The French banker and philanthropist Albert Kahn created Les Archives de la planète between 1909 and 1912. This strikingly ambitious project was “documenting” and collecting visual material from all around the globe until 1912 when the financial crisis exhausted Kahn’s fortune. The archive, which is considered to be the most important collection of early color photographs in the world, contains three different visual media: 72,000 “autochromes” (a color-photography process on glass plates), by then a new invention by Louis Lumière, over a hundred hours of film (183,000 meters) and 4,000 stereoscopic plates.

Apart from the central aim of bringing peoples and cultures together under an umbrella of universality, Kahn had a twofold agenda: “to capture and document what was new in the world, and to record what was in the process of vanishing,” where the “very new and the very old are both vividly captured.” As part of being a sort of locus of the coming and vanishing, Kahn’s project could also be read along with the then burgeoning processes of de-colonization.

“...in the interwar years...”, Jay Winter writes, “Kahn’s photographers reached Africa. Some of his photographers [...] handed their cameras to the locals; others stayed resolutely behind the lens. Kahn’s was a kind of League of Nations mandate of l’imaginaire, pointing toward the end of Western rule and the end of the time when Europeans photographed Africans and Asians as we photograph animals in a zoo today” (Dream of Peace, 22). Perhaps, however, Kahn’s practice and quest for universality was not as unambiguous in its progressivism as Winter has claimed, and perhaps it did not mesh easily with the French colonial project either, as most other Kahn scholars suggest. The archive points in several, and even opposite, directions at the same time.

Where Kahn’s Coming From

In Kahn’s series of autochromes everyone is photographed equally — identical photographic techniques and framings are used, and there is a consistent general composition and aesthetics in most images — all for the benefit of peace under a flag of a universality of man. This was a time of globalization of business — when a common market of labor, capital, and the exchange of goods was starting to develop — when war was still bad for business. Kahn also had idealistic motivations with roots in 19th century liberalism, which considered this axiom to work the other way around as well; good business is good for peace. In other words, along with his Victorian liberal counterparts, Kahn was a so-called “free trade pacifist”.

Kahn had first built his fortune on the colonial exploitation of diamond mines in South Africa, but after acquiring his wealth, he appears to have gone through some sort of conversion. Whether it was a case of guilt, or an ideological operation aiming to preserve the geopolitical structure that had made his fortune possible, is hard to know. Either way, he cannot be reduced to a caricature of a shrewd capitalist. As a thinker — and for instance a lifelong friend of Henri Bergson, who had also been his teacher — Kahn’s idealism and quest for peace and understanding can hardly be reduced to an ideological veil for colonialist-capitalist exploitation (which is a more obvious way of analyzing the venture). His lofty idealism could, however, be accused of being naïve. “I am convinced”, Kahn writes in one of his reveries, “there is a pattern to history, a pathway leading from narrow particularism to universality.”

Nevertheless, the converted Kahn tried to change what he recognized as a narrow-mindedness in European attitudes about the non-European world. At the end of the 19th century he started to sponsor a number of projects for “talented young men and women” who would grow up to be the “intellectual and moral elite of the nation”, but who were “not old enough to have fixed ideas”. This eventually grew into the photographic and cinematographic project that became the Archive of the Planet. Kahn, with a somewhat unrefined view also of technology, believed that the encounter between photographer and subject established a silent dialogue
between the two. He regarded it as a human 
encounter, reducing the camera to an objective 
tool of documentation. In contrast to the reality 
of the colonial ethnographic discourses of the 
times, Kahn meant that the person or group pho-
tographed in his project were not objectified, or 
treated as species or oddities; instead they were 
imprinted with the same humanity as those who 
would later come to view their images.5

Two Registers/Forces
In view of Kahn’s claims of universalism, it can 
be argued that his practice contains two basic 
registers or forces. The first deals with the, 
fairly obvious, ways the archive can be seen as 
problematic from neo-Marxist and postcolonial 
perspectives. The second — which I will give a 
more speculative and detailed treatment — at 
least makes the whole venture more ambivalent, 
and will be dealt with through new — imminent 
and processual — ways of understanding norma-
tivity and universality as possible to affirm.

