spelled out some of what I saw as rewards for participation, such as the opportunity to see the three films in question on DVD, with a DVD-player on loan for the full period if needed, four free fika, and an increased competence to think and talk about film and to work with the on-line presentation software Prezi.

The series of screenings would be structured as follows: data-producers 1&2 would receive film A (*I'm still Here*), data-producers 3&4 would receive film B (*Exit Through the Gift Shop*), and data-producers 5&6
would receive film C (*Catfish*). This part of the project would stretch over a period of approximately two months to be followed by the lesser effort of writing an evaluation together after a minimum of six months had ensued. I suggested that for a person interested in film and discussion, participation in the project could be interesting, but I chose not to develop any extended insights into the nature of my thesis, such as its theoretical or methodological framework, in order to make possible data production that allowed for a freer flow of ideas.

During the canvassing period, I talked to different classes of students of media and communication, digital media design, and pedagogy. I worked with only a few criteria besides being non-film student, namely, having access to a personal laptop and Internet and not having seen the three films in question. When only one student ended up signing on to the project through these classroom interventions, I decided to rethink the criteria of not having seen any of the three films. This initial criterion had come about as a means to have a group of data-producers with similar foreknowledge, but naturally, even if the data-producers had not seen these three films, they would have very different backgrounds and foreknowledge about many other things that could equally inform their different processes of contractions. Therefore, I decided to skip this criterion as I expanded my search for data-producers. Also, taking into consideration that the three films were fairly recent and distributed in the mainstream, I came to see that perhaps it was an unnecessary difficulty that would add little of importance to the project.

In addition, I realized that getting people who were motivated to be part of the project was a more important criterion, especially considering it would stretch over a long period of time. And since some of my colleagues had begun to recommend students who were highly motivated, I decided to conduct a more extensive outreach by e-mailing a presentation of the project to selected students (this consisted of offering the same information as in the pitch to the groups of students as explained above). Besides the one person who signed up through my initial canvassing effort, four data-producers joined the project in this way. The sixth data-producer was not a student but contacted me to express interest in being part of the project, having heard about it through a cousin who was a media and communications student at the university. For the sake of anonymity, I have changed the names of the six data-producers in this paper. Joe was a first-semester student in media and communications, Lisa a bachelor student in media and communications, George a bachelor student in pedagogy, Bruno, a bachelor student in media and communications, Rosa an unemployed as-
piring student and Marie a second-semester student in media and communications.

The films had not already been seen by the data-producers but Bruno and George had seen *Exit Through the Gift Shop* and *Catfish*, respectively, and Rosa realized during her first screening that she had seen bits of *I’m Still Here* (by chance, on cable) but that she had forgotten about it. Because George and Bruno knew beforehand that they had seen these films, I organized the series so that they would see a different film as their first in order to see if they would experience the previously encountered films differently this time around. For Bruno, *Exit Through the Gift Shop*, which he had already seen, was assigned last. For George, *Catfish* came second.

As has been spelled out above, I chose to provide only very basic information about the theoretical nature of my project, but there was informed consent: the data-producers were informed that The Study was an experimental reception study that would be part of a PhD in media and communications. Anyone who wanted to leave the study was clearly free to do so at his or her will (and Rosa did end up leaving half-way through), and they were promised anonymity. I also informed them that they would be given a chance to read the analysis, and if they so wanted, comment on this and other thoughts related to their participation in a later document (this became the document Google.doc, attached in this thesis as Appendix C, which I will discuss a bit more shortly).

When asked why they were to see these particular films or what my dissertation ‘was about’, I replied that this, in a way, was what it was about: to see what they thought about these films and the experience of seeing them and talking about them, and also that this was the reason I didn’t want to reveal the specificities of my theoretical framework. But naturally, I tried to be as forthcoming as possible about what was expected of them as data-producers (including telling them that I would call them data-producers and the reasons why). I made sure they knew what they signed on to do (answer questions, see the films, and do a Prezi with all that these activities entailed in terms of time-consumption and effort). I also informed them that I would use the data produced in order to activate a methodological experimentation in order to ask questions pertaining to the reception of films.

Thus, it was a conscious choice to not give the data-producers too many instructions as to the ‘quality’ of their contribution, although the quantitative effort was clearly stated. This choice was made in order to provoke the birthing of organizing practices, such as seeing whether a reiteration of a representationalist conceptualization of ‘knowledge’ would be produced in order to stabilize the event (knowledge as disciplining power, in Foucauldian-
an terms) and seeing whether a more wandering-practice of opening onto the unknown would occur and, if yes, how.

**Structure of series and documentation design**

The Study was designed in such a way as to encourage the data-producers to actualize and synthesize the affects beyond the compartmentalization of each film. Hence, the choice was made to design an event where the data-producers would have a conversation, both on-line through the Prezi and in real life, without all of them having seen the same films at the same time. As such, I wanted the design to provoke thought about the **event** rather than ‘the film’. In other words, I conditioned the possible intra-action through the event by creating a schemata of overlapping extensity or a succession of folds that were produced in the ongoing becoming of the event over time, thus giving the data-producers different points of entry in the aim of seeing whether and how they would navigate an experience of shared affection (if such would occur) where the attributes might still differ. As such a ‘series’, the structure for the events of spectating and documentations thereof can be considered to have materialized time into values and thought (Rodowick 1997, 140).

Considering that the affection of an event extends the particular time in which it occurred, what ‘has been’ will take on new meanings and consequences in a new time-and-place (context). In other words, the past may change through future events. I wanted to craft a design that allowed for a possible mapping of the folding and unfolding of these movements of de- and reterritorializations.100

The tri-partite documentation design gave the data-producers the complementary opportunity to make use of both written and oral faculties as well as a sense of individual and collective thought. The choice of offering the films on DVD (as well as DVD-players, in some instances) as opposed to screening them at the university was made with the aim of enabling data production that would reflect a social context close to the one the data-producers would choose in their every day life even if they were not part of the project (acknowledging that this is a speculative ‘if’). As The Study progressed, the data-producers offered many thoughts on the social context of film reception. In chapter seven, I dedicate a section to discussing this more in-depth.

100 In *Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's Film Philosophy* (2010), D.N. Rodowick discusses the time-image as such a non-chronological force; see xviii. Here, I discuss the event of spectating that brings out the mock-mode as capable of such non-chronological force.
To work with a methodological design that takes into account practices of film reception as these occur is to offer a way to work with an investigation into ‘film-in-action’ in a similar intention to Helen Wood’s (2007) methodological suggestion for a “text-in-action” approach. Wood works with conversational analysis in order to capture conversations as they occur while watching television. I employ the mediamaterialist concepts of spectatorial contractions and the mib to amplify and make resonate the patterns of affective flux in and after reception (as presented in the data). Where Wood investigates broadcast talk as a “conversational floor” (2007) for viewers in action, I investigate events of spectating the affective mockumentary as a particular space for affections and contractions for viewing subjects-in-action, one could say. Hence, I argue that events of spectating can, just like Wood’s ‘texts’, “be analysed as events of dialogic social action, transcending distinctions of text and content” (ibid., 80, italics in original).

In Wood’s methodology, the presence of the researcher in the viewing setting serves as the interlocutor who enables the viewer to produce inner speech out loud (ibid., 92f). In this research design, the series of events – fika, screenings, questions and Prezi – enabled the data-producers to ‘speak out loud’ through e-mails, at fika and in the Prezi, a speech that was subsequently intercepted by the method assemblage for mediamateriality as a “radio receiver” or “a gong” (Law 2004, 117).

Similarly to Woods methodology, my hope is that the serial approach of my proposal will enable one “to see the shifting positions that one might occupy over the duration of the viewing experience, rather than attempting to fix viewing positions in terms of their reading after the event” (Wood 2007, 99). It is, in Haraway’s words (1988), a desire to offer a design of “[f]eminist accountability [that] requires a knowledge tuned to resonances, not to dichotomy” (588). Consequently, I craft this methodology with the aim of following the ‘shifting positions’ within an event as well as over the course of several events, understanding the very event to not end as the documentation-event of The Study has ended. This is also why we will revisit this part of the project through a collective on-line document produced the following academic year, with the aim of it being capable of “tuning in on resonances” as these are produced over time. My proposal to offer a conversational floor through the Prezi software, the questions, fika and screening events (and a Google.doc) is an attempt to make possible multivocal data that can trace the ‘simultaneously salient’ yet perhaps contradictory positions, understanding the event of spectating as a possibility for fluctuating and paradoxical movements of the mind rather than a clear and concise journey from A to B.
The fika
The fika was voiced to the data-producers as a practical way for them to exchange films and to get to know each other’s faces as well as my own. Also, since they received no other remuneration for their participation, I encouraged them to choose freely from the cafeteria so that they would feel a bit compensated for their time. Considering the social context of fika in Sweden, I gathered that it would be a good context for introducing an experiment that I wanted the data-producers to experience as fun, relaxed, unpretentious and hopefully inspiring. That they would feel safe, free and confident in their own abilities, simply by being, were other important aspects that I intentionally tried to bring to the fika (in other words, the focus was not on performance). In this way, I hoped to produce conditions that would make them feel at ease so that they could have open and relaxed conversations as if among friends.

Naturally, we could have met in other ways if the only goal was to simply exchange the DVDs, but I was working with the hypothesis that they would feel a need to ventilate some affections and I wanted to see what they would feel the need to discuss with their project peers.

We decided to meet at a café at the university campus, since most of them were students and it suited them. I took field notes during the fikas, although I tried to keep the atmosphere as light and casual as possible. Regarding the time-frame for the fika, I told the data-producers that it could be as short or long as they wanted; as long as they had things they wanted to discuss, we would continue, but if they wanted to leave, they were free to do so. The fika usually lasted as long as the group stayed together. If one of the data-producers got up to leave, the rest would usually follow. As The Study progressed, the fikas became longer and longer. Whereas the first fika had taken around 15 minutes, the fourth and final

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101 The style chosen for transcription of these is a first person perspective: I am the one channeling the data-producers’ voices, but their clear presence as second persons is to be observed. I have tried to stay as close to the data-producers’ own formulations as the translation and transcription would allow, albeit clearly using an analytic vocabulary not shared by the data-producers, such as ‘event of spectating’, ‘missing contract’, etcetera. Also, they do not refer to themselves as ‘data-producers’ but as participants or, simply, ‘the others’ (although I told them I would call them data-producers in the text).
fikas lasted over one-and-a-half hours. An easy conclusion is that the extension of a series where the problem of recognition was brought to the fore produced a momentum for discussions, not dissipation. In other words, the problem of recognition itself offered a productive rather than a reductive problem. The more we spoke about their affections and thoughts, the more they had to talk about.

Q&A, e-mails
I constructed the questions so that they would not be too demanding and yet open enough for the data-producers to use them in correspondence with the particular problem the events posed for them. As with all of our intra-actions throughout the project, the working language was Swedish. I have thus translated the data, and the questions they received are translated and included in Appendix A. One of the aspects covered by the set of questions was the setting of spectating, the ‘where’, ‘with whom’ and ‘how’. Another aspect was the use of so-called second screens and other interactions with media during the screening and to what end. Although the aim of this thesis is not to take charge of the particular practice of second screening (see Wilson 2016) or SMU (simultaneous media use; see Hassoun 2014), I believe these practices are intrinsic to events of spectating today and that it is important to take them into account, notably when it comes to charting the contractual practices of de- and reterritorializations

102 I had not anticipated that the data-producers would want to stay and converse as much as they ended up doing. By use of a tape-recorder, I could have gathered a more detailed documentation. Moreover, perhaps the data-producers would have felt less observed than with me taking notes throughout, although I did try to be as discrete as possible. I think that the foundation for them not feeling observed was still the relaxed and friendly atmosphere that I intentionally tried to bring to the framing of the fika.

103 If I have put something in citation marks, it is because it was written like that in original. To provide transparency in translation, I have chosen to include the original Swedish word or say in bracketed parenthesis where the translation has been particularly tricky.
of knowledge. 104 Also, questions pertaining to what they had seen and experienced through the event of screening were asked, and as the event was extended, questions asking them to begin comparing and evaluating the experiences were included.

I provided instructions through e-mail and at the first fika. They would receive the first question to answer before watching the film (sent to them as an e-mail directly after each fika). I asked that they send their response to me just before they put on the film (in the setting of their own choosing any time during the following two week period). When I received the answer to the first question, I would know that they had begun to watch the film, and I would subsequently e-mail back within a couple of hours, sending them the rest of the set of questions to answer after they had seen each film. They were asked to only open that e-mail when they had in fact seen the whole film (thus, to wait should they choose to see the film in several sittings). There was always just one question before each film, asking them to account for what they had heard, read or otherwise knew of the film in question. Before the third film, I additionally asked if they had certain expectations. After each event of screening, there were three, five and, finally, six questions to answer. The increased number of questions was due to a more overt focus on expectation and comparison. All data-producers but one remained with The Study until the last fika. Rosa, who had to leave The Study after the second screening, did so due to a new job, which naturally became her first priority.

104 The term second screen often refers to a second screen through which a viewer may interact with and follow the same content as on the first screen, for instance, AMC’s “The Walking Dead: StorySync” which offers a way to play with and engage in the story unfolding on the first screen: http://www.amc.com/shows/the-walking-dead/story-sync/ (accessed 180115). Interestingly, this can only be done while watching the show as it airs for the first time. Hence, AMC uses second screening as a measure to counter illegal downloading. Other common second screen usages include voting apps connected to game shows, a use that also reactivates the feature of the liveness of traditional television reception. This particular use of second screening, that is, activation of liveness, is not relevant with regards to the study presented in this chapter, although it could become relevant considering the application of this methodology to events of spectating other audio-visual material where the mock-mode is actualized besides the affective mockumentary that is here investigated. Here, the questions in the Q&A have touched upon the use of a second screen/simultaneous media use as a way to account for the different strategies in producing spectatorial contractions, notably by negotiating questions pertaining to foreknowledge and the production of a particular relation to a discourse of factuality.
Prezi

Prezi is an on-line presentation software program that allows for up to ten participants to interact with the software simultaneously. When the six data-producers had confirmed their interest in being part of the project, I e-mailed them information about how to open a Prezi account and when and where to meet for the first time (fika one of four). Some of the data-producers were already familiar with the software, but I invited them to take part in a Prezi-tutorial available on-line (this allowed them to brush up on their Prezi skills at their own convenience throughout the event). I also gave them a document (Appendix B) where I discussed the Prezi as a possible mind-map and encouraged them to use Prezi as a shared on-line space where they could meet to express and share their thoughts in-between the different fikas. I instructed them to interact freely with the Prezi, starting at their leisure, possibly after our first fika (that is, even before they had seen either of the films in The Study). Moreover, I encouraged them to engage with the whole of the Prezi from the beginning and include whatever came to their minds – it wouldn’t even have to do explicitly with any of the films, perhaps the data-producers would see other films during the two month-period that would make for interesting associations. I made clear that all of this could be included in the Prezi, that they were-free, and that they could do no right or wrong.

One of the salient aspects I tried to take into account in designing the study-experiment was to condition it so that it would produce data that would not only trace the process of becoming of the events of spectating, and the larger event of the project, but also the process in a setting that imitates a contemporary practice of spectating film in Sweden today. My contention was that today, increasingly more events of spectating are taking place in the home, or even in public spaces such as public transport, as opposed to the cinema, and a good guess is that other media practices can intermingle with the event of spectating. For instance, a person can be

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105 It offers a collaborative framework for developing a navigational chart of ideas, multimedia content and information, and it functions as a structuring device for flows of ideas and associative connections. Although one can choose several different templates (just as in, e.g., Power Point) one of the unique features of Prezi is that it offers a clean slate that can be as large or small as one wishes, since it is possible to produce extreme in- and out-zooms. As such, it does actually offer a unique open plane through which a landscape, of any color, size, function or style, can become actualized. In addition, it allows the participants to freely produce links as well as the mentioned in- and out-zooms of subject matter, making it simultaneously open and structured, allowing for parallel micro- and macro-perspectives.
searching the Internet for information about a film during the very screening of the film, either on a computer, telephone or other such internet-connected device. Conversations can occur during the event of spectating, particularly understanding the event in a more extended temporal sense where the event begins before the actual screening, with conversations possibly occurring on- or off-line in the days, weeks, and months both before and after the event of the screening proper. Hence, the choices of productive devices for my study, which, besides having been born out of the process-oriented ethico-onto-epistemological assumptions, were influenced by the need to allow the data-producers to enter the events of spectating in locations they would usually have chosen (the choice of the DVD), to interact with one-another on-line (the Prezi) and to express the specificities of their choices (through the Q&A, for instance). As an on-line platform, the Prezi offered the possibility for the data-producers to work collectively but without having to adapt to each other’s schedules, since it is possible to use it from any location and at any time – all one needs is an online account, and these can be registered in a couple of minutes for free.

I created a new Prezi through my own account, and when the data-producers had opened an account, I asked them to e-mail me so that I could invite them to the Prezi. I entitled it “TittaFilm” (as a very preliminary title, this simply means LookFilm in Swedish) and chose a non-formatted template. I told them at the first fika that they were very welcome to change both title and template, but in the end, they did neither. Considering that up to ten people can collectively work on the same Prezi, using this software made it possible for me to ‘listen in’ throughout the unfolding of the event while staying ‘out’ of the conversation (at least that particular part of the conversation).

Since I could enter my Prezi account and follow as well as save copies of the process, I saved eight copies in all, naming the eighth the ‘final’, since there were no amendments after this one. I saved a copy once a week, with adjustments over the Easter holidays, since I thought, rightly so, that not too many changes would occur over the weekend. At the last fika, the data-producers decided on a date to sit down in person and finish the Prezi. This date was the same date of the final Prezi since after this date there were no additions.106

106 The final Prezi has been made public at: https://prezi.com/explore/search/?search=Tittafilm#search=Tittafilm&reusable=false&page=1&users=less (accessed 180118)
Google.doc (Spring 2017)
As has been stressed throughout, there is a need to account for the extensivity of events, since what the event ‘was’ will be ‘known’ – and perhaps changed – long after it ‘happened’. To trace the affection of the event during the spring of 2016 and to enable a follow-up after an even longer period had passed, I informed the data-producers that I would e-mail them with the analyses of the data sometime during the next academic year together with a request to co-write an evaluatory Google.doc on-line. This document is included here as Appendix C.

I created the document, including some instructions that asked them to reflect on my analyses and/or the process of producing The Study as well as any thoughts they have had pertaining to their participation since we last saw each other.

For reasons unknown to me (perhaps lack of time, illness, or lack of motivation), only four of the six data-producers answered my e-mail and subsequently added entries to the Google.doc, and these were added one after another. The entries were inserted into a document at Google.doc. For these to be put through as little interpretation and translation by me as possible, I asked that they write in English. However, one of the entries was in Swedish, so I translated it but kept the Swedish original in bracketed parentheses.

Since I did not manage to produce a sense of relevance for all the data-producers to participate in this last part of The Study, this part could be considered a failure. Perhaps I should have prepared for a follow-up meeting in person instead, although I did not want to ask for too much of their time, since they had already given a lot during the spring. To work instead with a sort of logbook could have been a way forward in order to obtain data pertaining to the continuing unfolding of effects and affects after the final screening had passed. However, having concluded that this part of The Study was a failure, as in not managing to be perceived as relevant to all the data-producers, nor a document of vivid discussion, I would still hold that the content of the actual document is highly indicative of the merits of The Study for the evolving process of learning and unlearning of the data-producers, since this is something all four mentioned – even specifically proposing that the study could be used as a class assignment. As a method for film pedagogy, The Study thus appears to have had a lasting effect, and this is a result worth noting. Hence, I will return to this question of the method assemblage as a moving-image-pedagogics in the last part of the last chapter.
Chapter 6: Analyses, unfoldings

“[t]he event is coextensive with becomings, and becomings is itself coextensive with language; the paradox is thus essentially a ‘sorites,’ that is a series of interrogative propositions which, following becoming, proceed through successive additions and retrenchments. Everything happens at the boundary between things and propositions” (Deleuze 1990, 8).

In this and the following chapter, I will put the method assemblage for mediamateriality to use by offering an analysis of the data The Study has provided. In this chapter, I will focus on the data of the e-mails, what I also refer to as the Q&As, and in the next chapter, I will look more closely at the Prezi. In both chapters, I will contrast these data produced by the data-producers with the data of my field notes.

To show how the different data-producers navigate the unfolding of the series of events that compose The Study, the analytic account is structured chronologically. This means that I will start with the e-mailed responses of the first Q&A followed by the following fika where I will offer a commentary on the research design, how and why I have chosen to work with multiple overlapping data and the serial structure. This is prompted by the obvious change in the data-producers way of discussing the events of spectating when writing to me and when meeting each other, notably by simplifying their experience of the first screening. As I move into the next section, analyzing the Q&A after the second screening, I will show how the data-producers now change their contractions, not only of the second film, but notably also of the first, by re-contracting the first through the production of patterns. To continue an analysis of the movement of this contractual flux and its production of difference in repetition, I will follow this section with a section on the third and last Q&A. Here, I will contrast the third Q&A with some field notes from both fikas before and after the third screening as well as with previous Q&As in order to show how the series of paradoxical contractions in most cases amounts to an exhaustion. In addition, I will discuss this as making possible a process of unlearning, that is, a questioning of the pregivens and an opening towards a new thought. In the last section of this chapter, I will ground a conclusion in the data of the last and fourth fikas, discussing how this exhaustion eventually makes possible a becoming-other of the viewing subject-as-spectator.

Dichotomies and Paradoxes (first e-mail/Q&A)

From the very beginning of The Study, the responses in the first e-mails/Q&As seem to suggest that the mock-mode is brought forth as a problem, independently of which of the three films the data-producers have
seen. This is important to take note of, since I had not discussed the problem of the mock-mode with the data-producers, and yet five data-producers out of six found that these first encounters brought out an affective event whereby questions pertaining to the veracity of the films was central, albeit in different ways, as I will discuss here.

For Lisa, Joe and George, it becomes an event that affects their view of themselves as recognizers and knowers of a correct relation between the factual and the fictive, notably bringing forth feelings of disorientation and anger. Their subsequent strategies to reinstate stability are oriented towards judgment and the bringing forth of an authoritarian notion of Knowledge. For Bruno and Rosa, there is identification of a destabilizing tension between dichotomies throughout this first screening, but their emails do not describe this as a cause for disruptive affections but rather as a source/tool for increased enjoyment. Lastly, for Marie, the identification of dichotomies serves to naturalize a pregiven stabilization. Hence, in this first documentation, there are traces of doc-contracts, mock-contracts and tentative openings towards missing-contracts.

In the instances where the affective resonances cause a disruptive sensation, the problem of the mock-mode produces a paradoxical relation when thoughts and feelings are working against each other as opposites: on the one hand, there is recognition of the film as a possible fiction, thus producing a possible mock-contract, but on the other hand, there is a strong feeling of being upset with the actions performed, as if these were performed in real life, thence suggesting a doc-contract (although this contradicts the data-producers’ own thinking). The preferred strategy in these instances seems to be the erection of strong either/or argumentation and judgment (thus, structuring thinking onto a dichotomous frame).

One example of this thought/feeling paradox is Joes’ answer in the first e-mail, where he describes “first thinking” that the film was a “real documentary” (*I’m Still Here*), although towards the end of the e-mail, he states that this thought did not persist. However, this is not his main concern in the e-mail; rather, he spends most of his response describing his feelings towards the main actor, Joaquin Phoenix. Due to his previous “high respect for Joaquin”, there is an initial affection launched through the fall from grace of a person hitherto respected. This leads Joe to use harsh phrasings when he formulates how he would describe the film that he suggests is about “the pathetic and desperate personality that Joaquin shows us time and time again”. He explains that his reason for “putting such an emphasis on the characteristics of him [Joaquin] is because of the respect he previously had (and still has) for Joaquin as a person and an actor”. He ends this answer by saying that in hindsight, he thinks this is not a doc-
mentary and is thus not a reflection of Joaquin’s “actual personality”, but he continuous to assert that this incertitude about the veracity of the film is “naturally [something that he] can’t say to the person he wants to make see the film”.

So although he does arrive at the conclusion that it is not a “real documentary”, he persistently makes reference to “Joaquin” as a “person and an actor” and not a character in the film, which would be more reasonable considering that he himself had just stated that he actually thinks it is not a documentary. His reason is that it is a way of producing interest in the film if he were to recommend it to a friend. At the same time, his strong feelings about “the person and actor Joaquin” produce an interesting inconsistency, where Joe strongly emphasizes the respect he has for the actor while also calling him a “pretentious poet”.

