GEXcel Work in Progress Report
Volume VIII

Proceedings from GEXcel Theme 10:
Love in Our Time – A Question for Feminism
Spring 2010

Edited by
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Centre of Gender Excellence – GEXcel

Towards a European Centre of Excellence in
Transnational and Transdisciplinary Studies of

• Changing Gender Relations
• Intersectionalities
• Embodiment

Institute of Thematic Gender Studies:
Department of Gender Studies, Tema Institute,
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October 2010

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Centre of Gender Excellence
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Towards a European Centre of Excellence in Transnational and Transdisciplinary Studies of:

- Changing Gender Relations
- Intersectionalities
- Embodiment

*Nina Lykke
Linköping University, Director of GEXcel*

In 2006, the Swedish Research Council granted 20 million SEK to set up a Centre of Gender Excellence at the inter-university Institute of Thematic Gender Studies, Linköping University & Örebro University, for the period 2007–2011. Linköping University has added five million SEK as matching funds, while Örebro University has added three million SEK as matching funds.

The following is a short presentation of the excellence centre. For more information contact: Scientific Director of GEXcel, Professor Nina Lykke (ninly@tema.liu.se); GEXcel Research Coordinator, Doctoral Student Ulrica Engdahl (coordinator@genderexcel.org); GEXcel Research Coordinator, Dr. Gunnel Karlsson (gunnel.karlsson@oru.se); or Manager Gender Studies, Linköping, Berit Starkman (berst@tema.liu.se).
Institutional basis of GEXcel

Institute of Thematic Gender Studies, Linköping University & Örebro University

The institute is a collaboration between:
Department of Gender Studies, Linköping University
Centre for Feminist Social Studies, Örebro University

Affiliated with the institute are:
Division of Gender and Medicine, Linköping University
Centre for Gender Studies, Linköping University

GEXcel board and lead-team

– a transdisciplinary team of Gender Studies professors:

- Professor Nina Lykke, Linköping University (Director) – Gender and Culture; background: Literary Studies
- Professor Anita Göransson, Linköping University – Gender, Organisation and Economic Change; background: Economic History
- Professor Jeff Hearn, Linköping University – Critical Studies of Men and Masculinities; background: Sociology and Organisation Studies
- Visiting professor Liisa Husu, Örebro University – Gender, gender equality policy, organisation, and higher education & research policy; background: Sociology
- Professor Emerita Anna G. Jónasdóttir, Örebro University – Gender Studies with a profile of The Politics and History of Gender Relations; background: Political Science, Social and Political Theory
- Professor Barbro Wijma, Linköping University – Gender and Medicine; background: Medicine.

International advisory board

- Professor Karen Barad, University of California, St. Cruz, USA
- Professor Rosi Braidotti, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands
- Professor Raewyn Connell, University of Sydney, Australia
- Professor Emerita Kathleen B. Jones, San Diego State University, USA
- Professor Elzbieta Oleksy, University of Lodz, Poland
- Professor Berit Schei, Norwegian University of Technology, Trondheim, Norway
- Professor Birte Siim, University of Aalborg, Denmark
Aims of GEXcel

1) To set up a temporary (five year) Centre of Gender Excellence (Gendering EXcellence: GEXcel) in order to develop innovative research on changing gender relations, intersectionalities and embodiment from transnational and transdisciplinary perspectives.

2) To become a pilot or developmental scheme for a more permanent Sweden-based European Collegium for Advanced Transnational and Transdisciplinary Gender Studies (CATSgender).

A core activity of GEXcel 2007–2011

A core activity will be a visiting fellows programme, organised to attract excellent senior researchers and promising younger scholars from Sweden and abroad and from many disciplinary backgrounds. The visiting fellows are taken in after application and a peer-reviewed evaluation process of the applications; a number of top scholars within the field are also invited to be part of GEXcel’s research teams. GEXcel’s visiting fellows get from one week to twelve months grants to stay at GEXcel to do research together with the permanent staff of six Gender Studies professors and other relevant local staff.

The Fellowship Programme is concentrated on annually shifting thematical foci. We select and construct shifting research groups, consisting of excellent researchers of different academic generations (professors, post-doctoral scholars, doctoral students) to carry out new research on specified research themes within the overall frame of changing gender relations, intersectionalities and embodiment.

Brief definition of overall research theme of GEXcel

The overall theme of GEXcel research is defined as transnational and transdisciplinary studies of changing gender relations, intersectionalities and embodiment. We have chosen a broad and inclusive frame in order to attract a diversity of excellent scholars from different disciplines, countries and academic generations, but specificity and focus are also given high priority and ensured via annually shifting thematical foci.

The overall keywords of the (long!) title are chosen in order to indicate currently pressing theoretical and methodological challenges of gender research to be addressed by GEXcel research:

– By the keyword ‘transnational’ we underline that GEXcel research should contribute to a systematic transnationalizing of research on gender relations, intersectionalities and embodiment, and, in so doing, develop a reflexive stance vis-à-vis transnational travelling of ideas, theories
and concepts, and consciously try to overcome reductive one-country focused research as well as pseudo-universalizing research that unreflectedly takes e.g. ‘Western’ or ‘Scandinavian’ models as norm.

– By the keyword ‘changing’ we aim at underlining that it, in a world of rapidly changing social, cultural, economic and technical relations, is crucial to be able to theorize change, and that this is of particular importance for critical gender research due to its liberatory aims and inherent focus on macro, meso and micro level transformations.

– By the keyword ‘gender relations’, we aim at underlining that we define gender not as an essence, but as a relational, plural and shifting process, and that it is the aim of GEXcel research to contribute to a further understanding of this process.

– By the keyword ‘intersectionalities’, we stress that a continuous reflection on meanings of intersectionalities in gender research should be integrated in all GEXcel research. In particular, we will emphasize four different aspects: a) intersectionality as intersections of disciplines and main areas (humanities, social sciences and medical and natural sciences); b) intersectionality as intersections between macro, meso and micro level social analyses; c) intersectionality as intersections between social categories and power differentials organized around categories such as gender, ethnicity, race, class, sexuality, age, nationality, profession, dis/ablebodiedness etc); d) intersectionality as intersections between major different branches of feminist theorizing (e.g. queer feminist theorizing, Marxist feminist theorizing, postcolonial feminist theorizing etc.).

– Finally, by the keyword ‘embodiment’, we aim at emphasizing yet another kind of intersectionality, which has proved crucial in current gender research – to explore intersections between discourse and materiality and between sex and gender.

**Specific research themes of GEXcel**

The research at GEXcel focuses on a variety of themes. The research themes are the following:

**Theme 1: Gender, Sexuality and Global Change**
On interactions of gender and sexuality in a global perspective.
Headed by Anna G. Jónasdóttir.

**Theme 2: Deconstructing the Hegemony of Men and Masculinities**
On ways to critically analyse constructions of the social category ‘men’.
Headed by Jeff Hearn
Theme 3: Distinctions and Authorization
On meanings of gender, class, and ethnicity in constructions of elites.
Headed by Anita Göransson.

Themes 4 and 5: Sexual Health, Embodiment and Empowerment
On new synergies between different kinds of feminist researchers’ (e.g. philosophers’ and medical doctors’) approaches to the sexed body.
Headed by Nina Lykke and Barbro Wijma.

Theme 6: Power Shifts and New Divisions in Society, Work and University
On the specificities of new central power bases, such as immaterial production and the rule of knowledge.
Headed by Anita Göransson.

Themes 7 and 8: Teaching Normcritical Sex—Getting Rid of Violence. TRANSdisciplinary, TRANSnational and TRANSformative Feminist Dialogues on Embodiment, Emotions and Ethics
On the struggles and synergies of socio-cultural and medical perspectives taking place in the three arenas sex education, critical sexology and violence.
Headed by Nina Lykke and Barbro Wijma.

Theme 9: Gendered sexualed transnationalisations, deconstructing the dominant: Transforming men, ‘centres’ and knowledge/policy/practice.
On various gendered, sexualed, intersectional, embodied, transnational processes, in relation to contemporary and potential changes in power relations.
Headed by Jeff Hearn.

Theme 10: Love in Our Time—A Question for Feminism
On the recently arisen and growing interest in love as a subject for serious social and political theory among both non-feminist and feminist scholars.
Headed by Anna G. Jónasdóttir

Themes 11 and 12: Gender Paradoxes in Changing Academic and Scientific Organisation(s)
Forthcoming theme on gender paradoxes in how academic and scientific organisations are changing and being changed.
Headed by Liisa Husu

In addition, three cross-cutting research themes will also be organized:

a) Exploring Socio-technical Models for Combining Virtual and Physical Co-Presence while doing joint Gender Research;
b) Organizing a European Excellence Centre—Exploring Models;

c) Theories and Methodologies in Transnational and Transdisciplinary Studies of Gender Relations, Intersectionalities and Embodiment.

The thematically organised research groups are chaired by GEXcel’s core staff of six Gender Studies professors, who together make up a transdisciplinary team, covering humanities, the social sciences and medicine.

**Ambitions and visions**

The fellowship programme of GEXcel is created with the central purpose to create transnational and transdisciplinary research teams that will have the opportunity to work together for a certain time—long enough to do joint research, do joint publications, produce joint international research applications and do other joint activities such as organizing international conferences.

We will build on our extensive international networks to promote the idea of a permanent European institute for advanced and excellent gender research—and in collaboration with other actors try to make this idea become real, for example, organizations such as AOIFE, the Socrates-funded network Athena and WISE, who jointly are preparing for a professional Gender Studies organisation in Europe.

We also hope that a collaboration within Sweden will sustain the long-term goals of making a difference both in Sweden and abroad.

We consider GEXcel to be a pilot or developmental scheme for a more long-term European centre of gender excellence, i.e. for an institute- or collegium-like structure dedicated to advanced, transnational and transdisciplinary gender research, research training and education in advanced Gender Studies (CATSgender).

Leading international institutes for advanced study such as the Centre for the Study of Democracy at the University of California Irvine, and in Sweden The Swedish Collegium for Advanced Studies (SCAS at Uppsala University) have proved to be attractive environments and creative meeting places where top scholars in various fields from all over the world, and from different generations, have found time for reflective work and for meeting and generating new, innovative research. We would like to explore how this kind of academic structures that have proved very productive in terms of advancing excellence and high level, internationally important and recognized research within other areas of study, can unleash new potentials of gender research and initiate a new
level of excellence within the area. The idea is, however not just to take an existing academic form for unfolding of excellence potentials and fill it with excellent gender research. Understood as a developmental/pilot scheme for CATSgender, GEXcel should build on inspirations from the mentioned units for advanced studies, but also further explore and assess what feminist excellence means in terms of both contents and form/structure.

We want to rework the advanced research collegium model on a feminist basis and include thorough reflections on meanings of gender excellence. What does it mean to gender excellence? How can we do it in even more excellent and feminist innovative ways?
Introduction

Sofia Strid & Anna G. Jónasdóttir

The work to develop Theme 10—Love in Our Time—A Question for Feminism—started during spring 2009 and the overall planning and preparations for the visiting fellows programme were carried out during autumn the same year. This included invitation of Senior Scholars, announcement of competitive positions for Junior Scholars (post doc and doctoral students) and the evaluation and selection of applicants. Of the 20 applications submitted (seven postdocs and 13 doctoral candidates) two postdocs (four months each) and four doctoral candidates (one month each) were selected. The theme attracted applications from twelve different disciplines or interdisciplinary fields, 19 different universities in 14 different countries. A call for paper proposals for a final Conference of Workshops (2–4 December 2010) was sent out and the selection of external participants was announced by June 2010.

The chapters of this volume are the result of the initial activities carried out within the frame of GEXcel’s tenth research theme. Most of the contributor authors participated with presentations at the Opening Seminar of this actual theme on 20 May 2010 or in the Workshop the following day (see Appendix 1 and 2). During the Autumn this year the contributors will be back in Örebro for shorter or longer periods of time to continue their work as visiting fellows, participating in the development and forthcoming activities of this research theme. A separate volume of this Work in Progress Report Series will be published as a first result of the December conference.

Chapter 1 of this volume ‘Love in Our Time—A Question for Feminism: Presentation of Research Theme 10’ by Anna G. Jónasdóttir introduces the overall aim of the research theme; sets the scene for the following chapters of the report and maps briefly the research field of love. Jónasdóttir points to the growing interests in studies of love, while simultaneously showing that love as a concept has long been interesting for social theorist, albeit not always named or made visible as such.

The Visiting Fellows will now be introduced in the order of the chapters of this report.

In chapter 2 ‘Affective Equality: Love, Care and Solidarity as Productive Forces’ Kathleen Lynch argues that despite the neglect of love in egalitarian and political theory, love is indeed productive both emotionally and materially. Concepts such as love, care and solidarity are important
political concepts, not only for what they can produce personally but for what they might generate politically in terms of heralding different ways of relating beyond competition and aggrandisement. The generation of a more egalitarian driven society, beneficial to human well-being, would potentially benefit from, or indeed be made possibly by, grounding politics in love, care and solidarity rather than competition and greed.

Kathleen Lynch is Professor of Equality Studies and Senior Lecture in Education at the University College Dublin, Ireland, and an invited senior GEXcel Scholar.

In chapter 3 ‘Equalise Love! Intimate Citizenship Beyond Marriage’ Eleanor Wilkinson challenges the idealisation of romantic love as an unquestionable good. Wilkinson asks what happens when we claim the opposite, that normative romantic love is detrimental to the common good. Based on empirical material gathered through interviews, Wilkinson finds alternatives created by those who either position themselves as standing against the idea and practice of romantic love and whose rejection of romantic love is a political act.

Eleanor Wilkinson is a PhD student at the School of Geography at the University of Leeds, United Kingdom, and a competitive GEXcel Scholar.

In chapter 4 ‘Love and Bodies; Shouts or Whispers? A Look at Discursive Representation of Body in Iranian Love Blogs’ Maryam Paknahad Jabarooty examines how people who write love blogs attempt to represent their body by applying different discursive strategies leading to subversion of pre-made gender identities. The context is Iran, where desire, sex and sexual behaviour are separated from the concept of love, while the concept of ‘shame’ is a central component of ‘love’ and where people utilise the digital media and love blogs to write about the concept of love or the progress of a relationship because such expressions are forbidden in many other contexts. Jabarooty concludes that it might be possible to claim that, in Iranian society, the whispers of body-included love are turning to shouts by the help of digital media.

Maryam Paknahad Jabarooty is a PhD student in Linguistics and English Language at Lancaster University, United Kingdom, and a competitive GEXcel Scholar.

In chapter 5 ‘Reading Hannah Arendt’s Life Writing: An Intimate Political Biography of Love’ Kathleen B. Jones takes the reader on a journey of love, intimate friendship and the difficulty and discovery of living authentically. Jones tells the story of how she came to regard a stranger, a woman dead many years, as her closest woman friend. Jones embeds a writing methodology she calls ‘occupying Hannah, slipping into Han-
nah’s story’ into the very narrative itself, which, Jones argues, forces and enables the fragmentation and de-fragmentation, the rearrangement and rebuilding, and the making sense of oneself.

Kathleen B. Jones is Professor Emerita of Women’s Studies at San Diego State University, United States. She is also member of GEXcel’s International Advisory Board.

In chapter 6 ‘Theorising Love in Forced/Arranged Marriages: A Case of Stockholm Syndrome’ Kaye Quek examines the issue of love in forced/arranged marriages from a feminist perspective. Quek argues that although forced and arranged marriages have become a growing area of feminist research, the theorisation of the emotional and psychological bonds that are created between men and women, husbands and wives, as a result of forced or arranged marriages has received little attention in feminist literature. Quek aims to fill this gap and to offer a conceptualisation of love in forced and arranged marriages that differs from the notion utilised in non-feminist works on the topic. She employs the concept of the Stockholm Syndrome, ‘loving to survive’ and argues that it is helpful in understanding love in arranged and forced marriages.

Kaye Quek is a PhD student at the University of Melbourne, Australia, and a competitive GEXcel Scholar.

In chapter 7 ‘The Royal Wedding as True Love Story. Emotional Politics Intersecting Culture, Nationalism, Modernity and Heteronormativity’ Anna Adeniji sets out to analyse the media coverage of the Royal Wedding in Sweden, taking place in June 2010 between Crown Princess Victoria Bernadotte and Daniel Westling. She raises questions about what the concept of ‘love’ really means in relation to a royal wedding, which per definition is classified as a state affair, in need of governmental approval and renders a multi-million dollar bill partly paid by the citizens.

Anna Adeniji is Lecturer in Gender Studies at Södertörn University College, Sweden. She is a postdoctoral researcher and a competitive GEXcel Scholar.

Chapter 8, ‘Love in Translation. A Proposal for Feminist Critique of Neoliberalism’ by Ewa Majewska, analyses how elements of neoliberalism meet feminist revisions of the concept of romantic love to strengthen the effectiveness of the social production of capital, in the meantime forcing the reduction of support for women in welfare and cultural narrative. Majewska revisits some contemporary theoretical approaches to family and proposes a feminist critical reinterpretation of their analysis of current transformations of the organisation of society in the context of love and intimacy.
Ewa Majewska is doctor of Philosophy and Lecturer in Gender Studies, Polish Academy of Science, Warsaw, Poland, and a competitive GEXcel Scholar.

In chapter 9 ‘Love, Social Change and Everyday Heterosexuality’ Stevi Jackson asserts that feminists have long been critical of heterosexual love, but have had less to say about how love ‘works’ in heterosexual relationships. Jackson examines recent debates around the ‘transformations of intimacy’ and argues that despite the growing debates, there is still relatively little written about the meaning of love in everyday heterosexual lives. Jackson considers what can be extracted about love from recent research and debates and asks: What is meant by love? How does sexual love differ from other forms of love? Why is monogamy considered so central to the former? What is the relationship between love as passion and love as caring? Is heterosexual love now seen as less permanent or more contingent than it once was? To what extent are forms of love historically and culturally specific?

Stevi Jackson is Professor and Director at the Centre for Women’s Studies, University of York, United Kingdom, and an invited senior GEXcel Scholar.

In chapter 10 ‘All in the Family: Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Love’ by PhD student Alyssa Schneebaum examines the relevance and the use of the concept of love in feminist critiques of the institution of marriage as patriarchal. Schneebaum explores how social and linguistic constructions of love serve to uphold the exploitative nature of marriage under capitalism. Schneebaum argues that the fight for equal rights of same-sex couples and different-sex couples risks the creation of new, evolved forms of patriarchy unless the demand for equal rights are embedded in a in a wider challenge to other aspects of capitalist patriarchy.

Alyssa Schneebaum is a PhD student in Economics at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, United States, and a competitive GEXcel Scholar.

In the penultimate chapter, ‘A Return to Love: A Caribbean Feminist Explores an Epistemic Conversation between Audre Lorde’s “the Power of the Erotic” and Anna G. Jónasdóttir’s “Love Power”’ professor Violet Eudine Barritteau sets out a research project to map the field of love studies in the Caribbean. By locating the theoretical and political significance of her emerging study of love and passion and their attendant complications, Barritteau intends to contribute to a feminist understanding of the relevance of examining love in this time and in this geo-political space.
Violet Eudine Barriteau is Professor of Gender and Public Policy and Deputy Principal at the University of the West Indies, Cave Hill Campus, Barbados. She is an invited senior GEXcel Scholar.

In Chapter 12, ‘Love, Caring Labour and Community: Issues For Solidarity and Radical Change’ Ann Fergusson draws on her previous research to argue that highlighting love as a motivation for human actions requires an analysis of human subjects which sees them not merely as rational self-interest maximizers, but as social animals motivated by identities and passions bonding or opposing them to others.

Ann Ferguson is Professor Emerita of Philosophy and Women’s Studies at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA, and an invited senior GEXcel Scholar.

This volume is of a work-in-progress character, and thus the texts presented here are to be elaborated further. The reader should also be aware that due to the fact that this is a report of working papers, the language of the papers contributed by non-native English speakers has not been specifically revised.

We would like to thank Lena Gunnarsson, Gunnel Karlsson and Eva Ljunggren for all their assistance in the arrangements so far for Theme 10 and Valerie Bryson for her invaluable advice on applicants for GEXcel. Special thanks also to the colleagues in the Centre for Feminist Social Studies (CFS), Örebro University, and our GEXcel partners at Linköping University for all their support and more or less active participation.
Chapter 1
Love in Our Time–A Question for Feminism: Presentation of Research Theme 10

Anna G. Jónasdóttir

Introduction
Theme 10 builds on research theme 1. *Gender, Sexuality and Global Change*. Most directly it continues, deepens and widens one of the latter’s three sub-themes, ‘Sexuality, love and social theory’. By focusing on love–particularly the contemporary increase in the knowledge interest in love–it seeks to understand how love questions are interwoven with the other two sub-themes of research theme 1, with feminist views of power and politics and with common and conflicted interests, solidarity and action. This new research theme also ties into several earlier and ongoing GEXcel themes.¹

Aim of theme
The overall aim of this research theme is to investigate the recently arisen and apparently growing interest in love as a subject for serious social and political theory among both non-feminist and feminist scholars (for example: Axelsson (2009); Barriteau (2008, 2011); Bauman (2003); Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (1990/1995); Cixous (2005/2008); Douglas (1990); Evans (2003); Giddens (1991, 1992); Grenholm (2005); Gunnarsson (forthcoming); Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004, 2009); Hendrick and Hendrick (1992); Hesford (2009); hooks (2001); Irigaray (2002); Jakobsen (1999); Johnson (2005); Jónasdóttir (1991, 1994, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2011); Jónasdóttir and Jones (2009a, 2009b); Jones (2000); Jones and Karlsson (2008); Kipnis (2003); Langford (1999); Luhmann (1986); Mackay (2001); and Solomon (1994/2006). What distinguishes

¹ Theme 10 is the second one based at the Örebro University part of the two-campus Excellence Centre, GEXcel. The first one, mentioned above, had its main activities running through the academic year 2007–2008. So far the first Theme has resulted in several publications, for instance three volumes (II, III and IV) in the GEXcel Work in Progress Report Series. Three book manuscripts are also now (by Aug 2010) in various stages of the publishing process with the Routledge Series, *Routledge Advances in Feminist Studies and Intersectionality*. 
this renewed interest in the subject of love is its perspective on love as an important topic to approach in its own terms. Whether sexual, parental, religious or ‘love of the world’, scholars are now exploring love without translating it into other terms (such as labour, care, commitment, trust, respect etc.).