Register/Force 1: Comb-over Universalism
The simpler conceptions of human universality 
have of course been thoroughly deconstructed by 
now. We have learned, for instance, that the uni-
versal “we”, who claims to be general, in fact also 
tends to hide the particular, i.e. a particularity of 
power and interests, and as such has throughout 
history often been a means of exclusion and 
domination. From the narrow perspective of 
Kahn as being a sort of “colonial” entrepreneur, 
we might be dealing with universalism exclu-
sively as what could be called the consensus of a 
colonial-capitalist image of thought. This would 
comply with what many would call a “false un-
iversalism”.6 Seen from a Marxist perspective, 
such an image of thought reflects not only the 
ideology, but also the concreteness, of the world 
market. As such, however, as Etienne Balibar 
claims, it is “real” and “true”, and “provides an 
ontological basis for the juridical, moral and 
political representation of equality”.7 
This is an order that contradicts its own 
egalitarian claims. That is, to generalize, it is a 
universalism that covers up the real power 
relations and inequalities in the distribution 
of wealth between the peoples and nations 
portrayed — particularly in Kahn’s time, which 
largely coincided with the peak of colonialism 
and imperialism.8 A cynical description would 
be that Kahn’s teams traveled around the French 
colonies collecting cute postcards from the 
places France had brutally exploited.9 In this 
sense, instead of making human and social 
conditions visible, it covers over everything 
that would compromise the dominant image of 
colonial-capitalist consensus.9 And no matter 
how anti-Eurocentric Kahn’s own intentions 
were, as a collection of visual knowledge of 
peoples, the gaze in at least some of the images 
cannot help but be read in relation to the discurs-
ive context of the era: the massive collection of 
“information” gathered by the colonial powers 
on the colonized. In other words, it relates to, 
rather than belongs to, the typical ethnogra-
phical racism of the times, which used photographic 
and cinematographic means.10

Register/Force 2: The Ambivalence 
of Universalization
When studying the actual artifacts of the archive, 
I was struck by how elusive they are in view of 
the discourses sketched out above. They do not 
fit particularly neatly into these — some of them 
by now fairly predictable — lines of reasoning. 
First of all, I would say that these images, gener-
ally, do not express the typical ethnographical 
racism and exoticism of their times. Not only 
could some of the images be argued to convey an 
unusual and almost strangely forceful “dignity” 
(on the use of this word beyond humanistic 
clichés, see below), but the charges of exoticism 
are also countered by the fact that Europeans — of 
all classes, both urban and exotically rural — 
were photographed with the same technological 
and aesthetic gaze. Although, of course, the 
comparison falters when one looks at how the 
different pictures strike different discursive
chords. That is, the pictures cannot be seen in isolation from the dominant ideas governing their time (or our time, for that matter), in which Europeans were of course coded very differently. When seen in isolation, however, or even sprung out from such contexts—and let’s be open to the possibility of Kahn’s archive having actually achieved something semi-autonomous in this regard—the images do point in other directions.

So how do the artifacts relate to Kahn’s idealistic intention? Perhaps the reality of the artifacts themselves also constitutes a consistency that is neither a classical static universality (man), nor the ideological comb-over for colonial capitalism. At least some of the photos express a low-key, but curiously progressive, potency perhaps beyond the ideality of their intentions—see for instance the weirdly non-orientalist dreamy force in the picture from Shiraz, Persia. Instead of representing a transcendent ideal, the images in this way constitute sense (if not “meaning”) in themselves.

In light of the spontaneous judgments I made when first hearing about Kahn’s intentions (more in line with the first “force” described above), there was a kind of clash when I actually started viewing the pictures. They do not lend themselves to any easy categorization. So what is there to say about the possibility of universalism here? Perhaps we are viewing something along the lines of a creation of a universal, a sort of visual universalization, but as such it is not a matter of a representational universality: in the sense that the pictures signify the preexisting—or teleologically unfolding—universality of man, which the camera only helps to discover (this is Kahn’s own idea). Instead, the pictures can be seen as the production of a universal people that is photographic.

For Deleuze, the political function of art is to “invent a people” where the “people is missing.” In the cinema, this concerns a type of storytelling and narration that does not purport to represent the truth (that is, to mirror an already existing actual state of affairs); rather it is about creation through mobilizing “the powers of the false”.