This inconsistency is not evident in the overt content of Joe’s e-mail but in its emotional and judgmental tonality. This produces a paradoxical relation between a thought, namely, recognition of the film as possibly fiction, thus producing a mock-contraction, and an affection, namely, disappointment in the behavior of a ‘person’ hitherto respected, hence indicating a doc-contraction. It is disappointment in someone being different than previously thought. This paradox functions to deterritorialize the contractual practice of Joe whereby the film is talked about as “either/or” but actualized in reception as “both”.

This lack of consistency produces a tension that demands a strong emphasis on either/or argumentation in order to stabilize affection. The paradox in Joe’s contraction touches upon something closely attached to his feeling of self, particularly his relation with an actor he holds in high regard. He feels strong disappointment in the actor, a disappointment that is possible on the grounds of a doc-contraction. But a doc-contraction threatens to dislocate his own view on himself: who is he when the person he looks up to fails him? A way of solving this is to conclude that it wasn’t real, thus keeping his relationality to himself intact, in short, saying it is a mock-contraction (even though his feelings pertain to a doc-contraction). In this way, there is a tremor, but no landslide. The event threatened to tear his face off, which is to say de-organize his world, but he was rescued at the last minute. The sad affects of the possible doc-contraction have, although perhaps only momentarily, been domiciled through a mock-contraction. Only for the sake of making it more interesting for another person to see would he conceal that the film is not a documentary, although his alternation between past and present tense in writing about the experience of the event indicates a slight unsureness if this is indeed what he thinks about the film. The
mock-contraction is thus weakly established and is ultimately grounded in Joe’s assertion of himself as a spectator-knower.

Another weak and wobbly contract is produced by George. However, for him, there is no question that there is some hidden truth that he can (should?) excavate. It is thus an unstable doc-contract. To stabilize this, he will attempt a solidification of dichotomous thinking, although he is still left with doubt and uncertainty towards the end of the email. The prevalent contractual instability is seen in his emails through the expression of rather frustrated affects due to his assertion that he still hasn’t ‘found’ the ‘proper answer’ to the question of the identity of this film (Exit Through the Gift Shop). In his e-mail he expresses an “uncertainty whether the film is real or if it is made up as an art project”. He writes that he researched the film on the Internet both before and after screening it, which suggests that this uncertainty has something to do not only with the screening of the film but also with what he discovered on-line (which underlines the need in the digital age to work with the reception of film as extended events where multimedia practices intermingle in the practice of reception).

Considering George’s uncertainty regarding the veracity of the film, it is interesting to note that he continuously uses the term documentary to reference the film. There is thus an initial doc-contract that is destabilized as it is opened onto a mock-contract through the adding of new knowledge (through on-line investigative practices), but this new knowledge still does not resolve the issue for him, thus resulting in frustration and instability. At this point, George is overtly searching for ‘true knowledge’ about this film, a knowledge that he seems to think exists ‘out there’. Hence, the possibility to extend the event onto a missing is sidelined by the setting up of dichotomous coordinates for thinking, although there is difficulty in actually stabilizing the same. That is, although the encounter becomes an instable event for George, it does not amount to a missing, since he still holds on to the expectation that it should be stable, making him think that it must be that either he still does not have sufficient information to make a stable doc-contract or it has to be an art-contract (suggesting that for him this equals an instable-contract). Lacking decisive knowledge, his conclusion is that he is failing in his status as knower at this point, in short, that there is a truth but he has not been able to grasp it ‘out there’. For him, reterritorializing affection as knowledge seems to be the preferred method for integrating the affections through this event, although towards the end of this first film, he is still unsure. He has set out a dichotomous territory, but the pieces don’t seem to fit.

Similarly, Lisa’s responses in the first e-mail indicate a dominant dichotomous thinking that is intercepted and blurred through affective resonanc-
MIRIAM VON SCHANTZ: The doc, the mock and the what?

Her email expresses a presupposition that there are rights and wrongs, goods and bads, and that her task is to recognize these. First, she approaches this task in a very rational way, and as a student of media and communications, she makes a short would-be semiotic analysis of the DVD cover (Exit Through the Gift Shop), deducing that it is “very disorderly”, which she concludes connotes “a somewhat dark story”. However, she thinks the blurb on the cover calling the film “hysterically funny” contradicts her own analysis. Thus, in the end, she doesn’t know what to expect. She thus enters the screening in a state of ambiguity. This state persists as she watches the film and begins to comment on it. On the one hand, she commends the film’s aesthetics; on the other hand, it “rather made [her] angry”. She concludes that she didn’t laugh once, so she has problems understanding the blurb on the cover. This makes Lisa think that the film breaks protocol, not only because of the paradox of the blurb on the cover that doesn’t respond to her own experience but also because she thinks the film presents her with a moral paradox by raising for her important moral questions, but in a way she finds morally dubious.

Here, it becomes apparent that there is a multiplicity of affections related to her experience of seeing this film and to being asked to think about it, but because of a pregiven thought grounded in a dichotomous thinking of rightfulness, these affections are actualized as emotions of judgment (Deleuze 2004, 167). This concerns, for instance, anger at “all the artist that consistently break the law by spraying or painting on public property” and “the irresponsible behaviour of Thierry regarding his economy and family”. Since she contracts the event as a doc-contract, and since emotions, as has been discussed earlier, are affections rendered communicable to others and are thus a social expression of affect (Shouse 2005), she is compelled to declare a moral judgment in order to position herself as distant from the reality she encounters in the film (in other words, as separate from herself and her own practice of reception). The problem for Lisa is experienced as an overwhelming emotion, but I would argue that it is the affective challenge to her self as a moral person that is the kernel of that problem. By actualizing the affection as judgment, she finds herself overwhelmed by confusion, deterritorialized as a moral human being.

However, this judgment appears to be difficult to sustain throughout even this first e-mail, since she continues with a more appreciative thinking regarding the film’s capacity to make debate possible. Moreover, she detects strategic dichotomies that function as a “balance between opposites”, which she admits to liking. This debate (strategically ordered through dichotomies) is something that she sees as revolving around “the obsession in today’s society” leading her to voice concern about the state of society,
exclaiming, “where are we heading?” Towards the end of her answer, she thus remains in a doc-contract, although her less emotional and more feeling-cum-affection extension of the intensities she finds to be at offer produce an opening towards a rethinking of her own initial statements. The affection is thence not resolved and closed off; rather, it has produced a rift in the known territory.¹⁰⁷

For others, the blurred dichotomy between true and false is experienced as a site for enjoyment in itself. This is the case with Bruno, who produces a mock-contract through the event of spectating his first film (Catfish). However, for him, the affection is joyful and is thus adequate (in a Spinozist sense) and more stable than for Joe, George and Lisa. Before seeing the film, he says he suspects it to be a drama documentary, but after having seen it, he thinks it does raise questions regarding whether it is true or not, both concerning what is going on in the film and the film itself (thus, he starts to untangle the relation between form and content). He concludes that it has the form of a documentary but the content of a fiction film that “makes one as spectator wonder a bit. This is fun”. Importantly for Bruno, he saw the film with his wife, and the second half with his two-year-old daughter when she woke up halfway through. This makes him

“think that that, the context, influenced the film somehow. We talked quite a lot during the film, commenting and different things in the film, and talked about things that didn’t have to do with the film. Then kids always demand a certain attention. I think the documentary format invites to discussion between the viewers in another way than fiction film. A story placed in a documentary is exciting because it is so improbable”.

Thus, for Bruno, the doc-cum-mock-contract is a source for thinking that for him is joyful. He finds the film bizarre but funny, exciting and thought-worthy. Whether or not it is ‘truly’ a documentary or mockumentary, or something else, is not the center of his attention. On the contrary, the way the event produces a tension between the two genres is what makes the event joyful for him. The difficulty of recognition is a source of enjoyment. It is interesting to note that it was the social aspect of the event of spectating that really made it joyful in Bruno’s account. Stating that he has the habit of producing events of spectating as social events, to simply share a

¹⁰⁷ Had the event not been extended, the rift might have just been felt as an ‘error’, making her think the film was ‘bad’ (the fifth postulate of the dogmatic image of thought; see Deleuze 2004a, 186). As will be noted, it is by extending the event, importantly through an opening onto a collective becoming, that her capacity will be increased – in fact, opening into what may be, for Lisa, new territory.
laugh with his family is at the top of his agenda (in chapter seven, I will
discuss how we might understand the social context of these events more
thoroughly). The play with the discourse of factuality doesn’t cause anger;
on the contrary, it is accepted as a conscious method for producing
thought and discussion (in the social context), which are practices he says
he enjoys. For him, this is a fake documentary, or rather, if he were to
guess, that seems to be where he is headed, but he doesn’t really mind ei-
ther way. What he and his family may produce in the space of family life is
what is real and important. To constitute himself as a ‘knower’ in this in-
stance is not his prime concern – the enjoyment is the same either way. The
affection hinges on the tension of an unstable dichotomy but is not ruined
because of it.

Similarly, for Rosa, her first event of spectating (I’m Still Here) is pro-
duced as a joyful event, since the confusing affects being brought out do
not seem to faze her too much. She feels confused, but it is ok. At first,
when she sits down to watch the film, she realizes that she had in fact seen
bits and pieces of it before (on cable), and she remembers her surprise in
seeing an actor she remembers as very good appearing in “such a way”. She
finds this film confusing, since she can’t determine whether it is a docu-
mentary, a parody or “based on a made-up script”. But this confusion
makes the film different from “a typical American film” and would be
cause for her to recommend it to a friend if this person “would like to see
something new”. Although she finds the film “startling and one that will be
remembered without a doubt”108, notably because “it is difficult to deter-
mine what genre it is (documentary/parody)”, she does not express any
negative feelings or emotions. But then she admits to having had her “nose
down the cell phone” interacting with Facebook and text messages. She
thinks the distractions might have made her miss important observations
and rendered her less focused. In the end, the encounter with this film be-
comes an event ‘of interest’ where the confusion is not seen as an obstacle,
but that is not resolved either. It is an open ‘either-or’, a ‘perhaps-both’
that is felt as interesting more than anything else. As such, in the cases of
Rosa and Bruno, this lack of determinacy is understood as a quality in

108 This is an interesting comment by Rosa, since just prior, she had admitted to
having seen the film but had forgotten about it, so this film that in a first instance
was forgettable is now in a second instance, when part of The Study, no less, “one
that will be remembered without a doubt”. This underlines the difficulty in investi-
gating reception, since the actualization of affect into thoughts, words, and actions
through events of spectating produces an affection that is not just ‘there’ but is an
actualization of virtualizations, thus a bringing about what it talks about (just like
the practice of documentary filmmaking).
itself, not actually a lack at all, as it were. Hence, I argue that the events function to open towards a missing contraction.

Marie is the only data-producer who produces a clear-cut doc-contraction in this first part of The Study. Since she has seen the TV-series that is the sequel to the film *Catfish*, her experience of the TV-series overlaps her experience in this encounter, resulting in an event not so much of bringing forth a new thought as a continuation/reiteration of a previous one. For her, there is clearly a repetition of the same, not the different. In conversations with friends (in relation to the TV-series), they had previously spoken about how they would react if they were to be ‘catfished’ and “how stupid most people are [in the series], (since they as spectators) find it obvious that they are being fooled”. These previous conversations and encounters with the TV-series participate in her reception of the film as ‘evidently’ a documentary.

Like her discussion about the TV-series with her friends, this first screening is produced as a social event with her boyfriend. During the screening, both laughter and discussions came forth. Like with Bruno and his family, Marie and her partner also experience it as an enjoyable event, but for other reasons (even though it was in fact the same film). Her comments on the stupidity of the people being catfished can be understood as a way of insulating herself from the affects of the film by recourse to a binary organization. This is about others, not about her. And together with her partner, they can have a laugh about it. ‘They on the screen’ are in ‘error’, whereas she and her partner ‘know’ the ‘truth’ (consistent with the fifth postulate of the dogmatic image of thought; see Deleuze 2004a, 186). The doc-contract establishes a power-relation conditioned through knowledge and judgment, where the relation between Marie and the discourse of factuality remains stable and trustworthy.

It thus seems that affections are produced that indicate that the relation between the data-producers as viewing subjects and the discourse of factuality is in fact problematized through these events of spectating. In other words, the mock-mode is indeed rendered visible for five of the six data-producers. For three of them, this is a problem, for two it is a source of enjoyment. For those for whom it has been a destabilizing event, different strategies have been employed in order to seek stabilization. For George and Lisa, there is the establishment of a dichotomous thinking, although this does not seem to have resolved their paradoxical affections, whereas Rosa does not express a need to stabilize the destabilization.

As the analysis moves into the field notes of the following fika, the data-producers will be seen to use the moment for collective thought in order to attempt to stabilize the initial tremor of the mock-mode.
**Cutting the event through a collective body, fika**

Throughout the following fika, i.e., between the first and second film, it becomes clear that the data-producers fall back on the system of genre and the practice of classification and taxonomy in order to produce a more stratified and simplified version of an experience that in their e-mails is of a rather complex order.

Bruno for instance, in discussing how he experienced the event of screening, noticed that he talked a lot with his wife during the film, but he explained that he “usually does that during this type of film”. When asked what he meant by “this type of film”, he immediately retorted “documentary”. This is an interesting reply, since in his first e-mail to me, he called *Catfish* “a film with the form of the documentary but with fictive content”. In other words, he uses the almost exact formulation as Roscoe and Hight in their description of a mockumentary. However, the term ‘mockumentary’ has not been raised by Bruno or by anybody else at this point. In the social setting of the fika, Bruno is using his identification of *the form* as documentary to stand in for his total evaluation of the film, thus ignoring his own understanding of the content as fictive. When compared to his e-mail, this appears to be a simplification, even a contradiction to his own previous acknowledgement of the form as “probably fake” (first e-mail). This inconsistency, as part of an experience of an event of spectating, is made possible through the enactment of multiple methodological “cuts” to use Barad’s terminology (2007, 148). That is, considering the boundary-making practice of methods, different methods yield different results. By making a dialogue resonate between several overlapping pieces of data, the complexity of the actual viewing experience is brought forth.

That methods change the result is surely not a controversial conclusion, but it is important to underline at this juncture, since this is a point that the present thesis – through its activation of a method assemblage for mediamateriality, of which the research design is an intrinsic part – aims at bringing to light. Therefore, it is interesting to note how the change from written expression with one recipient to oral expression with several interlocutors changes the way the data-producers speak about the experience. The first situation is less complex: the data-producers need only to relate to written questions, and they get to say what they want at the pace they want. Here, the answers are more complex. In the latter fika-situation, the complexity of the situation is greater, but the way the data-producers speak about the films is rendered simpler and more clean-cut. By recourse to the recognizability of form as an acceptance of proper identity, what comes across as a mock-contract in the Q&A is thence reterritorialized as a doc-contract throughout the fika.
Another aspect of how the research design offers conditions for problematizing foreknowledge, expectation and recognizability, an aspect that is made tangible throughout this first after-screening-fika, is the condition that all of the data-producers are not seeing the same film at the same time. This could mean that instead of talking about the specificities of each film, since they do not share the same foreknowledge, the conversation could instead be geared towards synthesizing the experience and not the films in themselves, that is, finding common ground beyond ‘the film’ in order to open the conversation towards questions of affections, thoughts, and actions. Instead, as this fika makes clear, the data-producers strive to reduce that experience to a matter of genre and in so doing they produce themselves as a collective of spectators.

This is exemplified by Joe, who exclaimed during the fika (gesturing towards the DVD of the film he saw, *I’m Still Here*) “at first I thought it was a real film”, upon which Bruno immediately inquires, “what do you mean ‘real’?” But instead of waiting for a reply, Bruno answers his own question: “aha, yes I’ve heard it’s supposed to be a PR-stunt”. This prompts Lisa to pick up one of the DVD covers that lies on the table between us. As she opens it (it is the cover of *Catfish*), she exclaims with laughter, “a red thread is showing itself”, for inside the cover is an advertisement for *Exit Through the Gift Shop*. However, this eventual identification of a red thread does not seem to resolve Lisa’s affections. As we are ending the fika, she exclaims that she feels really angry towards Thierry and really everything concerning the film (*Exit Through the Gift Shop*) and that she might have to call a meeting after all have seen the film, since she feels she didn’t understand it and found it outrageous in so many ways.¹⁰⁹

In this way, the fika has actualized a collective territory where they produce a ‘we’ that attempts to make sense of the experience whereby they are becoming viewing subjects-as-spectators (although this is easier for some than for others, such as Lisa, who is struggling emotionally). Where they could have allowed a conversation pertaining to the affections and thoughts brought forth through the event to become dominant in the fika, the experience is reduced to an exercise in identification and in extension, I

¹⁰⁹ Due to the fear of ‘spoilers’, it was not an option for her at this point to talk about the experience of this film with the others before everyone had seen it. This fear influenced the way the data-producers proceeded with the data-production, particularly noticeable in the fika and the Prezi. I will return to discuss this more closely in chapter seven.
argue, of themselves as spectators (affirming a proper distance from the event). As will become discernable as The Study is extended, such an exercise will become an increasingly less capable strategy for navigating the events of spectating to come. Thence, not for lack of trying, the data-producers will eventually abandon what they come to perceive as a frustrating project of identification, moving beyond the reduction of genre and instead venture into increasingly more productive and joyful strategies.

The doc, the mock and the what? Contractions in flux (second Q&A)

As the unfolding of The Study continues, the data of the second Q&A point to a change in focus from attempts to recognize proper identity towards ambiguity as a productive force. The prevalence of paradoxical affections and contractions becomes recurrent throughout the second set of e-mails. Joe, for instance, detects what he identifies as a discrepancy in the main character’s mind-set, the opposing perspectives of the adult/child. This discrepancy he finds to be put to use in order to function effectively as PR, something he perhaps doesn’t like but ‘can understand’, as comes forth in his own summation of the film (Exit Through the Gift Shop):

“This is a fairy-tale about a man who lives on in the 6-year-olds body, who looks up to his uncle and want to imitate this uncle’s exact step. This 6-year-old boy, in a mix between a junkie/closeted capitalist, who can even be somewhat retarded. Thierry does everything to get the attention from his surroundings (from the perspective of a child), at the same time he sees a capitalist value in imitation, or simply copying others art (the adult mind-set). The film gives me a feeling of falsity, gross falsity and pretentious personality traits At the same time I can probably draw the conclusion that this is a PR-trick for both Thierry and Banksy, which lead to an over dramatization that will provoke and give raise to reactions” (sic) (second e-mail).

In this quote, it becomes clear that for Joe, this experience engenders paradoxical affections. Later in the email, he himself notices that even though he detects a falsity that he dislikes, he “still loves this art enormously”.

As with I’m Still Here, Joe has a relation with one of the characters in the film, in this instance, Banksy, whose art and activism he “loves enormously”. Similarly to his experience of JP, there is a discrepancy between Joe’s rejection of the propos in the film (Banksy claiming to make a film about Thierry) and his own personal feelings for Banksy. In an attempt to stabilize the affection produced through this event of spectating, he sets up a spectatorial contraction of mock-as-PR. The falsity he detects in the film is thus not a cause for him to be angry at the film; rather, he sees “a clear
thread between film 1 and film 2 where the question of reality or dramatization prevails”. In this way, he understands this second screening through the mock-contract, which also strengthens the previous unstable mock-contraction. However, in both instances, he has done so as a result of almost violent affections, that is, as a strategy for stabilizing his foreknowledge about a character in the film and, in extension, himself as a knower. Whereas he started with the idea that *I’m Still Here* could be a mock, he is now using that idea as a point of departure, contracting his previous knowledge as productive foreknowledge in this instance. Thus, by thinking about the two films together, he is able to affirm a more stable mock-contraction. Identifying common traits, he produces a joint category of ‘films made in the aim of PR’. This is made possible by positing himself as the knowing critic who recognizes the play with the discourse of factuality as well as a similar function between the two films: that of fulfilling a capitalist need to produce attention and sales.

Similarly for Lisa, the first two events of spectating have produced an intense affective paradox, leading her to critique the content of the first film (*Exit Through the Gift Shop*) in strong negative wording, though appreciating the questions it raises, while expressing a rather positive but strong affection in relation to the second film (*Catfish*). In her second e-mail she attempts to wrap her head around the experience by turning to the question of form, since this is where she sees “the veracity claim” to be “a similarity between this film and ‘Exit Through the Gift Shop’ [...] Is this film true or made-up?” She continues, “personally, I think that a film that is classified as a documentary has the duty to be true and based on factual material” (although she does not go into detail about how such a classification would come about). It is interesting that this theme of genre affiliation, ‘proper’ classification and the question of veracity is posited as a common thread, since in her first Q&A, she only spoke of *Exit Through the Gift Shop* as a documentary (this being part of the reason she got so angry at the illegalities present in the film). Through the second set of data, she has thus shifted her phrasing towards what is just or unjust in terms of both content and form. This shift is understandably influenced by the serial design, whereby the previous fika informs the ongoing conversation in the second Q&A. In both Joe’s and Lisa’s cases, the previous thoughts are overtly contracted through the second screening, which would give cause to think that from now on, the contractual practice would move from clarity to clarity. But again, Lisa finds herself in a paradox; only three sentences later, she expresses that “personally, I think that both films are educational regardless of whether they would turn out to be true or not”. Thus,
on the one hand, the films have ‘a duty’ to conform to the standards of genre, but then shortly after, this is no longer the case.

In the first instance, she uses the foreknowledge of the previous film to think that there is cause to say that the two films are similar in form if not in content. At the same time, she is open to the possibility that the films are not the same in form or content but only insofar as they both function as food for thought for her (which could be many a film, hence making any categorization pretty useless). She is thus torn between a doc- and a mock-cum-missing contraction and is starting to open her thinking to a new, for her, radically different thought: what she is used to thinking might no longer be valid for her. Her own sense of selfhood, notably in moral terms, is rendered instable, opening the way towards a process of unlearning.

For **Rosa**, who experienced the first event of spectating rather unproblematically (not experiencing the need to define *I’m Still Here* in terms of veracity, even though she acknowledged that theme to be actualized through the event), the encounter with her second film, *Exit Through the Gift Shop*, introduced some paradoxical thoughts. Having been part of the conversation at the fika in-between the first and second films, there is a more complex and reflective attitude in her email after the second film. She feels that “the film created some form of moral double-standard”. The affection of the event was thus actualized as a problem of morals. Interestingly, she saw the first film alone and the second with her father and his wife. As has already been discussed, emotions are the actualization of affect as relations in the social. She describes how, on the one hand, she finds it cool how they are putting up graffiti on different buildings. One the other hand, she would “naturally be upset and angry had someone scribbled on the façade of her building and home”. The qualitative appreciation of graffiti as an art form is thus a personal feeling, but if she were to express an opinion in a social setting, she would rely on moral judgment, positioning her in the ‘right’ corner as opposed to an illegal ‘wrong’. She also acknowledges how she thinks that it was “very likely that we might have influenced each other’s thoughts” as they discussed and commented on the film, particularly towards the end. She ends up thinking, the same as Joe, that both films

“could be PR-tricks. Perhaps Phoenix only did the film to show off his multiple skills as an actor, that he can act in public situations without being exposed and not just in front of a camera. The same way Banksy directed his film above all else to show off his art and make people open their eyes to graffiti more. Why else would Banksy otherwise allow a random filmmaker to film his work if he hadn’t allowed it before...?”
This comment suggests that the previous moral judgment of graffiti as ‘wrong’ was perhaps a comment of principle, a moral conversation that was brought out as an effect (of affection) of the event of spectating (particularly as a sociality) rather than a comment pertaining to the ‘wrongs’ done in the particular film. For Rosa, there is something of putting-on-display going on in both films, making her think that they both serve the aim of showing off skills, of raising publicity for oneself, thus not primarily offering a doc-contraction (although making a moral judgment). Her contraction in this second event is a PR-cum-mock-contraction, but as with the first event, although actualizing an event of blurred boundaries, she is not particularly negatively affected by them. Her e-mail revolves around what she thinks the films do/can do, not so much about what they ‘are’ as in finding their proper identity. She finds that the participation in The Study thus far has been an eye-opener, and although the film she saw might have been a PR-trick, that is no particular cause for consternation or anger like the kind expressed by Joe or Lisa.¹¹⁰

For Marie, however, the question of identity is central to her discussion. Where she finds that the two films she has seen so far resemble each other in their documentary style, she feels there are differences. I’m still here she unproblematically understands as not a real documentary. On the other hand, she thinks that considering how Catfish started, it doesn’t seem credible either (although the data from her first Q&A indicate, as has been discussed in the previous discussion, that Catfish was unproblematically received by Marie through a doc-contraction). She concludes that Catfish is about a person being fooled, whereas I’m Still Here fools the whole audience as well as the whole of Hollywood. Interesting here is that although she says that I’m Still Here “is not a real documentary” she initially describes it as a film that one doesn’t know if it is a documentary or not. Within the few lines of this second e-mail she is thus contradicting herself suggesting that she considers the film to fool others, but that she is not part of that group. By so doing, she produces herself as complicit with ‘the film’ and, in extension, herself as exterior to ‘the whole audience’ and hence interior to knowledge. Here, in an attempt to neutralize the affections engendered through the event of spectating, she is reproducing the genre of mockumentary as a center of elitist knowledge, and she as a part of that privileged few.