A general assumption behind this research theme is that the increasing scholarly interest in the phenomenon and concept of love has to do with contemporary social (socioeconomic and sociosexual), cultural and political actualities that need to be understood and approached theoretically and politically—in particular by feminists.

The questions raised by this distinctive focus on love include the following: Where do contemporary knowledge interests in love come from—and why now? How do they define and deal with love? What kinds of love are interesting today and for whom? What part do feminists play—or not play—in ongoing works focussing on love? How—if at all—are non-feminist approaches to love theory connected with existing feminist love theories?

The growing interest in love

The growing interest in the subject of love can be seen in various scholarly disciplines and multi-/interdisciplinary fields (economic theory and management philosophy, feminist theory and gender studies, history, neuroscience, philosophy, political theory/philosophy, psychology, sociology, theology). Recent arrangements such as research networks and conferences focussing on love themes indicate a changing attitude towards love as a significant subject in its own right. (Examples: the Fifth National Conference of the Isonomía Foundation for Equal Opportunities on Equality between Women and Men: ‘Poder, poderes y empoderamientos ... ¿y el amor? Ah, el amor!’ (‘Power, ability and empowerment ... and what about love? Oh love!’), Jaume I University, Castello, Spain, September 2008; The Research Network on Love, at the School of Social Sciences/Department of Politics, the University of Manchester, with seminars and a conference—Love in Our World—in November 2008; The Politics of Love conference, Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University, April 2009; the panel The Politics of Love: Male Friendship in the Mediterranean, Britain, and America, 1550–1800, at the 123rd Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, held in New York, January 2009.) Of these four examples only the first arrangement is specifically related to gender and feminist theory.

In sociology, and social theory more broadly, where love has been seen (if seen at all) as, at best, of marginal interest but otherwise considered ‘awkward’ and ‘impossible’ to approach without translating it into other
terms, a noticeable shift in attitude has been occurring. In psychology, where love has been a subject of considerable scientific interest longer than in most other disciplines (except in literature and some other fields of cultural studies), feminist influence has been surprisingly weak. Among feminists, love, especially sexual love and maternal love, has been a burning (political) issue for a long time. Consequently, love as such has been even more difficult to deal with seriously in feminist theory and research than in non-feminist fields. Yet, even in feminist theory and practice love has become visible (again) as a theoretical problem and political issue. Why? What is this new research interest in love about? Why is it arising now, and why seemingly more so, or at least differently, in non-feminist than feminist circles? How are feminist theorists dealing—or not dealing—with love today?

Love as such

To say that love is being seen ‘as a topic important to approach in its own terms’ is not to say that it is seen or should be approached as something pure or absolutely isolated from everything else ‘(such as labour, care, commitment, trust, respect etc.)’. Instead, this focus on love implies that love can be understood as a particular kind of creative/productive human power, which brings about effects. The identification of love with a ‘power’, a capacity to make something new in humans and their social and physical worlds, understands (analytically) love as a field of social forces of its own.

An important part of this research theme is to investigate and elaborate theoretically how love, defined as a set of relational, practical activities and discourses that are formed and regulated through complex cultural powers and political institutions, intersects with other dynamic social forces and processes, as well as with various political, religious, and cultural institutions and ideologies in our time.

I. Love Studies—mapping the field

First, this theme aims to map the emerging field of knowledge interests in love, including feminist ways to analyse love critically and constructively. In particular, it invites studies that investigate this emerging, heterogeneous field of Love Studies through feminist lenses, locating love historically and discussing its theoretical and political significance.

Rather than addressing love questions within specific disciplinary boundaries, the research theme focuses on how and for what aims love is being placed at the centre of several newly emerging research problems and theoretical inquiries about global social processes and political
movements. For instance, the renewed interest in ‘passion’ in politics, whether religious, patriotic or otherwise; in people’s ‘animal spirits’ said to be at play in the economy and in feelings/emotions in social life en-gender unexpected ‘love talk’ in contexts where love would have been an improbable subject.

II. Love Studies—remaking the field

Second, this research theme invites feminist contributions, both critical and reconstructive, that specifically approach the following sub-themes:

(1) Gendered interests in sexual love, for instance how (if at all) care practices relate to erotic agency;

(2) Temporal dimensions of loving and love activities, preferably as compared with temporalities of working, or labour activities; or with thinking and action time. Is there a philosophy and politics of time that should be distinguished and developed about love, to understand better the social conditions, cultural meanings and political struggles of love in our time?

(3) Love as a strong force in the intersection between politics and religion and as a useful key concept for a new political theory of global revolution. What is to be said and done from feminist points of view about postmodern revitalising of pre-modern ideas of passionate love?

Some further questions and comments

When, where and what was ‘recently’?

When I talk about ‘the recently arisen and […] growing interest in love’ in academic scholarship—what do I compare with? When was recently? When and what was before recently and in which academic circles? In other words, what is the time and (intellectual) space frame of reference here? Here I will only make some brief comments, and I aim to get back more thoroughly to these questions and their answers in a later work.

As to time I do compare with the situation during the 1980s when I was writing, and publishing piecemeal, the work that I then put together in one volume, first published as Love Power and Political Interests (1991). This work was translated into Spanish and published as El poder del amor (1993), thus with ‘love’ remaining in the title, but when Temple University Press published the book (1994) it was renamed and called Why Women Are Oppressed. In the 1980s love was almost non-existent in feminist theory, specifically in the kind of theory that I was into, that is meso- and macro-oriented social and political theory, trying
to analyse and explain a specific form of male-dominated society which I call formally equal patriarchy. Especially among those who, like me, were inspired by historical materialism the core area of feminist analysis was always work or labour in one form or another, dependent on which branch of the historical-materialist research tradition each theorist followed (Jónasdóttir 1994, ch. 1 and 9). If or when considered theoretically, sexuality and sexual love did not really count as a part of ‘society’. Sexuality, including love (and love in particular) counted as ‘culture’ and was most often theorised categorically as a means of oppressive ideological power only. When, however, care and affection, understood as practices in social relationships, including sexual relations, were central in feminist analyses, the core concepts tended to be variously named as ‘emotional labour’ and ‘emotional work’ (Hochshild 1983), or as affective, love-related or sexual labour. Here I think of, for instance, Ann Ferguson’s ‘sex/affective labor’ (Ferguson 1989, 1991) and Kathleen Lynch’s ‘love labour’ meaning ‘solidary labour’ (Lynch 1989, 2007, 2009) just to mention two theorists both of whom are invited to contribute to this research theme and this volume.

I think that the different titles of my book, mentioned above, can well exemplify how farfetched it seemed, even in the early 1990s, for most serious publishers to use ‘love’ in a book title—not to mention ‘love power’. I was unhappy with the US-title, but there was no room for negotiations. In the world of publishers a shift has occurred quite obviously. One example is Fiona Mackay’s book, *Love and Politics* (2001). This is a good and interesting book, no question about that, but love is not mentioned in it. Nor is love in the subject index, whereas there is much about care. Love is only in the book title—to sell the book better, I assume.

Towards the end of the 1980s something had happened, if I may say so, in Academia. People were not yet dealing so much directly with love, but a new strong wave had arisen, bringing forward theories of feelings, emotions, affect and the body. There was also a new interest in old (pre-Marxist) philosophical notions and versions of materialism, or, rather, following the current categorical mode of thinking: ‘the material’ (Spinoza for instance). A few influential sociologists started to address intimacy and love in the 1990s, most notably Beck and Beck-Gersheim (1990/1995) and Giddens (1991, 1992). But it was not until the shift of the millennium and after that a certain boom in love titles can be observed, some by today’s most prominent feminist authors and philosophers (and with all but humble titles!). *All about Love* (hooks 2001); *The Way of Love* (Irigaray 2002) and *Love Itself in the Letterbox* (Cixous 2005/2008) can exemplify this new trend. During the 1980s, though, Julia Kristeva had been writing about love, related to her litero-

During the first decade of the 21st century a growing number of books and articles with ‘love’ in the titles have been published. (A selected list is included below.) Let me just mention one or two of the latest feminist contributions. In her ‘Towards a poetics of love: poststructuralist feminist ethics and literary creation’ (Feminist Theory 2010/1) Margaret E. Toye echoes the argument of this research theme, that the topic of love has been largely avoided, and that within feminist theory, more so than in contemporary theory more generally, ‘the subject of love usually evokes embarrassed responses similar to what the formerly taboo topic of sex used to elicit’ (Toye 2010: 40). Also, and again in agreement with the objective of this theme, Toye thinks that ‘”love” needs to be taken as a serious, valid and crucial subject for academic study, and that feminist theory should have a special investment in the topic’ (2010: 39). In addition to examining ‘how love has been theorized’, it is important according to her, ‘to engage in the possibility of reconceptualising our notions of love in order that we can formulate new concepts of love that can be used as necessary grounds for ethical and political relations with others—our family, friends, significant others, communities, neighbours, and nations’ (Toye 2010: 41). For Toye love is an ‘ethical concept’ (2010: 48), conceptualised and elaborated under the influence of Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray. In her ‘The politics of love: women’s liberation and feeling differently’ (Feminist Theory 2009/1) Victoria Hesford, on the other hand, approaches love as a (historically located and changing/changeable) social institution and a space of personal-political dynamic and struggle. She is informed by radical and socialist feminists—or what she calls ‘the work of the early women’s liberationists’ of the second wave movement (Hesford 2009: 7), and it is important, she thinks, to show and make use of the too often foreclosed ‘connections between women’s liberation and queer theory and politics’ (2009: 7).

From silence to centrality
Sociology, and more specifically social theory (in the sense of theories of society and social change), seems to be the academic context where it has been most embarrassing and risky for one’s good reputation to deal with love (Duncombe and Marsden 1993, Smart 2007). Carole Smart, for instance, in her review of Paul Johnson’s book Love, Heterosexuality and Society (2005), says that not only does a heavy silence reign over the areas of love and affect, even heterosexuality as a subject of study has been avoided. This is something she thinks might depend on its ‘too taken-for-granted to be captured on the sociological radar’, and she adds: ‘it is also because it is an analytical minefield’ (Smart 2006: 973). However,
it might be added, ‘the sociological radar’ is not only one or transferring automatically all that it ‘captures’ to researchers or others interested in sociological knowledge. There are people at the academic disciplines’ radar stations, among them powerful people, who can pick up issues, that not really counted before, thereby making them legitimate, even central, without bothering so much about ‘analytical minefields’. Here I’m thinking about Anthony Giddens, for instance, whose theorising of intimacy, changing gender relations and love has become very influential—and criticised also, among feminists (Jackson, Ch. 9 this volume). However, the absence of love in classical sociology, and more widely in social and political theory, has never been absolute. Love is more or less clearly being considered in Marx, in Weber, in Durkheim, and Simmel in particular (also in the classical political economy and political philosophy of Adam Smith, David Hume, Thomas Hobbes and many others). Therefore, it is less surprising than it may seem at first, when we come across love in some of the late twentieth century social and political theorists’ works, who build on the early modern classics. For instance, it is important, I think, for attempting to understand the growing interest in love in various places of Academia, to look at how Talcott Parsons, the very influential, normatively oriented, cultural and social consensus theorist, in his late work took up love and affect as central in his revised theory/solution to the problem of social order. Interestingly also—and seemingly in a direct contrast to a structural-functionalist theory of order—the anarchist co-authors (philosopher and literary scholar) Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt have in several recent works expressed their interest in love and suggest that we should think of revolutionary politics ‘as a project of love’. Both so-called modernist and postmodernist thinkers, including some feminists, seem to be moving towards making ‘love’ a core concept in their strivings to understand, explain and intervene into the current state of the ‘human condition’ and the contemporary world. What this many-sided interest implies concerning gender relations, power and political sexuality, is doubtless a very important and diversified question for feminism.
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Chapter 2
Affective Equality: Love, Care and Solidarity as Productive Forces

Kathleen Lynch

Introduction
Feminist-inspired work has played the key role in taking issues of care, love and solidarity out of the privatised world of the family to which they had been consigned by liberal and indeed most radical egalitarians (Benhabib 1992; Gilligan 1982, 1995; Held 1995; Jónasdóttir 1994, Kittay 1999). They have drawn attention to the salience of care and love as goods of public significance, and have identified the importance of caring as a human capability meeting a basic human need (Nussbaum 1995, 2001). They have also exposed the limitations of conceptualisations of citizenship devoid of a concept of care, and highlighted the importance of caring as work, work that needs to be rewarded and distributed equally between women and men in particular (Finch and Groves, 1983; Fraser and Gordon 1997, Glucksmann 1995; Hobson, 2000; Hochschild 1989; O’Brien 2005; Sevenhuijsen 1998).

Overall, what feminist scholars have helped to do is to shift intellectual thought from its intellectual fixation with the Weberian and Marxist structuralist trilogy of social class, status and power as the primary categories for investigating the generation of inequalities and exploitations. They have drawn attention to the way the care world and affective domains of life are discrete spheres of social action, albeit deeply interwoven with the economic, political and cultural spheres.

This paper builds on this work, and on our own studies of care and love relations (Lynch et al 2009) and equality more generally (Baker et al 2004, 2009), by highlighting the importance of care relations generally for the pursuit of equality and social justice in society. It highlights the importance of affective equality for producing a society governed by principles of deep egalitarianism.

The paper opens by defining affective equality and inequality and outlining the core assumptions underpinning affective egalitarian thinking. From there it explores the history of neglect of affective relations in egalitarian theory. It then outlines a new framework for egalitarian thinking, one that takes account of affective relations and highlights their inter-relationship with other social systems. This is followed by a
discussion of the implications of relationality at the heart of affective equality and a short comment on the links between affective relations, ethics and politics. The paper concludes with some comments on why social scientific and political thought needs to change to take account of the affective and the normative in social life.

Defining Affective Equality and Inequality

Affective equality is focused on two major issues, securing equality in the distribution of the nurturing provided through love, care and solidarity relationships and securing equality in the doing of emotional and other work involved in creating love, care and solidarity relations. Affective inequality occurs directly therefore when people are deprived of the love, care and solidarity (LCS) they need to survive and develop as human beings and/or when they are abused, violated or neglected affectively. It also occurs when the burdens and pleasures of care and love work are unequally distributed in society, between women and men particularly but also between classes, ethnic/racial groups. And it occurs when those doing love and care work are not recognised economically, politically and/or socially for that work. Affective inequality occurs indirectly when people are not educated regarding the theory and practice of love, care and solidarity work and when love, care and solidarity work is trivialised by omission from public discourse, when they are made inadmissible political subjects.

The concept of affective equality is based on a number of key premises. First, it assumes that humans live in profound states of dependency and interdependence and are therefore relational beings. Second, it assumes that people are deeply vulnerable at several levels, corporeally, emotionally, socially, politically, culturally and economically. Third, it assumes that people are sentient beings, with relational identities and feelings (both positive and negative) and that these feelings and identities play an important role in informing normative rationality; relational feelings influence choices about what is good and bad, moral and immoral. Finally, it assumes the citizen is a carer and care recipient both in the public and the private domain of life so lay normativity is not the prerogative of the private sphere.

Egalitarian Theory and Affective Equality

Political theory has tended to define the human person in three distinct ways, first as a public persona, second as an autonomous person devoid of relationality, and thirdly as a self-sufficient rational (cerebral) being, exemplified in the Cartesian assumption, ‘Cogito ergo sum’.
Most branches of political egalitarian thinking have been concerned with the ‘public’ sphere of life, namely the political relations of the state, the economic relations of the market, and the cultural relations governing social recognition. The preoccupation has been with inequalities of income and wealth, status and power. Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice*, which has been the dominant work in Anglophone political theory since its publication in 1971, is a clear example of a text that gives primacy to the public sphere.

Those coming from a socialist and feminist tradition (Young 1990, 2000; Fraser 1995, 2008) also frame egalitarian questions in terms of the economy, polity and culture. While some feminist political theorists (Tronto 1993; Jónasdóttir 1994) have recognised the importance of care as a form of work, and a discrete site of injustice, this is the exception rather than the rule. Fraser, who is one of the most influential contemporary political egalitarian theorists within the socialist feminist tradition, while giving attention to care work (Fraser and Gordon 1997), has not recognised the affective domain as an independent site of injustice. She has argued in most of her work for a perspectival dualism, a two-dimensional conception of justice. She identified redistribution and recognition as the two fundamental and mutually irreducible dimensions of social justice, although acknowledging the discrete ways in which the political sphere generates injustice in her recent work (Fraser 2008).

From the time of Hobbes and Locke, that of Rousseau and Kant, up to and including Rawls, Western political theorists have also glorified the autonomous concept of the citizen. They have upheld a separatist view of the person ignoring the reality of human dependency and interdependency across the life course (Benhabib 1992). Moreover, they have idealised autonomy and independence as a sign of maturity and growth, placing a premium on a human condition that is never fully realisable (England 2005). In so far as it ignores relationality, liberal political thinking has glorified a concept of the person that is potentially socially unethical in that it is assumed to be detached and accountable primarily to the separated self.

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2 Honneth (2003), in response to Fraser, claims that recognition is the fundamental and overarching moral category and that the distribution of material goods is a derivative category. Fraser’s retort is that Honneth has psychologised the problem of injustice, and is treating social justice as primarily an issue of self-realization, a subjective identity problem (via loss of self confidence, self respect, self esteem), thereby ignoring the deeply structural aspects to this type of injustice (Fraser and Honneth 2003). In neither case are care relations, nurturing and dependencies, deriving from the inevitable vulnerability of the human condition, entertained as a site of injustice, except in a derivative or secondary sense.
Like most of the social sciences\(^3\), political theory has also been driven by a Cartesian rationality. There is a denial of the importance of emotions and affective realities in politics; this creates significant omissions in political understanding not only as to how gender inequalities operate across society, but also in terms of what subjects are deemed suitable for political analysis. It is no exaggeration to say that care politics have been consigned to the sub-altern.

While there has been an intense debate about care and its implications for gender justice, this has taken place largely outside the domain of mainstream egalitarian theory, operating mostly among feminist economists and sociologists (Folbre 1994, 2001, 2009; England 2002, 2005; Himmelweit 2002; Hochschild 1989;; Gornick and Meyers 2003). Some philosophers (Kittay 1999, Nussbaum 2001) and feminist legal theorists (Fineman 2004; Fineman and Dougherty 2005) have also drawn attention to care as a site of injustice, although the reigning preoccupation in political egalitarian theory is with redistribution or recognition and, but to a much lesser degree, with the equalisation of power.

An Equality Framework incorporating the Affective System

Equality is not simply about (re)distribution and/or recognition, nor is it simply about the interface between redistribution, recognition and power relations, overcoming the Keynesian-Westphalian frame, as Fraser (2008) has recently suggested. The Marxist-Weberian trilogy of class, status and power do not establish the parameters for the knowing the scope of inequality and injustice. Neither is inequality and injustice simply about the public domains of life, nor is it indifferent to the matter of care and love, or affective relations generally.

In *Equality: From Theory to Action* (EFTA) (Baker et al 2004, 2009) we challenged the sociological axis on which most contemporary egalitarian theory is premised. We identified four rather than three major social contexts in which inequality is generated in society, namely the economic, the cultural, the political and the affective\(^4\). Figure A.1 in the Appendix below shows how these four key social systems generate ine-

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\(^3\) The same three type of assumptions inform sociological analysis of injustice be it within the neo-Weberian (Tilly 1998) or the neo-Marxist tradition (Wright 2010).

\(^4\) While is it obvious from extensive research over time how the economic, political and cultural relations generate injustice, it is not so clear how affective relations are generative forces for inequality, nor is it clear how each set of relations interfaces with each other (for a detailed discussion of all four and their interrelations (see Baker, Lynch, Cantillon and Walsh 2004: 57–72).
qualities in different contexts and how particular social institutions play a key role in either countering or exacerbating injustice.

The salience of the affective system arises in particular from the fact that all people have urgent needs for care at various stages in their lives, as a consequence of infancy, illness, impairment or other vulnerabilities (Fineman 2008). Being cared for is also a fundamental prerequisite for human development (Kittay 1999; Nussbaum 2001). And relations of love, care and solidarity help to establish a basic sense of importance, value and belonging, a sense of being appreciated, wanted and cared about. (Lynch et al 2009). Being deprived of love and care is experienced as a loss and deprivation (Feeley 2009). Humans are relational beings and their relationality is intricately bound to their dependencies and interdependencies (Gilligan 1995; Kittay 1999).

But the affective world does not operate autonomously. Figure 1 below maps out visually the relationship between the affective system and economic, political, cultural systems, and between each of these and the dimensions of equality/inequality to which they are related. The four social systems are deeply interwoven. The relationships between parents and children are not only affective they are also economic, cultural, political. While affective relations play a key role in framing how people are loved and cared for, so do economic relations, and power relations as the pervasiveness of child abuse internationally makes clear. The economic relationship between an employer and employee is also a relation of political power, as is the cultural relationship between the newspaper editor and a reader. The significance of all of this for public policy is that it is not possible just to address problems of inequality or social justice in one social system without addressing inequalities in related social systems. Inequalities are intersectional and deeply interwoven because human beings have multi-dimensional, structurally influenced identities that are constantly in flux.
Figure 1

Not only does inequality occur across all systems, the ways in which inequality operates for different groups varies across systems. While it is clear that class inequality is generated in the economic domain, it is not confined to this. Class inequalities are also generated in the cultural system; cultural tastes are class stratified so the accents, modes of dress, ways of speaking, ways of eating, tastes in music and literature etc., of working class people are also culturally defined as inferior to those of the middle classes (Bourdieu 1984; Skeggs 2004). Working class people experience a moral judgement of themselves as socially lesser; this judgement has an affective outcome as people experience the shame and embarrassment of being judged to be of lower moral worth (Sayer 2005).