However, the “false” does not therefore mean the untrue or the imaginary, but that which creates or conditions new truths in the form of the non-representational. Although Kahn’s project moves more in the direction of a “molar” or actual people, instead of a “molecular” or virtual people (potentially spawning an actual people to come), the archive is still an invention of a “people”, involving a certain (inadvertent) molecular fabulation. Kahn himself was a visionary who believed in the construction of a universal people, but not in this sense. He was a positivist, and wanted to produce and spread knowledge about a preexisting humanity through photographic documentation, but Khan, I argue, creates a (photographical) universal people, rather than making a preexistent universality visible, as if it were only laying there waiting to be objectively captured by Kahn’s (of course, highly selective, subjective and creative) camera.

Through followers of Nietzsche like Deleuze and Foucault, we have in different ways learned to regard “universalis” in general as immanent and singular effects. The universal—in a non-teleological sense—comes last. The universal, even if it is fully real and true, is not a preexistent foundation that explains the myriad that is the world, but is rather that which must be explained. In other words, “universals” are in fact (more or less temporary) culminations of complex and heterogeneous processes—in immanence. But, and this is important, this type of genealogical critique does not necessarily mean that the universal at hand is to be frowned upon. With genealogy comes evaluation. Through this conception of universals, as real creations, one can therefore come to evaluate them as defendable to some extent (even though the final aim is to open up the present in a way that can spawn a different future). In this way, we can recall Foucault’s later phases in his analysis of power, where the disciplinary processes of subjugation/subjectivation are shown to be the very preconditions for what is also our modern state of freedom. In other words, a critical genealogization of “universals” does not necessarily speak against them having value.

Liberalism From Behind

As a “universalizing practice,” the universal “people” become a semi-divergent effect of Kahn’s intentions. That is, the archive, when seen as the creation of a new universal (in contrast to representing a teleologically predicted or pre-existing one), is something that is more or less unintentionally achieved in and through the reality of the images themselves. But since this “universalizing practice” is nevertheless produced within the frameworks of Kahn’s own liberal discourse, it might be interesting to extend the discussion of the relation between the liberal tradition of philosophy and Deleuze.

Daniel W. Smith’s and Paul Patton’s respective readings of Deleuze along with the liberal tradition are not about harmonizing the two, but rather staging an encounter in order to productively transform them both. Their readings first of all emanate from trying to solve a problem in the political philosophy of Deleuze: how to bring it to concrete normative use in today’s political landscape, with its concrete political problems (which are, furthermore, not fully the same as when Deleuze wrote most of his political works—that recognition is also in line with Deleuze’s Marxist disposition where political philosophy always has to be readapted to a changing situation). The most central question asked—at least from the perspective of Kahn’s practice—is the one about the relation between Deleuze and concepts of normativity. Along with other liberal...
concepts like freedom and judgment, Deleuze himself "shows an almost complete lack of engagement with the central problems and normative commitments of Anglo-American political thought." It’s easy to conclude that Deleuze regards these concepts as exhausted clichés that he leaves behind (or at best critiques, as in the case with judgment), favoring the invention of new political concepts (on a different plane of immanence of thought). And of course, this “complete lack of engagement” with the liberal tradition has to do primarily with “the fundamental shift in the status of the subject that is effected in Deleuze’s philosophy,” where “the subject itself becomes a secondary phenomenon, the product or the ‘effect’ of more primary sets of flows or processes”, in contrast to the liberal tradition which presupposes “already constituted individuals as political subjects”. (“Deleuze and the Liberal Tradition”, 303) However, what Smith and Patton do is first of all attempt to make connections where certain notions of these liberal concepts can be shown to be at work in Deleuze in spite of all this—especially in Deleuze’s later philosophy, which Patton describes as following a “normative” and “democratic turn”, containing a much more affirmative view of “the institutions and practices of liberal democracy.” But more importantly—they attempt to demonstrate the reverse how these extracted notions, turned back on the liberal tradition, fundamentally transform its concepts.