¹¹⁰ Due to a heavy workload, Rose did not continue participation after the second film.
Similarly, George continues to attempt to stabilize a deterritorializing affect throughout his second e-mail, reproducing a representationalist idea of knowledge as external to production and internal to its own essence. Importantly, this event reactualized previous experience of having seen this film (*Catfish*) twice before, the first time alone around 15 months previous to *The Study* and then a second time shortly thereafter with a friend. He had felt an urgency to show the film to this friend since they had a shared experience of being ‘catfished’. After the film, they discussed “how scary it can be that people claim to be someone they are not and the consequences this can have on the surrounding and the person”. Since he had used the Internet extensively that time, among other things, to look up a web page that sells Angela’s art, and since he saw the extra material on the DVD, he felt no need to do so this time. In other words, he had a good idea of what to think of this film before entering *The Study*. He didn’t think about similarities between the first two films when watching them, but after concluding the second screening, he realized that they both offer a twist of ‘what the film was supposed to be about’:

“In *Catfish*, the documentary filmmakers are set from the beginning on doing a documentary about the relationship between Nev and the wonder child Abby. This is later turned in the film, and instead, it is then about how Nev has been catfished through 9 months and chooses to confront the woman who is guilty of this. In *Exit Through the Gift Shop*, the documentary filmmaker Thierry Guetta is set on doing a documentary about graffiti culture and the graffiti-artist ‘Banksy’. However, this film also has a turn when it is revealed that Guetta himself is not capable to finish and edit the film. Instead, the second half of the film is about Guetta and how he makes a big debut as a graffiti-artist” (second e-mail).

In the quote, George is seeing a similarity between the first two films in that they say they are about one thing but then turn out to be about something other than stated at the beginning. He thus sees a contradiction in expectation set up throughout the event on-screen. Nevertheless, George still contracts the event of spectating through a doc-contraction, notably through the almost excessive use of the words documentary filmmaker and documentary. Thence, although he detects a contradiction in the setting up of expectation, he does not consider this to imply the viewer, as far as he expresses it in the email; this is contained within the diegesis. Therefore, his conclusion is that if there is a contradiction, it is because of the lies of Angela and the flaws of Thierry, not because of some deliberate play by the film. It is ‘error’ in the characters that is producing this failure to live up to expectations.
Having browsed the web for information about these films, he is aware there are questions of the veracity of these films, but George understands them as “conspiracy theories whether both films are real or made-up”. George is thus resolving the perceived contradiction through judgment, but in this instance, not judgment as a moral and social positioning, as in the case of Rosa, but judgment as a strategy to organize perceived irrational behavior.

By contracting this second event as a doc-contraction, his rationalization of the ‘error’ present in both films makes this even firmer instead of shaking it, and in extension, he invokes a reinforcing feedback that he was perhaps ‘right’ in contracting the first event of spectating as a doc-contract. As discussed in chapter one, the love for knowledge, spectatorial epistemophilia, functions as an existential confirmation. Epistemophilia expresses a love for knowledge (understanding this as functioning through lack and fulfillment of lack). Thereby, the viewing subject is constituted through what it has or not; its value is not intrinsic to itself. The non-knower is constituted as lacking what the knowing subject contrarily has. Thus, knowledge becomes more than having or not having information about certain things – it is a focal point for proper existence. Knowledge as a microphysics of power thence becomes “above all, a micropolitics of existence and desire” (Guattari 2009b, 289).

Importantly, George’s affection through the second event of spectating reaches back to a deep personal experience of having felt betrayed. There is thus perhaps also a personal agenda, a need for redress, that motivates him to identify and reaffirm the dichotomous right from wrong and true from false. George’s epistemophilia desire is thus perhaps not only a love for power in the world but also for existing in the world, where correct knowledge is a prerequisite for the latter. In an acute sense, his need for recognizing the right from the wrong is thus not only related to his status as political subject but as subject tout court, since the former cannot exist without the latter.

As has been shown, for some of the data-producers, The Study is felt to be unstable from the beginning, while for others it becomes unstable as an effect of moving through the series. However, by the middle of The Study all are in some way or another battling with a sense of contradiction or paradox suggesting a dichotomous impasse of the fact/fiction divide. As we convene for another fika and the following third film this impasse will in different ways give way to a more productive than reductive approach by the data-producers.
Reaching exhaustion (third Q&A)

As has been seen, the erection of a dichotomous thinking has in itself becoming a paradox that further dichotomies are hard-pressed to resolve. In other words, the recourse to a representationalist frame has produced a classic negative circle. But in the wake of the challenge to the stability of contractions, the series of events of spectating manages to increase a capacity for affection, making possible a process of unlearning.

This becomes clear in the case of Lisa, who began feeling strongly that if a film has been classified as a documentary, it has a duty to be true and based on factual material. But as The Study unfolds, she increasingly leans towards thinking that what is being done trumps the veracity of a film’s truth claim. At the point of the third and last Q&A, she thus finds herself in a paradoxical situation where she, on the one hand, considers that her third film *I’m Still Here* “is explicitly false”\(^{111}\), but on the other hand argues that

> “one has to ask oneself: does it really matter if the film is true or false? The fact that it is a film shows a perspective on reality [en bild av verkligheten] where certain aspects appear, and others are hidden. This is a part of the actual filmmaking. Maybe the messages are more important than the absolute truth? Even though I, as a film viewer, place great importance on truth-claim in choosing genre, even I must admit that the basic messages in all three cases are more important, even in the third film, where I actually felt ill at ease with the offensive scenes. And perhaps this is what makes these films so important. They create debate, create discussion and create awareness. They disturb and touch [upprör och berör] just like a film should” (third Q&A).

Thus, although Lisa as a viewer identifies herself as placing great importance on questions of veracity and contained genres, she ends up thinking that what makes the films important is that they “create debate, discussion and awareness”. In other words, what makes them important is that they open for processes of affections. In a way, she thus produces a missing contract even when the film, in her own admission, is “explicitly false”.

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\(^{111}\) In contrast to the previous two, which had been less clearly fake in her view. She did not offer argumentation for this conclusion in the Q&A, but previously at fika, it had been mentioned by her, and agreed upon by others, that this film is the only one marked as a “fake documentary” on the jacket of the DVD. I believe it is safe to conclude that this is the reason she used the wording of “explicitly false” in this email to me.
For Joe there is a similarly noticeable change in how he now reflects on the films. In general terms, his focus for thinking about “these three films is the border between reality and film”. He thinks that

“it can be hard, without previous knowledge, to differentiate whether these films are real or not. If one doesn’t know who Joaquin Phoenix is it can be difficult to get a perception of reality to either I’m Still Here is real or not” (sic) (third Q&A).

He continues, “the same thread goes through all 3 films. One doesn’t know whether the film is real or not without going deeper into the subject”. Foreknowledge is key for Joe, but this realization also makes him acknowledge that it will always be difficult to know about everything beforehand. If form or context do not give away how to recognize what something is, then he “will look more critically at film and not assume that something is true or not until the contrary is proven (or not), documentary or not”. In short, even though he has continuously leaned towards a mock-contraction, he ends up here, after the third film, opening onto a potential missing in that he admits the fluctuating character of events of spectating. He thinks there is nothing fixed about them. What they are depends on both fore- and afterknowledge. As such, he understands that the films produce different events of thinking. Consequently, thinking about these films in terms of what they ‘are’ is fruitless. It is rather what they do, which he sees as raising the need to engage critically with films in general, by which they can be said to be at a specific moment in time. By seeing the flux of his own engagement, he has formulated a strategy for general audiovisual engagement. As such, The Study has functioned for Joe as the foundation for a strategy of unlearning and learning.

For Bruno, there is an increased sense of unlearning as The study progresses. Already from the beginning, Bruno came forth as the most habituated mock-contractor of the data-producers, not the least since he is the data-producer most occupied with thinking about the problem of form. Thus, thinking about what we could call mocking-terms, or performative aspects of play between form and content, is not a new thought for him. This also explains why the mock-mode is not provocative for him – to think of himself as a viewing subject in relation to the discourse of factuality is habitual and a source of enjoyment. Thence, it is not the veracity of a film that is initially the most salient question for him, but in the third email, he discusses how “he has been part of the true/false discussion [of the fika]”, which makes him change his previous ideas concerning his third film (Exit Through the Gift Shop). Bruno had seen the film before. This time around, he says it was better than he remembered but that he “had
regarded it as part of Banksy’s art project rather than as a documentary about Banksy”. This comment is either offered to the effect that the other data-producers have expressed at previous fika that they think it is a documentary, or it indicates that Bruno now questions his own position. Regardless, he now, in this third Q&A, considers “all films as raising the question of what is ‘true and false’, ‘real or copy’, both in choosing genre and content”. He thinks his participation in the study influenced the way that one “knew beforehand that the films were mockumentaries”, although he does not elaborate on how this was ‘known’, since the word mockumentary has not been used by him or anyone else up to this point (also, he just used the word documentary, indicating that for him this was still a relevant word in conjunction with the last film).

I think that this conclusion by Bruno suggests that he was influenced towards thinking that the films are mockumentaries, since the discussion in the fikas had so far revolved around what I would call the potential problematization through these events of spectating of the mock-mode. He thus consolidates his thinking throughout the serial event, where he begins thinking that the film (*Catfish*) displays a play with the doc-form and “interesting ideas” (first Q&A) and now thinks that all three films belong to a shared genre terminologically understood as the mockumentary (third Q&A).

Even though this, in itself, points to a process of unlearning, for Bruno, the salient revelation – the birthing of a new thought for him – pertains to a realization of these events as bringing forth a paradox in thought/feeling. At the fika that took place before he saw the last film, Bruno exclaimed that on the one hand, he admitted to appreciating the second film because it produced thinking and debate, but on the other hand, he didn’t *like* the main character and found that the film “wasn’t funny! JP is flat, bad [keff]” (fika between the second and third Q&As).112 Instantaneously, however, he makes another statement, concluding that by phrasing his feelings this way he is entering a paradox, since this makes him talk about the main character as if this were a ‘real’ person. In the end, he decides that the fact that he *has* these paradoxical feelings and emotions is what he finds interesting with the film. Hence, he is reterritorializing these emotions and feelings as increased capacity for affection and the birthing of a new thought. Consequently, just like Joe and Lisa, although Bruno makes a mock-contract, there are cracks in this opening towards an opportunity for the bringing forth of something new, something previously unthought. He embraces these affections as an interesting problem for thinking as opposed

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112 Keff is Swedish slang for bad, as in “uninteresting/boring”.

to frustrating emotions or feelings. This causes him to conclude at the next and last fikas that it is “because there is no fixation between the categories of true/false that the need to talk about the films afterwards is awoken”, that it is what makes them affective. For Bruno, there has been a process of becoming-attuned to his own affections, taking them seriously rather than shrugging them off as irrational. Whereas he started off unrattled, as in enjoying the de-stabilization, he has now stabilized a mock-contraction, although also finding a deeper sense of enjoyment by allowing it to be a rather open mock-cum-missing contraction.

In a reverse motion, Marie feels somewhat confused, since she thinks that her last film (Exit Through the Gift Shop) was a film she normally wouldn’t have questioned, but that she now, following the repetition of the series, feels a need to also question and problematize. In her third Q&A, she thinks that although “it felt more real than the other films, there is doubt that all the events in the films have really happened for real. It almost feels ‘too good to be true’”. She admits that she “had a hard time determining if the film [Exit Through the Gift Shop] was real or staged”. In addition, she asks what that really means, “That it felt real? Or that it felt staged?”

She thinks that seeing the other two films and participating in the conversations in-between made her doubt the veracity of this film. Although she “experienced the film as real”, she “doubts when thinking about the other films. Catfish felt staged and I’m Still Here is a mockumentary” (sic). But she feels she cannot get past how they went about sorting through all Thierry’s tapes. That must have been hard work, she thinks, especially since Thierry himself said he never watches what he films. She asks why there is footage of Banksy putting up the Guantanamo doll considering that Thierry says he deleted everything when apprehended by the security personnel. Again, she reiterates that this story “feels ‘too good to be true’. A Frenchman in LA is an amateur filmmaker who succeeds in attaching himself to the most famous street artist in the world, builds a network, begins to do street art and get super famous in a very short time. Don’t know if I buy the concept” (third Q&A).

Because of the seriality of the event, Marie has grown wary with regards to the veracity of the truth-claims in the last film. Where she initially felt pretty sure, contracting the first two events of spectating through the doc-contrast, she now enters the screening of the third film with a question already formed, “and this was: will this documentary also feel staged and thus also be more of a mockumentary?” This is an interesting formulation, since this is not how she presented the films in her previous two Q&As.
Having participated in the collective actualization of a mock-mib, she now re-contracts a possible mock-contract for the whole series. However, she concludes the last Q&A with a laconic “I didn’t get a clear answer on [that]”. So, although she thought that the serial construct of The Study would induce a thinking of similar identity (all films being mockumentaries in the end), she ends up feeling unsure about all of the films.

Whereas she started off thinking that the first and second films were definitely documentaries, and she began the third event of spectating with the foreknowledge that it would surely end up revealing itself as a mockumentary (and through this, shift her understanding of the two previous films), she ends up with no clear knowledge. *Doubt* was the main conclusion for Marie. As such, she contracted the whole event of The Study as a missing contract resulting from the paradoxical exhaustion of a doc-contract, a mock-contract and, ultimately, a what-contract.

This development can also be detected by following Marie’s changes in how she approached the task of participating in The Study. She had approached the first film in ‘student mode’, using a pen and paper to keep track of characters and events in the film – something she later admitted that she usually doesn’t do. For the second film, she felt that she had to experiment a little. She writes that since she didn’t know what the project or my thesis was about in theoretical terms, she was unable to know “what you wanted” (second Q&A). This made her think more freely. She thus chose to discuss the matter in detail with her boyfriend and to search the Internet for clues as to how to think about the film. Through the extension of the event, there was thus a push towards a practice of spectating less concerned with doing ‘right vs. wrong’ and more willing to venture outside of the known and take a risk. In summation of her experience, she writes in her third Q&A that her participation in the study “absolutely [has influenced] how I experience and reflect on the films”. She feels that the conversations at the fikas “remain in your thoughts when you start watching the film, while you watch the film and after you have finished watching the film”. She finds that the meetings have brought many interesting discussions to life, “such that would not have come up had I only seen the films by myself and not discussed them afterwards”. Here, she is pointing towards the need to take a moment to think about the social aspect of these events of spectating a bit more. As stated previously, I will come back to this point in the next chapter.

George’s expectations of the third film were influenced through the previous fika. In this case, he entered the screening of the third film with low expectations due to what he perceived as negative remarks made by the others. By browsing the Internet, he tried to ascertain whether the film was
staged or not. Coming across an interview on *The Letterman Show* where Phoenix explains that he had been performing a character during the shooting of the film, George now “understands the film was faked” (third Q&A). He contends, “*I’m Still Here* is also the only film that is classified as a mockumentary, and even the director has certified that the film is arranged”.

Despite this contention, George consistently makes reference to the film using the word ‘documentary’, producing an interesting paradox. On the one hand, he is very keen on ‘getting to the bottom’ of the truth of the film, but on the other hand, he doesn’t allow the increasing knowledge about the film to adjust his own terminology. He explains that while investigating the issue, he has become aware of the disjunctive opinions about the film on-line, such that some say it is all arranged and faked, while others are convinced that Joaquin Phoenix is going through a mental crisis and is in urgent need of help. Although he already had low expectations of the film, he was still irritated and disappointed at what he saw as ruthless behavior by Phoenix. George found him to humiliate people. This made George dislike him, and it changed the image he had of the actor previously. This disappointment was extenuated by “learning” that Phoenix had entered character in order to make the film, but whether others in the film were prepared and “in on it” was yet unclear for George. Here, George, sharing a reaction similar to that of Joe previously, has difficulty reconciling the affective resonances towards Joaquin Phoenix as a person and JP the character. George and Joe both voice an evaluation of the film as ‘not real’.

In contrast to Joe, however, George does not find a way out of this paradox. Effectively, he finds himself stuck and on a loop of irritation. The only way out in this instance is for George to think within the context of reception. As with all the films he saw, he watched *I’m Still Here* alone. But now, towards the end of The Study, he thinks it would have been more interesting to have seen it with someone so that a continuous conversation regarding the main character’s behavior could have been had. He finds the three films similar in that they all center on more or less odd characters. They lead to debate and questioning of the authenticity of the films. In all three films, he also detects a close relation between the main character and the documentary filmmaker/director. This, George believes, can “increase the suspicion concerning the authenticity of the film” (third Q&A). Another similarity is that all the main characters try to accomplish artistic careers with more or less success. And in *Exit Through the Gift Shop* and *I’m Still Here*, the main character has little or no experience concerning the artistic career they are attempting to enter.
Thus, the focus for George throughout is not on form but on narrative. For him, the problem vacillates between the doc- and mock-contractions, perpetuated through a representationalist idea of knowledge as external, out there, essential and stable (by, for instance, calling any questioning of the veracity claims of the films irrational “conspiracy theories”). However, as is consistent throughout the overall data, George also provides paradoxical enunciations. For instance, he concludes, as has been discussed above, that a similarity between the first two films is that they both break expectations by being about something other than what they claim to be about in the beginning. This breach of expectation he detects as a cause for disappointment for the other characters in the films. However, he does not associate his own extensive investigation on-line in order ‘to get to the bottom of the truth’ with this play with expectations. His persistent use of Internet resources (reading articles and discussion-threads, viewing clips on YouTube) to indeed ascertain the truth-value of the films stands in paradoxical relation to his equally persistent use of the term documentary, all the while his investigations lead him to mostly produce mock-contractions. He is thus reluctant to abandon what he is told about the film, although he comes up with another description. Since his understanding of ‘knowledge’ is external, he is torn between his own becoming-thought and the disciplinary function of knowledge. Hence, the paradox for George at this point is really between an earnest joy in increasing one’s thinking and a reterritorialization of these affects into judgment, producing sad affects. This way for George, as well as for the others, there has indeed been an opening towards a process of unlearning. The dichotomous impass of a binary thought has been ruptured and a strengthened diffractive capacity to think has come forth.

**Conclusion, emancipating the viewing subject-as-spectator, entering unlearning**

In conclusion, I argue that the analysis of the data of the Q&A and the fika, as made to resonate through the method assemblage, suggests that there is an actualization of the mock-mode as a problem all throughout The Study. This produces a lingering uncertainty as to what the data-producers are seeing (what is this film?) and a lingering loss of stability in the identity ‘spectator’. This can be seen as a certain process of affection that constitutes a break with doxa and expectation. As for example in the case of Joe, who came to embrace the importance of context in thinking what film is and thus can do, or in the case of Lisa who shifted foot from thinking there should be a clear identity of a right versus a wrong, to think-
ing that films should offer conditions for thinking and feeling, or again in the case of Bruno, who came to consolidate a common idea of the series all the while acknowledging that this idea is that to be difficult to sustain as one or another. By making possible such processes of affection, The Study resulted in a process of emancipation for the viewing subject-as-spectator, which will be considered here as a process of unlearning (something also supported in part by the evaluative Google.doc included as Appendix C). As such, the group is seen to share a budding sensation of a new mock-identity, an increased attunement to the practice of spectating as a possibility to become-other.

As discussed in chapter one, the mockumentary has to be recognized as such to enter into effect. Indeed, the use of humor is an essential aspect of the mockumentary (Wallace 2011), and it is the way a mockumentary makes itself recognizable (Roscoe and Hight 2001; Lipkin, Paget and Roscoe 2006). Importantly, the laughter needs to be a laughter whereby the viewers are recognizing themselves as an ‘us’ laughing at ‘them’. However, by actualizing the mock-mode as a problem, the three films of The Study implicate the viewing subject as the object of laughter. In other words, however a viewing subject tries to distance her/himself from being the butt of the joke, the doubt that one might actually be the laughing-stock oneself persists. Since the films defy definition to different degrees depending on the specific contracts at play, the events they make possible produce a lingering affection of uncertainty. This can feel as threatening as it can exciting.

A conclusion that can be drawn is that there is a particular affection made possible through this series of events of spectating these three affective mockumentaries and that this is dependent on the problem of not recognizing, on actualizing the mock-mode as problem. In other words, it is by not providing easy categorization that they produce affective responses, not just because the characters might be shocking or silly or because immoral acts are portrayed. One of the conditions for enabling this affection, as has been seen in this chapter, is the extension of paradoxical relations to the point of exhaustion throughout the event. As already discussed in chapter four, exhaustion means to “exhaust the whole of the possible” (Deleuze 1998, 152). It is thus not to ‘talk about’ being exhausted, because the exhausted cannot make sense. Instead, exhaustion brings on “the wide-eye person” (ibid., 171), a person seeing something new, who has a ‘widened vision’. What had been thought of as ‘a chair’ is perhaps now ‘a sense of relief’. What had been a frustrated Ping-Pong game of dichotomies is perhaps now thought of as a joyful sensation.
This is, for example, seen in the third fika (fika after the second film and before the third film) when Lisa exclaims with some frustration, “if it *says* documentary, so it *has* to be”, upon which Bruno interjects, “...otherwise it’s false marketing” (italics mine to underline verbal emphasis). But Bruno then follows his own statement with a suggestion that it is precisely because something turns out to be different from what one is *expecting* that he find it interesting. He believes that if *Catfish* (his second film) had been made as a drama, they would have had to use a lot of “effects and action and what not” (fika after the second film and before the third) to make it interesting. But now, it is the documentary form, in other words, the play with the discourse of factuality, that creates a closeness to the characters.

For Bruno, the use of the documentary mode of the camera provides for a more direct access to the diegesis. 113 It is thus not only the mock-nature of the event, the play with expectation and foreknowledge, that draws him into the event but also the fact that it is indeed actualized as a particular event whereby an ontology of on-going intra-active actualization of reality has come to the fore (what I will discuss in the conclusion of chapter seven as an *event of realing*). Consequently, such an event provokes effects and actions from the inside out as opposed to the outside in, that is, it places the viewing subject as an intrinsic co-producer of said ‘effects and actions’ who also produces a tangible becoming in so doing. This is, as it were, exhaustion as in turning something inside out, making it qualitatively other.

By the fourth and last fika, there is a feeling of complicity in the group, as if its members now belong to a new group, as if they share a new mock-identity. This is increasingly shown in in-jokes, such as when Joe asks the others, “is it the same person in the TV-series as in the film?”, and Bruno answers that “no, he just pretends to be”, a comment said with a wink and that produces laughter in the group. In these little instances, there is a sense that the voice of the discourse of factuality as an expert voice is rendered less authoritarian and more a subject for personal play. Through reception, the normatively voiced opposite categories of the documentary and the fictive film are slowly breaking apart; “the trend” of the event, as expressed

113 In conjunction with Bruno’s statement, George puts forth *The Blair Witch Project* as an example where this documentary mode of address enables a stronger affective reaction than had that story be told in the form of fiction. Joe suggests we think similarly about *Trolljegeren/ Trollhunter*, and someone else (my notes are difficult to read here) mentions *Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan*. 