Equally, while children could be defined as the prototypically powerless group in society, the injustices they experience are not confined to that system as poverty studies show that children are disproportionately poorer than adults (Survey of Income and Living Conditions in Europe 2006, data from Ireland)
The Relational Realities of Caring and its implications

Love, care and solidarity\(^5\) are productive forces not only emotionally but also materially (Hardt and Negri 2009). Studies of countries operating public policies involving the equalisation of wealth and income show that people are healthier and have higher levels of well-being in more equal and solidarity-led societies (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009, Dorling 2010). Equally, we know from psychology, that experiencing love and care at the personal level is vital for producing emotionally and mentally healthy persons, and that the latter, in turn, influences physical health and well being enabling people to work and function more effectively in all areas of life. Given the primacy of love, care and solidarity for human well being, it is important to comment on them further here (see Lynch 2007 for an in-depth analysis).

There are three major life-worlds or circles of relational care work (Figure 2). First, there is the world of primary, intimate relations where there is strong attachment, interdependence, depth of engagement and intensity; the prototypical relationship in this circle is that between parents and children. Even if little love labour is invested by the parties to this intimate world, or if there is abuse or neglect, these relationships retain

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\(^5\) Love relations refer to relations of high interdependency where there is greatest attachment, intimacy and responsibility over time. They arise from inherited or contractual dependencies or interdependencies and are primary care relations. Secondary care relations are lower order interdependency relations. While they involve care responsibilities and attachments, they do not carry the same depth of moral obligation in terms of meeting dependency needs, especially long-term dependency needs. There is a degree of choice and contingency about secondary care relations that does not apply to primary relations. Solidarity relations do not involve intimacy. They are the political form or social form of love relations. Sometimes solidarity relations are chosen, such as when individuals or groups work collectively for the well being of others whose welfare is only partially or not immediately related to their own, or solidarity can be imposed through laws or moral prescriptions that are collectively binding. While most people can readily identify the value of love and care at the personal level, there is less understanding of solidarity. Solidarity is the more political or public face of affective relations. It finds expression in the values a society upholds in support of others who are not autonomous. It is both a set of values and a set of public practices. It connotes the work that is involved in creating and maintaining local communities, neighbourhoods on the one hand, and the advocacy work in civil society for social justice and human rights at local, national and global levels at the other. It finds its expression in people’s willingness to support vulnerable others within their own country or to support to peoples in other countries who are denied basic rights and livelihoods to live a life of dignity. The levels of solidarity in a given society are reflected in everything from the vibrancy of its community activities to the taxes people are willing to pay so as to fund and support vulnerable members of their own and other societies. It is where the moral, the affective and the political systems overlap in public life.
a high level of emotional significance. Secondary care relations involve outer circles of relatives, friends, neighbours and work colleagues where there are lower order affective engagements in terms of time, responsibility, commitment and emotional engagement. Tertiary care relations involve largely unknown others for whom people have care responsibilities through statutory obligations at national or international levels, or for whom people care politically or economically through volunteering or activism. Within each of these circles of care, people live in varying states of dependency and interdependency. And each care reality is intersectionally connected to the other, moving along a fluid continuum from care-full-ness to care-less-ness.

The world of care is not an isolated and autonomous sphere however. It is deeply interwoven with economic, political and cultural relations, and inequalities in the latter can undermine the capacities and resources to do love, care and solidarity work (Baker et al 2004). It is no accident of history, for example, that those who are in prison are not only disproportionately from very poor households, but are also very likely to have
suffered severe care deprivations and to have lacked equality of access to education and other social goods (Feeley 2009; O’Mahony 1997). Structural injustices exacerbate affective deprivations.

In primary care relations, labours of abuse and neglect can replace love labouring, not only denying someone the benefits of love labour but damaging the person through abuse and/or neglect. Equally in the secondary care relations fields, other-centred care labouring may or may not take place. Highly competitive work environments do not generate cultures of care and concern among colleagues (Ball 2003). Neighbourhoods mired by poverty or violence are not likely to produce the kind of trust that underpins neighbourly care or so-called ‘social capital’ (Leonard 2004). In the global or national sphere of social action, opportunities to express solidarity through forms of fair trade, debt cancellation or the curbing of sex trafficking are greatly undermined when governments and multi-lateral agencies conspire against them in their own interests. There is therefore nothing inevitable in the love, care and solidarity (LCS) world; the relational sphere provides contexts where they can be either fostered or destroyed, not least because economic, political and cultural injustices interpellate with affective relations and frame their character.

The Ethical, the Affective and Politics

Human beings are ethical, committed and emotional, as well as economic, political and cultural; the sets of values that govern people’s actions in everyday life and the emotions that accompany them are central to how people live and define themselves (Sayer 2005: 5–12). People struggle in their choices between what is good and the not-so-good; their lives are governed by rules of lay normativity in much of their social action (Sayer 2005: 35–50). Because human beings live in affective relational realities, they also have emotional ties and bonds that can reinforce their motivation to act as moral agents, to act ‘other wise’ rather than ‘self wise’ (Tronto 1991, 1993). To say this is not to deny the fact that people can and do disregard feelings for others in all relations; they can and do behave indifferently, neglectfully and abusively. One of the defining struggles in the lay normative world is the struggle over how to balance concerns and commitment to others with self-interests tapping into and managing corresponding emotions.

Given the complex character of human relationality however, social actions are not simply interest-led in the economic, power and status sense. While interests do play a role in framing choices and actions, people are evaluative; they make moral judgements about what matters to them in terms of their relationships, money, work and/or leisure. Because people have relational nurturing (nurtured) identities as carers and
cared-for persons, their decisions are influenced by their love, care and solidarity priorities and values (Lynch et al 2009). Recognition of their vulnerability as human beings undoubtedly drives self-interest in the traditional economic sense, but it also drives people as moral and relational agents. In recognising the vulnerability of themselves, people can come to see the vulnerability of others.

Relations of love, care and solidarity matter not only for what they can produce personally (or what their absence of abuse can do negatively to persons, communities or societies) but for what they might generate politically in terms of heralding different ways of relating beyond separatedness, competition and aggrandisement. Grounding politics in the ethics of love, care and solidarity rather than the ethics of competition and self interest alone (I am not suggesting that self interest is not desirable or that it cannot at times work in the service of others) has the potential to help generate the type of egalitarian-driven societies that would be so beneficial to the well-being of humanity (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). It would enable the principle of other-centredness to manage and contain the principle of rational economic interest, thereby driving economic and social policy in a way that is ethical in the sense that is it always two-dimensional in focus; it is not just focused on simple economic self interest or advancement (growth for growth’s sake) but is also focused on the care-of-the-other in the context of caring of the self.

Conclusion: The Normative, Positivism and the Neglect of the Affective in the Social Sciences

To move beyond the narrow definition of the human person as a public, rational and cerebral actor, one needs to address a major tension in contemporary sociological theory, namely the tension between the normative and the analytical within positivist led social science. While maintaining the separation between the positive and the normative is vital to avoid representing a priori assumptions and values as empirically valid ‘facts’, the dichotomy also presents us with unique problems of analysis. One of the issues is that it generates disinterest in the role of the normative, and relatedly that of affective relations in social life. Yet, as observed by Sayer in his analysis of social class and related inequalities (2005, 2006), human beings are not emotionally and morally detached entities. Social actors are not only interest-led, power-led or status-led. They can and do make moral choices that are driven by their relationality.

Humans are not objects devoid of vulnerability; they have a susceptibility to loss and injury emotionally, physically and mentally (Fineman 2008). Their vulnerability grounds their relationality no matter how
complex and conflict-laden these relations may be. A political space for new modes of political engagement, redefining the public from the inside out rests in that relationality. There is scope to direct political desire towards an admission of vulnerability and other-centredness. While economic and other self interests will inevitably play a role in desire, there is scope to define desires relationally not least by naming and recognising the collective (and ultimately individual) benefit of solidarity.

To recognise the salience of relationality for human choices and actions is not to suggest that relationality is disinterested or driven by simple altruism. Relational beings are simultaneously living in an autonomous space; they are both self-interested and relational simultaneously. People are individuals-in-relation, not separate and soluble persons (England, 2005). And being self-interested in the classical economic sense may indeed be what enables people to be other-centred in other spheres of life; autonomy is not the enemy of relationality. Neither is relationality the enemy of autonomy; people who are engaged with the interests of others are more sensitive to their needs and desires and this knowledge of others gives one power to service the other and to be rewarded in turn by reciprocal appreciation and action.

References


## Key Social Contexts for the Generation of Equality and Inequality

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<td>Private sector producers and service providers State economic activity (social transfers, public services, etc.) Voluntary sector service providers Cooperatives Trade unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>Production, transmission and legitimisation of cultural practices and products</td>
<td>Educational system Mass media Religions Other cultural institutions (museums, theatres, galleries, concert halls, etc.)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Legislation/policy-making system Legal system Administrative bureaucracies Political parties Pressure groups Campaigning organisations Civil society organisations</td>
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<td>Providing and sustaining relationships of love and care and solidarity</td>
<td>Families Friendship networks Care-giving institutions (children’s homes, old people’s homes) Solidaristic bodies engaged in work for justice and equality</td>
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Chapter 3
Equalise Love! Intimate Citizenship Beyond Marriage

Eleanor Wilkinson

Introduction

Romantic love is almost always invoked as an unquestionable good, a signifier of all that makes life worth living for, the most important feeling on earth. To love, and to be loved, is a cherished ideal that almost everyone is believed to aspire to. Love is seen as the foundation of society and essential to community. Yet the idealisation of romantic love as an unquestionable good is something that I seek to challenge in this paper. I want to begin to ask what might happen when we claim that normative romantic love is actually detrimental to the common good. What happens if we do not want to preserve the current community or the existing order of things? And what alternatives are created by those who position themselves as standing against romantic love?

However, of course I am clearly not the first to form a critical account of romantic love. Romantic love has been a key site of struggle in many feminist debates; love and marriage have been challenged because of the way in which they are seen to uphold both patriarchy and capitalism. However, despite these continued criticisms, the ideology of romantic love still appears to be as strong as ever; to borrow a term from Miranda Joseph: we have witnessed both ‘persistent critique’ and ‘relentless return’ (2004: vii). Yet what I want to begin to explore in this paper is how romantic love ‘returns’ in various different forms, and how there has been a change in the way in which romantic love is now perceived. Therefore in this paper I outline some of the ways in which the boundaries and markers of romantic love have been said to have shifted in recent decades, placing my research within existing literature on individualization and the so-called ‘democratization of desire’ (Giddens 1992). In this I paper I investigate how campaigns for same-sex marriage may pose challenges to earlier feminist critiques of romantic love, and shall examine how these debates re-enforce and/or challenge conventional ideals about romantic love.
The bedrock of society

I begin this paper with a brief overview of some contemporary examples of how long-term stable romantic relationships are promoted as the foundation of a ‘decent’ and good society. Durable romantic relationships and stable families are still frequently on the agenda within UK policy, with the government even attempting to bring in tax breaks for married people. In my research I am interested in the complex ways in which normative intimacy is seen to work through and reproduce a number of different spatial scales; particularly how neo-conservative narratives portrays romantic coupledom as inextricably connected to the good of the community, the nation, and even the world.

The starting point for my research has been to look at some of the rhetorical devices that are being used by those who are trying to defend marriage from ‘threats’ such as gay marriage and polyamory. For example, Australia’s National Marriage Collation claims that:

The greatest resource Australia possesses lies in the families of our nation. The strength of Australian families depends on the quality of the relationships between our nation’s mothers and fathers. Therefore the quality of our nation’s marital relationships will determine the destiny of Australia.⁶

More worryingly a similar pattern can be found in recent UK family policy, a recent government Green Paper in 2010⁷ states that ‘Strong, stable families are the bedrock of our society …Strong families also help build strong communities, so they are crucial for a successful society’.

In my research I have been thinking through how these narratives might add to Doreen Massey’s use of ‘Russian doll geography’ in which care and responsibility are always associated with proximity. Massey states that:

….certainly in Western societies, there is a hegemonic geography of care and responsibility which takes the form of a nested set of Russian dolls. First there is ‘home’, then perhaps place or locality, then nation, and so on. There is a kind of accepted understanding that we care first for, and have our first responsibilities towards, those nearest in. There are two qualities of this geography which stand out: it is utterly territorial, and it proceeds outwards from the small and near at hand (2004: 8–9).

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⁶ www.marriage.org.au
What these narratives about normative romance highlight however, is that if you care for those ‘nearest in’ then you are also, somehow instantaneously also caring for society, the nation, and the world; that there is a direct link between having a good normative intimate life, and being a good citizen. In these narratives people’s intimate lives are not just private, but directly link to a wider societal good; the links between scales in these narratives, between the intimate, the nation, the global are often very overt. By being in a stable happy family we’re doing our bit for society, and working towards the common good. Loyalty to your partner becomes synonymous with loyalty to the nation.

The reverse of this therefore is that to not be in, or even worse, to not even aspire to be in, a romantic coupled relationship is not just seen as just a personal failure, but as a failure to society as a whole. Broken relationships are portrayed as one of society’s biggest problems and the cause of almost all that is wrong in the world today. For example in 2010 Anthony Fisher, the new bishop of Paramatta (a city just outside Sydney), made the following statement: ‘Last century we tried godlessness on a grand scale and the effects were devastating...Nazism, Stalinism, Pol-Pottery, mass murder and broken relationships’. Similarly, recent debates in the run up to the 2010 general election in Britain have seen David Cameron claiming that the cause of ‘Broken Britain’ is the breakdown of families. Those who don’t / won’t or can’t form ‘proper’ long lasting romantic relationships, become the source from which all our society’s’ problems stem from. It is argued that people have forgotten how to love properly, and that the values of love need to be learnt again. Take for example a recent headline the UK Telegraph which reads ‘Broken Britain needs lessons in love’. This story is about a report titled ‘A Good Childhood’ produced by Lord Layard, a Professor at the London School of Economics and former advisor to Tony Blair. In the report it is claimed that ‘Britain has been damaged by rampant individualism...the selfish ethos needs to be replaced by a greater sense of personal responsibility and the common good’. It is argued that ‘The country needs a ‘radical shift’ towards an ethos of love’. This radical shift of course needs economic incentive, and this is why there are now proposals for tax breaks for married people. As once again it is the family, and the heterosexual romantic bond that is seen as crucial for teaching children these ‘lessons in love’; somewhat paradoxically love is seen as both the problem and the answer.

Yet clearly what is lacking in these debates is any consideration about what makes these changes and shifts in family formation both possi-

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8 Sydney Morning Herald, April 2nd 2010.
9 The Telegraph, 2nd February 2009.
ble and even *desirable* for many people. The idea that something might not have been working with the existing traditions is never considered, and there is no critical questioning about why these changes have come about, or that it may be dangerous to try and push people back into these traditional and potentially damaging family units and coupled relationships. Moreover, does the promotion of the romantic bond, and the family as the key site, in fact often only site, of care and love in our society curtail the potentials of what love could be? Yet in the UK we have now witnessed the inclusion of civil partnerships into these debates. So for the second part of this paper I want to begin to explore what effect these inclusions may have upon these dominant heteronormative ideals about romantic love.

**Stand up for your love rights**

Back in 1995 Nan Hunter argued that same-sex marriage could potentially change and transform marriage as we know it; she thought the inclusion of same-sex couples may in fact destabilize and challenge the traditionally gendered and patriarchal nature of marriage. However, as Bell & Binnie highlight: ‘Paradoxically, however, it seems that such a move could have the function of *reaffirming* marriage as an institution’ (2000: 58). In my research I have been looking at both same-sex marriage debates, and polyamorist claims towards citizenship and equality. What I have noted is that although there may be a shift away from the conventional nuclear family, there is still as much emphasis as ever on long-term romantic bonds and commitment. Take for example, the following quote from an Australian campaign for same-sex marriage, called ‘Equal Love’. Their key argument is that ‘shared love [same sex] is equal to and no less worthy of legal recognition than the love shared by heterosexual couples. There is no justification for discrimination.’

Ultimately, what we see in these campaigns is a narrow personal politics which fails to move beyond an individual’s ‘right to love’. Moreover, often these narratives seem to present a vision of ‘love’ that is all too familiar, and they echo prevailing ideas about the importance of romantic love above all other attachments. Likewise, in previous research, I have found similar narratives in popular portrayals of polyamory, and rather than provide a radical critique of monogamy, popular polyamory seems to still be cherishing many of its basic principles (Wilkinson 2009).

However, for many these popular portrayals of same-sex love and polyamory as ‘unthreatening’ and politically conservative may be seen as a positive step forward. If wider society can see that lesbians, gays and

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10 www.equallove.info
polyamorists also value love and commitment, then they can be seen to be the same as everyone else. Framing a defence of marginalized sexualities around issues of ‘love’ and ‘personal choice’ allows people to present a palatable argument that many people can relate to. However, claims to sexual citizenship become expressed as a social and moral status, which by their very nature is always exclusionary as they still help delineate appropriate and inappropriate attachments. What these campaigns fail to address is why should the coupled sexual partnership be granted legal and social benefits at the expense of a whole host of infinite other possibilities for living and loving differently?

Furthermore, could the opening up of marriage to same-sex couples have in fact made it even harder to place oneself in opposition to marriage? Take for example the following argument from the ‘Equal Love campaign’ who state that:

The idea of marriage as an unchanging institution does not hold up to historical examination. Traditionally, marriage laws treated wives as the property of their husbands, and prohibited inter-racial and inter-religious unions. It has evolved with the times. If marriage is to remain relevant in Australia, it must be expanded to permit same-sex unions.

This idea that marriage has changed, means that ideas about marriage being oppressive and constraining are seen as outdated. Therefore, heterosexuals who may have once opposed marriage for the way it privileged heterosexuality may now even be considering marriage as a valid option.

Ultimately it appears that people now believe we have more choice in our intimate lives, and perhaps therefore no longer see marriage as constraining; what once was a constraint appears now be just one choice among many. Intimacy and romantic bonds are now theorized in terms of negotiated and individualized relations, whereas previously there was more emphasis on the gendered division of roles and obligations. Marriage and romantic attachments are now viewed not as a social duty but as an active choice. However, the motions of freedom and regulation are both complex and contradictory; detraditionalization and retraditionalization often come hand in hand. Attempts to assimilate polyamory and same-sex unions into existing structures may in fact be reinforcing the power of romantic love. In the final section of this paper I shall explore some of the ways in which certain queer activists have attempted to reject these normative ideals about romantic love.
And don’t you feel ashamed?

In my doctorate research I have been speaking to people who do not place romantic love as the key attachment in their lives, with some rejecting it entirely, and others actively refusing to let it take precedence over other attachments such as friendship. Many of my research participants are actively involved in queer and often anarchist / or ecological political projects, for which intimate politics are seen as crucial. The intimate is seen as a space of utopian promise, for as Berlant and Warner state:

[m]aking a queer world has required the development of kinds of intimacy that bear no necessary relation to domestic space, to kinship, to the couple form, to property, or to the nation’ (1998: 558)

A rejection of normative romance may therefore free us to rework intimacy, and challenge the idea that that those closest are the ones we care for, and who we feel most responsibility towards.

In the final section of this paper I want to explore how the traditional scaling up of normative romantic love that I outlined in the first section of this paper, is challenged by certain forms of queer politics. The normative narrative goes something like this: ‘to be in a durable committed stable relationship, is to mark ones commitment to the community, to be a decent respectable citizen, to commit one’s self to the nation’. Yet what happens if we disrupt this logic? What happens when we remap and queery these lines of connection between the intimate /the nation/ the global. Is romantic coupledom really so beneficial to society? In these queer counter-narratives romantic love is not seen as a prerequisite for being a decent citizen, instead normative intimacy is seen as antithetical to society. Heteronormative and mononormative relationships stand accused of being privatized, isolated, individualistic, and ultimately self-interested bonds, where ones only responsibility is towards your nearest and dearest alone. Many of my research participants feel that their rejection of normative romance is a political act: they argue that the privatized monogamous couple diverts attention away from wider global struggles. They challenge the way that romantic love is often portrayed as ‘a haven in a heartless world’, an escape and a retreat, and the way that the romantic bond is meant to become all that matters, ‘You mean the world to me’.

Instead it is argued that there is something profoundly anti-social about the romantic monogamous bond. Compulsory monogamy may in fact contribute to the structural inequalities and problems that society faces. Does the promotion of coupledom protect ‘the common good’ or
does it result in inequality and division? As the radical queer collective Homocult (1992) write:

POOR LITTLE LOVE BIRDS
COUPLED & CONTROLLED
STAYING IN PLACE
MARRIED & MORTGAGED & MONOTONOUS
FEATHERING NESTS AGAINST THE WORLD

This idea that the couple is an isolated form, feathering nests away from the rest of the world, is echoed by one of my research participants who states that:

At times in the past when I’ve been in what appears to the outside world to be a ‘normal’ couple I’ve hated the way the world feels to close down on you. You’re coupled now, you’ve made it, you don’t need anything else (Kay).

Others criticise normative ideals about romance for being both isolating and highly competitive:

The idea of being in a couple just seems really isolating to me... I mean, I just feel like it’s a series of isolated little units, kind of everyone for themselves, couples against the world ... all competing with each other and trying desperately to come across as the perfect happy family (Alex).

Love and the family are seen as a way to create to competition, the perfect family becomes a marker of status, quite clearly linked to consumption, as Grewal states:

Combined with the suburbanization of motherhood through living in gated communities of suburbs (for the safety of children), driving very large SUVs, forms of superconsumption in the name of the family... the latest version of the American dream. (2006: 3)

Conclusion

In this paper I have attempted to outline some of the ways in which certain queer political projects have attempted to remap the lines of connection between the intimate /the nation/ the global, and have explored some of the ways in which they have tried to create alternative maps of loyalty and affect, that challenge the idea that the normative intimate
bond should always be the ultimate source of care and love in society. Intimate life is seen as a potential site of global resistance. Global resistance, here, however is not some sort of large scale project, or a rallying call to rejecting romantic attachments and instead give oneself to the activist cause. Rather, changes in our everyday intimacies are seen as a potential site of resistance in itself, there is no necessity to scale ‘up’ this form of politics. It is more about living out our everyday intimate lives in a way that does not infringe upon, or cause harm to others and their own intimate lives. Rather than coalition politics, and alliances across space, this is a placed-based politics that pays attention to the connection between local to local.