In Patton, these transformations are first of all made possible through a discussion of Deleuze’s notion of the concept or virtual idea beyond the actual state of affairs, based on Kant’s distinction between the concept of the revolution, and how it actually turned out as an actualized event in history. That is, in Kant “the ‘enthusiasm’ of the Europeans, their becoming-revolutionary, is explicitly linked, not to the historical revolution as it unfolded before them in France, but rather to its concept [...] almost as if the revolution itself was something secondary” (“Deleuze and the Liberal Tradition”, 304); cf. “Utopian Political Philosophy”, 43–44). Here we seem to encounter a problem in relation to Kahn’s archive: its artifacts might be argued to belong purely to an actualized state of affairs, and not to some kind of virtual “idea” of the universal. But the point is that the “universality” of the archive can be argued to include both the actual and the virtual. The virtuality of the archive concerns at least three things: 1) The discursive and technological process that is the practice of making the archive that then actualizes a virtual potential, which it also helps to create. 2) The artifacts, seen as objects of art, make up a consistency of virtuality. 3) The virtual potentials in the archive as a whole could be differently actualized in constellations to come. The archive and the archival practice are therefore more than something merely actual. The “universalizing” process is not exhausted in the actuality of the artifacts, but belongs to a problematic idea, which could also be re-articulated as new actualized formations in the future. All these levels point to a virtualization of the universal itself as a constant already there, and as such, it is also a creation.

According to Smith, a truly normative principle in Deleuze would have to entail a principle of creation as well as critique. First of all, one must not only provide norms or rights that critique abuses of power, but also critique norms which themselves have become abuses of power (which abstract, static universals tend to become, since they block or override the flows and singularities of life). What this disposition provides, then, is the need to produce new norms and new rights (new “universals”), as the political landscape constantly changes, and no norms are immune to themselves being turned into abuse. The normative must therefore be seen less as a search for a-historical norms so much as the production of new norms (or the reactivation of old potentials) in relation to a shifting — concrete, actual — situation, with the aim of drawing it in a “utopian” direction. This is not in the sense of an ideal utopia, but an open horizon, summoning forth a new earth, a new people. (In this sense, any amount of progressivity in Kahn’s specific type of visual creation of a “universal people” will of course have to be measured in relation to his own time and place.)

In what he states as a “contrast” to Foucault, Patton argues that Deleuze has an approach to power that is explicitly normative (Deleuze and the Political, 65, 49). Smith:

This is a somewhat surprising claim, since Deleuze is often condemned along with Foucault for neglecting (or avoiding, or refusing) questions of normativity. Indeed, one could imagine two possible Deleuzian responses to the criticism of non-normativity. One might ask if normativity is a good or rigorous concept, and proceed to criticize the concept from a Deleuzian viewpoint. In this case, one could argue that Foucault and Deleuze do not address issues of normativity because their work entails a critique of the very notion of normativity. Patton, however, follows the opposite approach. He takes the problem of normativity seriously, and argues that, despite appearances, one can find an explicit normative criterion in Deleuze’s work. (“Deleuze and the Liberal Tradition”, 306–7)

For Patton, this normative criterion is nothing less than deterritorialization. “If Deleuze’s political philosophy”, Smith explains, “effects a shift from subjects to processes, then the concept of normativity would have to be altered accordingly”. For Patton, then, the notion of deterritorialization provides “a normative framework within which to describe and evaluate movements or processes”. Evaluation, it seems to me, is the key for Patton’s proposal to make more useful sense. That is, evaluation through distinguishing between different forms of deterritorializations as well as the different forms of reterritorializations that deterritorializations lead up to. (Here it is clear that we need to be careful to follow Patton’s idea about a “turn” in the later Deleuze, since it risks obscuring how Deleuze has always been normative in this sense. Deleuze & Guattari not only constantly remind us that the one does not exist without the other, but the point of affirming deterritorialization is how it can —constantly — condition and arrive at new reterritorializations in the future which are different, which are better.) For Deleuze, in practice, this means that “to analyze a social formation is to unravel the variable lines and singular processes that constitute it as a multiplicity: their connections and disjunctions, their circuits and short-circuits and, above all, their possible transformation” (Difference and Repetition, 260).