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by Joe at the last fika, “has been to think if something is true or not”. In the last fika, Bruno asks his fellow data-producers if they see documentaries differently now, upon which everyone laughs. Lisa compares it to the discourse analysis she performs on media texts (in her capacity as a student of media and communications). She feels that studying media has made her unable to stop analyzing everything around her. “And now one also continually has to ask: Is it real? Is it false?”, says Bruno with a laugh. Lisa feels that “these kinds of films” require more engagement, that they are not easily accessible. She finds that one usually wants to know what one is getting and chooses a film on that basis but that these films function differently. However, all seem to agree that it has been interesting to see the films and that they lead to discussion and thoughts they wouldn’t have had otherwise.

Lisa, for instance, says that she found the “weird films” of the project to be fun but that the films are such that she wouldn’t have seen/chosen them were she not part of this project. George seems to be in agreement, and thinks it is “a weird genre”. When asked to expand, he specifies that it is a genre he hasn’t encountered so much before. It’s like “school films”, Joe adds, continuing, “films you don’t choose yourself”. Although this statement is met with agreeing nods, some of the data producers had in fact seen some of the films before, suggesting that the wording of the films as “school films” indicates more than just having seen the films since at least some of them had already done this. I would suggest that it is by screening the films within a larger social event of unlearning and learning (by meeting, discussing, producing the Prezi, and answering questions) that they are appreciating the project as a ‘school project’ because they come to perform practices they would usually associate with school. Because they evaluated their own participation in the project as having amounted to a process of learning and thinking new thoughts, it was associated with school. In this way, what The Study ‘became’ was informed through what the data-producers found that they and the project ended up doing, giving rise to actions and affections and not what ‘it was’ in terms of organization, which was a research study and not an educational project or teaching.

As such, The Study functioned to produce at least a crack in, if not in all cases full emancipation from, the identity of the viewing subject-as-spectator. Instead, the data-producers began to produce a less stable relation to the discourse of factuality, disclosing the relations of power intrinsic to the same as well as the existential dimension these enact in the constitution of the viewing subject-as-spectator.

The paradoxical and dichotomous contractions have torn the relation between the viewing subject and the discourse of factuality, causing a de-
organization of the mib, as brought out through the unfolding of The Study. In mending that rip, a qualitatively new relation has been produced. This new relation re-organizes the mib, making it function differently than before – in this case, breaking up the pendular movement and increasing the circular affection whereby there is an increase in the mib’s capacity to attach new parts to it, in other words, to increase a capacity for affection as a sticky, connective-productive quality.

In other words, the experiment with the method assemblage and research design in The Study has, in this chapter, amounted to an analysis that is capable of tracing the flux of contractions in the actual event as experienced by an actual viewer. I find this an important contribution, since I would argue that today we live by and through a flux of spectatorial contractions. And, as stated by Panagia (2007), the political subject today needs to be thought of as a viewing subject. The analysis of the data from the Q&A and the fika field notes suggests that an outcome of The Study for the data-producers was that they indeed questioned the presupposed and given, producing themselves as ‘learners’ as opposed to ‘knowers’. As such, I would argue that they have indeed produced a de-organized mib, an opening onto a mibwo.

This is thus a potentially political act (and in chapter eight, I will develop this thought further). Since the films are difficult to recognize and do not offer easy compliance with a receptive regime that would stabilize the mock-mode, they are felt to be demanding for the data-producers. But it is also this unready determination that functions to cause a disruption of the relation between the viewing subject and the discourse of factuality. This makes that “the spectator must provide the relation himself or herself” (Rodowick 1997, 150), which I argue constitutes an increase in affective capacity and the force of change – of one’s relation to the discourse of factuality, to oneself as a viewer, and to the real as external and out of reach. By producing a series of events of spectating where the mock-mode becomes visible – the problem, as it were – the data here analyzed offer a perspective on what was done and with what result. The resonating of the The Study through the method assemblage, suggests that taking part in The Study resulted in an attunement of the data-producers towards their agential capacities as producers, not just receivers of external reality, and, as such, a slight emancipation of the viewing subject-as-spectator. In the next chapter, I will continue to investigate the data of the Study, but this time, I will look at the Prezi.
Chapter 7: Analysis, body is as body does

“Univocity signifies that being is univocal, while that of which it is said is equivocal: precisely the opposite of analogy” (Deleuze 2004a, 378).

In this chapter, I will continue to work through the data produced throughout The Study, but here, I will look at the collectively produced enunciation of the Prezi and will think about what mib The Study can be seen to have actualized. I will argue that the Prezi effectuates a paradoxical and exhausting relation of the notion of the rational whereby the mib becomes ‘frightened and jumpy’, a dis-organized mibw-huu. In a twist, the stability of the viewing subject-as-spectator is thus exposed as dependent on the stability of an irrational and paradoxical thought. Through the continuing exhaustion of the possibility to sustain the irrational, the mibw-huu will be shown to be opened towards a becoming mib-what? This is an attentive mib that carries a promise of a possible missing mib and an embrace of doubt as a productive force of increased affectivity.

Since the data of The Study came forth through a vacillation between the individual and the collective, the processes mapped in the Prezi unfold in parallel with other processes. The research design of The Study was constructed with the aim of making possible a multidimensional map that resonate through many planes of the event of spectating. If the data discussed through chapter six populate a plane of written and verbal communication that could be associated with an individual sender, the data that will be discussed in this chapter offer a point of entry into a plane of written and visual collective communication. Interestingly, as will be discussed, this tended to aim at re-organizing what chapter six showed to be an unstable, de-organizing and messy flux of affections, contractions and paradoxes.

However, as will also be clear, almost in spite of this re-organizing aim, the messiness of the experience leaks through, leading me to consider the development of the mib in three shapes. First, there is an establishment of a mibw-huu, which is the injective sound of feeling cold and disoriented. This body arrests a dogmatic thinking, questioning the pregivens. Second, this disruptive capacity serves as a condition for the becoming of the mib as a mib-what? This is the capacity to acknowledge not knowing. Third, this doubt functions as creative forces that ultimately open the mib towards a promise of the new, the yet to come.

To situate the unfolding of this mib, I will thus first discuss how the data-producers chose to interpret the rather open assignment as a call for organization and, subsequently, how I chose to structure my analysis. Following this, I will show how the stability of such organ-ization breaks
apart through an increased irrationality that makes it increasingly difficult to hold the problem of the mock-mode at bay, ultimately amounting to an opening of the mib towards a potential mibwo.

The Prezi, organ-izing of flux

As has been discussed, the data-producers confessed to becoming increasingly open to venturing beyond a dichotomous thinking as The Study unfolded, but paradoxically, they also confessed to moving increasingly into a ‘student-mode’, that is, approaching the different tasks in a similar way as they would other schoolwork. This becomes particularly noticeable in how they chose to construct the Prezi. At the last fika, several of the data-producers excused themselves for “delivering just before the deadline”. They thus evaluated their own performance as doing just what was asked but not necessarily more, in the same way as they thought they did with other assignments given throughout a typical course at the university.

I argue that the feeling of moving away from a dichotomous thinking into a more complex mindset is the reason they interpreted the Prezi assignment as schoolwork. However, a paradoxical outcome of this is that they thus re-stratified their own more complex reasoning as if they thought a more reductive ‘result’ was demanded. In addition, I believe this idea was strengthened through a fear of spoilers that they mentioned at the fika, that is, the data-producers admitted to restricting their engagement with the totality of the Prezi, since they deliberately chose not to engage with each
other’s comments if they had not seen the film yet.\textsuperscript{114} This shows a desire to produce and follow rules, to make a code of conduct that is more restricted than the free conduct I gave them permission to if they so wanted. Drawing from this and considering that none of them had seen all of the films until the end of the project, it is logical to assume that they did not intra-act fully with the Prezi until the last couple of weeks. They also decided to meet in person after our last fika to, in their words, “finish the Prezi”. The date they sat was the 12\textsuperscript{th} of May 2016, which is also the date of the last version of the Prezi.

Combined, the above reasons may explain why there is little change in the Prezi between the fourth version and the eight and final version. This is also why, throughout the following analytic text, I will focus on the final version. A comparison with the first version (21\textsuperscript{st} of March, 2016) shows that the beginning of the last Prezi is the same as it was entered in the beginning. In fact, comparing the different saved versions of the Prezi\textsuperscript{115}, one can see that there are additions here and there, notably in the third and fourth copies I saved, where the bulk of the Prezi was made, but the order stays the same. There is thus a skeleton from the beginning that becomes fuller and fuller, but no continuous disorganization of the body. On the contrary, there is a higher and higher level of organization that comes through.

\textsuperscript{114} This fear of spoilers was a more dominant structuring principle than I had anticipated, even though I was familiar with the idea. Thinking back on the instructions for the Prezi, I think I could have asked them to meet after each fika to work on the Prezi in a more organized way. For instance, I could have asked that they interact with at least one entry pertaining to a film of The Study they had not yet seen. However, the use of parallel practices for documentation placed a focus on the productive aspect of methodology, pointing to the Q&A and the fika to function as de-territorializing, whereas the Prezi functioned more as a reterritorializing effect. In this way, there was a point in allowing the data-producers to navigate the process of data-production in a freer, more wandering way, making it possible for the data to enact the Baradian cut. That they choose to structure the Prezi according to films and not affects or themes shows how the data-producers understand the films to have a higher degree of agency than themselves, as if the films are leading the way and they are merely responding. However, it must be granted that I also did the same in chapter four. What would be interesting at this point would be to see whether in the future there would be ways to use these insights to produce an operative tool for working with the affections and diffractive processes produced in events of spectating beyond a refolding back onto the structure of films as separate artifacts. Would it make sense (in a diffractively generative sense)?

\textsuperscript{115} I saved eight copies in all, the first on the 21\textsuperscript{st} of March 2016, then on the 23\textsuperscript{rd} of March, 29\textsuperscript{th} of March, 5\textsuperscript{th} of April, 6\textsuperscript{th} of April, 3\textsuperscript{rd} of May and, finally, on the 12\textsuperscript{th} of May. No new entries were made after the 12\textsuperscript{th} of May.
The idea of rules of engagement present in the Prezi can be exemplified by an entry already present by the third copy (and then kept the same until the last, although the sequencing and framing of the entry has been slightly changed). The entry consists of a thought-bubble that begins by offering an elaborate reflection on the larger perspective of criminality and punishment and the consequences thereof (as a response to another bubble that had introduced the topic in conjunction with one of the films). This extended commentary is followed by a second comment that reads “Then I haven’t seen the film yet and am thinking from a total perspective with criminality and punishment and their consequences” (sic). This second comment is followed by a third in miniscule letters at the very bottom of the thought-bubble, “I shouldn’t really at all be looking at the other films parts of this mind map but this questions caught the glimpse of my eye sort of...” (sic) (Slide 22, 3rd version, copy 29th of March). Here, the writer seems to excuse him/herself for commenting on a line of thought that had been inserted in conjunction with a film, because she/he had not yet seen that particular film in question.

The organizing principle in the Prezi is by films as closed-off narratives, not by (as could have been equally possible), for instance, themes, affects or feelings or questions of form or aesthetics, all of which had been discussed to various degrees at the fikas and in the e-mails. Thus, the final Prezi is organized as a presentation of three different films (and to some extent to the events associated with them). This is visually made clear by separated color-coded clusters. In the causal alignment of the presentation, these clusters are not ordered to interfere with one another but rather follow one upon the other. Hence, there are no lines or inter-actions between the three clusters, no synthesizing of what is going on in one with the other. However, there are three slides placed in the center of the Prezi that I consider as suggesting the identification of ‘themes’: “True or False”, “Odd Characters” and “Artistic Career”. Although these three themes, as has been mentioned in chapter six, have indeed been noticed as ‘themes’ in the e-mails and fika discussions, such a conclusion is not used as a device for producing a more synthesized documentation in the Prezi. Neither were the numerous possibilities for in-zooms, out-zooms and movement that the Prezi offers used to enforce or discuss these links between the films that they had indeed found and discussed elsewhere. In short, the theme-slides are not used to link recurring themes in all three films but appear once each: “True or False” (slide 7) and “Odd Characters” (slide 15) through the Exit through the Gift Shop cluster and “Artistic career” (slide 41) through the I’m Still Here cluster. This suggests the idea that they serve as ‘titles’. However, they are not placed on top of each cluster but rather in the center
of the Prezi. Although the instructions for the Prezi were open (see Appendix B), the choice for sequencing the Prezi by film and not by theme, for instance, indicates that the data-producers were not fully aware of, or did not wish to make clear, the existence of a thematic synthesis that was otherwise present in the data of the Q&As and the fika field notes. This choice could equally be informed by the research design, whereby the data-producers were given the films one by one. Here again, there is a note to be made concerning the importance of working with multiple methods in order to provide for data that offer access to the often-contradictory affects and effects of lived experience.

I had initially had the idea that the Prezi could work as a digital ‘room’ where the data-producers could meet in-between the opportunities to meet in real life, but it was not used as such to the extent I thought it might be. Although slides were added throughout The Study, I can conclude by comparing the different saved versions of the Prezi that the bulk of the Prezi was entered and organized towards the end, with the penultimate and last versions being the fullest. The visible color-coded clusters, for example, did not appear until the last version, and there were no experimentations as to other ways of organizing or using color before, at least not in the versions of the Prezi I saved. Needless to say, I was not following the development of the Prezi live throughout the several months but only popped in periodically to save the traces of the process.

**Dis-organizing the body, exhausting the rational, a mibw-huu**

Throughout the Prezi, the relation between the rational versus the irrational is a paradoxically enunciated theme, particularly considering that the ‘trend’ of The Study, as discussed in chapter six, was understood by most of the data-producers as bringing about a conversation regarding the falsity and veracity of the films. Hence, it would be easy to think that this ‘trend’ would thus continue into the Prezi, but as I will discuss, somewhat surprisingly, it took a backseat throughout. In fact, the statements in the Prezi can be seen to contradict statements made elsewhere in The Study.

One example is the issue of the mental health of the main characters, who when mentioned by name are spoken about as if actual persons. This issue becomes a central focus in the Prezi. This concern becomes a disavowal of their own previous mock-contractions (as seen through chapter six) which suggests the strength of the affective resonances produced throughout the series of events of spectating and how even a mock-contraction has not been able to resolve this destabilization as the data-producers finalize the Prezi towards the end of The Study.
For example, in *Exit Through the Gift Shop*, Banksy, in referencing the ‘street-art documentary’ Thierry is supposed to have made, states that “it was at that point I realized that maybe Thierry wasn’t a filmmaker...he was maybe just someone with mental problems who had a camera” (Banksy in *Exit Through the Gift Shop*). As I discussed in chapter four, this idea that Thierry is ‘crazy’ is a point that is underlined and overly constructed throughout all of *Exit Through the Gift Shop*. To accept Banksy’s statement as a fact would then be to accept a doc-contract. But as I have shown in chapter six, towards the end of the Q&As and the fikas, all the data-producers make mock- or mock-cum-missing contracts in summarizing ‘what kinds of films they have seen’. If these contracts persisted into the Prezi, they would rationally discuss the issue of mental health through the choice of Banksy to have produced a character that activates this issue. However, as shall be exposed, they do not.

For instance, Slide 14 shows a close-up of the text “Does Thierry Guetta suffer from some sort of mental disorder or does he have some sort of functional disability, ADD, OCD, Asperger’s syndrome?” This discussion is continued by the inclusion of a comic strip depicting a joke regarding someone being developmentally challenged (Figure 11). This leads to slide 18, where it is asked “if obsession is a disease”, upon which Slide 19 states in response, “perhaps not a disease but an addiction, and one could interpret that as a disease”. This entry continues to reflect on Thierry’s ‘condition’: “Regardless it seems to be something he needs help with, like therapy? Just like an alcoholic needs help to control his drinking so Thierry needs help controlling his filming”. Ultimately, the third part of the entry in slide 19 offers an analysis of how he came to be this way: “It seems like the root of his addiction comes from trauma in his childhood”. What comes forth is that Thierry must clearly be mentally challenged, because he is filming things he admits to not even look at later, which the data-producers seems to take as an irrational thing to do (something he needs help with, a condition, a disease). The next Slide 20 depicting Thierry filming himself filming is subsequently offered as illustration.
In this chain of opinions and questions, the (orthodox) conclusion that the listed director, the renowned street artist Banksy, rationally and deliberately as director made choices, such as constructing a ‘crazy’ Thierry is rendered invisible. Instead, all these abovementioned slides reinforce a contraction that the data-producers contradicted in Q&As and fikas that took place before the finalization of the Prezi.

On overlapping contradiction occurs with an expanded conversation regarding obsession, as related to the conversation regarding mental health issues. Already in the third slide, “obsession” is suggested as a more general “underlying message” in the cluster of Exit Through the Gift Shop. Here, it is introduced not only in reference to Thierry but also in reference to the film itself, where multiple enactments of obsession are noticed: “Thierry’s obsession with filming, Thierry’s obsession with his art, The obsession of the people with street art”. In this slide, obsession is not only a personal analysis of Thierry (as it appears in some slides later) but is also applied to “the people’s” interest in street art. A further analysis is offered a couple of slides later:

“In the end it is not about art and creativity but about publicity and attention! Thierry cuts and pastes in motives that are already made and creates a work that already is made and suddenly people are like crazy and must be part of the new movement and have an opinion about something that has already been said. People are so desperate to fit in (both Thierry and the population) that they don’t see what they are becoming a part of. Importance is created in something that is really unimportant!” (Slide 8)
What comes out here is that this previous mentioning of obsession has something to do with “being desperate to fit in”, not some unique mental quality of Thierry but rather a conformist quality in ‘people’. To fit in to ‘what’ is not spelled out, but it is interesting to note that obsession here is not understood as the quality of one person but of a mass of persons. It is not only the individual who is irrational but also the mass that is irrational. This insulates the viewing subject, since he/she is not acknowledging complicity in that mass but is a separate rational individual who takes it upon himself/herself to explain why this irrationality persists in society.

This perceived lack of rationality in Thierry’s, Angela’s and JP’s characters could be seen to relate to the Slide 15 “Odd characters” although this slide is only on display once in the Prezi (in association with the above discussion pertaining to Thierry’s mental health). Through the unfolding of the event of spectating onto the production of the Prezi, the intensity of ‘oddness’ is extended as a personal quality of these three characters, leading the data-producer to insulate him/herself from such a personal ‘quality’. Recognizing this oddity and explaining why it is keeps the data-producer’s sense of connection to a ‘real reality’ intact. As such, the recognition of the irrational behavior of these ‘odd characters’ functions to reflect the viewing subject’s own rationality (not this but that).

While stating that the ‘trend of The Study’ to discuss the wobbly veracity claims of the films is not the main topic in the Prezi, it is not a fully forgotten theme. But although there are some slides that approach this topic, these are not made to dialogue with the louder conversation regarding, for example, the mental health of the main characters. Slide 5, for instance, reads “[in bold] balancing contradictions: [not bold] creativity vs. provocation, hobby vs. addiction, true vs. false, freedom vs. laws.” This slide is connected to the following one, not only through the sequencing of the Prezi but also through the inclusion of an arrow drawn from the “true vs. false” caption in slide 5 to slide 6, which has the title “Is the documentary film real or is it a made-up film? Is the film and Mr Brainwash an art project by Banksy?” The bubble also includes two links that lead to two articles, one claiming that Exit Through the Gift Shop is a prank, the other that it is not (Walker 2010; Child 2011). Also, the second of the overall thematic slides reads “true or false”. However, the continuation of the Prezi comes across as paradoxical and irrational, considering that these insights, or questions, are just left unanswered and are not allowed to inform the continuation of the Prezi. An acknowledgment of Banksy as the accredited director of Exit Through the Gift Shop would suggest the ra-
tional conclusion that the film is a result of conscious choices. And a simple Google search would, if not put to rest, at least ease many of the questions pertaining to the veracity of all the three films. This was in fact done and discussed by the data-producers on different planes of the project. Nevertheless, the Prezi communicates vivid doubt and ambiguity towards the identity of the films.

Another example is the conversation regarding Phoenix as a ruthless person, although *I’m Still Here* was the film that all of the data-producers were most certain was a mockumentary, “since it says so on the cover”. For example, slide 42 reads as follows:

“During the film I got irritated and disappointed at Joaquin Phoenix ruthless behaviour. His humiliations of others made me dislike him as a person, which changed my previous image of him. I was impressed and liked him in *Gladiator, Walk the line* and *Her*. Even though it appears that most of the scenes in *I’m Still Here* was arranged I wonder how many people in advance was ‘in’ on his acting? Is it really justifiable to violate other humans just to after the fact declare that one was in character? My moral compass says no”.

Although the data-producer has reached the conclusion that the events taking place in *I’m Still Here* were an act (and that the film is even classified as a fake documentary on the cover, etcetera), the data-producer is still convinced that there were violations going on in the diegesis. For example, recurring references (such as the one above) are made to Phoenix’s impressive acting in, for instance, the film *Gladiator* (Ridley Scott 2000). His character in that film, the Roman Emperor Commodus, was hardly pleasant, yet many data-producers admitted in the Q&A and fikas that they really like Phoenix as an actor because of this role. It is funny, then, that despite the previous praise, the first slide in the *I’m Still Here* cluster depicts Phoenix in the role of Commodus, but with an emoji-turd placed on his head like a crown (Figure 10).

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116 Making the conscious choice to display his own art as well as portray the persona ‘Banksy’ as ‘a mystery man’, for instance, by recourse to many of the strategies that come forth in the analysis of chapter four: through his talking-heads with distorted voice, covered face, being filmed in the dark, or through this secrecy of his identity being one of the premises underlying the film, produced through the perpetual blurring of the faces of his co-workers, close-ups of news items talking about him as a mystery man, etcetera.
The affections of the data-producers throughout the event of spectating *I’m Still Here* function to overpower the mib. There is a stronger flow of intensities than can be made to flow productively (again indicating the excess present in the analysis of chapter four). Hence, the problem of the mock-mode, although visible, cannot be acknowledged in this instance. Instead, negative emotions are projected onto Phoenix as an actor.

This affection is indeed so strong that s/he cannot set this aside, even though s/he acknowledges the probable transgression of the discourse of factuality enacted. Interestingly, a few slides later, the Prezi asks, “is the documentary real? Probably not. Aim? PR trick? Satire of the hunt for success? Art?” (slide 37). Thus, where slide 32 indicates irritation towards Joaquin Phoenix as a person and actor, suggesting a doc-contract, slide 37 acknowledges that there are good reasons to make a mock-contract. Then, slide 42 again acknowledges a lingering sense of affective discomfort that needs at least a partial doc-contract to be domiciled. In this way, the conclusion offered in slide 42 – ‘it was immoral of Phoenix to put others in the film at risk through his performance’ – places the blame for the affective discomfort on the film and Phoenix, when at least the rational conclusion, taking all the ‘evidence’ to heart, is that when the film is identified as a fake documentary, it is so to the full. That is, the most rational explanation of Phoenix’s behavior is that everyone was indeed in on it. By recourse to rational thinking, this would make sense. If the director says it was a per-
formance, and the DVD is now marketed as a fake documentary, why wouldn’t the actors in the film know that they were part of it, the same as any actor in any film? Why is there still a need to place the responsibility for the affective discomfort on the shoulders of Phoenix?

This succession of slides suggests a particular discomfort that occurs through the paradoxical exhaustion of clear binary types and their boundaries, projected expectations and epistemological foundations, i.e., through the paradoxical exhaustion of a mock-mode as a stable and privileged relation of knowledge. It is interesting that in the face of so much data in front of her/him pointing towards the possibility that everything could be staged, that it is a fiction film, this is still not the conclusion this data-producer is willing to reach, even though it could be reached on the theoretical level as a logical conclusion. In a very paradoxical twist, then, the slide expresses an irrational need to produce the events and characters of the films as real so that the viewing subject-as-spectator can remain distant from the real.

The irrational continuing production of a doc-contract throughout the Prezi stabilizes affections that could otherwise destroy the stability of the viewing subject-as-spectator. The more real the affection, the more the viewing subject has to accept the realness as impacting him/herself in an ongoing process of subjectification under the threat to become de-organized (opening the way for a re-organization – change), or the diegetic world of the film has to be made to absorb the realness, regardless of how irrational this action might be. In short, it is an instance where the response-ability, i.e. the attention “to power imbalances” (Barad in Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012, 55), of the viewing subject-as-spectator is at stake. That is to say, where an affective discomfort is masked as rational in order to resist what inevitably would mean to change and to have a new thought.