My research respondents claim that a rejection of mononormativity may free us to imagine new ways of living and loving, and new ways to imagine community, society and ‘the good’. This position obviously stands at odds with certain strands of queer thought that reject ‘the redemptive hope of producing brave new social collectives’ (Edelman 2004: 821). However, I find this strand of queer theory in dangerously close proximity to the arguments used by the neo-conservative right. Take for example the following quote by Michael Warner:

Nonstandard sex has none of this normative richness, this built-in sense of connection to the meaningful life, the community of the human, the future of the world (1999: 47).

My research highlights how a number of queer projects have refused to accept these links without question, and have instead begun to ask what ‘standard sex’ has ever done for the community, the human, the future of the world, and could a rejection of mononormativity provide a far better alternative?
References


Chapter 4
Love and Bodies: Shouts or Whispers? A Look at Discursive Representation of Body in Iranian Love Blogs

Maryam Paknahad Jabarooty

Introduction

Since the Iranian revolution of 1979, romantic relationships have been subject to strict interpretations of feqh (Islamic jurisprudence). The imposition of the Islamic dress code, along with sexual segregation, and restrictions on women in public has meant that expressions of romantic love have become more and more difficult. In the 1980s, Iranian people rarely saw women and romantic relations portrayed in their media, though this situation has since improved slightly.

Additionally, in Iran, desire, sex and sexual behaviour are separated from the concept of love, while the concept of ‘shame’ is a central component of ‘love’. Therefore, ‘love’ is aligned with family and private relations, while the body and physical contact is marginalised or tabooed. This situation is highlighted in digital media by imposing a sever governmental web filtering. People who write love blogs attempt to represent their body by applying different discursive strategies leading to subversion of some pre-made gender identities. Therefore, I have decided to focus my study on Iranian love blogs, in which the body is represented in language. A love blog seems to be a phenomenon distinct to Iran. People write about the concept of love or the progress of a relationship, because such expressions are forbidden in many other contexts.

Digital Context

During recent years, the use of the Internet has rapidly increased; consequently, computer mediated communication (CMC) has attracted more and more attention by many Iranians. Although CMC technology, contents and usage patterns are still in a process of rapid change, the use of CMC as a popular medium for reinforcing self-expression, and socialisation is increasing dramatically. In fact, the internet operates in a complex way that, upon closer inspection, appears to affect the real world.
by resembling it and may at times require a critical eye to uncover. The focus on content and communicative practices in CMC highlights the possibilities of new gendered identities being constructed through online interactions. These new gendered identities may appear in a different form from the more fixed forms of real life.

Additionally, the heterogeneity of internet users in their needs and aims, makes it possible to think about embodiment from different aspects. Some people like Bornstein (1998: 206–7) have written on the liberating power of the internet to allow its users to alter their gender identities by disembodiment, while for many lovers who use the internet to contact their lover or express their feelings, there is a need to talk about bodies (such as when they talk about kissing their lover’s lips), because the body and physical contact are substances of sex and desire.

Butler (1990:25) writes that ‘gender is always a doing... no gender identity behind the expressions of gender. Identity is performatively constituted by the very “expressions” that are said to be its results.’ On the other hand, Mullany (2000:3) notes that ‘masculinity and femininity are not traits that we inherently have, rather they are effects that we perform by the activities we partake in.’ While fully aware of the existence of dominance and power structure through performing hegemonic masculinity in the society, it is believed that the differences implemented in the socialisation process profoundly affect male and female discourses (Maltz and Borker 1982; Tannen 1990, 1994). That is, although there are ‘norms that govern how individual speakers decide to perform either masculinity or femininity... men and women are fully capable of resisting and subverting these norms.’ (Mullany 2000:4)

Such an instance shows itself when looking at the collected information from some Iranian love blogs, in which actual people construct their gender identity through an online representation of the self. Love blogs are a type of diary, which have love and romantic relationships as their main topics.

Love bloggers as owners and writers of blogs come from a physical (real) society in which dominant hegemonic masculinity subjugates them by pervading the gendered norms of real life. On the other hand, they resist this subjectivity by constructing new gender identities through using their bodies to express their emotions, values and attitudes toward their romantic relations and represent their agency. The possibility of appearing anonymous is a significant privilege for the bloggers, male or female, though it is found that females prefer anonymous interaction through CMC because it does not allow judgment on the basis of gender (Gopal, Mirana, Robichaux and Bostrom 1997). Further, anonymity actually leads to increased idea generation (Connolly, Jessup & Valacich
Though this anonymity is not absolute. They talk about their bodies (real or preferred).

By the way, it is clear that real life and love blogs are affecting each other through doing gender and subverting the gender norms simultaneously, when love bloggers change the position of love from the private and put it in the hands of the public. However, it is important to know how love bloggers may affect the hegemonic masculinity in the real life, while they as non-exemplar people will be also affected by it just as they are a part of the real life.

It is also important to understand and attempt to ascertain the effects that such an environment may have on both bloggers and blog readers: are they picking up on these norms and conforming to them? My data shows that it is a matter that could be having a major impact on social life of those involving the production and consumption of love blogs.

**From body to emotions via language**

The emotions as the main substance of romantic relations can be conveyed by the body (or its physical contacts) and represented through language. In non-virtual societies, individuals have access to the physical substance, while in virtual societies they attempt to reproduce it by means of digital media. Language is one of the main ways that people represent their bodies.

In Iranian on-line society, the images of body are expressed in a new form indicating an ongoing change in romantic relations, while love is politicised under the dominance of a religious regime. In current Iranian off-line society, there are a number of restrictions on the ways that gender, sexuality and desire can be expressed. Homosexuality is criminalised and though heterosexuals do not face the same stringent measures, sexual relationships or even friendships between un-related men and women prior to or after marriage are forbidden by the government (although such relationships still occur).

Iranians must take care to monitor their own behaviour in public at all times—for example, kissing in public is frowned upon. Therefore, Iranians have found other ways to express aspects of their identities that is publically suppressed, by using the internet.

In this study, I will focus on the ways of public expression of body and physical contact in romantic relationships between couples, by examining the phenomena of love blogs. A blog is a personal journal which is published on the internet, and is a relatively new form of media, becoming popular in the last decade around the world. Bloggers write about many topics, although in Iran, many choose to frame their blog postings around the concept of love.
Bloggers in Iran are afforded freedom via anonymity, but blogging is closely monitored by the government—for example, web filtering programs remove any web pages that contain banned words like *women* (although not *woman*), *penis*, and *sex*. Bloggers must therefore develop strategies in order to express themselves without being censored. In my research I intend to examine how love blogs are used in order to construct new gendered identities and power relations through the representation of body, drawing from a range of theoretical and methodological frameworks, including Connell’s theory of hegemonic masculinity, Baxter’s Feminist Post-structuralist Discourse Analysis (FPDA) and Jackson’s explanatory framework of gender, sexuality and heterosexuality.

A look at Iranian love blogs reveals some ways of representing body. As indicated in Figure 1, body is represented by various ways as naming body organ, verbalizing by movement, metaphoric and non-metaphoric contact, and highlighting generated reactions and emotions.

These debates lead me toward some significant research questions. Firstly, what is the role of the body in the on-line discursive representation of love? Secondly, how does censorship (political (legal), cultural, or digital) affect this kind of representation? Thirdly, what is the role of love blogs in responding to the way that love is discursively constructed via hegemonic power?

I also intend to investigate how CMC technology provides opportunities for individuals to express neglected or limited aspects of love in terms of body in order to make communication possible.
Methods and procedures

The methodology I have employed in this study is based on a post-structuralist discourse analysis of gender and sexuality. Post-structuralist researchers have criticised the notion of the unbiased or neutral researcher, pointing out that all research is governed to some extent by discourses. Rather they try to de- and re-construct previous and current ways of thinking (Baker 2008:18). This aspect of researcher bias which leads to involvement in a social change is one of the most important goals of this study. In regard to the study of romantic relations in Iranian society, I need to consider the socio-cultural factors ‘behind the ways that categories like male/female or homosexual/heterosexual have been understood, how our understandings of such categories have changed over time, and the consequences that such categorisations have had on society and individuals, particularly in relation to issues of power and inequality’ (Baker 2008:18).

Taking a post-structuralist approach to language, intertextuality has a very important role in this study too. In talking about competing discourses, Baxter (2003: 8) argues that ‘Such discourses do not operate in discrete isolation from each other but are always intertextually linked, that is, each discourse is likely to be interconnected with and infused by traces of others’. Therefore, diversity in self-identity of bloggers and their relation in constructing their on-line world (and the off-line one later on) are emphasized in this study. This intertextuality is discussed mainly when the web of power in the posting is under question by adopting the classification of Jackson (2006). Sources will also be disparate, though the main source for data is Persian Blog, the main Iranian host server.

Trying to provide a structure for analysis, which makes answering the research questions possible, I use the a specific structure as the method for analysis of my selected blog postings. This structure includes four steps of mapping, description, interpretation, and explanation.

The discourse of love and embodiment on this issue can be retraced by a study on the construction of power as a web. Therefore, I investigate how the blogger constructs him- or her-self, and his/her romantic relationship in relation to a web of power by using various linguistic strategies. I thus relate my findings to laws, religious rules, the unwritten rules and traditions of society and culture, the historical context (e.g. the relatively recent changes in Iran), everyday routines and the blogger’s personal situation and his/her relationships, and also the blogger’s own views of Iranian society, how he/she views him/herself and his/her own political stance.
All of the above methods will be applied to changes over three decades from Islamic Revolution (start of a religious government) in Iran and emergence of digital technology in the life of Iranian people.

Analysis

The analysis of selected Iranian love blogs shows signs of generating various discourses reinforcing or competing to the dominant discourse of love in the Iranian society. With this in mind, the following extracts explore some of the various discursive tools used by Iranian bloggers in order to justify the existing image of love in terms of imposed (self) censorship by the religious and political regime as well as some cultural boundaries, specifically attempts to present bloggers’ thoughts and feelings toward tabooed parts of love and romantic relations.

Extract 1:
‘... your body becomes loose in our relationship, it dwindles little by little, and is melted, and you pour into the bed, I lick your body little by little and destroy it gradually; there is no more body of you, only the symbol of Lust, is left.’
[From “A thief’s diary” blog]

I have interpreted this extract as the blogger referring to the act of sexual intercourse with his partner. It is difficult to be certain about this interpretation, because the blogger does not make this explicit. The blogger cannot make it explicit due to censorship. However, there are a number of textual clues, which have helped me to make this interpretation. First, the blogger refers to ‘the bed’, which could suggest either a sexual relationship or a sleeping place. Secondly, the blogger has used letter-spacing to spell out the Iranian word for lust. Thirdly, the blogger uses the verb lick, which could refer to sexual activity. He uses lick with the word body. He describes the body as dwindling and melting. This does not make sense. However, if we interpret his use of body as a holonym for penis, then the line makes sense and the concepts of ‘the body’ dwindling and melting (which are used metaphorically) are clearer.

Additionally, at first the blogger talks about the body of the lover as subject, but then he changes the grammatical subject to the lover himself. Therefore, he identifies the lover with his body. Arguably, the word body is a metaphor for the male sex organ and the concept of destruction is a reference to infertility in the homosexual relationship.
Extract 2:
Some women looked at you. My jugular became straight. I was annoyed, why is your dress so low-cut.
[From “Woman(‘s) Pub” blog]

In extract 2, the lesbian blogger describes how other women were looking at her lover. She describes her jugular as becoming straight. This Iranian expression is traditionally used by men to describe their annoyance if their female partners receive attention from other men. This expression therefore directly relates to the expression of male (heterosexual) honour.

The blogger then asks why her lover’s dress is low-cut. In this respect, Afshar (1999) concurs that the modesty code of Iran ‘rests on two contradictory assumptions: the woman is weak and needs to be protected from threats to her honor, and that she has strong sexual impulses which threaten the honour of males and the integration of the group.’ And dress code represents feminine chastity and modesty.

This relationship, although between two women, appears to be modelled on heterosexual relationship codes, whereby the ‘man’ or dominant person is possessive of the ‘woman’ or submissive person. Duggan (2003) refers to the concept of homonormativity which is the assimilation of heteronormative ideals and constructs into homosexual cultures and identities. The description of the relationship above could therefore be described as homonormative.

Extract 3:
Never put others’ chewed gum in your mouth!
[From “15 years old boy” blog]

The heterosexual teen blogger of above extract is describing and objectifying a girl friend by using the metaphor of chewing gum. A chewing gum is sweet at the first moments of chewing, but later it loses its taste. Mouth is also the metonym of a boy/boyfriend. By using this metaphor, the blogger strengthen the dominant discourse of heterosexual male superiority.

Extract 4:
Do you know why I love you so much? Your way of looking reminds me a hungry bear, you hand is a rasp which rubs my delicate body, your ridiculous demands put me in non-returnable straits:. But, oh, that ruby ring was not too much without effect....
[From “This is a woman” blog]
In the above posting, the heterosexual female blogger is talking to her lover/husband. The ironic tone of the blogger refers to a broken relationship, while the ruby ring as a metaphor for marriage contract which (maybe economically) pushes the woman to continue her marital relationship. There are some body metaphors in this posting: a hugging hand like a rubbing rasp, looking manner like a hungry bear (sexual connotation). These metaphors reveal that man is still willing and enthusiastic to continue this relationship, while the woman’s reaction toward her attention is anger and hate. The irony in woman’s language gives her a power to reveal her suppressed feelings.

Concluding Remarks

Love bloggers as owners and writers of blogs come from a physical (real) society in which dominant hegemonic masculinity subjugates them by pervading the gendered norms of real life. On the other hand, they resist this subjectivity by constructing new gender identities through using their bodies in expressing their emotions, values and attitudes toward their romantic relations and representing their agency.

The possibility of appearing anonymous is a significant privilege for the bloggers, male or female, though it is found that females prefer anonymous interaction through CMC because it does not allow judgment on the basis of gender (Gopal, Mirana, Robichaux and Bostrom 1997). Though this anonymity is not absolute. They talk about their bodies (real or preferred).

It is clear that real life and love blogs are affecting each other through doing gender and subverting the gender norms simultaneously, when love bloggers change the position of love from the private and put it in the hands of the public. However, it is important to know how love bloggers may affect the hegemonic masculinity in the real life, while they as non-exemplar people will be also affected by it just as they are in the real life.

It is also important to understand and attempt to ascertain the effects that such an environment may have on both bloggers and blog readers: are they picking up on these norms and conforming to them? My data shows that it is a matter that could be having a major impact on social life of those involving the production and consumption of love blogs.

In particular, this research leads one to conclude that although ‘the “democratic” perception of CMC is seriously flawed’ (Yates 2001:32) because there are some other social and cultural variables needed to be included in the study of gender issues within the blogs, the CMC through blogs makes it possible to make a more democratic society. For example, expressing emotions and attitudes toward romantic relations by the
bloggers increases the competing discourses of love which leads to a more democratic perception of romantic relations in the day-to-day life. Therefore, it might be possible to claim that, in Iranian society, the whispers of body-included love are turning to shouts by the help of digital media.

References

Chapter 5
Reading Hannah Arendt’s Life Writing: An Intimate Political Biography of Love

Kathleen B. Jones

A long time ago a woman named Hannah wrote a letter to her lover to tell him about her best friend. Rahel, the close woman friend, ‘unfortunately dead a hundred years now,’ (Kohler 1996:10) the letter noted, had once explained something very important to Hannah. What had Hannah understood from this woman’s life lived a millennium earlier? She had come to know, the letter continued, how important it is that other people, who live in the same time and space as you do, recognise and accept you as the person you understand yourself to be. Of course, Hannah admitted, she had never met Rahel. It turns out that the explanation she had garnered was one Hannah had crafted herself by reading diaries and letters Rahel left behind.

‘What a crazy thing,’ I thought when I first read that letter some years ago. A woman born in another century, dead a hundred years, whom you had never met. How could anyone ever call such a ghost a close friend? And I continued to think it was crazy until I began to feel the same way. Until, that is, the Hannah in question—Hannah Arendt—became my own closest woman friend.

Hannah, as I have come to think of her, defied categorisation. She was a brilliant political philosopher, who refused to call herself a philosopher, a woman who never considered her sex to be an obstacle in her life, a Jew whom others called anti-Semitic, and a rigorous thinker who wrote passionately about hatred and love. Tackling some of the thorniest moral and political questions of modern times, she became as well known in literary and political circles for her brave, powerful prose, as she was among academicians for her philosophical arguments.

Her ‘closest woman friend’, Rahel Varnhagen, was a Jewish woman born in the late eighteenth century into a Berlin suffused in Enlightenment ideals. An influential figure in German Romanticism, Rahel hosted one of the most illustrious salons in her famous garret on Jägerstrasse. The major intellectuals of Berlin society, people from all walks of life, came to her rooms to discuss culture and politics. They came, and, when the world changed again and Jews were no longer welcome in ‘polite society,’ they left.
Though a century separated Hannah and Rahel, these two European women shared a similar fate: they both had been born into a world where being identified as a Jew demanded explanation, and, by Hannah’s time, led to extermination. Yet, what drew Hannah to Rahel, what intrigued her enough to write Rahel’s biography, extended well beyond the similarity of lineage.

When Hannah first discovered Rahel Varnhagen she was wrestling with conflicts in her own life paralleling Rahel’s, including difficult intimate relationships with men. She was also deepening her exploration of her own identity, asking questions about what it meant to be a Jew. I believe Hannah came to feel close to Rahel, perhaps closer than with any living woman friend, because the story she told about Rahel’s life became the narrative arc of a life-long thinking journey Hannah took to discover her own life’s truths and make sense of the dark times in which she was living.

Less than half a century separates me from Hannah Arendt. Yet, on the face of it, except for the profession of political theory, we have little in common. Hannah’s personal experience of the Holocaust ruptured forever her perception of the historical era and political and cultural spaces which, at least for part of the same time and in some of the same places, she and I both lived, though we never met. Yet, I have come to know Hannah in the same way she came to know Rahel: through her writing and the life records she left behind. And the Hannah I have come to know has haunted me; her voice has become the voice in my head.

For someone like me—an ardent feminist with leftist predilections, a woman in love with a woman, a grandmother, a person who can spend hours lost in daydreams and introspection—to be obsessed with Hannah Arendt is disconcerting. Hannah ridiculed the women’s movement and rejected every form of modern ideology. She had no children. She dismissed interior reflection about one’s emotional life as vastly inferior to real thinking. And she would have considered conferences like this one, with its discussions of the politics of sexuality and love, ridiculous wastes of time. Why then has she captivated me so?

To dispense with the obvious first, Hannah’s experience as a singular star in the male universe of philosophy is, in itself, an achievement, and one I, as a professional woman, long admired. Her unwillingness to confine herself to some narrow identity category—Is she a woman, a Jew, a scholar? Is she arrogant or deeply vulnerable at heart?—makes her a distinctively contemporary role model. And her steadfastness in the face of brutal criticism has been a quality I have tried to emulate more than once. But none of this really gets to the heart of the matter, explains what drew me to her or makes me think that what she had written, and
how she lived, no matter how privately, how conflicted and with evident scorn for self-disclosure, could provide a way for an ordinary woman like me to make sense of her own life.

I found another Hannah in between the lines of her writing, a Hannah who, intentionally or not, confessed truths about herself, revealed blind spots and displayed emotions I am sure she would rather have kept hidden. That Hannah drew me into an unequal and not always welcomed thinking partnership, a disquieting dialogue between two women, one long ago dead, about what and how the heart knows yet prefers to silence. With her as my ghostly guide, I took an unexpected thinking journey and began to discover what might be more universal than the story of what happens in any one person’s life.

Like Hannah, who got caught up in thinking about her own life while writing her biography of Rahel Varnhagen, reading Hannah’s life and work caught me up again in my own, making me reveal things I might have wanted to keep even from myself. Telling these stories makes them become part of the wider web of human relationships binding us together in what Hannah once called the human condition of plurality, where ‘we are all the same, that is human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else….’ (Arendt 1958: 8)

The first time I came across Hannah Arendt’s biography of Rahel Varnhagen, its strange format put me off. *Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewish Woman* didn’t fit anything I recognised as biography. It read like a bizarre compilation of facts culled from Rahel’s correspondence and dreams cobbled together into what sounded like a very lopsided story, but one Hannah insisted she had told as Rahel might have told it herself. Only much later, when I read the book like a writer, did I begin to understand why it so compelling: Hannah the storyteller had slipped into the story.

‘It still comes as a shock to realize’, the memoirist Patricia Hampl once wrote, ‘that I don’t write about what I know, but in order to find out what I know.’ (1999: 27). The reader might succumb to the ‘lovely illusion’ that the words fall onto the page as if ‘inevitably…faultlessly’ (Hampl 1999: 28). But the writer knows what the reader forgets: ‘The heart, the guardian of intuition with its secrets, is the boss. Its commands are what a writer obeys—often without knowing it’ (Hampl 1999: 28).

So where had Hannah’s heart commanded her to go when she was writing Rahel’s story? What secrets had her heart made her confront? Was Hannah’s harsh judgment of Rahel’s many attempts to escape her identity (her fate?) by disappearing into a series of unhappy romances as much an indictment of Hannah herself as of her subject?
‘The thing which all my life seemed to me the greatest shame, which was the misery and misfortune of my life—having been born a Jewess—this I should on no account now wish to have missed’ (Arendt 1974: 3). Hannah quoted these words Rahel had uttered at the time of her death and placed them at the beginning of the biography. From there, looping backwards, she recounted Rahel’s efforts to escape her Jewish identity.

Writing in a voice that hardly concealed her hostility Hannah described Rahel surrounding herself with the trappings of a cultured life, pursuing romantic liaisons with a certain class of men. She belittled Rahel for trying to be an exception among Jews. Rahel used the disguise of her sex to masquerade as a non-Jew, yearning to be married to a man of the right culture and bearing ‘as though,’ Hannah wrote, ‘she longed only to be taken away from what and where she was’ (Arendt 1974: 6). And so Hannah faulted Rahel for her indifference to politics, belittling Rahel’s efforts to find personal liberation through romantic love. Yet, Hannah never questioned the sexual politics of love.

This surprised me.