So what then is the place of the universal here, since, as Smith continues, they only serve to stop the (productive) processes of deterritorialization? The point here is to differentiate between the classical universals in the various senses of the more or less timeless, already there (static/abstract/teleological), and universals as creations, that is, the temporary culmination of processes, and how the latter, as such, can be evaluated as defendable in certain cases. In other words, the concept of the universal, just as the concept of normativity, has to be “altered accordingly”.

In relation to the traditional form of the universal, as a sort of illegitimate overdocking, the question for both Deleuze and Foucault is how it is possible to resist or find lines of flight that can transform the existing (static) norms in the present. But in this sense, as Smith describes, “neither Foucault nor Deleuze avoid the issue of normativity, they simply analyze it in terms of an immanent process”. This means that “it is the process itself that must account for both the production of the norm as well as its possible destruction or alteration”. In other words, what normativity, in this sense, means in Deleuze is analyzing and evaluating the various conditions for these very processes. Most importantly, the conditions for the creation of something new — and “one cannot have pre-existing norms or criteria for the new; otherwise it wouldn’t be new, but already foreseen”. In this way, the
The Singular vs. the Particular: The Moving Images from Ethiopia

[A] singularity opposed to the particulars subsumed under laws, a universal opposed to the generalities which gives rise to laws.

Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 6

As a universalizing practice, despite being a quite singular and specific assemblage, Kahn’s universalization is nonetheless fairly abstract and general (a universality of man), which in a certain sense seems slightly anathema to a Deleuzean view: abstract a-historical laws like “human rights” explain nothing because they do not automatically correspond with the specificity of singular cases. The more processual concept of jurisprudence therefore “provides Deleuze with a model for the creation of rights that are not universal, but always linked to a given assemblage, and the particularity of specific cases or singularities”.23 Even though Kahn’s archival practice could be argued to constitute such a concrete case in a specific time, I will not continue to discuss Kahn’s collection in general, but instead narrow things down to the even more specific and singular: the moving images from Ethiopia in the archive. These images have a somewhat different status than the photographs discussed above. As a non-European country, Ethiopia was first of all not a French colony. Second of all, these images were externally acquired, that is, not produced by any of Kahn’s own teams. To the extent that these images contain aspects of deterritorialization in relation to pre-existent given, I will argue that they include both forces discussed above.

In a lot of ways the very addition of externally produced images into the archive underlines a curious relation between the concrete facts and histories of the respective countries and how they are subsumed under an over-arching concept of classical universalism. This regards the archive as a power to dictate what is visible and audible inside this potentially all-inclusive generality (archive of the planet). What is at stake, it could be asserted, is the relation between two different notions of what the universal is made of: (virtual and actual) singularities vs. the particular.

Ethiopia is one of the oldest nations andprobably (competing only with Armenia) the oldest Christian nation in the world. Alongside the aspects of the country that are perfectly ordinary, Ethiopia also has other aspects that are singular more than particular. The problem with Kahn’s framework, in view of the first register/force described above, is that in these images, Ethiopia’s singularities tend to be subsumed under the umbrella of a transcendent general universal, which covers them over or turns them into the relative, general to the universal at hand. But why is this even a problem? Is this not an unavoidable part of the project? In Kahn’s belief, direct experience is superior to books when it comes to acquiring knowledge. As he stated, “so see is to know”. And as described above, the camera (and the whole photographic process involved) is not understood as an obstacle in this regard — “to see” is to know. So let us look at the images themselves. What is it we get to see and know here?

The moving images from Ethiopia were commissioned by the French Foreign Office as a part of an expedition that travelled across Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt, mainly in order to verify how the railway linking Djibouti and Addis-Ababa worked.24 These moving images, which are edited as a narrative and even contain inter-titles, are in that sense closer to the typical traveller’s tales of the times more than the stunning autochrome-stills, but they are nonetheless respectful and “molecularly” dignified. One of three surviving films is called Fête du couronnement de la Reine Zauditu (Adès Abeha, 1917), and shows the festivities around the coronation of emperor Makonnen 1916/1917. European and Ethiopian state officials intermingle. Yet again, what is visible and what is not here?

The medium of film came into being on a large scale at the peak of Western imperialism and colonial racism. It is very much connected, in a lot of ways literally, with the colonial project as infrastructure, ideology and discourse.25 But even if these images from Ethiopia actually escape from such an established frame of analysis, Kahn’s idea of making visible and the notion of “seeing is knowing”, become curiously empty in relation to Ethiopian history. What is it that we actually learn from these images?