Thus, there is, on the one hand, a theoretical recognition of the mock at play, but the affection produces an existential resistance to this idea, resulting in an irrational sense of doubt as not knowing which foot to stand on. Paradoxically, the idea of ‘rationality’ is consequently employed in an irrational way, being brought forth when suited and not as a general method. I argue that this is so because the foundation for this idea is also dependent on a process of subjectification of the viewing subject-as-spectator. But by making the irrationality of a certain notion of the rational visible, the problem of the mock-mode is showing itself in the cracks of the Prezi. In other words, there is a process where the viewing subject is arrested and stops in its tracks, sniffing from where the wind is blowing. There is resitence but perhaps it is not that dangerous to at least ask a new question? In this way,
the frightened mib-huu give way to the mib-what? of a doubtful becoming-animal as when curiosity wins the day over fear.

**Doubting as becoming-animal, a mib-what?**

Although there is an organ-izational momentum throughout the Prezi, there is also a noticeable persistence of doubt and uncertainty that causes leakages throughout. For instance, mentions of doubt over veracity were dominant in the emails and the fikas. But in the Prezi, this takes a back seat to other issues, such as the mental health and obsessions of the main characters, as discussed in the previous section. As mentioned, this question of veracity is brought up in the Exit Through the Gift Shop-cluster in the mentioned slides 5 and 6 and in the I’m Still Here-cluster in the mentioned slide 37. However, this doubt is conspicuously lacking from the Catfish-cluster, even though it was present in the Q&A and fika data.

There is, however, one slide, slide 30, in the Catfish-cluster that raises the issue of trust. This is composed of a frame containing a YouTube video of a song with the full lyrics appearing against a black background as it is sung. The song is “Vem kan man lita på” (English “Who can one trust”), by the Swedish Hoola Bandoola band. As can be deduced from the title, the song is about the world being so ‘up-side-down’ that it is difficult to know whom to trust. Towards the end of the song the lyric reads, “And when he looks in the mirror it has ruptured in two, and between the halves of his face the rats are scurrying in and out” [Sw: Och när han tittar sig i spegeln, har den rämnat mitt itu, och mellan halvorna av hans ansikte kilar råttorna in och ut]. It is difficult to know whether the lyrics are the main reason for the inclusion of the video clip at this juncture or if it was simply the title, or even the connoted value of the Hoola-Bandoola Band, considering that this was a very politicized band that questioned authority in its time (late 60s and 70s). But the inclusion, almost mid-way through the Prezi, of this video with strong politicized lyrics about the rupture of recognizability, as it were, anchors the whole conversation in the actualization of doubt as a powerful tool for a revolutionary moment. These lyrics embody the strong affection of not only the cracking of one’s face but also of

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117 Hoola Bandoola Band was part of the Swedish progressive music movement (not the same as progressive rock). It was a movement within Swedish music that came to the fore during the late 60s and was prominent in the Swedish music scene during the 70s. As a politicized movement, overtly taking stands in topical political issues of the time, it was also a stand against what was considered an ‘Americanization’ of Swedish society, thus the choice to sing in Swedish. Hoola Bandoola Band was one of the most prominent of the Swedish ‘prog-bands’; see http://www.hoolabandoolaband.se (accessed 180116).
one’s Face as an authoritarian organization. To embrace a lack of recognition through doubt is thus to,

“escape the face, to dismantle the face and facializations, to become imperceptible, to become clandestine, not by returning to animality, not even by returning to the head, but by quite spiritual and special becoming-animals, by strange true becomings that get past the wall and get out of the black holes, that make faciality traits themselves finally elude the organization of the face” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 189).

In other words, doubt works as a leakage dis-organizing the face. I argue that this disruptive-productive potential of doubt throughout The Study produces conditions for a more diffractive-productive conversation than a mere stating of positions, as was the default point of entry at the beginning of the project.

In slides 16-18, for instance, there is an interesting exchange in combination with a special effect (the only time this is put to use). This effect makes it possible to turn the Prezi on its axis (giving the viewer a slightly dizzy feeling). This special effect follows on slide 16, which suggests, “Perhaps Guetta has some sort of autism/Asperger’s? These kinds of people can often get fiercely knowledgeable [grymt insatta] in a field”. Under this text, there is an arrow pointing to the right and when clicking to move to the next slide the whole Prezi moves around its own axis so that the arrow now points to the next slide 17. Interestingly the image that composes the slide is placed vertically, lying on its side, forcing the viewer of the Prezi to cock his or her head to be able to read the speech bubble of what looks like a frame from a comic strip (Figure 11). The intention might well have been to put the image straight, but for some reason this failed, or it could have been intentional. Regardless of which, it forces the viewer to relate to the Prezi through the viewpoint of one lying down, as if having lost one’s balance.

In Slide 17 (see Figure 11) a woman is patting the head of a boy standing in front of an easel. She says, “This is our own little artist. We call him ‘Marc Chagallenged’.”

In the original: förståndshandikappablo, where ‘förståndshandikapp’ means mentally retarded and ‘pablo’ refers to the artist Pablo Picasso. To translate, I instead used Marc Chagall in the pun.
When clicking to go to the next slide, slide 18, the whole Prezi now turns right-side-up again and lands in a bubble that asks, “Is obsession a disease?” Here, the movement of the Prezi produces a movement in the viewer that creates a sensation of not knowing up from down. The comic follows a question regarding Thierry Guetta’s mental state, which would indicate that the child in the comic is Thierry (and that Thierry is mentally challenged). However, on the next slide, this very ‘maladization’ of human behavior is put into question. What started as a conversation about the film has germinated into a norm-critical commentary regarding the possible stigmatization of minor developmental variations and behaviors.

In this way, I would argue that the Prezi opens onto the actualization of a fundamental practice within democratic society, which is to indeed voice and debate different views, notably, what it is to be human, what it is to live in society, etcetera.

The question of political philosophy, for instance, is raised in slide 10. This slide discusses the practitioner of graffiti as someone who “can’t help to break the law”, that is, someone who cannot restrain him or herself, someone who by doing something is incapable of doing something else (restrain oneself, follow the law). Slide 11 follows in response to this, as indicated both in content and by the large, red arrow pointing from it back at slide 10. Here, a reflection on the wider reasons for a person to be practicing illegal street art is offered:
“Couldn’t one on the other hand say that it is society itself that imprint the minority, that then takes to the streets and break against the law in the form of graffiti to begin with? Isn’t there often in a way a chokehold on the poorer parts of the population, in conjunction with the structural bullying by the society and bureaucracy (more so in the US than in Sweden)? Not to justify their behaviour, which I don’t, but it is incredibly important to express oneself creatively and in a good amount of freedom (like you said you understood). If their freedom is taken away from them, and all they have left is their creativity (that can not be expressed through the educational system since this costs or demands an education), why then not use the creativity they have to kick the people who took their freedom in the guts, to show themselves and say ‘I am still here, give me my freedom back’”.

In this entry, the data-producer is suggesting that the practitioner of graffiti is, in fact, doing something (graffiti) in order to do something else (carve out an ever so small space of power for the disempowered). 119 “To break the law” is, in slide 10, seen as an irrational act (because this is ‘wrong’; contrarily to the law), whereas slide 11 suggests there is rationality in the act of breaking the law if viewed beyond the morals of right and wrong and rather by thinking about what such action produces in terms of affects and effects in and through the world. Slide 10 seems to suggest that if someone does something that goes against the moral code of slide 10’s author, it is irrational. But slide 11 replies that there are several overlapping moral codes in this world, several perspectives and experiences, and to summarily reduce an action that one does not agree with as something that is done out of lack of ability to do something else – breaking the law as opposed to following it, restraining oneself as opposed to letting loose – is to point out how an inaptitude in understanding or rationalizing what is going on is disguised as rational thought when in fact it is a moral thought.

In this way, slide 11 expresses a rationality that becomes legible if we are to consider society as a structure that produces a myriad of real situated citizens, where the moral rationality expressed by slide 10 suggests a view of society that harbors ideal, equal, individual citizens who all agree to the rules of engagement and have had some part in their devising, which indeed would make the sudden breaking of these rules irrational.

Thence, I would argue that the production of an event of spectating where discussions challenge the fixed and pregivens, even pertaining to categories that in themselves are not perceived as ‘political’, can stimulate

119 Interestingly, the statement towards the end of the comment has been phrased, perhaps unintentionally, as the title of another film in The Study, I’m Still Here. Perhaps this indicates that the writer of this sentence is thinking that JP is also performing a sort of emancipation of the oppressed.
democratizing practices in its increasing the capacity to focus on questions rather than answers. As in slide 4, which offers a series of “irritating questions”:

“[W]as the intention of the filmmaker to ‘rip off’ Banksy’s art or was it an accident? Is it an agreement that the filmmaker got to film Banksy to create a documentary that displays and sells more of Banksy’s art?? (since no one got to film Banksy previously??) HOW does Banksy cover his identity so well) Sick.”

I would suggest on the basis of the analysis in the previous sections that this irritation is related to the sensation of dis-organization of the body, that is, of the rendering of the mock-mode as a problem that asks to be thought about and integrated into the body in some way. This is also how the slide continues:

“Raises interesting insights like: That I got crazy eager to buy art made by Banksy. That I several days later realized that it was most probably a PR-trick and that I bought it. That both my viewing company and myself bought the PR trick and believed in the films message (if that is what it was). Outrageous and an awakening to realize how easy it is to be fooled by this form of PR, never encountered it before” (slide 4).

Here, the opening towards a becoming-animal, of cultivating a critical stance, comes into relief. Not because the data-producer later understood that it was in fact a PR-trick but because he/she believed it “if that is what it was”. Ending up with doubt more than ‘knowledge’ is integrated as a positive affect and thus actualized as “an awakening”, making, as it were, an affirmative mib-what? As such, the exhaustion of the relationality of the rational has produced a generative relation to doubt, making the body capable of something-other, making it work in a new way, that is, opening onto a potential missing contract and a mib yet to come.

Re-organizing the body, a missing mib

The exhausted relation between the rational and irrational might first appear scary, but is it potentially made productive through the ‘so then what?’ of the doubtful mib-what? That shifts the mib towards a productive state of thinking the new, as in slide 34 with the title “A bit about Phoenix”. In it, the data-producer reflects on the contradictions of the actor:

“Phoenix creates conflicting thoughts and emotions in the spectator. If the documentary is true he shrinks as an actor for the viewer because it becomes difficult to place the successful actor the talented Phoenix as this frail and feeble-minded person. At the same time as someone mentioned beautiful to see the more visible humans more vulnerable, intimate side, that side steps
and is as nuts as the rest of us invisible people. If it is fake it is an incredible effort of acting and does show the frail boundary between acting and truth in the meeting with us humans” (sic).

The slide “someone mentioned” is Slide 36, with the title “General opinion/dopey suggestion”\textsuperscript{120}. It reads:

“There is something beautiful with this film and the fact that it is difficult in the beginning to determine if it actually is a documentary or not. It just as easily could be a tragic reality about a human that really just tries to fulfill his dream–” (sic)

These slides point to the possibility that the events of spectating have actualized multiple realities that may in fact co-exist. The esteem of Phoenix might shrink or grow, but at the end of the day, it might possibly do both. Just like we humans are strong and weak, just like dreams can be beautiful and tragic, reality is rarely either/or. The connective viewpoint acknowledges reality as multiple and brings forth a promise of a missing mib born through the clash of heterogeneities. Similarly, I argue that The Study, notably through its conjunctive seriality, made possible the formation of a diffractive-productive viewpoint that leaked into an otherwise organized and potentially facialized body.

What becomes clear when contrasting the different sets of data is that there was compartmentalization between the affections produced through different methods. But by transmitting the data through the resonant registers of the method assemblage for mediamateriality, the face has also been seen to be capable ‘of making different faces’. Although a face can be a Face, it can also pull a face or else face up to the world. The tripartite method of The Study shows that different methods produce different events as well as different accounts of them. In the case of the Prezi (in combination with the particular instructions I gave to the data-producers), the perceived need for order (understandable, since Prezi is a tool for presentation and thus communication) reduced the experience, causing it to close down on itself. In contrast the Q&As and the fikas were seen to rather open up towards higher degree of embrace of a more messy and complex experience. In the end the participation can be seen to have increased the capacity for a diffractive thinking. That is, it has made visible the limit, to speak with Barad (2007, 381), of the “the determinacy and permanency of boundaries.” Such way the data-producers have reconfigured connections and entered a process of unlearning.

\textsuperscript{120} In the original, the data-producer used the Swedish slang ‘flum’, here translated ‘dopey’.
Having used different tools for mapping the processes as unfolded during The Study, it becomes clear that even though the structuring of one’s thoughts can be a productive method for understanding one’s own process of learning and thinking, it can also make it less fertile. However, even a possibly reductive tool such as the Prezi can be made to crack open and leave lines of flight as is seen in the example of a potential redemption for Phoenix in slides 34 and 36. The irrationality of rationalizing the rationale of an assumed fictive character’s real reasons for the performed actions explodes in an affection that makes it possible to face the real as anything but certain, stable, exact or exterior. Rather, it is qualitatively multiple and layered, critical, collectively produced and with material consequences. As such, perhaps most importantly, it is our collective shared responsibility.

**Interlude: The force of the social**

While the emails express individual thoughts and the field notes from the fika a moment blurred by many individual voices, the Prezi is a collective enunciation that speaks of the event as a totality. But since “sociability is inherently affective” (Gatens and Lloyd 1999, 77), that is, bodies are largely made through relations with others, the result of the project needs to be considered the result of a collective effort. With this, I want to highlight that the social character of an event of spectating is paramount for an event to be fully productive in terms of producing thinking, notably because the social character of the event makes possible an affectively more complex mib. Although this might not be controversial, it is important to keep in mind while thinking of events of spectating as the birthing of the new.

This force of the social has been suggested throughout the data, especially in the e-mails with persistent revelations of the qualitative differences felt by the data-producers when a screening was a social event and when it was not, which confirms the influence of the social in actualizing the virtuals of affect. To indeed enter spectating events as a social event seems for many of the data-producers to be to add a productive aspect to the event, particularly in relation to the birthing of problematizing questions.

For instance, Rosa saw the first film alone but then the second with her father and his wife. In producing a social event for ventilation, she thought that thoughts and questions appeared that might not have, had she seen the film alone (second e-mail). Also, Marie made comparisons between seeing films alone or with others (second e-mail). For instance, she saw her second film in two sittings, one where she saw the first part of the film alone and the other where she finished seeing it with her boyfriend. She didn’t choose to see it in two sittings, it happened because she was tired the first time and
decided to watch the rest of it the next day. During the second sitting, both she and her partner grew interested in Joaquin Phoenix, so they Googled him during the screening. This indicates that she was less geared towards providing the ‘right’ answer as she was with the first Q&A. In the second Q&A she expressed not feeling as serious towards the screening of the second film as towards the first.

This is also reflected in the style of her answers that in the first e-mail were a minutely detailed narration of the ‘story’, whereas the second e-mail cuts faster to her own reflections, since these had already become formed in dialogue with her boyfriend. By choosing open questions that gave away little information as to the theoretical grounding of The Study, etcetera, the research design forced Marie to cast a wide net and experiment a little. While she approached the first event as a ‘student’, she was more of a partner to her boyfriend in the second event. Here, the desire to have a joyful social event meant searching the Internet and discussing the veracity claim of the film, a discussion that produced a joyful affect in her and set that second sitting apart from the first, appearing as two different events for her.

Another data-producer who consistently highlighted the force of the social was Bruno. In reflecting on his last event of spectating (third e-mail), which was the first film he saw alone, he thought that,

“[…] if you see a film together with someone it is, as I see it, a way of socializing, It also creates expectations on the film in relation to the expectations around the personal encounter whether it is something ordinary such as hanging out with ones girlfriend, child or friend. If you see a film alone it is more about ones expectations of the film experience I think” (sic).

These examples point to the fact, perhaps not surprising but important, that we need each other as interlocutors in order to hear ourselves think, which, as is argued in this dissertation, is equal to thinking tout court. Thinking is not a solitary affair, it is a collective production. And just the same, the processes of different/ciation, of subjectification, are not a solitary affair but something we do together – we become who we are as individuals through the collectivities we sustain.

In praxis, however, due to the fear of spoilers, the social event of collective becoming does not happen unless everyone has seen the film. ‘Spoiler’ is a term that suggests that a future experience might be ruined by what others might communicate. This makes a person not want to discuss something, sometimes even in general terms, related to a film/experience they have not yet seen/had. Also, as concluded by the data-producers and discussed throughout chapter six, it is because the films do not offer easy
classification in reception that they manage to function affectively, and this is also the reason not to discuss the films widely, at least not until the others have seen the film. The power of these events of spectating would be diminished if talked about too much beforehand, while it becomes stronger if talked about afterwards. The affective mockumentary (or audiovisual communication that functions to similar effect) thus demands a certain social character to be able to function at its most powerful (this is important to keep in mind while thinking about a possible future moving-image-pedagogy, as I will do in the last part of chapter 8).

The topic of spoilers was a continuous element of discussions at the fikas. At the third fika, Joe expresses how tempting it is to Google information about the film but that he thinks that to hear/read what others think before seeing the film would “ruin the authentic experience”. Time and time again over the course of The Study, the group voices the problem of spoilers as something they believe is becoming an increasingly pervasive problem in their social life. This makes it increasingly difficult to have a conversation in a group of people, since ‘everyone’ is intra-acting with audio-visual material to a very large extent today. Thus, ‘everyone’ is reluctant to talk unless everyone present has seen the film/TV-series in question.

Paradoxically, however, the one who introduced the term spoilers to the fika conversation was George who by his own admission, both at fika and in Q&As, had the habit of using Internet resources such as IMDb, Wikipedia and ‘Googling’ both before and after screenings, and this he did not perceive in the terms of spoilers but as facts and information. Others, such as Joe, would normally not read anything before or during viewing a film, as he expressly felt that reading or hearing what others had felt or thought would ruin the experience for him (repeated in all three Q&As). Here, Joe is consistent in his fear of spoilers, thinking that a spoiler consists of anything anyone might say anywhere, whereas George’s conceptualization of spoilers seems to be what he perceives as subjectivelopinion, what a person he knows might think or have experienced. In contrast, information he can gather on web sites such as IMDb and Wikipedia is perceived as objective knowledge, which is thus not part of his conceptualization of a spoiler.

George thus allows his own thought to be influenced as long as he perceives this to be authorized through media and is hence objective in his perception. It is the personal and subjective commentary that he wishes to stay clear of up to the point of being able to meet as equals, that is, having had ‘the same experience’. A conclusion is that George related to the mediated voices as representing another, more superior experience than what he or a friend could have had alone. However, he does seem to think that he and his friend would have had a similar experience (thus warranting the
need to first see the film, then have a conversation, now as equals). This leads to a representational idea of the ‘film’ as an ontological and epistemological external object that offers the same thing, that has an essence, as it were, and that the mediatized voices represent a correct or more objective and privileged knowledge about this. This leads to thinking that the experience, when lived correctly, is the same for everyone (and that there is a correct way to perceive it).121 Another conclusion is that George considers himself, and his friend, for instance, as ‘unequal’ to the mediatized voices: listening to them is not to be affected in a biased way but to enter an inner circle of privileged ‘knowledge’.

Connected to this is perhaps George’s choice to view the three films alone. He expresses having done so in order to “increase my concentration and be allowed to reflect freely” (first e-mail). In the second Q&A he wrote that he had chosen to see the film alone for the same reasons as the first, thus again reiterating a preconceived idea that being alone equals a capacity for a more free reflection. However, by the third Q&A he admits that, “the film would have been more interesting to see together with someone”. The serial and collective aspect of The Study has given George a new experience, leading him to place a higher value in his own reasoning as it is actualized through reception and in dialogue with another person. In what can be seen as a significant shift of perspective, George expresses an understanding of the event of spectating as a more productive than reproductive event, which was his initial understanding. Where he started by understanding his task as one of excavating ‘true knowledge’ about a film, thus thinking that company would interfere in this quest, towards the end of The Study, he acknowledges events of spectating as sites for the actualization and materialization of affects that need a productive and, in a way,

121 This position would be consistent with the massive body of work within film studies that theorize film as essence as opposed to experience. In almost any field of theory, representatives of either ‘camp’ can be found. One example might be the formative contributions by Molly Haskell (1974) regarding representations of gender in film with *From Reverence to Rape: the Treatment of Women in Movies*, whereas Laura Mulvey’s (1975) “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” can be seen to focus on gendered ways of seeing film and, thus, experience in a broad sense. In short, the focus is usually on either object or subject, either composition or perception. Then, there are approaches that bridge this gap by, for instance, placing the topic of technology at the center, as in D.N. Rodowick’s important *The Virtual Life of Film* (2007), where he offers a lucid materialist discussion of the medium of film and its travels into the digital domain to discuss acts of viewing in onto-epistemological terms. In this dissertation, the method assemblage for medi-amaterality attempts to find a spot in-between this binary division by focusing on the event of spectating as a holey space where a moving-image-body comes forth.
response-able approach in order for the viewing subject to get ‘un-stuck’. In this sense, he provides a new view of the onto-epistemology of a film, not as an external object with a stable meaning (that he can master) but rather as a space that offers conditions for thinking, a practice that he comes to understand becomes even more powerful (capable) when collective.

Contradicting the fear of spoilers, however, is the fact that The Study does not point univocally towards a lack of foreknowledge as the one key aspect of the affection of the event. Two of the data-producers (Rosa and Bruno) expressed that they experienced the film they had seen before the project differently this time around, although they did have some foreknowledge of the films. Rosa expressed how she remembered the film as simply weird the first time she saw it (by chance on cable), and with no other thinking attached to that thought, she had even forgot she had seen it. That time, the event was experienced as a single event, not as a relational series. Hence, the blurred boundaries of the film were folded through emotion and judgment into the idea of ‘error’ consistent with a dogmatic image of thought. The experience was discarded into the ‘dunno-box’ (making her the one who was unable to see correctly) and left at that. For Bruno, it was almost the other way around: he had a clear idea of what Exit Through the Gift Shop was all about seeing it the first time around (‘an art-project by Banksy”). However, seeing the film as part of The Study made him question his previous idea, not as in thinking it wasn’t what he first thought but as thinking that he was no longer sure whether what he initially thought was the only way to understand the experience.

In summation, I argue that the method assemblage here proposed offers a valid experimentation, since it makes it possible to trace the parallel processes of becoming-other of multiple individuals, while acknowledging the same as intra-active parts of a collective body. In other words, the challenge and effect were different for the different data-producers: for some, it was encountering these particular films, for others, listening to each other, and for others, hearing themselves. But for all, I argue, the participation in The Study functioned as what I call an event of realing.

Conclusion: the event of realing

Whereas an event of spectating is an encounter with a problem, the event of realing comes about through an exhaustive extension of the particular problem of the mock-mode, bringing forth what can be considered a genesis of the disrupted. As such, the event of realing activates the combined notion of actualizations of realities, with the added notion of reeling. That is to say, by pulling away the mat under our feet, these events indeed
makes us reel, as in falling, wobbling, losing one’s balance and sense of up and down. As we lose our sense of stability, it is easy to wonder, is it the world or we who are falling? Before we regain our bearing, our perspective might have changed, sometimes a little, sometimes a lot.

The event of realing exposes that events of spectating are always potentially a struggle for subjectivity which is to say “a battle to win the right to have access to difference, variation and metamorphosis” (Conley 2010, 115). Through events of realing, the capacities for making sense are redistributed and momentarily even suspended. As such, the event of realing works as what Deleuze (2005b) calls a “failure of recognitions” (52).122

In this way, the event of realing functions to produce the image, not as “an object but a ‘process’” (Deleuze 1998, 159).123 This makes the event of this image-process (the realing) produced as “collective utterances (énoncés collectifs) whose paradoxical property is to address a people who do not yet exist and, in so doing, urge them toward becoming” (Rodowick 1997, 154). The event of realing works by displacing limits, by exhausting which makes “hiatuses, holes, or tears that we would never notice, or would attribute to mere tiredness, if they did not suddenly widen in such a way as to receive something from the outside or from elsewhere” (Deleuze 1998, 158). As such, it becomes “precisely this: not a representation of an object but a movement in the world of the mind [...] what matters is no longer the any-space-whatever but the mental image to which it leads” (Ibid., 169). This movement, drawing from the analyses in this dissertation, pushes forth a de-organization of the mib in such a way that there is increased flow (in the case of adequate affections) or an inundation or stop of the flow (in the case of inadequate affections).