After all, love—or, more precisely, Augustine’s concept of love, caritas, as ‘neighborly love’ or the divine command to ‘love thy neighbor as thyself’—had been the subject of her doctoral dissertation. Her interpretation of Augustine’s concept of ‘caritas’ or divine love stressed its rootedness in a fundamental equality—an equality ‘neither of traits nor of talents, but of situation’ resulting ‘in a kinship beyond any mere likeness’ (Arendt 1996: 100). This conception of equality was a radical one, in the sense that it ‘wipes out all distinctions’ and ‘receives a new meaning—love of neighbor’ (102). And this love ‘denotes a change in the coexistence of people...from being inevitable...to being freely chosen and replete with obligations,’ making ‘each belong to everyone’ (102) and marks the beginning of a ‘new social life...defined by mutual love’ (108). But when she remained unapologetically adamant that sexuality was not a political subject it seemed clear: to Hannah neither sexual love nor the status of women were political. In this, as in so many other things, Hannah Arendt appeared to part company with feminists of her own and earlier generations.

Although love, as a subject of serious theoretical analysis, may only have re-entered the feminist project within the last two decades or so, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, feminist progressive reformers were concerned deeply with the politics of love. Feminists criticised romantic love as a source of dangerous passion that led to conflict and disappointment in a society with gender-based inequalities. And they rejected what was called ‘sentimental love’ for ‘its exaltation of sexual
difference’ (Leach 1980: 100) and for representing women as ‘idealized objects and the passive recipients of masculine affections’ (Leach 1980: 100). Instead, nineteenth century feminists advocated ‘a rational, symmetrical, and egalitarian love based on a knowledge that made no room for ideality, passion, or fantasy’ (Leach 1980: 100). They wanted to ground love relations in equality and rationalise, even sublimate, both female and male sexual drives (Leach 1980: 124).

Latter day feminists, such as Jessica Benjamin and, more recently, bell hooks, have taken up the topics of desire and love from very different perspectives but with similar aims: to counter the conception of desire understood as a force operating along sado-masochistic pathways of domination and submission by offering new, transformative definitions of love. In hooks’s words, this means seeing love ‘as an active force that should lead us into greater communion with the world’ and identifying the practice of love as an action ‘not aimed at simply giving an individual greater life satisfaction’ but ‘as a primary way to end domination and oppression’ (hooks 2000: 76).

In many ways, hooks’s treatise offers an updated version of earlier feminists’ efforts to establish ‘rational love’, egalitarian at its core, as the hallmark of ‘true love’. Yet, her work pushes past these feminist reformers’ concerns with sexual inequality to advocate a model of love as ‘the will to nurture one’s own or another’s spiritual growth, revealed through acts of care, respect, knowing, and assuming responsibility’ (136). In this regard, hooks writes, ‘the foundation of all love in our life is the same. There is no special love exclusively reserved for romantic partners. Genuine love is the foundation of our engagement with ourselves, with family, with friends, with partners, with everyone we choose to love’ (136).

This begs the question, not fully answered in hooks’s treatise: Whom should we choose to love and how? Surprisingly, this question animates Hannah’s Rahel Varnhagen.

In between the lines of Hannah’s life writing is her fundamental concern with the practice of love expressed as authentic self-awareness and connection to others. One can even trace its ramifications across the trains of her thought from Rahel Varnhagen into her work on totalitarianism and the tragedy of the Holocaust through her reflections on the human condition.

So, reading Rahel Varnhagen again late in my own life, I began to wonder whether Hannah’s insistent lack of interest in the woman question wasn’t covering a deeper truth about her understanding of love and the politics of love.

Written in between the lines of Rahel’s story was a subterranean narrative, a sort of doppelganger tale where Hannah’s life shadowed Rah-
hel’s. To write her book, Hannah had slipped into Rahel’s skin, becoming the woman in the centre of Rahel’s story. And by taking on this other woman’s life Hannah raised questions about the politics of love, even if not directly to herself. This peculiar path Hannah took into biographical writing belied her erasure of sex as a political fact in any woman’s life story.

Like Rahel, Hannah had created her own escape into exceptionality; she too, had adopted a persona, worn a mask. By publicly distancing herself from her own identity as a woman, Hannah was able to stand apart. To many people who knew her, she was a woman-who-was-not-Woman. Critics, and even some friends, portrayed her as cold and uncaring, a woman out of touch with her feelings.

Vivian Gornick wrote that Hannah’s failure in the matter of Martin Heidegger was the result of her never being able to grasp the power of repressed feeling. Heidegger had been Arendt’s professor and became her lover when she was only eighteen. But the truly scandalous part of the whole affair was Hannah’s renewed friendship with and continued defense of him long after his support of the Nazi party was indisputable. Hannah, Gornick and others have said, was sealed off from ‘all knowledge of her own inner conflicts’ (Gornick 1997: 111) and more at fault in the Heidegger affair than an ordinary woman, who makes a mistake but at least tries to understand why. Yet, to me, these interpretations missed the mark.

The emotionally distancing language all scholars are taught to use is partly a clever way to appear respectably far from the subject. So I began to wonder whether Hannah had worked through her own relationship to womanhood and troubled affairs of the heart by writing Rahel Varnhagen.

‘If you only knew how dangerous love would be for me,’ (Kohler 1996:40) Hannah confessed in a letter she had written to Heinrich, her beloved second husband, on one of the many occasions when circumstances forced them to live apart. She said she had known for as long as she could remember ‘even as a kid’ that she could ‘only truly exist in love’ (Kohler 1996:40). And that frightened her; she was afraid being in love meant she would ‘simply get lost’ (Kohler 1996:40). But with Heinrich she was ‘no longer afraid’ (Kohler 1996:41). ‘For god’s sake you are my four walls’ (Kohler 1996:129). And within that home in the world she felt blessed because she had ‘managed to get both things, the “love of my life”, and a oneness with myself’ (Kohler 1996:41).

When I read her correspondence with Heinrich I realised something Hannah never admitted out loud. Being a woman made her feel vulnerable. Like Rahel, she had fallen in love more than once with the ‘wrong’
person and was afraid to risk love again. Hannah feared being wounded by love, a fear she had in common with many women, but admitted only to Heinrich. How she longed for connection; how afraid she was to get lost. With Heinrich, Hannah could live the truth she had discovered writing Rahel’s story: she was an ambiguous woman, a woman both like and unlike what everyone expected a woman to be.

That is why, to me, *Rahel Varnhagen* reads like a cautionary tale about the consequences of a woman’s complicity with supporting society’s exacting price for earning the mantle of respectability simply by conforming to social expectations. Except *Rahel* was written from the inside out in a voice so omniscient you’d hardly suspect its author fell into the same trap.

Even today a woman who wants respectability still must do (and not do) certain things and if she is an outcast, a pariah, the kind of woman who does not fit or resists the social roles and expectations carved out for her, she needs to find a way to survive. The more difficult path is to become a conscious pariah, an outsider aware of her position and hell bent on sticking with it. The trouble is, without a social network of other pariahs, this path too often leads to self-destruction. So instead she might try manipulating conventional choices available to women in her position. She might try, like Rahel, to marry beyond her assigned status or otherwise pass for someone she is not, becoming a stranger even to herself.

I know how easy it can be for a woman unhappy with society’s restrictions to run away from herself. And how difficult to live authentically. That is what I think Hannah learned from writing *Rahel* and what I have learned from reading it.

By occupying Rahel’s story, Hannah found a method, a way into and out of her own shames and illusions, confronting her own longing to escape who she was. And so I have slipped into hers and inside that kaleidoscope looked at myself, fragmented, rearranged and then tried to make sense out of my many parts.

In the story that follows I have embedded this method in the narrative itself. By speaking it here in this forum I embody the tale, bringing it into the space between us, into what Hannah called the public space of action in concert with others.
References


Chapter 6
Theorising Love in Forced/Arranged Marriages: A Case of Stockholm Syndrome

Kaye Quek

Introduction

This research will examine, from a feminist perspective, conceptions of love that exist in relation to the practice of forced/arranged marriage. More specifically, the paper will seek to draw on feminist use of the concept of Stockholm Syndrome in order to develop an alternative theoretical framework for understanding the aspect of love in these marriages to those which currently dominate the literature.

Since the period of the early-1990s the issue of forced/arranged marriage has become a growing subject of feminist inquiry, due in large part to increased media, and subsequently, public interest in the occurrence of the practice within migrant communities in western states (Deveaux 2006; Siddiqui 2005). One aspect of the custom, however, that has received little attention from feminist scholars, is the discourse of love associated with forced/arranged marriages, and the theorisation of the emotional and psychological bonds that are created between men and women (as husband and wife) as a result of the practice. Such a gap in the feminist literature is significant in view of the extent to which ‘love’ is invoked in cultural defences of the custom and in anthropological and sociological works on arranged marriage. These hold that far from being ‘loveless’, such marriages are based on a notion of love distinct from western understandings, as an affection that ‘develops over time’ and over the course of a marriage (for example, Gagoomal 2008; Gopalkrishnan and Babacan 2007; Zaidi and Shuraydi 2002). Through use of the concept of Stockholm Syndrome, this project seeks to address both the gap in the feminist literature, and to offer a conceptualisation of love that differs from the notion of ‘love developing over time’ by providing a gendered conceptual framework for understanding the development of love and affection in forced/arranged marriages. The paper will focus on the practice of forced/arranged marriage in South Asian communities in the UK as the basis for its analysis.
The concept of Stockholm Syndrome, and in particular the feminist appropriation of the term, is identified in the paper as a possible, alternative means by which to theorise the development of love in forced/arranged marriages. The term ‘Stockholm Syndrome’ originates from a bank robbery that took place in Stockholm, Sweden in 1973, in which four bank employees, who were held hostage for six days, developed positive feelings of loyalty and affection toward the robbers who were holding them prisoner (Graham 1994: 1). Following from this, the notion of ‘Stockholm Syndrome’ has been used by scholars, particularly in the field of psychology, to refer to the positive bonds of affection that hostages have been known to develop toward their captors in situations of hostage and terror. In feminist use of the concept, Stockholm Syndrome has been drawn on primarily in relation to situations of domestic violence, as a means of explaining the gendered dynamics of power and affection that develop in such circumstances (Goetting 2007: 85). In particular, feminist scholars have referred to the psychology of Stockholm Syndrome as a way of understanding battered women’s ‘love’ for their male partners, theorising that in these situations women’s love for men develops as a strategy for survival; it is said that they are ‘loving to survive’ (Graham 1994). By drawing on the gendered conception of love put forward in feminist understandings of Stockholm Syndrome, this research seeks to test the relevance of the concept of ‘loving to survive’ to situations of forced/arranged marriage as a means of theorising relations of love in these marriages.

The project is borne out of two key trends in the literature on forced/arranged marriage. The first relates to the growing body of feminist work on the custom, which is closely linked to increased media and public interest in the issue. In the UK, the emergence of forced marriage as a topic of public concern and feminist inquiry is often attributed to the rise in the media coverage of cases of murder following forced marriages that took place in the late-1990s. Several theorists point in particular to the murder of British/Pakistani woman, Rukshana Naz, in 1998, and to the subsequent media interest in the case, as pivotal to the rise of forced marriage as an issue of public debate (Deveaux 2006; Siddiqui 2005). Naz, who was married at the age of fifteen, was killed by her mother and brother for refusing to stay married to her cousin in Pakistan and for becoming pregnant to her lover in Britain (Siddiqui 2005). Both political theorist Monique Deveaux and women’s rights activist Hannana Siddiqui argue that it was following the public outcry at the murder of Naz, and other similar high-profile cases, that forced marriage became a matter of public policy in the UK (Deveaux 2006; Siddiqui 2005). The current extent of the problem of forced marriage in the UK, though diffi-
cult to assess, is understood to be considerable; for instance, the government agency charged assisting victims of the practice, the Forced Marriage Unit, reports that it deals with some three to four hundred cases of forced marriage annually, a figure that is considered to significantly under-represent the actual number of forced marriages that take place in Britain each year (Macey 2009: 68).

In the feminist literature on the practice of the custom in Britain, a major focus of discussion has been on the difference, or degrees of difference, between ‘forced’ and ‘arranged’ marriages. This has been due in large part to the politics of multiculturalism in the UK, and to the efforts of succeeding British governments not to offend minority culture groups when dealing with harmful cultural practices such as forced marriage (Dustin and Phillips 2008). As a result, feminist debate has centred mainly on issues of ‘force’ and ‘consent’, that is, the question as to whether a woman has consented to marry a family-chosen spouse or has been subjected to physical force in order to secure the marriage. In many cases, feminist scholars, in addition to British governments and cultural ‘elders’ from within affected communities, have sought to distinguish between ‘forced’ marriages, which are condemned for their use of physical coercion, and ‘arranged’ marriages, which are seen to involve ‘consent’ and therefore are considered a respectable cultural tradition (for example, Dustin and Phillips 2008; Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2005; Phillips and Dustin 2004). In this paper, however, I use the term ‘forced/arranged marriage’ in order to signal an approach in line with the small number of theorists who seek to understand forced and arranged marriages as on a continuum involving varying types and amounts of pressure and force, rather than as diametrically opposed practices (Beckett and Macey 2001; Jeffreys 2009; Macey 2009). Although this is an approach that is at the margins of feminist scholarship on the issue, it is utilised in this work in order to highlight and to include in analysis non-physical types of force, such as psychological pressure, threats of social ostracism, financial coercion, or restrictions on freedom of movement, that may be used to bring about a family-arranged marriage (Macey 2009: 70–71).

Aside from issues of force and consent, other main concerns within the feminist literature on the custom have included state efforts to address the worst aspects of the tradition through policy initiatives and legislation, such as through criminalisation of the practice or the use of civil remedies (Phillips and Dustin 2004; Siddiqui 2005; Ward and Patel 2006). The literature has also called attention to theoretical questions regarding the rights of individual women within minority culture groups, and the implications that cultural traditions such as forced mar-
riage hold for women’s human rights (Deveaux 2006; Dustin and Phillips 2008; Wilson 2007). As a result, a lesser focus has been on conceptualising the type of relationship that is formed between men and women, once a forced/arranged marriage has taken place. There are an increasing number of works that document women’s experiences of the practice (Bhopal 1999; Gangoli et al 2006; Netting 2006; Zaidi and Shuraydi 2002), and others that suggest that forced/arranged marriage should be conceived of as a type of domestic violence (Siddiqui 2005). Nonetheless, there remains a lack of theorisation within the feminist literature which brings these concerns together and develops a comprehensive approach for understanding the bonds of affection that are created in these marriages. This is an anomaly that the project seeks to redress.

The second key aspect of the literature on forced/arranged marriage that is crucial to the study is the concept of ‘love’ found in much sociological and anthropological work on the custom. As stated earlier, this is the idea that love in family-arranged marriages is different to western notions of love in that, rather than occurring before marriage, love is considered to ‘develop over time’ (Dion and Dion, 1996; Hashish and Peterson, 1999; Gagoomal 2008; Gopalkrishnan and Babacan 2007; Madathil and Benshoff 2008; Netting 2006). Love between a husband and wife is in this way conceptualised primarily in terms of a companionship and a ‘practical love’ that develops as spouses learn more about each other over the course of a marriage (Gopalkrishnan and Babacan 2007; Madathil and Benshoff 2008: 223). The contexts of shared responsibility and experience (Netting, 2006), and realistic expectations of one’s spouse (Madathil and Benshoff 2008) are factors considered to aid the development of love. In fact, in many cases such circumstances are identified within the literature as rendering the custom of arranged marriage preferable, or more likely to provide spouses with satisfaction than ‘choice’ or non-arranged marriages (Gagoomal 2008; Pasupathi 2002). For instance, in an article that assesses the compatibility of arranged marriage with international human rights law, Prashina Gagoomal argues that ‘Arranged marriages not only offer the possibility of romantic love, but also...a broader sense of love that encompasses compromise, respect, and understanding between the spouses’ (Gagoomal 2008: 610). The notion that arranged marriages are ‘loveless’ is firmly rejected by such works, which instead characterise love in these relationships as a ‘work in progress phenomenon’ (ibid: 608).

Within this literature, relations of love are also discussed beyond the realm of the marrying couple, and in terms of emotional bonds within and between families. This relates closely to the understanding of marriage held in practicing communities that marriage is less a union be-
tween individuals than it is between families (Macey 2009: 79; Netting, 2006). As such, love is often also identified in terms of the affection that parents hold for their children in seeking to secure them a suitable life partner, and in the respect and deference to parents displayed by children in accepting a family-chosen spouse (Gopalkrishnan and Babacan 2007; Macey 2009). The difference between this understanding of love and western conceptions of love, which are said to focus on romantic love, intimacy, and individuals, features significantly in defences of forced/arranged marriage made by those who wish to uphold the practice (for instance, see Gagoomal 2008; Gopalkrishnan and Babacan 2007; Zaidi and Shuraydi 2002).

The representation of love put forward in these works is important in terms of the concerns of this project due to the fact that in most cases, love is presented uncritically and, largely, as an ungendered phenomenon. This is significant in view of the critiques made by feminist theorists in the 1970s and eighties of love as an ideology that is used to extract sexual and domestic labours from women, particularly in marriage (Atkinson 1974; Delphy and Leonard 1992; Douglas 1990). It is in many ways surprising that such feminist analyses have not been considered in relation to practices such as forced/arranged marriage, given that in such marriages the power differences between men and women are often more apparent (Bhopal 1999). Nonetheless, there is little attention paid in the literature to the gendered implications and realities that the conception of ‘love developing over time’ might entail. This is despite the fact that several studies on the custom in the UK indicate that women’s experiences of forced/arranged marriage differ considerably from men’s, and often include unwanted sexual intercourse or rape, forced childbearing, and domestic labour (Bhopal, 1999; Gangoli et al 2006; Jeffreys 2009; Macey 2009). British feminist sociologist Kalwant Bhopal in fact argues that ‘Arranged marriages are used to keep women powerless and controlled by men…The marriage relationship confines “traditional” South Asian women to the private sphere of the household and oppresses them’ (Bhopal 1999: 134). It is therefore a primary aim of this research to examine the understanding of ‘love developing over time’ through a critical feminist lens, and to develop a distinctly feminist, gendered explanation for how and why such bonds are created between men and women in these relationships.

In view of these gaps in the literature, the central question that the research asks is: Does the development of love in forced/arranged marriages reflect a situation of ‘loving to survive’, i.e. a case of Stockholm Syndrome? The project also asks: Is the discourse of ‘love developing over time’ a patriarchal construct that enables men to extract domestic,
sexual, and reproductive labours from women, in the same way that ‘romantic love’ can be seen to facilitate this in ‘choice’ marriages (Delphy and Leonard 1992)? Are these ‘flipsides’ to the same coin? Or put another way: Is the discourse of ‘love developing over time’, from a feminist perspective, better described as ‘loving to survive’?

In seeking to apply the concept of Stockholm Syndrome to cases of forced/arranged marriage, the research will draw principally on the work of American feminist psychologist Dee Graham and her concept of ‘loving to survive’ (Graham 1994). Graham’s work is particularly suitable for analysing the emotional and psychological bonds created in forced/arranged marriages due to the fact that it seeks to explain how in specifically gendered situations of hostage and terror, such as domestic violence, women come to love their captors (men). In her 1994 text *Loving to Survive*, Graham identifies Stockholm Syndrome as ‘a universal law of behaviour, which operates when a person existing under conditions of isolation and inescapable violence perceives some kindness on the part of the captor’ (1994: xv). She proposes that at a societal level, women’s love for men emerges from women’s recognition of their subordinate position in patriarchal societies and thus as an effort to bond with the more powerful in society (men) as a means of surviving (ibid: 206–207).

In the proposed research, I seek to apply Graham’s societal concept to the particular scenario of forced/arranged marriage and will suggest that the notion of Stockholm Syndrome provides one way of explaining and understanding relations of love in these marriages.

In the conceptual framework put forward by Graham, love, or more specifically women’s love for men, is theorised as a manifestation of women’s societal Stockholm Syndrome. Women’s love for men, Graham argues, ‘grow[s] out of needs for protection and safety resulting from a deep-seated fear of male violence’ (ibid: 200). Through love, she explains, women not only seek to ‘recoup our losses’ by aligning with those more powerful in society, but ‘hope to persuade men to stop their violence against us’ (ibid: 209). This can be achieved, for instance, through women’s provision of ‘services (domestic, emotional, reproductive, sexual) that enable [men] to keep up the oppression’ (ibid), which women perform because of love. The value of the concept of Societal Stockholm Syndrome, according to Graham, therefore lies in the fact that it ‘enables us to go beyond previous conceptualisations of women’s love for men by explaining why most women sacrifice so much of ourselves in relationships with men. It…offers an explanation for why love grows in the face of the threat of violence…[and why] love means [that] women provide unreci-
procated services to men...[even if] it does not help to equalise the relationship.’ (ibid: 209–210)

Such a conceptualisation can be seen as useful in terms of theorising relations of love in forced/arranged marriages for a number of reasons. In the first place, the theory of Stockholm Syndrome provides a way of conceptually bringing together the issue of forced/arranged marriage with that of domestic violence. This is due to the fact that it offers a framework for understanding how love operates across situations of gendered violence outside of the public sphere. Such a conceptualisation is significant in view of the efforts of many feminist theorists and activists working on the issue of forced/arranged marriage to contextualise the custom as a form of domestic violence. Hannana Siddiqui of the London-based NGO Southall Black Sisters, for instance, has argued that rather than being considered as an issue of culture or race, forced marriage practices should be addressed within approaches to domestic violence and violence against women, more broadly (Siddiqui 2005). Applying the concept of Stockholm Syndrome to the custom of forced/arranged marriage can be seen to add to this analysis by providing a framework for understanding the gendered dynamics of love in these situations while connecting the custom with behaviours found within the ‘mainstream’ community.

In addition, the feminist appropriation of the concept of Stockholm Syndrome can be seen as a useful tool for analysing love in forced/arranged marriages because it provides a theory of love in specifically gendered situations of hostage and terror. Much feminist research on the custom of forced/arranged marriage indicates that the situation women often find themselves in is one analogous to a hostage situation, although this can vary in its extremity. Women may literally and physically be prevented from escaping a forced/arranged marriage (Sanghera 2009), or in more subtle cases, may be socialised against divorce and therefore unable to leave a harmful marriage (Bhopal 1999). The theory of Stockholm Syndrome can in this respect contribute in accounting for the bonds of affection that develop in such situations of female isolation and fear.