In the Albert Kahn Museum in Paris there is a digital map of the world in which you can click on a country and see the moving images taken from there. These images literally represent each particular country in the general universalist framework that is the archive. Sitting there clicking around, countries flash by. Look, there is Ethiopia, another colonized African country, right? Actually, that is not so (and I am now disregarding a brief but decisively damaging occupation by Mussolini later on around the Second World War). At the time when African territories became colonies and were brutally divided between the Europeans aggressors, Ethiopia not only remained autonomous but actually expanded its own territory. That is, Ethiopia was the only country that was not colonized during the Scramble for Africa at the end of the 19th century. Because no one tried. In fact, Ethiopia won in battle over the Italian army, which was utterly humiliated. Curiously close to what is usually regarded as the birth of cinema, and sending a bit of a shockwave throughout all European imperialist nations, this is the famous “Battle of Adowa” in 1896.26

I say famous, but I suspect that most readers of this article have never heard of it. It might be one of those historical scenarios that do not neatly fit into the frameworks of what is visible or audible in the normative — classically “Universal” — writing of world history (although it was, of course, considered to be an important event throughout the black Diaspora at the time; and later on for the anti-colonial movement). The standard image is that when a country has not been subjected to the force of Europeans, it is because the Europeans...
chose not to — it is a moral matter. The case of Ethiopia does not fully harmonize with this discursive regime, which tends to reduce it to a position of silence in the mainstream writing of world history, and, I might add, in Albert Kahn’s archive.27

These quite polite moving images, in a sense, pan over Ethiopian territory with a gaze that covers over this decisive and symbolic historical event — and we should remember that the events of Adowa were not too far away historically when these images were taken, and the film crew could hardly have been totally unaware of them. Perhaps there is even a sense of Ethiopian territory being “colonized” by a specific image-regime, however respectful, that gazes over just another timeless African country that lacks history (but where the natives wear beautiful clothing).28 But at the same time, these images also constitute a progressive expression, expanding the regime of what can be seen, in ways that do not necessarily point back to the past (that is, the past in the sense of a more truthful depiction of the history of the country), but also sows virtual seeds for possibilities of things to come.

In Fête du couronnement de la Reine Zauditu, French, English, and Italian representatives intermingle with the Ethiopian dignitaries and officials. The images display a general blending of Europeans and Ethiopians that seems un-dictated by power. This would have seemed false or contrived if Ethiopia was a colony (or a former colony), but it wasn’t. It was rather an autonomous state, and what is celebrated, by Ethiopians and Europeans alike, is the rituals of this autonomous state. In the middle of the film, a long cortege is shown where European soldiers intermingle with Ethiopian soldiers, both on foot and on horses. In this concrete case, then, the complex mixture of the two registers/forces described above becomes more apparent: in one sense, Kahn’s Ethiopia is a-historical, a particularity subsumed under the general and preexisting universality of man. Although in many ways admirable, this general universality, then, performs a kind of silencing and covering over of some of the concrete, and politically important, singularities of the country. In another sense, however, there is also an expression of a kind of autonomous, Ethiopian political subjectivity performed by these images. And presenting this, at this time, on a European stage might be said to constitute a singular event of making things visible — perhaps somewhere in line with a creation of new norms, specific to the era that was Kahn’s. •

▲ Stills from Fête du couronnement de la Reine Zauditu (Addis Abeba, 1917). Copyright © Musée Albert-Kahn
Notes


2. See also Patricia Hill and Teresa Castro in notes 8 & 9, and Teresa Castro in note 8 below.

3. For a wider selection of the photos that will be discussed in this article, see David Okefenokee, The Wanderer: The Life and Times of Albert Kahn, an Exploratory Photographic Protest from a Lost Age (London: BBC Books, 2008) for more details on the technology of the automote, see specifically 312–32; and the BBC television series The Wonderful World of Albert Kahn.


7. “[What was new in European colonialism was not its planetary reach, its affiliation with global institutional power, and its imperative mode, its attempted submission of the world to a single ‘universal’ regime of truth and power”. Ella Shohat & Robert Stam, Unthinking Eurocentrism, Multiculturalism and the Media (New York: Routledge, 1994), 15–16.