Michele Aaron (2007), writing on film genre a decade ago, purports that “the divide between fact and fiction, between the real and the fake ‘devastating spectacle’ is blurrier, more banal or potentially powerful, than ever” (89). Aaron is referring to the similarity between watching Armageddon (Michael Bay 1998) at home one day to watching 9/11 on the news the next day. It is as if the fake this time is ‘for real’, what she calls a doubling of screens. Her proposition that a contemporary spectatorial sphere is a sphere of discomfort is concurrent with the assessment of this thesis. But whereas Aaron gives the example of the experience of viewing similar con-

122 Deleuze is here talking about specific image types. In this dissertation, however, Deleuze’s insights into the function of images are applied to the whole event of spectating, moving the focus from the images per se to the intra-active event as such.

123 What Deleuze (1998) calls “a language of images” (159).
tent in different contexts over the course of a day – or, otherwise put, viewing similar actions unfold but in the one instance in fiction and in the other ‘for real’ – I have interested myself with the experience of not knowing what one is viewing. Instead of a ‘doubling of screens’, then, the event of realing is shown to rather abolish the screen as a safe zone of distance, disintegrating the relational conditions for the sustainment of the identity of the ‘spectator’ from within. Instead of a discomfort in seeing things that are discomforting, then, the discomfort of the event of realing is the event itself, where one’s pregivens are put into question, causing one to not know what to think, how to think, or what context one actually finds oneself in. Most pressing is the realization that this discomfort has something to say about one’s own identity, notably as a ‘spectator’ in that very instance.

By the exhaustion of the very ground for the viewing-subject-as-spectator, as discussed throughout these last chapters, the event of realing produces a tearing of the Face, a deterriorialization of the known, a reeling that is not brought on through ‘error’, such as a stumbling by the ‘walker’, but a reeling caused through a movement of the very ground. For example, Bruno admits towards the last fika that participation in the project led to a need to incessantly ask whether something is real or not and not just take it on face value. In this way the stability and distance of the position of ‘the spectator’ has been exhausted throughout The Study. Speaking with the Deleuze (1998) the exhaustive is “a matter of covering every possible direction, while nonetheless moving in a straight line” (160). Bruno and the other data-producers are still viewing, but no longer from any known position, since the onto-epistemological foundation of its territory, the discourse of factuality, has been made to tremble. The discourse of factuality is falling apart, leaks are cracking it open, effectuating disorientation and a subsequent de- and reorganization of the territory of which the viewing subject finds him/herself to be an intrinsic part.

As the horizon is stabilized and the territory reterritorialized, one sometimes finds oneself on a completely new plane, sometimes in a familiar landscape but where perspectives might have shifted ever so slightly. There is a before and after. Balance might be restored, but a generative rearrangement – a becoming of the territory – has come to pass, inducing a becoming of the relations of power that structures the territory, notably in the very possibility to conceptualize ‘up’ or ‘down’ as before the event of realing. These new relations impact how the viewing subject understands her/himself as a viewing subject as well as the power-relation inherent in its spectatorhood, particularly in relation to its ethico-onto-epistemology – the reeling brings about a realing.
This makes the event of realing a minor event in that it offers conditions for a revolutionary becoming-other of the event as what Deleuze and Guattari (2012) has discussed as a collective assemblage of enunciation (39). By disrupting the distribution of the factual and the fictive as dichotomous categories, there is a de-legitimizing of a narratocratic mode of sense making, additionally having repercussions on the existential territory of the viewing subject (Panagia 2009, 122). In addition, through its capacity to produce the problem of the mock-mode, i.e., its capacity to destabilize the narratocratic foundation of thinking that permeated the conditions of the event, the event of realing is what Rancière would a dissensual event (2003, 226) in that it “can be cracked open from the inside, reconfigured in a different regime of perception and signification” (Rancière 2011, 48f). The event of realing heightens the ability to understand the unspeakable. As such, it becomes an event of rendering sensible the nonsensible (Deleuze 1995, 103), increasing the affectivity of the mib actualizing it.

Whereas the concept of the viewing subject points to an understanding of the political subject today as a being of the sensible and affective realms, privileging the sense of sight as a means for making sense of the world (for conforming and participating in narratocracy), the term spectator as employed in this dissertation is the practicing of the viewing subject of a particular relation of power. Spectatorial contracts thus point to the way this relation is shaped and reshaped and how we can think about those instances when its shape is unknown – the missing contract. This contraction makes a reliance on consensual habit and memory impossible, making the only possible way forward dissensus: the production of a reality not yet visible in the actual.

While the event of realing as concept opens up towards a multitude of events of producing mediamaterialities, the term affective mockumentary stays in the very specific realm of feature films. If I have striven towards staying close to the specificities of praxis throughout these last chapters, it has been in the aim of making it possible to arrive at an opening onto questions of a more general order in the following, last chapter. Here, I will suggest that events of realing can be thought to produce a form of mental ecology, or mockumentality, that make possible practices of becoming-political in the post-truth society of control (Deleuze 1992) of IWC (Gauttari 2014). These will be considered as practices of change, although depending on the capacity for affection of the mib, the practices will increase or decrease equality and/or governance, thence motivating me to end with a commentary on the possibility to think about the method assemblage for mediamateriality as a moving-image-pedagogy, or mip.
Chapter 8: Mockumentality as a becoming-political

“If the face is a politics, dismantling the face is also a politics involving real becomings, an entire becoming-clandestine. Dismantling the face is the same as breaking through the wall of the signifier and getting out of the black hole of subjectivity. Here, the program, the slogan, of schizooanalysis is: Find your black holes and white walls, know them, know your faces; it is the only way you will be able to dismantle them and draw your lines of flight! (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 208).

In this chapter, I will consider the outcome of the event of realing as the formation of a mockumentality. I will argue that mockumentality corresponds to a characteristic process of subjectification in the society of control (Deleuze 1992) in that it works through modulations and flux. As a concept, mockumentality speaks specifically to the forces of reconfiguration of what Johanna Oksala has discussed as a ‘neoliberal regime of truth’ (2013). This means that by destabilizing the viewing subject-as-spectator, mockumentality brings forth change. However such change can both “enable the assemblages to evolve in a constructive, processual fashion” (Guattari 2014, 30) as well as a violent event of fascist desire (Foucault, in Deleuze and Guattari 2009, xiii). As such, it functions as a war-machine (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 388), conditioning a process of subjectification whereby there is a possible new future for the viewing subject, what I call a becoming-political.

I argue that in today’s so called post-truth society, this thus functions as a double-edged sword. This gives rise to a pressing need to understand the affects and effects of mockumentality. Notably in order to find responsible ways of working with the capacity of mockumentality for re-organizing the regime of truth as well as the society of control its practices sustain. Therefore, this chapter offer the dual contribution of both a deepened analysis of the data of the previous chapters as well as conceptual proposals that may further a theoretical discussion pertaining to the problem of mockumentality in a post-truth society. This leads me to end this dissertation with a reflection on the need to work pro-actively with events of realing as a promise of strengthened capacity for democratic engagement. Thus I will suggest that the method assemblage for mediamentiality offered through this dissertation, understanding this to also be composed of the subsequent conceptual proposals of this chapter, can be activated in the future as a moving-image-pedagogics, or mip.
Mockumentality in the society of control of IWC

The italics in the word mockumentality point to Guattari’s suggestion that there are three connected ecologies that condition processes of subjectification as these are intra-actively produced through/producing what Guattari calls Integrated World Capitalism (IWC): mental ecology, social ecology and subjective ecology (Guattari 2014). Together, these inform the functioning of IWC. My contention is that mockumentality informs and affects the ecological registers of human life, notably by intra-actively participating in the production of a “collective mass-media subjectivity” (ibid., 5). This Guattari sees as sustaining the “productive-economic-subjective” ‘aggregate’ of the IWC (ibid. 32). Mockumentality thus partakes in the unfolding production of a societal system through processes of subjectification. However, and this is the crux, it does so in a way that destabilizes one of the key functional organs of the IWC, which is its regime of truth (as I will return to shortly). More than sustaining the IWC, mockumentality therefore presents itself as a possible moment of change, as a becoming-other of the collective mass media subjectivity and the system it sustains.

The concept mockumentality is developed in dialogue with Hito Steyerl’s Foucauldian concept documentality, which references the power relation that intersects with the relation of knowledge particular to documentary film, understanding its strategic function as a form of governmentality through documentary truth production. Importantly, mockumentality, just like documentality, references the self-governing function of truth-production (Steyerl 2007, 219, my italics). In Guattari’s proposition, the question of self-governance is central, understanding this to be a key function within IWC where “the introjection of repressive power of the oppressed” (Guattari 2014, 32), through the ecologic registers, makes for a subjectivity that fits the functioning of IWC (that together make up the aggregate). Hence, for Guattari, self-governed subjectification-processes within IWC are not next to economics or politics – they are the political economy particular to this system (ibid., 33). IWC thus functions as a society of control (Deleuze 1992) in that the subjects are not controlled through spatial discipline as performed through the hospital, the school, or the prison but through a logic of temporal, shifting and unbound modulation (ibid., 4). As a society of control, IWC replaces/overlaps the molding of the subject in the society of discipline with a modulation, “a self-

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124 This idea, as Frida Beckman (2016) writes, of a society of control “does not break off from Foucault’s analyses of biopower so much as it constitutes a continuation and elaboration of disciplinary and regulatory technologies that Foucault had already begun to theorise” (3).
transmutation molding continually changing from one moment to the next, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point” (ibid.).

The force of modulation in the society of control is particularly manifested through “technologies of action at a distance” (Lazzarato 2006, 183). These are, for instance, different media-technologies, and these function to stratify “multiplicity in an open space” (ibid.). That is, they inform intensities throughout the ecological registers, such as public opinion, coding of values, and subjectivity. In contrast to the disciplining of previous disciplinary societies, the exercise of governance throughout IWC is therefore less centered on prohibition than on controlling affective capacities through modulations that ‘fit’ the function of the system (machine, wider body).

As a typical, in the society of control, affective self-governing modulation, mockumentality is fluid enough to intersect and re-orient affective flows towards a destabilization of the functioning of practices of control. Documentality refers to the production of a particular understanding of the concept of truth through which the subject is produced. Importantly, it is thus a subject of a particular system (that has produced the subject as the subject produces the system). Mockumentality, in contrast, refers to the production of an emancipated relationship between the viewing subject and the discourse of factuality, giving cause to a process of subjectification that is thus brought on through IWC but that gives cause to a becoming-other of the subject that is not consistent with the neoliberal regime of truth that sustains IWC. This inherent discrepancy is the force particular to mockumentality, and I will discuss this in more detail in the next section.

A neoliberal regime of truth

As a force of modulation, mockumentality is intrinsic to the functioning of a society of control. As such, it is a force of becoming from within. Oksala argues that Foucault’s political analysis was centered on understanding how certain practices construct reality, in other words, how the regime of truth as a practice inscribes reality (Oksala 2013, 54). She posits that he was explicitly addressing the political ontology of neoliberalism as it presents itself as the One political reality. She thus argues that neoliberalism needs to be understood as “a distinct regime of truth” (ibid., 56). By practicing this distinct neoliberal regime of truth, the neoliberal subject (as well as the interdependent neoliberal society) is constituted and sustained

125 This, Mauricio Lazzarato (2013) has called the “problem of politics”, as Foucault came to understand it after May 68 (155). Also, Steyerl (2007) suggests, drawing from Lemke, that this was “the central question for Foucault” (219).
The neoliberal regime of truth is ordained as an acceptance of ‘The Reality’: that economy is everywhere and nowhere, that economy is neutral and natural. In this way, practices of a neoliberal regime of truth produce the individual as a particular economic subject, a ‘rational’ and self-interested ‘homo economicus’ (Oksala 2013, 69). In short, the practices of a neoliberal regime of truth produce neoliberal modes of subjectivities (see also Guattari 2014, 31f; Lazzarato 2013, 157; Zepke 2011, 206) that are needed for the functioning of IWC (Guattari 2014, 5).

To speak of the neoliberal political economy of IWC is thus to speak of a neoliberal subjective economy of IWC. Without the processes of neoliberal subjectifications (which is to say, practices of a particular neoliberal regime of truth), IWC would not ‘make sense’, its continuing modulations would not continuously sustain its functioning. This makes the subjective economy of neoliberalism, where the individual as individual is the site for control, totalitarian in nature. In fact, the neoliberal subjective economy is “a social order that subsumes entire populations” (Holmes 2009, 3/30) from which “no human activity on the planet could escape” (Ibid., 6/30). It is simply, to make a travesty of Nancy Reagan’s (in)famous slogan, impossible to ‘just say no’ to the system of IWC.126

I believe there is reason to think about the subjective economy of the viewing subject-as-spectator together with the subjective economy of the homo economicus, since they are both constituted through practicing a particular ‘acceptance of Reality’ (under punishment of existential stigma to not do so), hence also constituting and inscribing the real and reality in

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126 Even radical action is questionably possible: how could we possibly take ourselves out of the equation of global materialist relations of power? Even if we were to ‘move out into the woods and live off the land’, it is difficult to argue that this would constitute a severance of the power-relation involuntarily given to us by being born with the requisite conditions to do so – freedom of movement, access to ‘land’, etcetera. This is not a possibility offered by any one member in the ‘community’ of IWC. It is to be considered a particular capacity to influence one’s life that we have not chosen but that the particular system of governance under which we are born awards us, and for the ones who are awarded this power, this capacity is bestowed at the expense of the ones who are not awarded it. To simply ignore this fact of global relations of power is not enough to sever relations with IWC, it only demonstrates ignorance of one’s own relation to, and position within, IWC. This is why Arendt considers that only the outcasts, the state-less, the refugees are without responsibility, that is, the ones who find themselves completely in the power of others (i.e., unable to respond to the situation, where the response is totally in the hands of others) (Gatens and Lloyd 1999, 75).
a certain way with certain consequences for the continuing unfolding of the society and its members.

In the first case, the notion of the real is practiced through an acceptance of what I have called the doc- and mock-contracts. In the second case, the notion of the real is practiced through an acceptance of economy as Nature (Oksala 2013, 69). But if the viewing subject-as-spectator and the homo economicus are defined according to their capacity for affection (Deleuze 1988, 124), both pertain to practices of a neoliberal regime of truth that hold reality as a matter of, on the one hand, constantly being in flux and, on the other hand, external and out-of-reach. In this way, the notions of truth, fact, reality and objectivity are practiced through the auto-governed flux of individualized ‘ownership’, and yet this depends on the central condition of unconditional acceptance of ‘the reality’. It stipulates a reality of ‘choices’ but where one’s existence as a subject depends on ‘the right choice’. It is a freedom to go ‘wherever one wants’ but where ‘the road’ has already captured movement. As exemplified by Deleuze:

“a motorway does not enclose people, but by building motorways the means for control are increased. I am not saying that this is the only aim of motorways but people can turn around as much as they like ‘in freedom’ without being enclosed, yet they are fully controlled. This is our future” (Deleuze 2004b, 93). Practicing subject-hood in the society of control of IWC is therefore thinking as a way of being, not becoming, as a way of reiterating repetition as the same, not as difference. It is to ‘fit in’ by practicing a certain idea of choice in a totalitarian measure.127

This leads me to argue that the neoliberal regime of truth constitutes an inter-dependent paradox of a relative yet totalitarian regime of truth. The constitution of an identity of ‘recognizing reality’, be it the viewing subject-as-spectator or homo economicus, means normalizing an invisibility of relations of power. In contrast, mockumentality, in causing an emancipation of the viewing subject from its identity as ‘spectator’, functions as a challenge to the hegemonic ‘acceptance of how things are’, a challenge to the dominant regime of truth, instead opening up the possibility for a regime of truth that is focused on ‘how are things?’ In short, reconfiguring ‘the social order’ from within, making leaking faces, little revolutionary machines of emancipatory flows whereby a new is made possible.

127 This is how the Cogito becomes despotism, since the existence of the subject depends on its function and its function depends on the subject (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 197).
Since mockumentality conforms to the forces of modulation that constitute the society of control but not to the composition of a relative-totalitarian regime of truth that sustains the actualized IWC, it threatens to cause a collapse from within. It is a force from within, not a force brought on from the outside. As such, it punches a hole in the rationality of a complex and paradoxical relative-totalitarian neoliberal regime of truth, enunciating equal threat and promise. In this sense, mockumentality functions as a “changingpoint” (Steyerl 2007, 219), giving rise to a reconfiguration of both the dominant regime of truth and the identity of the viewing subject. Given this possibility of change of identity of the viewing subject, I argue that mockumentality can bring forth a becoming-political.

Mockumentality as a becoming-political

As I have argued in this thesis, capacity to affect and be affected is inherently relational, that is, inherently beyond the individual, always practiced through the relational force of assemblages. By challenging the stability of the neoliberal regime of truth, mockumentality is a force of change of the assemblages through which it is brought forth, but this can become a change towards both an authoritarian-totalitarian regime of truth-to-come and a materialist-egalitarian regime of truth-to-come. Mockumentality is a dissensual force (Rancière 2003, 226), but the outcome for the viewing subject is in itself uncertain, since I argue that it depends on the capacities of affection of the mib through which it is brought forth.

Drawing from Rancière, I take ‘the political’ to mean “the meeting of two heterogenic processes”, one of which is governance, in other words the organ-ization of collectivities, and the other equality, which is composed of practices of emancipation (Rancière 2006b, 67). By making possible a reconfiguration of the regime of truth, so that there is freedom but without the despotism of the correct choice or even any choice, in that it can potentially bring into question the notion of choice precisely as a mechanism of control, mockumentality has the force of the anarchic. In this way, it enacts a becoming-political by rendering visible that Politics is in fact a configuration of the space where the political takes place, i.e., not the battle for or exercise of power per se but the very conditions for such battle (ibid., 96). Becoming-political produces the regime of truth as a complex of material relations with actual intra-active agential capacity to bring about the becoming of the world(s) (Rancière 2006a, 39).

128 Or perhaps it could be considered a “snap”, in the terminology of Sarah Ahmed (2017).
As a disrupter of the despotism of (no)alternatives, mockumentality can offer the possibility to form new assemblages with the capacity “to connect the social libido, on every level, with the whole range of revolutionary machines of desire” (Guattari 2009a, 171). As I have discussed throughout this thesis, this begins with the force of thinking as a creative, not reproductive, act, understanding this (and subsequent processes of subjectifications) already as the space where the political takes place (Spindler 2010, 150). If an event of spectating is contracted through the doc- and mock-contracts, conditions are thus brought forth that can lift reality to the impossible status of universalism (sustaining the status quo of the neoliberal regime of truth of IWC). Deviating from such acceptance by producing a missing contract brings forth a mockumentality through which there is a new future for the viewing subject-as-spectator.

Rhodes and Springer argue that the blurring of the lines between fact and fiction is “a diverse but pervasive strand in film history and practice” (2006, 4f) and that this existed “literally at the beginning of the cinema” (ibid., 6, see also Cynthia J. Miller 2012). There have thus been many variations on the docufictive continuum over the course of audiovisual history, although most variations attempt to declare their identity in overt or subtle ways. But a film such as the already-mentioned Forgotten Silver failed, like War of the Worlds, to provide for such easy categorization (Conrich and Smith 2006, 234-236).

To consider hoaxes events of realing instead of failed communications is thus to rethink the history of these events in terms of a history of the becoming-political through spectatorship. As such, Ingagi (William Campbell 1930), marketed as an ethnographic documentation of an expedition into the jungles of the Congo (Doherty 1999, 240), may have activated a becoming-racist of the 30s American viewing subject, or Las Hurdes, the Luis Buñuel film from 1933, may have activated a becoming-other of the Madrileño viewing subject-as-spectator, ushering it to engage with the relations of power produced through the tension of the rural and urban in the 30s in Spain. As such, the here-presented method assemblage and the term affective mockumentary offer a sort of flipside to Stella Bruzzi’s ‘performative documentary’. The performative documentary “use[s] performance within a non-fiction context to draw attention to the impossibilities of authentic documentary representation” (2006, 185). Her term thus refers to the becoming of the filmic real through performance, that is, it points inwards, towards the subjectification of the participants and the documentarist(s). The events of realing made possible through the affective mockumentary, on the other hand, make possible an event through which the viewing subject is disrupted as spectator. This term thus points out-
wards. Instead of the impossibility of documentary representation, it is the possibility of the becoming-other, the becoming-political of the viewing subject that is highlighted.

As can be noticed, the three films that in different ways are engaged with throughout this thesis are all from the year 2010. I believe this is no coincidence. In fact, I would suggest that the increase in affective mockumentaries around the turn of the millennium, can be seen as the visibility of a problem that has been germinating throughout the previous century(ies). That is, the turn of the millennium was not the birth of the problem – this can be said to have existed all throughout the history of (audio)visual media – but perhaps it was around that time that the relations of power inherent in the viewing subject-as spectator were rendered more visible.

This suggests that the becoming-political of mockumentalities has little to do with producing distance, as with a Brechtian verfremdungseffect. Quite the contrary, mockumentality abolishes the screen, abridging and blurring distance and the firm boundaries between the here/there, inside/outside, external/internal. Mockumentality disrupts the foundation for the identity of the viewing subject-as-spectator, making visible that “the brain is the screen”, as phrased by Deleuze (Deleuze 2000, 366). This shows that the event of spectating, just like “[p]olitics and art, like forms of knowledge, constructs ‘fictions’, that is to say, material rearrangements of signs and images, relationships between what is seen and what is said, between what is done and what can be done” (Rancière 2006a, 39, italics in original).

In this way, mockumentality undertakes “a ‘transvaluation’ of all values” (Lazzarato 2013, 166) that makes out the neoliberal regime of truth, i.e., subjectifications (ibid., 170). It is thus a force of making possible an ‘otherworldly’ event in its literal creation of new worlds.

By making visible what had been concealed, kept out of sight, unspoken of, mockumentality brings on a becoming-political that is always minor, always an othering of the major, that is, a questioning of the pregivens. This is seen, for example, in chapter six, where Lisa is seen to develop a new realization that what she comes to consider the most vital and real aspect of an event of spectating is in fact the affects and actions brought forth. This constitutes a vital change not only in her view of encounters with films but also in how she views herself.

There are glimpses of such meeting of governance and emancipation in the empathetically written slide 40, which asks why Joaquin Phoenix cannot become a rapper just because he has been an actor previously, even if he “sucks at it”, if that is what he really wants. Here, the rational idea that one has to be good at something to do it (i.e., moral idea) is contrasted
with an advocacy for the right to do what one wants regardless of the taste of others or the dominant idea of taste. There is also the example of Marie, who becomes increasingly skeptical towards her own thinking as The Study progresses, a skepticism that ultimately makes her ‘lose control’, abandoning the idea of giving right answers and instead practicing thinking as a creative act of investigating and producing a critical thought. In these instances, mockumentality serves as a minor intervention to the major acceptance of the relation between the discourse of factuality and the viewing subject-as-spectator, and as such, its doubts and incertitudes are practices of a becoming-political for the viewing subject.

This is further noticed in relation to The Study in the example of George, who began with an initial urge to arrive at a recognition of ‘correct’ knowledge, thereby constituting himself as a valid spectator (chapter six). However, it became increasingly clear as The Study continued that this identity succumbed to a slight implosion, as the irrationality of his own doc-contraction, against his own observations, opened him to a new thought. This was actualized as a re-evaluation of the opinion of other people he knew versus the ‘expert voice’ of a reviewer or a Wikipedia author, acknowledging them to be equally a threat or a qualitative add-on to his understanding of a film. In this way, he was seen to move from a doc-contraction to a tentative missing, which was a move from a viewing subject-as-spectator towards a viewing subject-in-dialogue-with-others, entering a process of becoming-political.

As a changepoint, mockumentality thus brings forth a reconfiguration of the relations of power expressed through the mock-mode, destabilizing the ground for the dominant regime of truth, making the viewing subject momentarily non-functional with the modes of governance of the IWC, which demands an acceptance of a form of reality that is opaque, singular and totalitarian. Instead, there is an opening towards a new future for the viewing subject.