The initial focus of the research will be on identifying from Graham’s work the key aspects and behaviours of ‘loving to survive’. This will then be considered in relation to descriptive or textual accounts of forced/arranged marriage in order to determine whether the theory ‘fits’ the practice being studied. The UK has been chosen as the primary case study for the project due to the considerable amount of data available in this respect. The principal primary sources that will be employed for this purpose include data contained on government department websites, reports issued by non-government organisations (NGOs) and govern-
ment departments, and women’s accounts of their experiences of forced/arranged marriage such as in the form of testimonies to government inquiries. The growing body of secondary scholarly and feminist research on the custom will also be used to support the understanding of the practice being developed. ‘Love’ throughout the project is identified primarily in terms of affection (Graham, 1994), and as a psychology and discourse that produces certain behaviours and actions, as regulated by social institutions such as marriage and religion.

The research aims to contribute toward contemporary feminist understandings of ‘love’ through its identification of love, in the context of a current and often controversial social issue, as a site in need of feminist analysis and theorising. In particular, the research aims to ‘map’ discourses of love that exist in relation to the social institution of forced/arranged marriage, and argues that seemingly ungendered accounts of love, such as the notion of ‘love developing over time’, are in fact political in nature, involving unequal relations of power between men and women, and therefore in need of theorising on the part of feminists. By understanding love in these terms, the project seeks to initiate feminist discussion on the theoretical and political significance of love in forced/arranged marriages. It aims to contribute toward the development of a feminist theory of love that can be used to explain the ongoing political struggles surrounding this contemporary cultural practice.

References


Chapter 7
The Royal Wedding as True Love Story. Emotional Politics Intersecting Culture, Nationalism, Modernity and Heteronormativity

Anna Adeniji

Welcome to LOVE Stockholm 2010. This summer, Stockholm looks forward to the Royal Wedding. In conjunction with Crown Princess Victoria’s and Mr. Daniel Westling’s wedding, the City of Stockholm invites all to join in two weeks of fabulous festivities. The theme is love, which will be prominent in programmes and activities. The wedding is a historic occasion that attracts attention far beyond Sweden’s borders and a great number of foreign visitors are expected to visit Stockholm. Love Stockholm 2010 will be a welcoming meeting place where Stockholmers and visiting tourists can celebrate together. On June 19th 2010, the Swedish Crown Princess Victoria married her long time boyfriend and personal trainer, Mr. Daniel Westling. The official announcement of the engagement was held on February 24, 2009. In the end of November 2009 the City of Stockholm sent out a press release to announce that the city would, in connection to the wedding, arrange a two-week festival, from the Swedish National Day at June 6 until the wedding on June 19. The festival is called Love Stockholm 2010.

The wedding did, unsurprisingly, receive a lot of national and international media attention, for several reasons. Firstly, it is the first royal wedding in Sweden since the current king and queen got married in 1976. Second, Crown Princess Victoria will marry a man who is neither royal noble or in any other sense a high-profile celebrity. The notion that the Crown Princess marries ‘a man of the people’ has been interpreted as evidence that the marriage is based on ‘true love’ and has repeatedly been described as a modern fairy tale. Thirdly, the wedding has attracted

attention because it is a very expensive affair that the Swedish tax payers are forced to pay for. Last, but not least, the wedding is seen as a state affair and is also expected to raise money both for the Swedish state and for the City of Stockholm in the form of souvenir sales, business deals, and increased tourism.

As can be seen in the title of the project, I am interested in the intersections between gender, culture, nationalism, modernity and heteronormativity. For instance, the narrative of our Crown Princess’s choice of life partner is also a narrative of a modern young woman who stands up for herself. Moreover, she carries the story of a gender equal nation, as Sweden was the first monarchy in Europe who changed the royal birthrights into a gender neutral arrangement. This was done in 1980, when the princess was 2.5 years old, and her younger brother—who was born in 1979 as the first successor of the thrown—lost his right to the throne. Because of the new gender neutral law, she became the successor instead and is still the only female successor in Europe at the time. How, I wonder, does this affect the story of her love for a common man? How does it affect the story of him, as he will by law marry into a relationship where he always will be of lower rank than her, both economically and socially? The questions of heteronormativity and kinship are also very interesting here. Since the monarchy is passed on by blood and kinship, they are expected to have children. How is this portrayed in media representations?

My main interest in this story is how the launch of the wedding is framed in a discourse of true love and a modern fairy tale. Questions need to be raised about what the concept of ‘love’ really means in relation to a royal wedding that is classified as a state affair; a wedding that needs the government’s official approval; and a wedding that will result in a multi-million dollar wedding, partly paid for by the citizens of Sweden? This is a wedding that also carries the traditional baggage of royalist patriarchal structures; strict regulations; almost impossible for any future divorce; and, not the least, a historical requirement for heirs. How can we understand this framework of true love from a critical feminist perspective? How and when is love being addressed in the media coverage of the wedding? What is it that we actually ‘see’ when we interpret certain body images and gestures when we interpret them as love? How can we understand the media’s coverage of the wedding as collective emotional work, and what are the political implications of this? And, finally, how is the discourse of love used as emotional politics, intersecting gender, culture, nationalism, modernity and heteronormativity?

That idea that marriage and romantic love are interlinked is something historically relatively new (Luhmann 2003; Andersson forthcoming).
ing; Lewis 2001; Coontz 2005; Melby et al 2006). In western society and culture the link between marriage and romantic love has become an ‘emotional truth’ and therefore difficult, if not impossible, to discuss and criticise in public (Adeniji 2008; Knuts 2006; Swidler 2001), at least not without a therapist included to solve the problem. As Bauman suggests, media often plays the role of a cultural therapist in cases where the question of love is addressed (Bauman 2003). The lack of space for critique of the love discourse of marriage became clear in 2005 when the political party Feministiskt Initiativ (Feminist Initiative) proposed to rewrite the marriage legislation into a ‘co-living’ legislation and delete all references to love and sexuality in the law (Adeniji 2008). The party was met with ridicule and was blamed for being unromantic, angry and, in general, joy killers to speak with Sarah Ahmed (Ahmed 2009). The same pattern could be seen in the media coverage of the then upcoming royal wedding, where it seemed impossible to formulate critique against the wedding without risking the label of being boring, envious, and stubborn. The link between marriage and love is thus conceptually strong, so strong in fact that other reasons for marriage—such as capital, status, social or legal benefits— are constantly overlooked. There is, so far, no indication that this pattern is not stronger than it will ever be in the case of the Royal Wedding. And, since the narrative of Victoria and Daniel is a story we recognise from fairy tales, which I will return to, the concept of love is even more important to examine.

After finishing my dissertation on marriage resistance in Sweden I have repeatedly been asked the question why feminists still get married. Although it is quite easy to describe the obvious problems with the institution of marriage, in terms of heteronormative assumptions or sexual morals and patriarchal traditions, it seems as if many feminist informed citizens still want to participate in this ostensibly patriarchal and heteronormative practice. My only answer is that we cannot and we should not underestimate the emotional power in the concept of love. As long as love is the most prominent symbol of marriage it is almost impossible to live, think and talk about other forms of marriage resistance without being punished, silenced or ridiculed.

This study will take place within a feminist cultural studies approach. My starting point is to understand popular culture and public media as a site for political contestation in general and a site for feminist enquiry in particular (Hall 1997; Hollows & Moseley 2006). The media coverage of the royal wedding, could in this regard never be seen as innocent and apolitical. Instead, it is a representation of what is possible to articulate in public and what could be regarded as hegemonic discourse. From a feminist critical perspective it is important to see popular culture both as
a repetition of patriarchal and heteronormative images, but also to discuss the possible subversive moments of feminist escape that it includes (Radway 1984). How can we, for instance understand the representation of the Crown Princess ‘strong will’ and ‘fight for true love’ from a critical feminist point of view? How can we understand the gendered representations of the royal couple in terms of power? The way that the royal couple met in the first place, as a Crown Princess and a personal trainer at a gym, is of importance and needs to be analysed further. It is, as have been said before, a modern fairy tale where we are able to both recognise traditional features and subversive feminist elements. It is on the one hand the story of a princess that meets a man from the people. At first they needed to hide their love, then fight for their love. After hard struggles and many obstacles they finally got the love and approval from both the king and the people, and they were able to get married. It is on the other hand a story of a potential feminist icon and a modern man that has no problem of backing up his successful wife and standing one step behind her for the rest of his life. This must also be understood within the framework of Sweden as a country that constantly portray itself as a modern and gender equal nation.

The nodal point in this study is the concept of love, which is to understood as ‘a privileged sign from which other signs is placed in order and get meaning’ (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips 2000:33). I will stress the importance of understanding love as a sign that works as a marker to other emotions and statements. There are, I would argue, other emotions that in different ways are linked to the concept of love, like for instance happiness, joy, hope, jealousy, anger and sadness. It is also important to analyse how the emotional politics of love is used to give other political and social signs—such as the nation state, modernity, monarchy, financial recourses, heteronormativity and kinship—meaning. The media coverage of the royal wedding is also an example of how love as sign can be used to include and exclude voices in public media, and in that sense legitimise and de-legitimise certain positions. As Sarah Ahmed discusses, emotions are not empty signs but an important part of cultural politics, and therefore something we need to take seriously (Ahmed 2004). The critique of weddings in general, and the royal wedding in particular, has been met with accusations of ‘killing joy’ or ‘acting out jealousy’. How are these accusations to be understood? How come that critique of the monarchy normally is included in a political discussion whereas critique of the Royal wedding is silenced or ridiculed? The analytical work will primarily be based on the field of feminist theories of emotions that link emotional work to power, politics, gender and heteronormativity (Jónasdóttir 2003; Wulff 2007).
The study takes a stand in a queer anthropological, feminist critique of marriage that focuses on heteronormative assumptions in terms of kinship (Butler 2002), heteronormative temporality (Halberstam 2005) and the need for sexual decency and straight maturity (Adeniji 2008). This is important in relation to the royal wedding since the Crown Princess not only represents herself as a private person but also a modern ‘soon-to-become Queen’ in a secular state, and in that role she serves as a role model to a lot of people. Her wedding is controlled not only by the will of her father but also the state. Understood within anthropological terms the questions of heteronormative temporality, decency and maturity are all part of a heteronormative framework where relationships and sexualities are understood in a hierarchical order and always already linked to kinship ties, such as marriage and children (cf. Butler 2000). The tabloids and other media coverage of celebrities could be seen as ‘hyper normativity’ where normative assumptions that concern all of us are highlighted and made extreme (cf. Adeniji 2008). Seen in this light, the representations of the Royal Wedding is not an independent and particular event, but something that affect all of us. It will never be possible for regular people to meet the standards of the Royal Wedding, but it will most certainly set trends.

Furthermore, the study takes on an anarchist analytical approach in criticising the relationship between the nation state, capitalism and marriage (cf. Marso 2003). This perspective provides a critical analysis of the understandings of public, private and personal in the media coverage. Love is usually seen as something private and personal, and is represented in this way even when it comes to the Crown Princess and her fiancée, but at the same time this particular love affair is constantly interlinked with public demands, state control and not least public, private and business capital. The link between nation state, capital and marriage also needs to be combined with critical research of the monarchy. The monarchy could for example be analysed as a symbolic and political power (Áse 2009), as a nodal point for a general public body of emotions to which people place normative conceptions of gender, hierarchy and nation (Frihammar 2010) and as an example of the intersection of family, nation, gender and race (cf. Collins 1998).

The actual bodies of the royals must not be forgotten either. I have already mentioned that we must address questions of how we understand certain bodily practices and images as signs of love. This is even more interesting when it comes to royals. With the historical inheritance of sovereignty, they are not traditionally portrayed as physically common people. As for instance Frihammar shows in his thesis on the reproduction of contemporary monarchy, much effort has been made
to make all signs of bodily needs (such as visits to the toilet!) invisible (Frihammar 2010). This can also be seen in the representation of this wedding, where television cameras were allowed during the whole wedding dinner, except when the guests actually ate their food. On the other hand, the representations of the new royal couple, Victoria and Daniel, are revolutionary in this sense. Never before have royals been seen to show their affection in public like they have. This is somewhat typical of the Crown Princess, although now more than ever before. I would argue that it is the amount of affectionate looks, the constant holding hands and frequent kissing that is crucial for the understanding of them as authentic and ‘truly’ in love.

The methodology is inspired by Graham Dawson’s concept of the cultural imaginary (Dawson 1994), and Laurel Richardson and Elizabeth St. Pierre’s concept Creative Analytical Practices (Richardson & St. Pierre 2005) where several types of material are analysed to be able to study a wider understanding of hegemonic discourse as well as disruptions and contradictions within it. I will focus on the media produced material, in terms of television broadcast, newspapers and celebrity magazines. This material consists of both written texts, still pictures and moving images. I think it is important to mix this type of material since it is all part of the cultural imaginary that are archived—not only in peoples personal memories but also in a historical sense. To get more in touch with affective part of people’s reactions to the wedding I have also made some light fieldwork at the festival, LOVE Stockholm 2010, before the wedding, as well as being part of the actual celebration down town, surrounded by thousands of people watching the wedding ceremony on big screens. This material casts new and interesting light on the media representation but will not function as my primary material.

As I am sitting here, only a couple of days after the royal wedding of 2010, my thoughts are spinning. The wedding ceremony, the greeting of the people on the balcony of the royal palace and the wedding dinner afterwards were all broadcasted on television. It was certainly an emotional event, even for those that are normally critical about the monarchy. I am even more convinced that the need of an analysis from an emotional political point of view is crucial for the understanding of the power of the Swedish contemporary monarchy.
References


Chapter 8
Love in Translation. A Proposal for Feminist Critique of Neoliberalism

Ewa Alicja Majewska

To surrender in translation is more erotic than ethical.
In that situation the good-willing attitude
‘she is just like me’ is not very helpful’.
G. Spivak, Politics of Translation

In contemporary, neoliberal societies primarily focused on effectiveness and productiveness, love as we remember it, especially from its romanticized romanticised versions, does not seem to be the first and most interesting social factor. It might seem that it is a completely outdated, old-fashioned notion for both progressive and neoliberal individuals, especially if they do, as they are supposed to, perceive their lives as ‘projects’. The progressive position requires scepticism about involvement, and therefore leads outside of the love context. The neoliberal position is based on productivity and effectiveness, which in our precarious times are usually perceived in short-terms categories. Neither of these would embrace a ‘loving perspective’, where effects are certainly not easy to measure in advance and the models of production depend on such factors as subjective affects.

Karl Marx faced a similar dilemma: the progressive writers of his times were either rational critics, who would not praise irrational passions and who would not allow themselves to turn the other into ‘object’ or passionate irrationalists with no grasp of historical development. As we can read in a letter Marx wrote to Ludwig Feuerbach in 1844, ‘These Berliners do not regard themselves as men who criticise, but as critics who, incidentally, have the misfortune of being men. (...) Love, for example, is rejected, because the loved one is only an “object”.‘ (Marx, 1844). As we know from his later writing, Marx tried to understand social reproduction as intersection of a material production and historical, repetitive process. The contradictions of the social existence of the human were for him obstacles to overcome, but also—human conditions. The feminist materialism later developed in opposition to liberal feminism, but also—to dogmatic Marxism—might therefore be one of the most important Marxist legacies. Marx’s observation on love might
sound like a swan’s song of romantism, but it might as well be perceived as a suggestion, that the domain of the affective involvement, and love in particular, is a possible site for critical approach to social theory.

Feminist interventions both in politics and in theory have often referred to the context based, affective work of women. Both efforts of reclaiming the importance of invisible housework done by women (see Oakley 1974) and the renegotiations of ethical and political subjectivity formation (see Gilligan 1982; hooks 1983; Benhabib 1998) have always been connected to a redefinition of the mainly rational human into a more affective one. Later the poststructuralist turn made feminist writers focus more on reproduction than affectivity (see Haraway 1984; Butler 1987), but we see affectivity recombined with analysis of reproduction in more contemporary works of European feminist authors (see Jónasdóttir 1991; Pateman 1989) and American too, particularly—the ones who claim their Latina/Chicana origins (see Sandoval 2000; hooks 2001).

Many feminist authors criticised love for reification and alienation resulting from a misogynist, heteronormative set of social norms and stereotypes. I would like to argue, that the neoliberal version of capitalism, where the focus on short term goals, productivity and effects is maybe stronger than any time earlier in history, requires a feminist critique in which the claim to love as ‘causal factor’, as Anna Jónasdóttir called it, but also as a revolutionary force, as it has been called by other authors, including bell hooks, Chela Sandoval, Cherrie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa, becomes a key element. The critical dimension of such a feminist theorising would above all mean a conscience of the limitation of the theorising, as Irit Rogoff claimed in ‘What is a Theorist?’

Criticality as I perceive it is precisely in the operations of recognising the limitations of one’s thought for one does not learn something new until one unlearns something old, otherwise one is simply adding information rather than rethinking a structure. (Rogoff 2006).

The ideologisation of the notions of love are one of the limits of the perspective I would like to develop, nevertheless ideology is only an element of what love became as concept and as social practice. As Chela Sandoval argues in her book on the methodology of the oppressed, we might still find some emancipatory potential in it. Taking her claims in a minimalistic way, we see, that love might thus become a similar element of understanding critical thinking as imagination became in Kant’s theory of perception—a ‘blind but indispensable function of the soul’ (Kant 1895: 62).

There is a field however, where love occupies an important, yet not analyzed place—the theory of translation. It begun with Walter Benjamin, who already in the 20s pointed out, that: ‘(…) a translation,
instead of resembling the meaning of the original, must lovingly and in
detail incorporate the original’s mode of signification, thus making both
the original and the translation recognisable as fragments of a greater
language, just as fragments are part of a vessel.’ (Benjamin (1923) 2004:
81). Later, Gayatri Spivak, who discusses the politics of translation, also
mentions, that the process of translation should develop lovingly, ’The
task of the translator is to facilitate this love between the original and its shadow, a love that permits fraying, holds the agency of the transla-
tor and the demands of her imagined or actual audience at bay’ (Spivak 1993: 181). We can also see some preoccupation with love in Derrida’s
work on translation, namely in the article ’What is a relevant transla-
tion’, in which he suggests a resemblance between the practice of trans-
lating and the Hegelian dialectic ’aufhebung’ (Derrida 1995). Although
his analysis of translation tends to draw on a rather pessimistic reference
to the oppressive treatment of Shylock, the Merchant of Venice in Shake-
speare’s play, we might also see the accentuation of the practice of trans-
lation as indispensable for exchange and cultural politics. In these theo-
rizations she isisations of translation love is indeed a kind of ’blind but indispensables function of the soul’, as I already suggested. I would like to try and develop some conclusions and possible critical suggestions from
these analysis of translation, which are—as I will try to suggest—brilliant
eamples of critical theory, which brings some radical conclusions.

In his essay on the ’task of translator’ Benjamin suggests, that the
practice of translation renders the subject to the ’foreignness of lan-
guage’. The key aspect of humanity is again, as it typically happens in
Hegelian philosophy, explained in terms of ’otherness’. Interestingly, in
the context of translation we are not faced with a fight, so often criticised
by feminist authors as misogynist, sexist element of Hegel’s project of
intersubjectivity (see Butler 1997; Pateman 1989). Inversely, in the proc-
ess of translation there are at the same time the effort to communicate
and understand the other and the conscience of the limitations of such
a project. In this sense translation might provide a good context for a
construction of a critical feminist theory with love as its core. The risk
of blatant idealization of communication, as it happens in the discursive
communication project of Jurgen Habermas could be diminished just
as much as the negative rejection of love in some feminist writing (see
Firestone 1979).

In the Polish Academia the work of Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens
concerning the transformations of family and love opened many impor-
tant debates. I would like to refer to these authors and to the Polish de-
bates on the contemporary organisation of intimacy in a feminist, critical
way. I would like to show, how the imperatives of ’precariousness’ and
'instability' shape the contemporary experiences of love and intimate relations providing a much stronger influence on individual practices in these spheres, than detached individual ‘choices’ and ‘preferences’, as these authors tend to suggest. I will also renegotiate some claims made by Zygmunt Bauman, when he speaks about globalization globalisation and the scattered lives without mentioning the fact, that societies are gendered and sexualised. I would also like to refer to contemporary Polish literature, just to observe the set of mind in queer, feminist and mainstream Polish writing.

In her preface to the second edition of Gender Trouble Judith Butler wrote about a performative vision of universality, which—seen as a 'future oriented labor of cultural translation’ seems to be an interesting progressive political option (Butler (1987) 1999: xviii). I think love, as a key element of this kind of vision, should be provided some critical attention.

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Chapter 9
Love, Social Change and Everyday Heterosexuality

Stevi Jackson

Introduction
Feminists have long been critical of romantic love as absorbing a disproportionate amount of women’s energies, as restricting the scope of their social lives and above all as snaring them into subordination within heterosexual relationships (Kollontai 1972; Beauvoir 1972; Firestone; 1972 Comer 1974). Less attention has been given to how love ‘works’ in heterosexual relationships—though there has been some research since the 1990s focusing on heterosexual love (Duncombe and Marsden 1993; Langford 1999; Johnson 2005). There are also numerous studies that touch on love in the context of everything from housework to sexuality as well, of course, of marriage—though love itself is rarely the central object of these investigations. Recently there has been considerable debate around supposed ‘transformations of intimacy’ (Giddens 1992) and here feminists have been active, not only in critiquing mainstream theorizations of intimacy and social change, but also in generating research on the everyday management of intimate relationships. There is still, however, relatively little written about the meaning of love in everyday heterosexual lives. Love deserves more attention since it plays a central part in the forming of heterosexual relationships and should, therefore, occupy a more prominent place in current feminist thinking on heterosexuality. In this paper I will consider what can be extracted about love from recent research and pose some questions that might advance feminist research agendas. In particular I want to consider how we can maintain a critical feminist perspective on heterosexual love while not denying that love remains meaningful for and highly valued by many women. Since my focus is on heterosexuality, I am concerned primarily with romantic love in relation to couple and family relationships.