8. Kahn’s archive depended on the very infrastructure of the colonial enterprise, as Kahn scholar Paula Ahmad has pointed out, the archive in one sense operated “in the tradition of the author/narrator’s mission (tied to colonial exploration)” and “the travelling and exploration needed to film many of the remote sites covered in the archive (not to mention the original source of Kahn’s fortune), were facilitated by French colonial, military and national connections”. Paula Ahmad, “Kahn’s Archive: From Pre-Documentary Film to Albert Kahn’s Archives de la Planète (1908–1937),” Film History, Volume 15 (2003), 131–149. See also Teresa Castro’s change of the new, in order to be truly new, can be neither foreseeable nor conceptualized nor even expected or hoped for” (199). When it is added here that this local unforeseeability only applies to the actual forms of the new (which per definition, in order to be new, cannot be predicted). Otherwise this argument would be in direct opposition to Deleuze’s notion of the virtual—which conditions the new—and of the concept of the virtual: “This role of creating and making art is to provide the ‘contour, the configuration, the constellation of an event to come’ Deleuze & Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 32–3.


13. Within the heterogeneous processes analyzed — in the sense that they result in effects in the form of specific ideals or “universals” — one force is in every moment dominant, which determines the value of the virtual. See Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Douglas Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 7–8.

14. This is the paradox of domination: it is an exercise of domination and subjection, but this is only one side of the complex of power. In Foucault’s later phases the perspective will change to emphasize the other aspect (or rather, he changes his mind to some extent), i.e. power as the condition for what has created the “autonomous” and free Western individual (albeit with a degree of “freedom” confined to a liberal social framework). The “basis” from which such a freedom emanates is then not a pre-existing ground, but a created “universal”, which is the condition to which those periods that Foucault analyses, which are not necessarily the same as our present state autonomous individual — which is said here to be an “autonomous” — refers to. However, it seems open to interpretation as if, or rather to what degree, this folding or invagination of outer forces that produce subjective interiority contain real autonomy with respect to those forces. See Michel Foucault, “The Ethics of the Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom”, in Michel Foucault, The Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984 (New York: Vintage, 1988), 1–70, 277–293.


16. Deleuze’s radical immanence with its immanent conception of ideas, and a type of transcendent, with its ideals, which are still there in Derrida however “impossible” it is for us to know them other than as a trace. See Daniel W. Smith, “Deleuze and Derrida, Between Ideology and Ideality: Two Directions in Recent French Thought”, Between Deleuze and Derrida, ed. Paul Patton and John Protevi (London: New York: Continuum, 2003), 1–17.

17. “When it is claimed that works of art are immersed in virtuality, what is being involved is not some confused determination but the completely determined structure formed by its genetic differential elements, its virtual or “embryonic” elements. The elements, varieties of relations and singular points coexist in the work or the object, in the virtual part of the work or object”. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 150, Paul Patton (London: Continuum, 2004), 81, 203. Henceforth cited as Difference and Repetition with pagination.

18. He adds, “I think it is a different question from that of the condition to which those periods that Foucault analyses, which are not necessarily the same as our present state autonomous individual — which is said here to be an ‘autonomous’ — refers to. However, it seems open to interpretation as if, or rather to what degree, this folding or invagination of outer forces that produce subjective interiority contain real autonomy with respect to those forces. See Michel Foucault, “The Ethics of the Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom”, in Michel Foucault, The Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984 (New York: Vintage, 1988), 1–70, 277–293.”


20. “Deleuze and the Liberal Tradition”, 308. Henceforth cited as “Deleuze and the Liberal Tradition” with pagination. The new is “a different question from that of the condition to which those periods that Foucault analyses, which are not necessarily the same as our present state autonomous individual — which is said here to be an ‘autonomous’ — refers to. However, it seems open to interpretation as if, or rather to what degree, this folding or invagination of outer forces that produce subjective interiority contain real autonomy with respect to those forces. See Michel Foucault, “The Ethics of the Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom”, in Michel Foucault, The Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984 (New York: Vintage, 1988), 1–70, 277–293.”

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