However, this can quickly become re-territorialized and subsumed as naturalized flow through the IWC, neutralizing the promise of mockumentality as emancipation from the neoliberal regime of truth. Thus, although the disruptive-reconfigurative force of mockumentality conditions practices through which relations of power are made visible, the existential relation constituted through the mock-mode makes this visibility an existential threat, as was noticeable in the initial affective registers brought forth in the event of Bio Rio and particularly throughout the first screening in The

129 This could be to be recognized as a proper member of a knowledge community (see Jenkins 2006).
Study. By offering a way to reinstate one’s legitimate existence through a practice of a relative-totalitarian neoliberal regime of truth, the disruption can be apprehended and overcoded as irrational, ‘not in touch with Reality’, etcetera (although this in itself, as I have discussed in chapters six and seven, is in fact deeply irrational and in many ways make-believe). This capacity for capture of the neoliberal regime of truth, turning the conditions for the space for politics into an irrational and arbitrary modulation that pledges allegiance to a totalitarian indiscriminative Real, makes resistance to the system difficult (Zepke 2011, 206).

To make it clear, it is not enough for the identity spectator as an acceptor of ‘how things are’ to be replaced by a counter-identity of the ‘non-acceptor of how things are’ for a bringing forth of a becoming-political as long as ‘how things are’ has not been changed. The vital aspect of becoming-political is that it is a practice that highlights actions and that eschews identities, notably since identities are vulnerable to the existential threat of annihilation through practices of a neoliberal regime of truth in a society of control of IWC. However, practices are less open to subsumption through IWC. To ‘be’ becoming-political would be an oxymoronic capture of dis-sensual forces. However, to practice a becoming-political is to practice resilience to the reterritorializing attempts of a present modulating society of control. By offering practices of becoming-political, mockumentality can serve as an exhaustion of the particular subjective economy of a neoliberal mode of subjectivity from within. The production of mockumentality produces the event of realing as its own subject, which makes it “immune to exploitation”, since it offers a practice of de-realizing the particular actualizations of potentials (Shaviro 2010, 44). In this way, it can offer the resilience130 of a “counter-actualization” (Deleuze 1990 150) of the subjective economy of the neoliberal regime of truth. In short, mockumentality can offer practices of an ethico-political opening towards another subjective economy (a becoming-political).

In the society of control, conditioned through practices of a regime of truth that stipulates equal measures of relativity (responsibility through the conception of the individual as individual, making no-one and every-one responsible) and totalitarianism (if things are as they are, then it is just how things are, accept it!), there is a cancelling out of responsibilities. By not existing in the sphere of ideas but of practices, the becoming-political of mockumentality renders visible a vital condition for democracy, namely,

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130 In a recent book by David Chandler and Julian Reid (2016), resilience is the particular quality discussed as a counter-measure to the condition of the neoliberal subject.
accountability, since it is an ethico-onto-epistemological affirmation of the relations of power that constitute the real. By practicing a becoming-political, there is thus a new future for the viewing subject. What this can mean and entail is the subject of the next section.

A new future for the viewing subject

As has been discussed in the previous section, mockumentality reveals practices of the neoliberal regime of truth as idealistic and irrational and thus in stark and paradoxical contrast to its incessant exclamation of being the very opposite: realistic and rational. Following this, I argue that the problem of mockumentality makes visible the processes of capture of the flux of forces, exposing that this is still, of course, a society of material relations of power. Paradoxically, this visibility is performed through an exhaustion of the invisibility of the totalitarianism of the present system. In other words, it is because the governance of the society of control is invisible that mockumentality can function as a becoming-political in it. This is also why mockumentality is a double-edged sword. Because it is a volatile destabilized/-ing force, it can function as a “new weapon” (Deleuze 1992, 4) and a changepoint, making possible practices of becoming-political for the viewing subject. This said, mockumentality can thus usher forth a new future for the viewing subject, but what future depends on the capacities for affections of the mib through which it is brought forth.131

If these practices are brought about through a non-response-able mib, the deterritorialization can be too strong, hence bringing forth a subsequent reterritorialization of the regime of truth in the shape of a totalitarian-authoritarian face-mib. But if the mib is response-able, making possible a full mibwo, it might be possible to choose any-whatever-identities, in short, sideling the concept of identity for the benefit of acknowledging the force of the reality-production of the viewing subject in the current post-truth society. Given this possibility to make visible what has been invisible and, in extension, understanding this this to be an ethico-political matter, I argue that mockumentality can function to disrupt a particular tendency in the post-truth society, namely, what is referred to as confirmation bias, as this is related to the identity of the viewing subject-as-spectator.

Confirmation bias is a cognitive bias that states that people believe what they want to believe or what they expect to believe because of their identi-

131 In this way, mockumentality could ask with Raastrup Kristensen, “what is expressed about being in the constitution of me?” (2012, 15).
fiction in a certain group (Nickerson 1998; Bäck and Lindholm 2014). Through events of realing, a mockumentality is formed that challenges, through practices of a dominant regime of truth, the naturalized identification with the ‘spectator’, ushering the viewing subject to abridge the distance between the reality ‘out-there’ and the reality ‘in-here’, making the identity of the spectator collapse and with it the particular confirmation biases connected to this group. Instead of a distant, perhaps safe position of a spectator, this new future is one of doubt, ambiguity, incertitude, tremor and increased affections. In this way, the viewing subject can no longer belong to the identity-group ‘spectator’ by simply accepting this identity. Through the practices of becoming-political, the viewing subject enters a process of reconfiguration whereby easy adherence to a group and its opinions is less possible. Therefore, this too makes confirmation bias and the related so-called fact-resistancy less influential as strategies to orient events of realing (I would argue, though it is beyond the scope of this thesis, that this could also occur through other events of spectating).

Because of this, I believe that mockumentality presents itself as the prevalent problem in and of the so-called post-truth society. My contention is that this is not a society where truth no longer exists as a notion or where truth is ‘lost’ (in general, on people…) but is an indication of an acceleration in the reconfiguration of both the relationship between the viewing subject and the discourse of factuality as well as the wider dominant regime of truth.

Arguing that mockumentality is a problem of the post-truth society is to highlight the governing function of identity in today’s society. Today, the stability of the expert as an identity granted the right to speak the truth (to offer a contract of stability as a doc- or a mock-contract) is in decline, giving way to doubt and ambiguity. I argue that this is not only indicative of a re-organ-ization of who can speak the truth but that the very conceptualization of a ‘who’ in this instance is related to the constitution of ‘the truth’ to begin with (just like Politics depends on the conditions for the political). In other words, the problem is not that we need more experts but that we need to rethink the relations of power of the expert, especially in relation to the viewing subject.

Since the post-truth society of control of IWC is a system of auto-subsumption, it works because we work to fit in, to ‘make sense of us-through-it’. If the viewing subject no longer practices a neoliberal regime of truth, then the subject becomes a threat to the system and, more saliently, to itself as an existence (since this is conditioned on the function of the former). Mockumentality produces a sense of non-sense, of a sudden being out-of-joint. In a society where a certain notion of realism is heightened to
despotism, the viewing subject is left with few choices: either accept that we do not know ‘our’ own good (that we need to trust the experts) or, if we claim to know our own good, be accused of “opening the door to totalitarianisms” (Rancière 2017).

I argue that this risks producing a context where the destabilizations of a mockumentality can usher in a need for a too-strong stabilization, what can amount to a desire for fascism: “the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us” (Foucault in Deleuze and Guattari 2009, xiii). That is, if inadequate mibs are produced, incapable of re-organizing the disruptive flow such that it still allows for a sustainable body (if a neurotic, cancerous or empty mib), mockumentality can serve as a force for increased stratification and facialization. In other words, the particular capacity for a becoming-political depends on the capacity of the mib (which as I have argued in this thesis is a connective-relational assemblage, hence something we do together) to be, speaking with Deleuze (1990, 149) worthy of the event. This, I argue, is related to the capacity to produce practices of becoming-political that are responsible.

Therefore, I argue that it becomes of fundamental importance to take mockumentality in a post-truth society seriously and not write it off as populist rhetorics or ‘error’ or ‘wrong’ unless we are to miss an opportunity to increase the conditions for sustainable democratic governance. In fact, I argue that mockumentality is not only an opportunity, it is a particularly resilient opportunity, since, as discussed in the previous section, practices of becoming-political are micropolitical measures of resistance that can function to counter micropolitical forms of control in the totalitarian system of IWC. In addition, I believe that the increased occurrence of events of realing suggests that the lesson offered by the post-truth atmosphere is precisely that the governance of a regime of truth can no longer be dealt with as ordination from above (visible oppression) nor as relative-individual (invisible oppression); rather, is increasingly practiced and begged to be practiced as a more egalitarian regime of truth.

In following the unfolding conversation regarding the post-truth atmosphere throughout 2016, it became clear to me that there is a prevalent sensation throughout the different strata of expert-society, be it in journalism, politics, academia, or media in general, that there is a relativization plaguing society that produces increased fact-resistancy and confirmation

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132 This is notably so, since, as Gabriel Tarde already pointed out over 100 years ago, the ‘media public’, or what I call the viewing subject, is the arena of politics and the political (Lazzarato 2006, 179f).
bias. In the eagerness to strike against this relativism, the somewhat irrational claim that media, scholars, etc., do not have agendas is heard. But as any scholar of media and communications well knows, of course media have agendas! The same goes for academia. At the top of the list is the aim to investigate and communicate truths, facts, etc. – but as has been argued throughout this thesis, the facts and the truth depend on the agential cut of the theories and methods we use! As continuously stated in this thesis, this is not to say that truths and realities are relative but that they are always situated – they always depend on agential cuts. As I have attempted to convince the reader throughout this thesis, to counter is not only not enough, it can even confirm and stabilize what it counters.

In the introduction, I made reference to a Swedish initiative for fact-checking the media called Viralgranskaren. This is a group of journalists who continuously publish examinations of viral media items. This group is thus strongly responding to the question ‘Who can one trust?’, and they do so by positing themselves as the answer. But although the actions of Viralgranskaren serve the democratic need for free information gathering by guiding the news consumer to see the often loose or false grounds for news stories that have come from unestablished sources, the discourse of Viralgranskaren also outlines a difference between itself and its readers. Positioning itself as somehow morally and intellectually superior, it is difficult to claim that the incentive increases equality (Filipovic and Alm 2015).

Viralgranskaren thus sustains a status quo of experts and ‘the rest’, sifting through the real versus the fake, taking on the role of a ‘we’ that speak to a ‘them’. Although surely born through a dedication to the conditions for democratic dialogue, and as such it should be applauded, such initiative tends to render invisible the opportunity to truly strengthen the democratic desire expressed through these events. Although Viralgranskaren has its legitimate reasons for doing so in the particular context of the news media, if the principle to shout down the message of mockumentality, deeming it ‘wrong’, ‘in error’, ‘faulty’, or ‘fake’ overshadows the opportunity to truly think as “repetition which ‘make’ the difference” (Deleuze 2004, 365), this tendency can lead to a stronger authoritarian control, inhibiting conditions for democratic governance, paradoxically in the name of democracy.

Moreover such initiative seems to blindside the central problem posed by the phenomenon ‘fake news’ which is not as it were that there is someone who writes fake news to begin with, but that fake news are believed and thus disseminated. If no one shared the fake news, notably through technical platforms that strongly support the formation of identities where a strong confirmation bias influence proliferation of what is called fact-resistance (and thence a further dissemination), there would not be a prob-
lem with fake news. The problem is not that someone says the world is flat; it is if this is believed and made to influence the belief of a vast number of people. And as Kahan and Braman have shown in their work on cultural cognition, confirmation bias is not a matter of being more or less educated in a general sense (Kahan and Braman 2005). The belief in facts will still depend on the identity with a group, educated or not, associated with a certain worldview, a certain cultural cognition (ibid., 148). Therefore, if facts are offered that go against our cultural cognition, we are unlikely to appprehend them as true. To combat this situation with louder and louder expert voices and thus increasingly stratified relations of power suggests a development towards a weaker democratic society – and, in a very unfortunate and paradoxical twist, in the name of democracy. It is thus insufficient to scream ‘the truth’ louder and louder or assert it more firmly, a fact or a truth needs to be framed in a way that is compatible with “the commitments of individuals of diverse cultural persuasions” (ibid., 149).

The concept of ‘post-truth’ could thus be used to indicate a threshold into something new rather than a loss of something old. To think of it as the latter would be to reconstruct the problem that bore it (and around we go). Instead, I argue that it is more fruitful to think of this atmosphere as an opening towards the possibility to move beyond antagonisms, finding new ways of making heterogenic processes meet, of thinking the space of the Political.

If the society of discipline produced truth as a sermon, the form of governance that regulates the society of control produces the concept of truth as an affective sound bite. In the society of the despot, a rebellion against the distribution of ‘the right to speak and know’ would demand that more people were included in this category. In the post-truth control society, the inclusion into the category of the right to speak does not bring equal terms, since the struggle of truth is no longer in speaking but in believing. With the development of communications technologies that offer the opportunity for almost everyone on the globe to speak, it is to be believed that produces power. Thus, what seems to be warranted and what is supported throughout this dissertation is that to combat fascist tendencies in society, or fact-resistancies that make dialogue more difficult, or a relative-authoritarian conception of truth that makes the very core of Politics (the

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133 This example is not so far off as one might think. There are indeed associations of so-called flat-earthers who regularly gather, for instance, at the Flat Earth International Conference in North Carolina (see http://fe2017.com). However, although the founding idea that the earth is flat has been in circulation for centuries, today, it does not appear to convince a vast number of people, although flat-earthers still exist.
meeting of heterogenic forces as described by Rancière) increasingly difficult, we need to develop tools to work with (and not against) mockumentality so that this can increase the affective connective capacity of the viewing subject and bring forth a capacity to practice response-ability.

In other words, the practicing of a becoming-political must not sever the individual from society, it must change the individual so that society is changed towards a more inclusive, not more severed, society. In short, the remedy is, I am convinced, to develop methods to work proactively with events whereby processes of subjectification bring forth viewing subjects who neither blindly trust the expert nor blindly trust anyone who distrusts the expert.

There is an urgency in this task because, as posited recently by Åsa Wikforss (2017), there is an increased polarization that divides society not only on the basis of values, as is common in political groupings, but also on the basis of beliefs in facts and identities attached to these beliefs. In this way, the dynamics of confirmation bias will only grow stronger in a society driven by a technology that is increasingly geared towards the production of a multitude of separate groupings of identities, which in turn are the basis for increased confirmation bias (since the identity with the group trumps rational assertion of facts). This makes me connect confirmation bias to idealism, that is, that confirmation bias functions as a ‘make-believe’, as if what we want to be true becomes true by wanting it. To combat this, there is thus need for a more situated materialist-ethical practice rather than a new idealism.

Thus, although I can understand the temptation to exclaim No, the news is not fake!, I argue that it can be more fruitful to ask What does fake news do? The production of distrust in the media by one of the most powerful political leaders, for instance, produces violent and hateful actions as well as a polarization throughout society. This polarization can function to produce strong senses of community (which in turn influence increased practices of confirmation bias and possible fact-resistancy). But the desire to belong to communities is not in itself anti-democratic. What is important is to acknowledge that these communities are based on issues related to morals and ideology, not the issue of What is the truth? in itself. What brings these communities together is whether or not immigration/unequal distribution of material wealth, etcetera, is good/bad. These are not issues of truth. Thus, to get these communities to meet in democratic dialogue, it is unhelpful to begin with a preconception of either of these statements as either true or false, since this is already to make a moral and ideological judgment. They are neither. What can be considered true however are the materializations of relations of power. There is a distribu-
tion of material wealth that does not follow a principle of equal amounts to each living being, and there is global migration/immigration. Whether we think this is ‘fair’, ‘just’, or ‘acceptable’ is ideology. Then, of course, the simple positing of something as a matter of ideology is ideology, so this example is too simple-minded, I am only offering it here in order to underline that we continually need to have a conversation regarding the relation between the questions What is true? and What is just? because they are related but not the same.

These statements are surely not controversial, but I offer them for a precise reason: to underline that if the regime of truth is practiced as a principle of obedience to a doctrine of truth, then the chances are that this doctrine becomes overcoded through fascist desire. The practices of a neoliberal regime of truth condition a co-existing obedience to a binary conception of the real and true (as well as the right to define this) and a nihilistic idea of the existential. This promotes the long-lived idea of a free-willed individual (severed from a collectivity) who accepts a social contract (the laws of governance). Together, these conditions promote a possible becoming-fascist. To combat these tendencies, accelerated through communications technology and parallel increased mockumentality, these conditions need to be de-stabilized through an onto-epistemology as ethics that promotes the individual-as-collective, the inherent relations of power of the regime of truth and the way that this produces a space for Politics (Gatens and Lloyd 1999; Spindler 2009, 23). In short, it must foster what I already discussed in chapter two as an ‘ethics of the idiot’, which is an ethics of becoming responsible and response-able, attuned to the idiot who “demands that we slow down, that we don’t consider ourselves authorized to believe we possess the meaning of what we know” (Stengers 2005, 995). Ultimately the response-ability of an ethics of the idiot is focused towards responsivity, not expressivity. More listening, less talking.

Invited to speak at a function to mark World Philosophy Day, Irish President Michael D Higgins addressed what he called “the post-truth’ society” (Humphreys 2016), underlining the need for philosophy in order to produce a “reflective atmosphere in the classrooms, in our media, in our public space [and to] be encouraged to think critically rather than merely reproduce the information pushed towards them by proliferating media sources” (ibid. See also Angie Hobbs’ (2017) essay in The Conversation). Joining forces with president Higgins and Hobbs, I too argue for the need to develop thinking-tools for all strata of society so that a more capable connective–affective societal body can be fostered as opposed to empty, neurotic, cancerous bodies of fascist desire.
Following the work with events of realing in this thesis, I am convinced that the remedy to the increased facialization of life (throughout all social, mental and subject ecologies) is neither to further a Universalist and totalitarian hegemonic claim on the concept of truth nor to leave a walkover by embracing a stance of relativity. Rather, I would suggest that a proactive engagement with mediamaterialities as a situated life-practice (be it a methodology in research or education or as activated through private/collective worldlings) makes possible the development not of ‘little identifiers of true knowledge’ but of thinkers capable of diffractively flushing through the empty signifiers, optical illusions and captivating drumbeats of an Integrated World Capitalism that, after all, favors the few over the many in real material terms. Hopefully, this will make possible modulating practices that make for a more affirmative and egalitarian organization of our collective present and future lives.

Moreover, I argue that the consequences of not choosing to do so raises the possibility for an increased mockumentality of an individual-fascist tendency, bringing forth an authoritarian-totalitarian regime of truth to replace the relative-totalitarian regime of truth of IWC. Hence, I will conclude that in order for events of realing to produce a mockumentality of increased capacity that makes possible practices of a becoming-political that are ethical and response-able, there is a need to think about the pedagogy of working with such events. In the next part of this chapter, I will discuss how the present method assemblage for mediamateriality can be practiced and developed towards a moving-image-pedagogics, or mip.

To practice a response-able mib as a mip

The present research design offer ways to not only map connections but also unpack what might be (Ringrose and Coleman 2013, 125). Hence, it has not ‘just’ been an act of observing whether the missing people come but of producing conditions for actively bringing them forth. As such, it can be considered a pedagogy as well as a methodology, a tool for setting in motion a process of affection as well as mapping the same.

As became clear towards chapter six, participation in The Study functioned for the data-producers as a process of unlearning. In this way, it brought forth an ethics of the idiot in that it became a response-able practice that became “characteristic of that, which can be neither true nor false” (Deleuze 2004a, 191). Processes of unlearning open one towards becoming-animal, or becoming-stupid, as discussed in chapter four, whereby the pregivenness of concepts that underpin thinking are destabilized. In this way, it “espouse[s] the principle of a repetition which is no longer that
of the Same, but involves the Other – involves difference” (Deleuze 2004a, 26). This is indeed what Deleuze calls “to learn” (ibid.).

Joe and Lisa both expressed in the third Q&A that The Study had made them question their own pregivens. For Joe, the stability of the boundary between the factual and the fictional was suddenly not tenable anymore; and for Lisa, there was a shift from thinking that this boundary was the most important aspect of these events, towards thinking that in fact it was not. Taking part in The Study opened them up to a process of unlearning, leaving them in a place unexpected and new, in fact, in a new territory for thought (Spindler 2013, 176). Here, new means new for the thinker, new in that particular locality, not ‘new’ as qualitatively new as if measured on a scale of newness, which would inevitably have to be structured according to some generally comparable concepts of ‘newness’ that do not take into account that what is new for one person might not be new for another.

Thinking about the method assemblage for mediamateriality as a framework for developing a moving-image-pedagogics would thus aim at finding ways to practice an ethics of the idiot, increasing the capacity to rethink pregiven conditions for the viewing subject-as-spectator and opening thinking to new images of thought. The aim would also be to create a capacity to be less vulnerable towards dogmatic thinking and confirmation bias134 and to therefore work with events of realing as a form of vaccination against anti-democratic tendencies in the post-truth society (of control of IWC). I call this a moving-image-pedagogics and not a film pedagogics, since I argue that events of realing might very well occur through engagement with mediated imagery communication beyond the realm of feature films that I have here called affective mockumentaries, although these have been my point of entry into probing the here-presented string of problems.

To date, the area of film pedagogy is an underdeveloped area internationally, although there are some variations locally (McEwan 2014). ‘Film pedagogy’ can also mean many different things: it can aim at teaching ‘how to do film’, including with the aim of teaching another subject, what is commonly referred to as aesthetic learning processes (see Halkawt 2016 for a comprehensive research overview), or how to work with film in increasing a critical notion of history (Dahl 2013).

Since mockumentality is a moment of destabilized identity and the concepts of both events of realing and mockumentality are grounded in an ethico-onto-epistemology that highlights the actions performed, not the production of identities, the method assemblage for mediamateriality is a

134 Thus in par with the “science curiosity” that Kahan et al (2017) shows to increase the resistance to biased political information.
framework that makes it possible to focus conversation on actions, thence eschewing judgment and taste, which are the elements needed for confirmation bias, since these express ideology and morals. When focused not on whether or not something is good or bad, right or wrong, fake or true but instead what affections are produced through this event, the same person can produce multiple and contradictory replies, thence making visible the pregivens that inform the event.

I argue that activating the method assemblage for mediamateriality as a mip could serve to “reverse perspectives” (Deleuze 1990, 174), that is, bring about an attention to the way we intra-actively practice the regime of truth through the viewing subject-as-spectator. A mip would thus aim at practicing an ethics of the idiot, where no individual wills, thinks or (especially) chooses on the basis of free will but always on the basis of the connective-collective bodies that the individual, as viewing subject or other, always makes as it, in itself, is in a state of becoming-made. This amounts to a realization of the connective-productive force of reality – audiovisual as well as political – as always material and specific, as always a doing that demands response-ability.

To exemplify this, I will consider the famous Milgram experiment (1963). This experiment has been used to prove that people are capable of doing things they believe to be wrong, such as electrocute people, as long as they perceive this as being done on the order of a legitimate figure of authority (in Milgram’s case, the scientist) who will take responsibility for the participants’ actions. In this way, the person him- or herself does not think s/he needs to take responsibility. In fact, the participants are not even response-able for the effects of their actions, since the actions are not even attributed to them. In Milgram’s view, this attested to an extreme obedience towards perceived authority, even when the actions carried out conflicted with the person’s own morality, such as giving what would have been lethal electroshocks had the experiment been for real (which was not known by the subjects at the time of the experiment).

Although the example might seem extreme, I think there is an analogy to be made between Milgram’s findings and the suggestion of this thesis. If the concept of objectivity is allowed to connote an external truth that is independent of the actions of the person, then this extreme obedience is possible because it is reckoned to lie beyond the agential capacity of the subject. On its flipside I argue, is the development of an extreme unwillingness to obey authority (or grant the authoritarian voice its privileged position as a speaker of truth, what is right, etcetera), noticed in the separation of the concept of truth and the concept of fact in a tendency such as fact-resistancy. I argue that the extreme obedience on the one hand and the
extreme unwillingness to trust anybody on the other, are connected in their affection since they the only way towards agency, responsibility and respons-ability lies is perceived in the relativity of the truth and the fact. This way both these tendencies foster and strengthen eachother towards paradoxical and mutually dependent totalitarian-relative regime of truth.