Love as a Social Phenomenon
The most obvious question to ask is: what is love? This is question is not easily answerable; indeed cannot be answered in any absolute way. Love has many meanings and it is common to distinguish between types or
kinds of love—forms of love proper to different objects (lovers, children or friends). More fundamentally, for those of us sceptical of universalizing, essentialist assumptions it is clearly problematic to think of love as a pre-existent emotion that can be known, discovered and dissected. Feminist critique should focus on what is knowable—the cultural meanings of love, how it is deployed and understood in the making and maintaining of intimate relationships and the social consequences of these meanings and deployments. Yet love is an emotion, understood as something deeply felt. How might it be possible to take account of this?

Carol Smart has recently been critical of those who turn love into something else—including my earlier work on love (Jackson 1993). She argues that in using what she calls a discursive approach, I ‘slip away from questions of feelings, appearing to move emotions into a kind of safe parallel universe in order to interrogate them’ and that in the process I turn love ‘into something sociology can safely handle.’ (Smart 2007: 67). My point, though, was we cannot know what love feels like for anyone other than ourselves—there is no way of ‘getting at’ inner experience; we only have access to the ways it is socially and culturally manifested. One avenue for exploration is the way love is talked about by individuals and represented in our wider culture. Another is to consider its meanings in everyday life, how it guides action and interaction or gives meaning to activities or relationships. We can also investigate the way love is socially ordered and its material social underpinnings and effects. We can begin, then, to map the social parameters of love.

In the first place, we should consider the material and social conditions under which love relationships are formed. This runs counter to romantic ideology—love is supposed to ‘conquer all’, to transcend material constraints to lift us above the mundane. Nonetheless, love is experienced within specific social contexts—at the very least the social milieu we inhabit delimits our romantic possibilities, in other words, with whom it is possible to fall in love. This in turn is related to economic resources, class positioning and our location within other social divisions. The social ordering of kinship and marriage and, above all, gender relations shape the experience and practice of love. Love is also socially regulated though formal and informal social controls, through law and morality. All this might be thought of as mere external constraints on a pre-given emotion, but may actually impact on how that emotion is experienced. Arlie Hochschild argues that within any given social context ‘some feelings are feelable and others are not’ (Hochschild 2003: 121). She suggests that how love ‘feels’ depends on ‘cultural dictionaries’, which define what is ‘pre-acknowledged, pre-named, pre-articulated, culturally available to be felt’ (Hochschild 2003: 121).
Drawing on Gagnon and Simon’s (1974) concept of ‘sexual scripts’ I would suggest that these ‘cultural dictionaries’ are part of the way in which love is socially scripted. This perspective allows for linkages—and dislocations—between the wider culture, everyday interaction and individual agency and subjectivity. It enables us to see connections between ‘the agentic individual, the interactional situation and the wider socio-cultural order (Gagnon 2004: 276). There are three interrelated levels of scripting. First cultural scenarios, which would include Hochschild’s ‘cultural dictionaries’, provide us with narratives of love (stories, films, songs and so on) and also a wider everyday knowledge of what love is and what it means. This cultural level of scripting does not determine feeling, but provides us with a stock of knowledge on which to draw in making sense of ‘love’. This in turn is modified through interpersonal scripting—the way in which this wider cultural knowledge is re-shaped and re-negotiated through interactions with others and through intrapsychic scripting, reflexive dialogues with the self (thoughts and fantasies). Individuals’ own feelings, made sense of through intrapsychic scripting, feed back into interpersonal scripting through our relationships with others and potentially into cultural scenarios. This approach might help illuminate how individuals ‘do’ love and how love figures in everyday social life.

If love is socially scripted rather than given by ‘human nature’ this raises the issue of its cultural and historical specificity. The consensus, of course, is that romantic love is as we know it is a modern western phenomenon. Much historical work has charted the rise of romantic love and, in particular, the way it has been harnessed to marriage as a both a precondition for marriage and a source of marital fulfilment and stability. Since the 1990s we have seen new elements added into this story, for example, the sexualisation of love and concomitant eroticization of sex (Sedman 1991) or the commodification of love and the romanticisation of commodities (Illouz 1997). There have also been debates about love and individualization—the idea that a new form of love ‘confluent love’ is replacing romantic love as part of a wider ‘transformation of intimacy’(Giddens 1992), that love has become something of a religion we cling to in the face of increasingly individualized, less predictable social conditions (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995) or that the prevalence of individualistic and fragile ‘liquid love’ is symptomatic of an impoverished social and personal life (Bauman 2003).

There are differences, however, in the degree to which love itself is seen as variable—whereas some historians suggest only a shift in attitudes to love others are suggesting more fundamental transformations at the level of subjective feeling. Many anthropologists have maintained
that subjectivity, including emotion, is culturally specific. For Michelle Rosaldo, ‘feelings are not substances to be found in our blood, but social practices organized by stories we both enact and tell. They are structured by our forms of understanding’ (1984: 143). Less radically social constructionist stances are adopted by others. Eva Illouz, for example, seems to accept that ‘substances in our blood’ may have something to do with it, albeit modified through culture:

‘Emotions’ are the complex conjunction of physiological arousal, perceptual mechanisms, and interpretive processes; they are thus situated at the threshold where the noncultural is encoded in culture, where body, cognition and culture converge and merge (Illouz 1997).

Arlie Hochschild (1983) suggests that in ‘managing feeling we contribute to the creation of it’. This could be taken to imply a pre-given emotion existing prior to our management of it, but in more recent work Hochschild (2003) has emphasised that ‘feeling rules’ shape what it is possible to feel and how it is felt and that this is historically and culturally variable. Writing specifically of love she says: ‘people in different eras and places do not just feel the same old emotion and express it differently. They feel it differently’ (Hochschild 2003: 122).

While love may not be universal there are signs that western ideas about romantic love have been exported to parts of the world where it was once alien—a result of the global reach of western capitalist culture and its cultural industries. Less is known about the consequences of this for those who have apparently imported it, but there is some research suggesting that it is part of the realignment of patriarchal interests. The leading Japanese feminist scholar, Chizuko Ueno (2009) offers a fascinating study of the explicit promotion of western ideals of conjugal love in the interests of promoting marital stability and satisfaction during the late nineteenth century Meiji modernization. Paradoxically this was part of the same modernizing project that, according to Ueno, imposed a particular patriarchal and patrilineal family form, the ie, once only practiced by the samurai class on the whole society. Modernization thus seemed to both strengthen patriarchy in the interests of the development of a capitalist society but also produced calls for it to be made more benign in the interests of conjugal harmony. More recently Korean scholars have posited a limited ‘intimate revolution’ based on marriage for love and companionate conjugality. Despite these appropriations of romantic aspirations, though, it would seem that family solidarity takes precedence over marital intimacy in much of East Asia.
The Specificity of Romantic Love

What makes romantic love different from other kinds of love? Romantic love is associated with passion, and particularly sexual passion, though sex may only have become central to romantic love relatively recently (Seidman 1991). Nonetheless, as soon as romantic love came to be seen as a precondition of marriage it implied a sexual contract—and a supposedly exclusive one (at least for women). This exclusivity is at the core of romantic love. As one early second wave feminist put it: ‘Like so much butter, romantic love must be spread thickly on one slice of bread; to spread it over several is to spread it too thinly’ (Comer 1974: 219). Why should this be the case? We might draw parallels with maternal love for children, which women often describe as passionate and intense, yet no one thinks a woman with more than one child is spreading her love more thinly than a mother of an only child (though there may be rivalry and jealousy from the point of view of the children. We may love friends, too, but here again, love can be spread around.

So why is monogamy considered so central to romantic and conjugal love? Historically monogamy was subject to double standards, a means by which men secured exclusive rights of access to ‘their’ women and ‘their’ progeny. There is a long feminist tradition of critiques of monogamy from the Russian revolutionary Alexandra Kollontai to second wave feminists like Lee Comer (1974). Such critiques tended to focus on the immorality of treating one’s lover as a possession and, in the context of the women’s movement, of investing all one’s energies in an individual man. Not surprisingly it was often lesbian feminists who were more forceful in their criticisms, seeing in monogamy a central element of male dominated heterosexuality. Yet these political analyses of monogamy went into decline—the recent interest in polyamory notwithstanding (and polyamory is a pale imitation of early feminist anti-monogamy). For the majority of the population, monogamy remains an ideal—albeit one that often not fulfilled—and it is an ideal that deserves more scrutiny.

There was another, and important, reason for feminist scepticism about monogamy and the forms of family life built upon it—that it fundamentally impoverished relationships outside the monogamous couple and their family. This view was held by feminist as different in their theoretical preoccupations and Shulamith Firestone (1972) and Michèle Barrett and Mary McIntosh (1982). Monogamous love tends to privilege sexual couples and associated families over all other social relationships—with the concomitant devaluing of other loves. The privileging of coupledom is as entrenched as ever, and now in many western countries, it is extended to gay couples. In this context there has been a muted revival of critique—at least of the re-drawing of moral boundaries to
include the stable gay or lesbian couple within the mainstream of citizenship while excluding those who do not conform to the monogamous ideal (Richardson 2005, 200; Seidman 2005).

**Love and the maintenance of heterosexuality**

The ideal of romantic love is supposed to lead easily into a mutually caring conjugal relationship, despite the contradictions between the tumult of romantic passion and longer term affection—not to mention routines of daily care. What is the relationship between love as passion and love as caring? Early 2nd wave feminists were clear about this: ‘it starts when you sink into his arms and ends with your arms in his sink’, as one slogan had it. At one level this remains the case—although men have increased their input into domestic life, women continue to bear the main responsibility for care-work, for both physical and emotional labour. Looked at structurally, men continue to appropriate women’s bodies and labour, their whole persons, their ‘love power’ (Delphy 1984; Jónasdóttir 1994). Thus love becomes a means by which women’s caring is secured.

From the point of view of women themselves, however, this is not how it is seen. Women care for those they care about and it is love that makes their work meaningful. In terms of emotional satisfaction with partners, however, the picture is less rosy—qualitative research spanning half a decade and more evinces women’s dissatisfaction with the lack of emotional reciprocity in their marriages (Kormarovsky 1964; Mansfield and Collard 1988; Duncombe and Marsden 1993). Moreover women do not just care for those they care about, they put considerable care work into relationships themselves, It has been suggested that the effort women put into ‘making the relationship work’ can be counter-productive—that the more women try to draw men into intimacy, the more men retreat (Langford 1999). There are, though, possible signs of change emerging from some recent studies, suggesting that younger women are less willing to put up with lack of emotional reciprocity (Hockey et al. 2007) and it is clear that women are now freer to vote with their feet and leave unsatisfactory relationships. The gulf between men’s and women’s expectations of loving relationships, however, remains.

Historically the rise of romantic love has been seen as a means of cementing marital bonds, of moving us towards more companionate marriage and more recently its possible supersession by confluent love as signalling the greater contingency of heterosexual relationships and also the possibility of non-heterosexual love. Like Giddens (1992), Seidman (1991) sees the separation of sex from reproduction and the increasing emphasis on sexual love and sexual pleasure as making possible the acceptance of non-reproductive sexual love and thus non-heterosexual
relationships. We have indeed come a long way from ‘the love that dared not speak its name’. British parliamentary debates over the last half century illustrate this well. From the debates over the decriminalisation of homosexuality in 1967, when gay men were depicted as dangerous perverts or unfortunate sufferers to the infamous ‘Section 28’ of the 1988 local government act there is some continuity. Homosexuals were seen as a threat to ‘normal’ family life— in the wording of Section 28 as capable of only a ‘pretended family relationship’— which should not be promoted. Yet less than two decades later, in debates on the Civil Partnership Act, MPs told many stories of gays and lesbians as ‘loving couples’ deprived of basic human rights (Woo 2007).

Thus love can be seen as equally valid in both its heterosexual and homosexual forms. There are, however, limits to this apparent acceptance of other loves—and thus limits to what Giddens (1992) sees as the contemporary plasticity of sexuality. The men and women interviewed by Paul Johnson saw ‘love’ as an emotion that could be experienced irrespective of gender and sexual orientation. When asked whether they could love someone of the same gender, however, they found that they could not imagine themselves engaging in a same-gender sexual relationship—and in some cases expressions of disgust, previously concealed beneath a veneer of tolerance, came to the surface. As Johnson argues, ‘through a rejection of homosexuality as ‘outside’ of themselves, heterosexuals establish an ontological validity for their own identities and... as a consequence, their own intimate practices are naturalized’ (Johnson 2005: 119).

There are those who see heterosexual love as less permanent or more contingent than it once was Giddens, 1991; Beck and Beck Gernsheim, 1995, 2002; Beck-Gernsheim 2002; Bauman 2003). Some have argued that the heterosexual/homosexual binary is becoming less stable and that there is a ‘queering’ of intimate relationships (Stacey 1996; Roseneil 2000; Roseneil and Budgeon 2004). Others are more sceptical, pointing to the continued importance of intimate bonds (Smart 2007). Since the majority of adults, continue to live in heterosexual relationships it seems premature to proclaim the end of heterosexual monogamy as a normative style of life. Moreover, the normalisation of homosexuality could be said to be working towards re-familialisation, rather than de-familialisation, of lesbian and gay lives (Seidman 2005; Richardson 2004, 2005). We remain, in many respects, bound by culturally specific constructions of love. I leave the last word to Paul Johnson:

...when we love we do so as beings with genders, and with sexualities, and we reproduce the foundation of our own existence. It is through beliefs about the seemingly unsocial “chemistry”
of love that we order our sexual practices in relation to a gen-
dered “other”. However we form relationships, we do not di-
minish the modern construction of sexuality, with its specificity of sexual identity categories, because, on the contrary, we re-
iterate it, we bring it to life. (2005: 137).

References


Chapter 10
All in the Family: Capitalism, Patriarchy and Love

Alyssa Schneebaum

Introduction
In her newest book *When Gay People Get Married*, Lee Badgett describes her experiences interviewing lesbian couples in The Netherlands about marriage. When she first explained her project to them, many responded with claims such as, ‘Oh—marriage. That’s a patriarchal institution for heterosexuals. I’m a feminist and don’t believe in marriage’ (2009: 2). The claim that marriage is a patriarchal institution is rather common among feminists, especially those of the so-called second wave. However, as societies have evolved, women are no longer as financially reliant on men as they once were, particularly in economically advanced countries. Therefore, one might question whether marriage is still a patriarchal institution, and if so, why women would choose to enter into it.

Why have so many feminists seen marriage as a patriarchal institution? Marriage is an important step to forming a family, and Millett (1997) says that ‘patriarchy’s chief institution is the family’ (2007: 566). The historical materialist view says that men took control of the women’s bodies and labour in order to be able to participate in the emerging society and economy based on private property. Men’s control over women meant that the latter could no longer decide for themselves when and how many children to have. It also meant that men—who controlled the property—became the public figures of the household and were the ones able to make decisions for the family, restricting women’s ability to make choices about the course of her life (Engels 1884; Federici 2004).

The modern family helps to facilitate different ways that men express their power over women in several ways. It gives men control over women’s sexuality, which sometimes includes marital rape. Marriage further restricts sexuality by imposing heterosexuality and monogamy as the only acceptable sexual choices. In marital relationships, men control women’s work because of the norm that she ought to take care of the home and spend the majority of time and energy raising children and caring for all members of the household. In the context of a patriarchal society, this sexual division of labour limits women’s choices and agency, but is often explained away as being ‘natural’ or ‘most efficient’. Finally,
marriage allows men to objectify women for their own exchanges, either by acquisition for marriage or as a ‘trophy’ wife to advance their status. In short, marriage still seems to be an institution laden with patriarchal tones. Why, then, do women—even those who are educated, financially liberated, and living in countries with equal legal rights for women and men—continue to marry themselves away to men?

In this essay, I argue that women continue to marry, because they ‘love’ their partners. ‘Love’ is supposedly an organic feeling; a euphemistic, joyous emotion generated by care, compassion, and excitement—certainly a justifiable feeling upon which to base the decision to spend one’s life with a person whom elicits such happiness. I asset, however, that ‘love’—as we know it in capitalist and patriarchal societies—is a constructed, manipulated concept, and is often employed specifically to coerce women into entering the institution of marriage. I explore why both capitalism and patriarchy, and most importantly the intersection of those two institutions, thrive when couples form nuclear families, in order to explain why this phenomenon exists. I rely mainly on two lines of thought to make these arguments: the social learning and the materialist feminist perspectives.

Further, I examine an important and related topic: the struggle of same-sex couples to gain marriage equality (i.e., the legal right for two people of the same sex to marry one another). This topic poses quite a dilemma for many feminists who see marriage as a patriarchal institution but who also believe in the equal rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people. I ask whether there is a fundamental difference in the nature of same-sex relationships that would make them less patriarchal, and explore whether the manipulated love construct that I introduce above applies to same-sex couples as well. I argue that in an important way, same-sex couples display the same degree of exploitation of one partner as we see in different-sex couples, and therefore suggest that we reconsider what we mean by ‘patriarchy’ to refocus that notion more on socially constructed gender relationships than on relations that are a result of biological sex.

**Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Love**

Before proceeding, we must address the questions, ‘what is patriarchy?’ and ‘what is capitalism?’ Rubin (1975) makes the important point that the term ‘patriarchy’ encapsulates both of the following: ‘the human capacity and necessity to create a sexual worlds, and the empirically oppressive ways in which sexual worlds have been organized’ (1975: 168). She juxtaposes ‘patriarchy’ with ‘sex/gender system,’ the latter being a neutral term that does not contain oppression as a necessary compo-
nent. Therefore, we can extract that the unique feature to ‘patriarchy’ is that an element of oppression exists in the sex/gender system. Materialist or Marxist feminists would argue that there is some exploitation of women by men in a patriarchal society; Bubeck (2002) for example, says that non-carers (men) ‘extract surplus labour’ from female carers, and that phenomenon is an aspect of patriarchy (2002: 174). I propose the following definition, which I employ for the length this segment of the essay: patriarchy is a social and economic system characterised by male dominance over women, where that dominance can take any of the five forms of oppression described by Young (1990): exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence. In other words, in a patriarchal society, men exercise various forms of power over women.

Capitalism can be defined as an economic and social system in which the factors of production are privately owned, and where the inputs and outputs of production are traded in markets. In a Marxian conception of capitalism, which I adopt here, the main motivation for production by capitalists is to gain profit, which is obtained by the appropriation of workers’ surplus value. In other words, capitalists who buy or rent other people’s labour make a profit on that labour by paying the workers less than the value of what they produce.

What is the intersection of these two institutions? Materialist, Marxists, and socialist feminists have spent many years discussing the interrelatedness of capitalism and patriarchy (see, for example, Benston 1969; Mitchell 1971; Rubin 1975; Federici 2004; and the volumes edited by Sargent 1981: and Hennessy and Ingraham 1997). Due to space constraints, I offer a just a short description of what I see as the main aspects of the relationship between capitalism and patriarchy, which undoubtedly deserves several volumes of explanation. Capitalism and the drive for profit motivate an endless push for efficiency, and the desire to be the most productive in the least amount of time is used to justify the sexual division of labour (due to women’s supposed comparative advantage at household and caring work). This obsession with efficiency keeps women doing two-thirds of unpaid household labour including caring labour on average in most economically advanced countries. Care work, such as raising children and tending to the sick and elderly, is not compensated monetarily and therefore women are at a financial disadvantage to men, giving men bargaining power over women. Further, the characteristics or personality traits that modern, mainstream societies typically value and encourage in women—such as being emotional, empathic, and agreeable—are the opposite of those that competitive labour markets value in their workers—rational, assertive, and competitive. This divide in the
gender of the ‘ideal worker’ prevents many women from achieving great success in the public (paid) working sphere. Finally, women are seen as sexual objects, an image and understanding deeply perpetuated by the highly lucrative pornography industry, and that objectification of women stands as a barrier to women’s emotional, social, and economic liberation (see, for example, MacKinnon 2006).

Why do societies that chose patriarchal capitalism benefit from the institution of marriage? Capitalism is a very dynamic and resilient mode of production; it has catered to many societal evolutions, including the growth of women’s rights and opportunities. Capitalists have realised that women are equally as intelligent and capable as men and have therefore hired women to work for them, granting women more independence from men than ever before. However, capitalism still relies on the creation and availability of future generations of workers, which means that it needs the current generation to produce and raise children. The patriarchal heterosexual nuclear family is still the most (economically) efficient way for societies to raise children from the market point of view, because women do the caring work for free; note that alternative ways of supporting children such as state support for single parents or state-enforced maternity and paternity leave are movements away from laissez-faire capitalism. Therefore, it is in the patriarchal capitalist society’s interest to encourage women—however economically independent—to enter into heterosexual marriages, in order to create and raise the next generation of workers. A key vehicle by which these societies have been successful at persuading women to marry is the ironic celebration of altruistic love.

‘True love’ has been marketed as the ultimate success for women in patriarchal capitalistic societies. Children’s movies end happily with the male and female protagonists proclaiming their love for one another; magazines for teenage girls advise readers on how to find real love; and advertisements everywhere, for every product imaginable, tell women how they can improve their appearance in order to be more attractive to men—all in the quest to find the ‘one’ with whom to share love. Women are so completely inundated with messages about how ‘love’ should look and feel that it has become impossible to have a natural positive emotion about a romantic partner without comparing it to all that they have learned about love. In this sense, patriarchal capitalism has succeeded in dictating to women what they want.

Not surprisingly, many lucrative markets have emerged to promote the expression and celebration of love, resulting in a double-win for capitalism: capitalists profit from their enterprise to organise society in a way that will keep capitalism itself healthy. Examples are abundant: on
Saint Valentine’s Day, people buy cards, gifts, and over-priced roses for their romantic partners. Almost anyone can picture the advertisements for romantic getaways to a beach in a poor country; these vacations cater to couples in loving, romantic relationships. A diamond engagement ring is perhaps the ultimate expression of two people’s love for each other—a man spent thousands of dollars to express to his fiancé and the rest of the world that he loves her enough to want to spend his life with her. All of these things are symbols of an emotion; an emotion that is convenient for the perpetuation of our economic and social system and which is exploited by some in order to make a profit.