In contrast, then, a response-able ethics of the idiot fosters a new coordinate for thinking cultural cognition and its relation to the in/ability to think the new. It is as such inherently collective (Spindler 2009, 14f; Gates and Lloyd 1999, 65f). This insistence on the inherent collectivity of the practice of the mip makes it a pedagogy not of reflection but of diffraction. Reflection as a term indicates a need for a surface to ‘reflect on’. To reflect on something is to reproduce – return an image of – what already is, although this can make visible, although not change, what was not seen up to that point. Reflexivity still “holds the world at a distance” (Barad 2007, 86f). Instead, diffraction describes the mattering of worlds as a process from within as opposed to the ‘without’ of reflection, making possible an affirmative, micropolitical and transversal passage of a chosen field (ibid., 56). As a deterritorializing force, diffraction is a call not for interpreting, but changing.135

A mip, in likeness to the activation of the method assemblage for mediamateriality through The Study here, would make possible not only the investigation but also the pro-active bringing into existence of an event of realing whereby a mockumentality makes possible practices of becoming-political, which is to say, a desiring-machine that functions by breaking down (Deleuze and Guattari 2009, 8). As such, the methodology can work like an affective pedagogy, like Anna Hickey-Moody’s proposal for a pedagogy that “recognises that processes of meaning making, crafting emotional responses and producing images of thought [as] practical and political acts. These acts inform the possible in social imaginings” (Hickey-Moody 2013, 85, italics in original).

Thinking of the method assemblage for mediamateriality as a possible moving-image-pedagogics, it is thus important to move beyond a method of reversal akin to reflection as well as an orientation towards ideology and morals (taste, judgment). Instead, it needs to make “patterns of difference that make a difference” (Barad 2007, 72), not present “an idea opposed to another idea since this is always the same idea, albeit affected by the negative sign. The more you oppose one another, the more you remain in the same framework of thought” (Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012, 120).

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135 As such, it is a form of schizoanalysis (see Shaviro 2011, 68; Berressem 2011, 181).
Importantly, to work with a mip as a diffractive pedagogy is a question of finding ways to work so that all the members of the body may go beyond regardless of where they begin. It is a question of producing conditions for an adequate mib for everyone to ‘catch up’ with one another and oneself, regardless of where they ‘began’, so to speak, to produce a generative flow through the connective mibs, leading to the birthing of a new image of thought in each and everyone’s own location. The mip thus needs to be understood as containing both a singular body – ‘my’ mib – and a continuous developing connective-collective body of knowledge and experience. Importantly it always occur through the specific since affects “[…] occur in an encounter between manifold beings, and the outcome of each encounter depends upon what forms of composition these beings are able to enter in to” (Thrift 2007, 179).

In this way, it is a pedagogy that sides with the theory of learning introduced by Paul Ramsden in Learning to Teach in Higher Education (2003). There, he promotes a theory where “[t]eaching is comprehended as a process of working with learners to help them change their understanding. It is making student learning possible” (ibid., 110). Clearly, I did not devise this project as a pedagogical project; rather, it is one of the outcomes of thinking about the event of spectating affective mockumentaries through the method assemblage for mediamaterialities. Thus, the word ‘teacher’ needs to be taken lightly in the subsequent alignment with Ramsden’s formulation. However, in my function as the leader of a research project, I did function as a teacher in that they followed my lead.

I argue that the work with the method assemblage for mediamateriality performed in this thesis offers conditions for activating the typical features of Ramsden’s educational theory, namely, that the teacher makes possible a relation between the student and the subject matter, allowing students to apply and modify their own ideas of the subject (Ramsden 2003, 111). The strategy the teacher needs to apply is consequently one of engaging with and challenging the process, similarly to what I did through the fika and, to some, extent in the Q&A. Between Ramsden’s theory and my own approach, there is a similar emphasis on attending to the specific in each process, as in finding a way to practice that is “systematically adapted to suit student understanding”. I argue that the fluidity needed for Ramsden’s theory is prevalent throughout my proposed method assemblage, where ethico-onto-epistemological attention to the momentum of the specific underlines “teaching as a research-like, scholarly process” similarly to Ramsden’s formulation of the last aspect of his theory (ibid., 115).

In chapter seven, I stated that one of the outcomes of The Study was producing questions that produce questions rather than answers. This is on
par with the above need to “teach a subject not to produce little libraries on that subject, but rather to get a student to think mathematically for himself, to consider matters as an historian does […]” (Bruner 1966 cited by Ramsden, 112). Translated to a moving-image-pedagogics as conceived through the events of realing here discussed, this entails ‘teaching the subject of moving images’ as a possibility to engage with the specific lived material existence in which encounters take place and events are born. It is to emphasize the event as the formative phenomenon of existence and, in extension, to open thinking towards location, perspective, and relations as well as the ethico-onto-epistemological practice of producing realities through the same practices.

Consistent with the discussion of the research design in chapter five, the moving-image-pedagogics thus also needs to be designed as a series. In her third Q&A, Marie speaks casually about how, out of curiosity, she used her phone to search for information about Banksy (since she had never heard about him before) and about Thierry’s film Life Remote Control, wondering whether that film really existed. Compared to how she related to the first event of spectating, where she saw the film, notepad in hand, and tried to give me ‘proper responses’, this is already a big change. Towards the end of The Study, she used the event as a moment to learn, unlearn, talk, laugh and share ideas with her boyfriend. An event of spectating went from being an instance of policing to an instance of becoming-political (Rancière 2011, 42).

**Concluding remarks**

Although I speak about very specific events, i.e., events of realing, I believe that the contributions of this thesis resonate with transversal movements across academia where the viewing subject is becoming more important than ever. Political scientist Jeffrey Edward Green (2010) for instance, argues that it is by rethinking the concept of the people as an ocular entity (as opposed to a vocal one) that democratic thinking can again find a way to think about the collective beyond the dichotomous model of the citizen-
governor and the apolitical citizen (32f; 209). Also, from within my field of media and communications studies, the move from discipline to control is becoming more noticeable. As an example, Brian McNair (2006) has made the argument that we need a new media sociology to meet the chaos paradigm of the current digital flux of mediated and fact-based content. His argument, on par with the proposal for a method assemblage for mediamateriality here, uses a renewed thinking of materiality as its point of departure. But where I refer back to Deleuze and the society of control to discuss the on-going shifts in societal organization, McNair speaks of chaos (as the opposite of a ‘control paradigm’). However, relying on my analysis of opposites as reifications, I would argue that similar points are raised.

Thus, concurrent with the problems of both Green and McNair, the arguments of this thesis turn to sight as an operative organ of political power in the society of control, and this specifically in order to make possible new models of understanding the becoming of the world today.

In an article in *The Guardian*, professor of philosophy and ethics of information Luciano Floridi (2016) offers a historiographic account of the problem of post-truth and claims that the current “digital, ethical problems represent a defining challenge of the 21st century”. To counter this, he concludes that

“[w]e need an ethical infosphere to save the world and ourselves from ourselves, but restoring that infosphere requires a gigantic, ecological effort. We must rebuild trust through credibility, transparency and accountability – and a high degree of patience, coordination and determination” (Floridi 2016).

Although I agree with Floridi in the assessment that the current digital and ethical situation requires a gigantic effort, I do not agree with his formulation of the problem as one solely concerned with a loss of credibility and accountability of, for instance, the media (as discussed already in the previous section), because if this were the case, then efforts such as Viralgran-

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136 However, Green’s (2010) theory of the citizen-spectator (32) pertains particularly to the realm of unprogrammed or non-rehearsed visual content and is thus unsuited as a concept for my study here. Moreover, it deals specifically with the power of the popular gaze as an instrument of what he calls candor, that the people be in control of the publicity of its leaders, an aspect he finds greatly unelaborated by political science and studies of democracy (128-130). Having said this, to study in what way the parrhesic account of the mockumentality of events of realing might function to foster candor is an interesting question, although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
skaren, as already mentioned, would be sufficient. The crux is precisely, as has been the core question of this thesis, that to label something, such as calling a film documentary, is not enough to put to rest a destabilizing experience on the receiving end. The point is that just as there are fact-checkers and genre conventions, so too there are fake media checkers (Jackson 2017; Lindberg 2017) and, as has been discussed at length throughout this dissertation, fake documentaries (or, why not, fake fiction films). The question of the connection between media literacy and democracy has seldom been as clearly underlined as in today’s digital environment, especially considering the proliferation of digitized communication and increased access to the Internet, as well as to written and audio-visual communication at large. If we do not want to turn to overt oppression and ban the Internet, free speech and freedom of the arts, the press and expression because ‘people read bad stuff, listen to each other and vote wrong’, the only other step, as always in a democracy, is to have a conversation. This necessarily needs to be inclusive of all its members and flexible enough to include the multiplicity of perspectives and truths.

In short, the problem with the loss of credibility cannot be amended solely by an even stronger assertion from the media that they can be trusted. Trust, just like communication, is a two-way street, and for a truly democratic rule to find roots in this moving, shaking landscape of a contemporary ‘post-truth’ society, the viewing subjects must also be trusted to have the capacity to think, truly think in the Deleuzian sense argued for throughout this thesis. I believe it is imperative that this be a priority for society, both educational and civil. Notably since there are other vital issues, connected with the larger issue of democracy that we as a human society need to tackle such as the climate change and sustainable ways of living. Just as is pointed out by Wolrath Söderberg (2017), here “truth fundamentalism” is not always the answer.

Thus, although I am certain that ethical regulatory frameworks for media production would be welcomed by viewing subjects at large, this thesis humbly posits that this is not enough. In Floridi’s text, he speaks of “the stakeholders” (2016), namely, those in the industry and the decision makers. The people who have little or no influence over the development of digital software and hardware are left out of the equation, except the

137 For instance, I have discussed Återträffen (The Reunion, Anna Odell 2013) as an occurrence of a reversed mock-mode where the expectation is fiction but where it is argued that the event of spectating is contracted through a mock-cum-missing contract, i.e., as a fake-fiction, although I did not, at the time, have the full method assemblage at my disposal in order to discuss the event in such terms (von Schantz 2014).
above reference to a ‘we’ that must be protected from ourselves. I think that the idea that we need to save ourselves from ourselves offers argumentation for a stronger authoritarian voice, something my argumentation here could be seen to situate as a responsible party for this situation. Unfortunately, it in fact offers a seedbed for the further development of a possible fascist Face as a logical continuation, however much one would claim it to be in the name of democracy. Again, a thing is not what you call it; rather, it ‘is’ what it ‘does’.

In the society of control of IWC, there is, on the one hand, a fostering of the idea of individualist control. On the other hand, there is a demand to just accept that one does not have control over the most basic aspects of one’s existence, such as how one thrives as a body and a soul over the course of the 100 odd years one has to live this life. The paradox practiced on a daily basis through the neoliberal regime of truth leads to a clash between a sensation of control and a sensation of one’s very existence as being out of control. On the one hand, one has to take all the responsibility for one’s existence. On the other hand, one is not trusted to even be able to think in any creative sense of the term; rather, ‘just accept’ is the sound bite of the neoliberal regime of truth. The affections engendered through this practice of a neoliberal regime of truth need to be taken seriously or else possibly dangerous affections might unfold.

To be taken seriously, I argue, is to find affirmative methods to diffraactively make other this tendency and atmosphere. If we are to “save the world”, as Floridi (2016) puts it, the ecological effort must include the whole of “the world” (ibid.). As this thesis has shown, producing events where the capacity to think as a diffractive-productive process is increased offers conditions for the birthing of a mind-set that is capable of asking questions pertaining to how we produce the truth and what this does in terms of power rather than how to counter the lie (understanding this as faulty). As much as I side with Floridi’s intentions (to save the world), I strongly believe that the salvation of the world comes through a becoming-other of this world and through considering the entangled ontology to begin with.

I have argued that events of realing can be considered fruitful points of entry into thinking about the governing capacity of the regime of truth in the society of control of IWC. My argument is therefore that there is, today perhaps more than ever, a democratic imperative in providing conditions for viewing subjects of all ages to ground a thinking of truth and realities in an ethical diffractive thinking. The proliferation of easily accessible technology for the production and consumption of audiovisual communication makes the problem of mockumentality as posed in the post-truth
society increasingly relevant to address, notably by finding methodologies for transdisciplinary work that brings cinema and media scholars, as well as pedagogues, political scientists, psychologists, etcetera, together in probing this common problem.

Instead of an error, mockumentality can be considered an opportunity to strengthen the conditions for democratic rule, since this consideration in itself would be response-able to realities as multiple, located and specific. If events of realing are conceived as and through solitary practices, their de-territorializing force might sever the individual as a site for control and the individual proper as a connective part of society (Gatens and Lloyd 1999, 75; Arendt 1987). But if coupled with an ethics of the idiot, an ethics of response-ability that understands the individual as always part of a collective, then mockumentality can become a force in a reconfigured materialist-egalitarian regime of truth-to-come.

As I have here argued, the neoliberal regime of truth is challenged through the mockumentality brought forth through events of realing, exposing the former to offer the viewing subject-as-spectator the oxymoronic subjugation of “Be free!”, which in fact decreases the capacity for affection. In contrast, the affective capacity of events of realing enables the production of another conception of politics, one “which refers to the capacity for change or transformation within or between assemblages” (Patton 2010, 118). It thus asks: How can I create conditions for freedom?138

At the last fika, Joe suggested that the whole project was about questioning what is true or false. In reply, Bruno asked the group whether this would mean that one would “have to question all reality-TV.” Interestingly, this suggestion was followed by shared smiles and nods, as the group seemed to acknowledge a need for increased problematized thinking around these issues. This is even more interesting considering that just some weeks prior, such a statement would possibly have been met with frustration instead of the joy these smiles and nods expressed.139 Here, the data-producers seemed to express an opening towards thinking that yes,

138 The use of the word freedom here draws from Patton’s (2010) comment on how to think the term for Deleuze: “freedom for Deleuze concerns those moments in a life after which one is no longer the same person as before” (118).

139 This move from sad to joyful passion is also noticeable in slide 36, where the data-producer under the headline “dopey suggestion” reflects that “there is something beautiful with this film and the fact that it is difficult in the beginning to determine if it actually is a documentary or not” (however, the framing of the suggestion under the title ‘dopey suggestion’ points to some embarrassment of one’s own positive affection, since this is recognized as ‘irrational’ under the current rule).
perhaps we all should continuously question the production of reality through our entangled viewing practices. And yes, perhaps it is not irrational to question the conception of reality, and perhaps it is irrational not to, considering that reality itself is in a constant flux of becoming, neither relative nor static. Because, perhaps the subject of reality is indeed not I, nor you but we.140 Or, as stated by Joaquin Phoenix in *I’m Still Here*, “We are all J.P.”

Throughout this thesis, I have argued that realities are produced by situated practices. Consequently, the question of scientific method is a political question. In fact, Law (2004) suggests that an acknowledgement of methods as discriminatively enacting realities should be considered “the end of political innocence” (ibid., 148f). This is not to say that reality is relative. On the contrary, it is to say that reality is more than what a class-politics of ontology enacting a prohibition on fluid and multiple messy realities would admit (ibid., 149). Hence, I argue that to combat the conditions for the actualization of possible fascist agendas, we need not less empiricism, but a more radical one, not less mess in research, but increased capability to be response-able to the messiness of reality. One step towards this is the recognition that both the practice of academic scholarship and a moving-image-pedagogics function to, not only speak of what has been and what is, but equally importantly, of actively practicing what may become.

Raymond Williams asserted that investigating the matter of (mediatized) communication is anything but a secondary matter. He writes, “We cannot think of it as marginal; or as something that happens after reality has occurred. Because it is through our communication systems that the reality of ourselves, the reality of our society, forms …” (Williams 1989: 22). For Williams, this is to point to the democratic promise of communication. In this thesis, I began by thinking about what happened in a certain encounter between a film and an audience. Now, I can see that it was an event of becoming-political, of shining a bright light on the possibilities for thinking as becoming, of intra-actively changing the world through the way we produce audiovisual events as events productive of relations of power. In what way these insights may function theoretically, methodologically and creatively in the intra-active production of further events of realing and unlearning is missing from this story. That, just like the future for us as viewing subjects, is yet to come.

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140 This phrasing is inspired from a talk by Alisa Lebow at the International Conference *Subjectivity, Transgression, Agency!* Stockholm University, September 2012.
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**Audiovisual Material**


Ingagi. 1930. Directed by William Campbell.

Las Hurdes. 1933. Directed by Luis Buñuel.

Late Night with Conan O’Brien. 1993-2009. Produced by Broadway Video et al. Originally broadcast at NBC.

Late Show with David Letterman. 1993-2015. Created by David Letterman and produced by Worldwide Pants. Original broadcast at CBS.


Man of Aran. 1934. Directed by Robert Flaherty.


The Daily Show. 1999-. Created by Madeleine Smithberg and Lizz Winstead. Original broadcast at Comedy Central.


The Rutles: all you need is cash. 1978. Directed by Eric Idle and Gary Weis.


This is Spinal Tap. 1984. Directed by Rob Reiner.

Trollhunter. 2010. Directed by André Øvredal.

What We Do in the Shadows. 2014. Directed by Jemaine Clement and Taika Waititi.

Appendices

Appendix A – Study questions sent through e-mail (Q&A)
(Originally in Swedish, here translated by the author)

Before the first and second films
Had you heard/read anything about the film before you saw it? Discussed it with anyone? Recount.

After the first film
Tell me what you have seen. What would you say about this film if you spoke with a friend?
Did you use any other medium while/in connection with watching the film?
If yes, which medium and with what aim?
How do you think your choice of screening context – with whom you were watching, your eventual interaction with other media/persons – influenced your experience of watching the film?

After the second film
Tell me what you have seen. Tell me as if you are describing the film and experience to a friend.
Did you use any other medium while/in connection with watching the film?
If yes, which medium and with what aim?
How do you think your choice of screening context – with whom you were watching, your eventual interaction with other media/persons, how you chose to see the film: place, time, etc – influenced your experience of watching the film?
Do you feel you made other choices for this screening compared with the first one concerning how you chose to watch the film (did you see it alone/with others, did you use other media while watching, and if yes, with what aim)? Specify the choices and how you have reflected upon them, if you have done so.
Reflect on the differences and similarities between the first and second films. Is this something you were thinking about during the screening, or did that question occur before/after?

Before the third film
Did you hear/read anything about the film before you watched it? Did you discuss it with anyone? What expectations did you have about the film? Recount.
After the third film

Tell me what you have seen. Tell me as if you are describing the film and experience to a friend.
Were your expectations on this film met or not? Recount.
Did you use any other medium while/in connection with watching the film?
If yes, which medium and with what aim?
How do you think your choice of screening context – with whom you were watching, your eventual interaction with other media/persons, how you chose to see the film: place, time etc – influenced your experience of watching the film?
Do you feel you made other choices for this screening compared with the first one concerning how you chose to watch the film (did you see it alone/with others, did you use other media while watching, and if yes, with what aim)? Specify the choices and how you have reflected upon them, if you have done so.
Reflect on the differences and similarities between the two first films and the third film. Was this something you were thinking about during the screening, or did that question occur before/after?
How do you think participation in this study has affected how you experience/reflect on these films?
Appendix B – How to think with Prezi

Look at it like building a mind-map. You are welcome to associate freely on the basis of the emotions, thoughts and speculations that you experience that the films set in motion, as well as the questions that you are asked before and after you’ve seen the films. If you turn to other media and/or persons to search for information/discuss the films, please create associated content that relates to this action.

Tell about
*The films*: use your own intellectual and emotional reaction towards the films. What are your thoughts? Feelings?

*The actions*: what you believe that the participation in the study and the screening of the films make you do: for example, interact with other media/read/talk.

*The discussions*: do you talk with other people about the experience of viewing these films? If yes, what are these discussions about, what emotions do these bring forth, etcetera?

*Effects of taking part in the study*: how does your participation in the study impact your choice of viewing context: how and with whom you choose to view the films as well as what actions are performed while so doing?

View the Prezi as a room where you can discuss and interact with the other data-producers. You may build upon, nuance, question, make associations, etcetera. Since you are using the Prezi as a place for discussion, it is a ‘living document’ that is not finished until the project is over.

If you need or want to, you are free to seek other communicative platforms/meet irl to discuss your common work. If you do so, please include commentary about this in the Prezi.

In short: you are relatively free to view and discuss the films as you so please. The only thing I ask of you is that you interact with the Prezi and answer the questions sent through e-mail to document the process of your experience.

Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions.

Warm thanks for your participation!

Miriam miriam.von-schantz@oru.se (+telephonenumber)
Appendix C- Google.doc

Collective Google.doc

- Have you had any reasons to think about your participation in the study since we last saw each other? Explain with examples.

- Do you experience that you think or act differently with regards to watching film and/or audiovisual communication since your participation in the study? If yes, in what instances of watching films/audiovisual communication does this occur and in what way and how do you think your thinking/acting has changed?

- Do you have anything you wish to add to the written account of the study that I have sent you?[1]

- You are welcome to provide any comment about the process, not only connected with what I have written in chapters five through seven or asked explicitly about here.

There are always thoughts and feelings awoken in me when I see a film, that way it reminds me of my participation in the study. For me film is an important source of information, where criticism of the sources is important to keep in mind. I studied history during the fall semester, where one of the courses was historizing in film and then I thought back on the study. I think it is an advancement to use film as a source of knowledge in history. Many historians look down on film as an important source of information, where criticism of the sources is important to keep in mind. I studied history during the fall semester, where one of the courses was historizing in film and then I thought back on the study. I think it is an advancement to use film as a source of knowledge in history. Many historians look down on film as an important source of information, where criticism of the sources is important to keep in mind. 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intermediary for history. But I don’t agree with that, one should see the potential of film to mediate history or any kind of knowledge. Film needs to be used to a larger extent in academic education. More people would rather watch a film than read boring course litterature. At least that is my opinion.

I value film the same way. However I appreciate that film is used and analysed in academic studies such as this study. I find that gratifying.

I wouldn’t say the study has changed the way I watch or evaluate movies in any specific way. However I can’t avoid thinking about the study as a whole when watching movies, especially movies with outspoken claims to the truth. For example, a couple of weeks ago me and my family watched the movie “The Butler” with Forest Whitaker. It is about a man named Cecil Gaines and his wife and two sons. The story then takes place over a period of time and we get a portrait of the history from early 1900 to our own time, and the colored peoples rights and struggles. The movie was in itself beautiful and skilfully made and I cried a number of times. But though I loved the movie I couldn’t help but wonder: would I have loved it the same way if the words ‘Based on a true story’ hadn’t been shown in the beginning of the movie? This also led my thoughts to the study, since I asked myself the very same question during those movies. Although it is important to mention that this movie differs in great length from the movies in the study. “The Butler” is a historic piece, which means that it is made on a whole different platform of fact and the spectators actual knowledge of something that, as a fact, has actually happened. The colored peoples struggle is not fiction in any way compared to lets say whether Joaquin Phoenix went rogue and became a rapper. Instead the questioning of the truth lies in whether this family existed, and if their story is accurately told. Again I don’t think this is important. I do believe the claim of truth has a significant meaning in how you see and reflect over a movie but it doesn’t mean that we should stare ourselves blind on this. Instead we should focus on what feelings the movie invokes. Do we recognize ourselves in the story? Can we understand the story from any aspects of our own lives? Can we say something about this movie that can create a debate concerning important subjects? These are the questions we should ask ourselves. If a movie then creates extra empathy and understanding about our own actual history, then that is mostly just a plus.

In the end the study is an excellent example in how movies can create conversations and be used as a broader mean of education. Movies can be more than just entertainment. It can be examined through eyes of history, propaganda, racism, oppression, justice and much more. In its pure form
the movie is nothing more than a visual book (which is so widely used in schools as a mean for learning). This study could easily be used as an example for a whole class assignment. And my gut tells me that a movie-assignment will be much easier to get through than a book report. Something to think about.

After my participation I’ve come to think about the study quite often, both in regards to actual films and our discussions. I believe that the reason for this has to do with the public debate about “alternative facts” raised after the Trump campaign. Since that debate also revolve around the categories true/false I guess it’s natural to reflect on the questions raised in the study.

I can’t say I’m thinking or acting differently in regards to watching films after the study. It’s just difficult to evaluate whether or not I’ve changed my way of thinking. However am I sure that my participation gave me new insights. I see it as a learning experience from which I’ve gained new knowledge, both I regards to the actual films but also about different ways of interpreting them. So seen from a learning perspective there has of course been some kind of change in my way of thinking, but I can’t really verbalize it nor pinpoint when that change would have occurred.

I haven’t thought about my participation in the study since we last saw each other, no not really. And well, I do watch film and audiovisual communication different but not necessarily because of my participation in the study. I think due to my on going education it has provided me with new tools of thinking and watching visual communication in all kind of ways. And also my personal development has made me more open minded and reflective.
I think this study combined with my personal development, and that I am more critical of sources when it comes to news spreading on social media, has all made me watch visual communication different.
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