One might expect that this caring, altruistic love could be dangerous for the capitalist order, which demands self-interested behaviour from its members. However, we see that with patriarchy in place, men benefit quite well from women’s caring love; they themselves are the recipients of women’s care and women’s subsequent unpaid labour. In this sense, Jónasdóttir (1994) argues that men exploit women’s love power (as opposed to the Marxian understanding of exploited labour power). We see empirically that men do quite well under the rubric of love in capitalism and patriarchy. Men who are married to women have a significant income premium over unmarried men, and they also report higher levels of health and happiness. Therefore, marriage rewards men with better economic outcomes (especially after the women’s rights movement, because men are no longer responsible for being the only ones to contribute financially to their wives and households) and it rewards women with the love that they have learned to seek out. With everybody getting what they think they want, patriarchal capitalism remains the most fundamental structure of society.

Same-Sex Marriage

A contemporary conversation in both feminist and non-feminist circles regarding love and marriage addresses the issue of same-sex marriage rights. This debate has been a source of contention among feminists: to many, marriage is still a patriarchal institution; but even so, if straight people get legal and economic benefits from it, then from a social justice perspective, LGBT people should have access to it as well (Ferguson 2007). I argue that gay marriage is not a completely desirable political goal, because it is informed by the same patriarchal conditions that encourage women to enter heterosexual marriages.

The recent phenomenon of what Lisa Duggan (2003) calls ‘homonormativity’ speaks to that point: many gay ‘rights’ activists argue that ‘LGBT people are just like straight people, not a threat to societal norms, so they ought to have the right to marry.’ (Duggan 2003) Representing
same-sex couples as ‘the same’ as different-sex couples makes the former unable to radically change the patriarchal nature of marriage. The ‘love’ constructed by patriarchal capitalism that I address in section two applies to same-sex couples, as well. The political claim of LGBT activists is often that their right to marry is based on love; if love is a natural human emotion, then everyone should have the right to participate in celebrating it. This argument has won the support of many politicians and citizens to support the gay marriage proposal. In other words, the gay marriage debate plays on the popularised tie between love and marriage. This strategy is problematic, because it limits people’s expressions of sexuality and desire, squeezing them into traditional notions of what loving relationships ‘ought to’ look like—i.e., marriage.

Some people argue—George Lakoff (2004), for example—that opening marriage to LGBT people necessarily changes the institution and the typical gender roles enacted within it to influence even heterosexual marriages to be more egalitarian. Following the line of thought developed above—that the division of labour in households is a critical aspect of patriarchy in marriage—someone in favour of same-sex marriage might argue that there is no sexual division of labour in homosexual couples, because there is no sex-specific comparative advantage for either partner to specialise in household work, and same-sex couples are therefore not as patriarchal as different-sex couples.

However, recent research shows that people in same-sex couples are indeed just as exploitative to each other in terms of the division of unpaid household labour as people in different-sex couples. Research using American Time Use Data makes clear that in different-sex relationships, women spend twice as much time as men doing unpaid household tasks, on average. Using the same time-use data, a recent analysis finds that a strong division of labour is just as common in same-sex couples as it is in different-sex couples (Schneebaum 2010). One person in each same-sex couple does almost twice the amount of unpaid household work as the other. Qualitative researchers found that same-sex couples often claim that they are egalitarian in their division of labour (Kurdek 2007 is a good example of this research), but actual observation of the couples (Carrington 1999) and the time-use study show that they are not.

Because even same-sex couples contain elements of exploitation based on traditional gender roles, it is highly important for feminists to think about the evolving nature of patriarchy. It seems that we can no longer think of patriarchal practices as just referring to a ‘man’ exercising power over a ‘woman.’ We need to think about how the compelling idea of ‘love’ and its role in marriage has helped patriarchy to evolve into an oppressive set of relations that might be based more on gender
performance than on biological sex, and capitalism’s role in encouraging the highest degree of efficiency possible, even in households. For Wittig, lesbianism is ‘the refusal of the economic, ideological, and political power of a man.’ That might be right; but it does not protect women from being in exploitative relationships with other women. I suggest that we reconsider the term ‘patriarchy’, and start to think about the relevance of unequal same-sex relationships on the characterisation of our sex/gender system.

Conclusion

Capitalism and patriarchy both benefit from women entering into heterosexual nuclear families, mainly because of the sexual division of labour that creates the next generation of workers and continues to stratify women’s and men’s spheres of working life. The concept of ‘love’ has been used to encourage women to enter into patriarchal marriages, in spite of their growing economic independence. Same-sex couples are not radically altering the landscape of love and marriage, despite the political opportunity to do so. Finally, and in connection to the previous ideas, I have made a case for reconsidering how feminists think about patriarchy: we need to move beyond traditional definitions of men’s exploitation of women to think about how the systems and institutions put in place by traditional patriarchy (including ‘love’ and marriage) continue to oppress women, but not necessarily in ways that we used to see.

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Chapter 11
A Return to Love: A Caribbean Feminist Explores an Epistemic Conversation Between Audre Lorde’s ‘the Power of the Erotic’ and Anna G. Jónasdóttir’s ‘Love Power’

Violet Eudine Barriteau

In a 1978 essay Audre Lorde offered feminist scholarship the theorization of the erotic as power, ‘as the nurturer or nursemaid of all our deepest knowledge’ (Lorde 1984: 56). In the process of her theorising Lorde links love to epistemology and ontology. In 1984, Anna Jónasdóttir constructed a theory of love power, ‘rooted in a materialist analysis of the political conditions of sexual love’ (Jones 1994: xiii, in Jónasdóttir 1994). In my research I intend to put the work of these two feminist theorists in conversation with each other. I anticipate an outcome that advances my ongoing project to centralize a study of women’s hetero-sexual relations as yielding knowledge about relations of domination in women’s public and private lives. Even though Jónasdóttir’s work is theoretically more sophisticated in its structural presentation and development, I argue Audre Lorde’s thesis is compelling and offers powerful epistemological openings that illuminate what is simultaneously possible and problematic in apprehending the phenomenon of love power as theorized by Jónasdóttir. Jónasdóttir’s theory is equally powerful but seems to anchor ‘love power’ in only a materialist explanation. Lorde’s definition of the erotic as a life force shifts or widens the epistemological base for theorising love, passion and desire in women’s lives. According to Lorde, love power or the power of the erotic is also ontological; it is a condition of being. By examining the questions implied by the implicit or explicit assumptions of the two frames, I intend to expand my ongoing theorization of women’s sexualized power in the contemporary Commonwealth Caribbean.

I view my proposed research as related specifically to the subfield of mapping the field of love studies in the Caribbean. By locating the theoretical and political significance of my emerging study of love and passion and their attendant complications, I intend to contribute to a
feminist understanding of the relevance of examining love in this time and in this geo-political space.

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My overall research project analyses three types of affective relationships: those formed in sexual love, in caring labour and between members of an acknowledged human community. The motivations and emotions that underlie and are generated in these relationships create and perpetuate distinctive types of social power and domination relationships at the same time they also interact with power relations that are a part of the economies such as rural household production, slavery, feudalism and capitalism which meet other material needs. As I have argued in my earlier books *Blood at the Root* and *Sexual Democracy* (Ferguson 1989, 1991) the relationships that are formed in the creation and exchange of emotional, sexual, and affectionate energies and pleasures form a semi-autonomous system of meeting these human needs necessary for human well-being. This system, which I have called ‘sex-affective production’ but might more simply be thought of as the ‘affective economy’, is a bodily-yet-social exchange of energies and pleasures that overlaps with the processes of the biological reproduction of new human beings as well as the reproduction of those, whether owners and/or workers, who are involved in the material economy of production of goods (what economists think of as the Economy proper). The affective economy operates through different institutionalized modes in societies with different material economies (that is, economies concentrating on the production and exchange of material goods). Social domination systems, such as male domination and racial, ethnic and national domination, are importantly embedded in the processes of the affective economy even though such systems are also implicated in preserving or undermining economic class power in class economic systems such as slavery, feudalism, capitalism and certain types of totalitarian state socialism. Because of the overlap, albeit non-identity, of the material and affective economies, I argue as a socialist-feminist that Marxist theories of social domination and liberation must be supplemented by a materialist-feminist analysis of affective economies that are grounded in particular historical social formations.
with their own processes of dialectical tensions and possibilities of resistance and change.

Using a broad-based historical materialist-feminist approach, my paper will analyse some key social power relations which are based in struggles to control and exploit three basic human capacities and the human goods they can produce. These are first, the ability to meet human material needs by creative productive labour; second, the ability to meet human sexual and affectionate needs by providing love and nurturance, and third, the ability to meet human communal needs by providing solidarity relations with others in a commonly shared sense of community. Extending earlier dual systems socialist-feminist theories such as those of Gayle Rubin, Juliet Mitchell, Nancy Chodorow, myself, Nancy Folbre, and Anna Jónasdóttir, I will argue that these three basic human capacities and powers—Labour, Love, and Solidarity—underlie three dialectically related social systems in which power struggles to create, control and exploit these resources are based. These social systems are based in three sites involving Economic, Family and Kin, and Community power relations (including in-group and out-group relations of race/ethnicity, religion, economic class, sexual preference, and nationality/citizenship). The historically various types of these social relations interact to produce, reproduce, and undermine relations of social domination, including male domination, forms of economic class, race and ethnic exploitation and inequalities, religious disputes and hegemonies, privileged and prohibited genders and sexualities, and privileged vs. marginalized membership in nation states via citizenship status.

I posit three types of human capacities around which power struggles revolve in human societies: control of the capacity for labour of others (their labour power), control of the love (and caring and affective) powers of others, and control of the capacity of individuals to enter into and amplify communal belongingness and energy (community membership and empowerment). Marx is correct to see class-organized material economies, which organize the production of goods to meet human material needs, as requiring cooperation and exchange but also power and exploitation. Similarly I assume that affective economies, which involve the ongoing exchange of caring and affective (positive) energy between

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12 Anna Jónasdóttir first developed the concept of Love Power as a parallel to Marx’s concept of Labor Power (cf. Jónasdóttir 2009).
humans, are characterized by exploitation and domination when sexist, racist and ethnicist institutional practices and powers are used by the dominant gender, race and ethnic group to exercise control over the affective exchanges made between themselves and subordinate groups.

To understand how the affective economy works, we must highlight love, sexual passion, and caring affection as motivations for human actions which are involved in forming kinship relations, parenting, sexual partnerships or solidarity relations with others in communities and nations. Philosophically this requires an analysis of human subjects which sees them not merely as rational self-interest maximisers, but as social animals motivated by identities and passions which bond or oppose them to others (Ferguson 1991).

The social and political power that some humans have over and with others is not merely based on greater abilities to threaten or harm others in their considered self-interests. Rather, humans like other living organisms respond to their environment by emotional responses that often reflect learned responses to what will promote a state of equilibrium, hence joy or pleasure, or a state of disequilibrium, hence, pain or sorrow. As social animals we also enjoy feeling the augmentation of self that positive group energies can give us and find painful the group rejection that outsider or deviant status can bring. Identifications that take place in the process of forming a conscious sense of self also involve positive affective energies being harnessed to some individuals and groups through symbolic images, words or signs and negative energies against or away from others. Thus, understanding the operation of particular regimes of social and political power (and oppression) requires a Spinozistic rather than a rationalist Cartesian or Kantian approach to human agency. We must learn to see humans as Freud and Spinoza did, as driven by affective investments to others (as lovers, kin, friends, caregivers, living or imagined community members, fellow citizens) with various energy flows generating emotions and passions that, often unbeknownst to ourselves,

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13 Affective economies also create and exchange negative emotions and energies, such as hatred, fear and disgust. However, these energies and emotions differ from positive energies in that they do not have value in themselves but are used as means which allow some to consolidate power over others to control the positive energies of love, passion and caring affection.

14 Sara Ahmed (2004) calls these types of images and signs “sticky” and argues that the social process of attaching positive and negative emotions, e.g. fear, disgust, identification, affection or love, to objects and signs associated with them, hence making the objects “sticky” with certain feelings, is a key part of affective economies as well as the psychological means by which gendered and racial attachments perpetuate systems of domination and oppression.
play key roles in either stabilizing or undermining human power systems as well as individual and group well-being or the lack thereof.

It follows from this philosophical starting point that to understand how and why contemporary political power persists in forms of social dominance such as class, gender/sexuality and race/ethnic domination systems, we require not only a structural analysis of the social relations of labour, love and sexuality, and race/ethnic community, but also an examination of the psychological mechanisms of power that allow political and personal authority to be distributed unjustly through the manipulations of love and identificatory affection of both individuals and groups. Only with such a groundwork can we formulate realistic political visions that suggest both goals and strategies to eliminate the kinds of exploitation of love, care and affection that currently exist.

One contemporary vision for social change that I will explore is that suggested by Deleuze and Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1988) and developed more fully in Hardt and Negri’s *Multitudes* (2006) and Gibson-Grahams’ *A Post-Capitalist Politics* (2007). The authors use Foucault’s insight in *The History of Sexuality, volume 1* (1980) that there is a new type of power, called ‘biopower’ which modern states have been developing since the end of the 19th century as a form of governance of their citizenry in order to maintain and augment state power through policies of population control (eugenics, birth control) and racial control (race/ethnic segregation, immigration control, racializing categories). Biopower works hand-in-hand with disciplinary power, another modern new power of micro-institutions such as the medical establishment, the criminal justice system, the family, the military and the schools. Disciplinary power works by habituating individuals to particular body practices and associated social categories (e.g. gendered ways of relating and acting with the concepts of masculinity, femininity, and good or normal man or woman). This juxtaposition of supposedly scientific norms and expected behaviour to achieve them normalizes people by having them incorporate a way of being and self-understanding through their own self-discipline, including gender and sexual norms and categories. Deleuze and Guattari argue that disciplinary and biopower channel life, bodily and sexual energies into what they call ‘territorializing’ sites such as the hetero-normative and patriarchal nuclear family and nation-state imagined communities, normed and racialised by various stratifying structures of segregation composed of the ‘true’ racially-normative Euro-Christian white members with their hetero-normative couples, and by extension, even ‘homo-normative’ gay and lesbian couples are normalized by these processes (see Puar 2007).
But there are signs of hope in the global material and affective economies formed by the dominant system of globalizing neo-liberal capitalist, male dominant and white supremacist bio-power, since, according to the authors above, the contradictions within this dynamic system also create waves of deterritorializing energy flows which undermine the nation-state’s political power on which bio-power is based, and the family kinship systems’ control of affective energies. Thus a postmodern bio-politics and bio-production emerges which challenges the old territorializations and seeks to re-territorialize resistant energies in alternative imagined communities through the solidarity networks of the anti-corporate-globalization, workers’ cooperative, environmental, anti-imperialist, global women’s and LGBTI and queer movements. According to these authors, these global networks are generating a transformative revolutionary love (based on solidarity across national lines, across racial and ethnic lines in global anti-capitalist solidarity economies from below, and across gender and sexual identities lines) that is challenging old hierarchies and social identities based on modernist forms of power and self-understandings. The new social imaginary that these social movements share is the demand and creation of a new economic commons that rejects capitalism, male domination and ethnicism/racism: these systems are seen as based on outmoded claims of private property, old conceptions of public vs. private goods, outmoded gender norms, and state-forms of representational democracy. Further, these are not merely utopian demands, but involve the uncovering and expansion of an already-existing alternative economy of exchanges based on use not profit, and on the exchange of affective and caring energies in an expansive and not exploitative way.

The postmodern resistance-from-below vision of politics espoused by these authors is in fact too undialectical to understand the complicated relation between forces of what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘territorialization’ and ‘deterritorialization’ in our contemporary combined material and affective economic systems. While I agree with the importance of the global solidarity networking of such social movements and that the solidarity involved is a kind of revolutionary love, I question the rather simplistic analysis of the authors I mention. First, all three sets of authors accept the argument put forth by Hardt and Negri that one of the contradictions of the present developing capitalist globalized material economy is that it requires the growth of what Hardt and Negri define as ‘immaterial labour’ The increasing inclusion of such labour in more and more types of work creates an opportunity for more workers, whether inside or outside of the formal capitalist economy, to find com-

15 Note that there are three author-duos here: what is the affective logic of co-authorship on such emotion-charged topics?
mon points of protest to the system. The authors list women’s caring labour in the home for children, partners and elders as examples of immaterial labour, reasoning that its goal is not to produce and exchange a material product but to produce positive energies for those cared for, and profit factors are not relevant to this process. I disagree with this line of thought. In my view there is an important distinction between the embodied caring labour by human bodies for human bodies and, for example, the kind of intellectual work done in computer programming or in researching marketing possibilities for rurally produced products. In the former kind of work, the labour spent directly in helping people, whether it is feeding, cleaning, clothing or otherwise servicing them, is directly or indirectly territorializing affective energy flows to them and between them. Such processes tend to resist the de-territorializing that is involved in the commodity production of, for example, producing intellectual products for a profit or providing an intellectual service for a profit. In the former kind of work there is non-alienable value for its own sake because of the mutually experienced pleasure or well being produced in the caring labour process usually even when it is done for profit, as with paid care workers, that is usually not produced in other sorts of intellectual labour or other service work for a profit that does not produce a material good (e.g. landscaping or police work).

In an argument a bit more complicated than I can reproduce here because of space considerations I maintain that traditional forms of love and solidarity to concrete others in family, kin and small-scale face-to-face community networks often continue to operate as road blocks to such commons-based global politics. This is because: 1) since they are valued as ends not just as means to other goals, people resist interrupting or diminishing their effects which other more general and more deter-ritorializing affective networks such as solidarity politics may require, and 2) The refiguring of these practices, as is presently happening among many Swedish couples because of the state policies of parental and paternal leave (Bennhold 2010), is necessary in a transitional feminist politics that must find ways to replace social energies initially lost to more intensive couple parenting. These solidarity and community networking energies need to be regenerated in different ways to make possible solidarity networks weakened by time considerations.

Territorialized love relations between couples in hetero- and homonormative families (Puar 2007) and between dominant race and ethnic-identified citizens in nation states will continue to support male and race-ethnic dominance in spite of other liberating trends unless social movements specifically prioritize challenging these affective dominances and find concrete ways to build new affective multi-racial and multi-
ethnic oppositional communities dedicated to ending racism, ethnicism and sexism.

We also need to pay attention to uneven development in contemporary global affective economies because of class and race effects. The phenomenon of new family forms such as gay and lesbian families in the US and more gender-androgynous parenting, both in the US and in Europe with the rise of parental leaves that include paternity leave (cf. Bennhold 2010) are indeed manifestations of the weakening of the patriarchal nuclear family in some contexts. However, male dominance still perseveres in neo-liberal state and corporate policies in the US and elsewhere which perpetuate double shifts of work for women in both paid work and unpaid care work. The new cultural norm (and for all but the upper class, economic necessity) that even married women should work in wage labour has given economic independence to women in professional and managerial occupations, and this in turn has provided the opportunity for new freedoms for middle and upper class women. But unfortunately such freedoms come with costs. First, such new chosen democratic family forms, which in turn create new types of small community networks, often merely stand in for but do not replace the larger community solidarity that is being lost by the neoliberal breakdown of the welfare state and the commodification of non-heterosexual sexual identities (Ferguson 2007, Hennessy 2000). Additionally neoliberalism, particularly in the U.S., has brought new forms of exploitation to poor and working class women, particularly single mothers and disproportionately women of colour, through punitive welfare reform, the reduction of affordable health services and the increased devaluation of the unpaid work of mothering with the imposition of double and triple shifts of paid and unpaid caring work, not to mention global chains of domestic servants paid to care for others’ children while unable to care for their own. Thus, the class divide has widened between women, since liberal feminism has won formal legal gender rights which have empowered most middle and upper class women while it has further disempowered working class and poor women (cf. Eisenstein 2009).

What this has meant, at least in the U.S, is that the emergence of new consensual sexual freedoms (non-monogamy, polyamory), gender-androgynous co-parenting, and gender and sexual identities (GLBTI, queer) that are only possible for some have tended to widen the class animosities of those with no time or ability to pursue such lifestyles (Hennessy 2000), and strengthen the growth of right wing sexually conservative movements opposed to abortion rights, lesbian and gay marriage, trans rights, and single parent families. We need a revitalized coalition of progressive forces opposed to neoliberal capitalism that understands
the need for a more intersectional feminist understanding of how these power systems interact to supplement the postmodernist call to create a new commons and show revolutionary love in so doing.

References


Appendix 1

GEXcel Symposium:
Love in Our Time—A Question for Feminism

May 20, 2010

Location: Örebro University, Hörsal G (Lecture Hall G), Gymnastikhuset

Programme

09.30 – 10.15  Registration and Coffee
10.15 – 10.30  Welcome
               Jens Schollin, Rector of Örebro University
10.30 – 11.10  Introduction
               Anna G. Jónasdóttir, Örebro University
11.10 – 11.50  Affective Equality: Love, Care and Solidarity as Productive Forces.
               Kathleen Lynch, University College Dublin
11.50 – 12.30  Equalise Love! Intimate citizenship beyond marriage
               Eleanor Wilkinson, University of Leeds
12.30 – 13.45  Lunch
               Maryam Paknahad Jabarooty, Lancaster University
14.25 – 14.50  Coffee
               Kathleen B. Jones, San Diego State University
15.30 – 16.00  Concluding discussion
Appendix 2

GEXcel Workshop:
Love in Our Time—A Question for Feminism

May 21, 2010

Location: Örebro University, Forumhuset, F2240

Programme

Venue:

09.15–09.30 Participants around the table introduce themselves
09.30–10.10 Further reflections about the Thursday presentations, including five minutes to each of the four speakers
            Kaye Quek, University of Melbourne, Australia
10.40–11.00 Coffee
11.00–11.30 The Royal Wedding as True Love Story. Emotional Politics Intersecting Culture, Nationalism, Modernity and Heteronormativity.
            Anna Adeniji, Södertörn University College, Sweden
11.30–12.00 Love in Translation. A Proposal for Feminist Critique of Neoliberalism. Ewa Majewska, University of Warsaw, Poland
12.00–13.30 Lunch
            Stevi Jackson, University of York, United Kingdom
14.00–14.30 All in the Family: Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Love.
            Alyssa Schneebaum, University of Mass. Amherst, USA
14.30–14.50 Coffee
14.50–16.00 General conversation
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