Identity Politics and City Planning
The Case of Jerusalem
To Erik and Mira
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ANN-CATRIN ANDERSSON

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Abstract


Jerusalem is the declared capital of Israel, fundamental to Jewish tradition, and a contested city, part of the Israel–Palestine conflict. Departing from an analysis of mainly interviews and policy documents, this study aims to analyze the interplay between the Israeli identity politics of Jerusalem and city planning. The role of the city is partly related to discursive struggles between traditional, new, and post-Zionism. One conclusion is that the Israeli claim to the city is firmly anchored in a master commemorative narrative stating that Jerusalem is the eternal and indivisible capital of Israel. A second conclusion is that there is a constant interplay between Israeli identity politics, city policy, and planning practice, through specific strategies of territoriality. The goals of the strategies are to create a political, historical and religious, ethnic, economic, and exclusive capital. Planning policies are mainly focused on uniting the city through housing projects in East Jerusalem, rehabilitating historic heritage, ancestry, and landscapes, city center renewal, demographic balance, and economic growth, mainly through tourism and industrial development. An analysis of coping strategies shows that Jerusalem planners relate to identity politics by adopting a self-image of being professional, and by blaming the planning system for opening up to ideational impact. Depending on the issue, a planner adopts a reactive role as a bureaucrat or an expert, or an active role, such mobilizer or an advocate. One conclusion drawn from the “Safdie Plan” process is that traditional Zionism and the dominant collective planning doctrine are being challenged. An alliance of environmental movements, politicians from left and right, and citizens, mobilized a campaign against the plan that was intended to develop the western outskirts of Jerusalem. The rejection of the plan challenged the established political leadership, it opened up for an expansion to the east, and strengthened Green Zionism, but the result is also a challenge to the housing needs of Jerusalem.

Keywords: Jerusalem, territoriality, national identity, commemorations, identity discourse, identity politics, commemorative narratives, city planning, traditional Zionism, place-making, city policy, green Zionism

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If someone had told me 10 years ago, when I was covering my ears with a pillow due to the shelling of the Israeli tanks standing outside the building in South Jerusalem, that I was going to write a book about the city, I would have rejected such a preposterous idea. It is too complicated, I am not a real Jerusalemite, there are already too many books about the city, and it is impossible to narrow down the city to an appropriate topic for a dissertation. When I was 10 years old I decided that my future profession would be either a diplomat or a foreign correspondent, but today I am happy that I was convinced to pursue this path and to write this book. Jerusalem is an intriguing city and my home away from home. This has been a long journey filled with hard work, but also with amazing encounters. But I did not do it alone.

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1. Framing the research problem

A city without future (Binat Schwartz)
The reason for waking up (Arieh King)
everything that is not normal (Moshe Cohen)
A living city (Uri Barshishat)

When I first travelled to Jerusalem in 2001 I associated the city with myths, symbolism, conflicts, and religious legends, and although the city is certainly connected to all these things, what I encountered was also an everyday city. This abstract perception and concrete experience has had a great influence on the structure of this dissertation. The quotes above furthermore emphasize the many faces of Jerusalem. The city is unique, as it holds a special place in the hearts of many people all over the world. It is holy for Jews, Christians and Moslems adhering to the three monotheistic religions. It is the declared capital of the state of Israel and the center for many Jews in a global perspective. It is also part of a Palestinian identity construction and of an ongoing geopolitical conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. On the other hand, it is facing the same challenges as any other city in at least two different ways. Jerusalem is affected by global trends such as migration, economic crisis, conflict patterns, and international relations in general. The city is also, in a more local and urban sense, home to over 700,000 residents who live their everyday lives in, are emotionally connected to, and construct their identities in relation to the city.

Jerusalem has been the subject of many books and articles, and these have mainly focused on the larger picture, such as the role of Jerusalem in the geopolitical conflict (Wasserstein, 2002; Klein, 2001), on the city as a religious center (Dumper, 2003; Armstrong, 2005), on the historical perspective (Thompson et. al. 2003; Asali, 2000), or on specific cases and policy issues (Bollens, 2000; Fenster, 2004). In order to fill that void, this dissertation therefore draws upon the intricate relations and interplay between identity politics and a practice-oriented policy area, more specifically land use planning (hereafter planning).

There are many ideas and visions about what Jerusalem is and should be, whether be they locally, nationally, or internationally based. Jerusalem, as a physical territory and symbol, is a central part of Israeli identity politics. Territory has always been a crucial component in the construction of

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1 The Arab population in Jerusalem will hereafter be called Palestinians and the Arab population with Israeli citizenship will be referred to as Israeli Arabs.
Israeli identity discourses (Kimmerling, 1983; Newman, 2001; Yiftachel, 2006; Yacobi, 2008), and the formation of Israeli commemorative narratives (Zerubavel, 1995) and collective memory (Pappé, 2004). This construction process is dominated by the hegemonic traditional Zionist identity discourse of building a Jewish state in the biblical land of Israel (Eretz Israel) with Jerusalem as its capital. There is not one single Zionist discourse but rather a number of competing and even antagonistic views (Ram, 2000; Kimmerling, 2001; Silberstein, 2008). This dissertation focuses on traditional Zionism, new Zionism and post-Zionism, and they are all in one way or the other positioned in relation with “the other”, which refers both to the internal, and the external (Palestinian) other. There are at least two aspects of the struggle for territorial hegemony. First, the physical reality, or as some would call it “facts on ground”, is difficult to change, at least on a short-term basis; and second, territory has a strong symbolic importance and is formed through long-term socialization processes of place-making. In this place-making process there is a continuous struggle over which visions, political priorities, and policies to implement. If you control the territory of Jerusalem and the agenda-setting process, you also have the opportunity to control the direction in which the city is developing. The hegemonic traditional Zionism is challenged by other Israeli identity discourses. The question is what visions and discourses are interacting with practice, and how.

The Israeli claim on Jerusalem affects every policy area. Israeli authorities, particularly on the national level, have been accused of using various policy areas, including planning, in order to assert control over the territory of Jerusalem (Bollens, 2000; Yiftachel & Yacobi, 2002). There are studies focusing on house demolitions that aim, according to these authors, to control the Palestinian demography (Margalit, 2006), and other studies concentrating on discriminatory aspects of planning permits and the planning system itself (Shehadeh, 1993; Kaminker, 1997; Khamaisi, 2007). The many ideas and visions about what Jerusalem should be can create problems, such as struggle over the agenda-setting, in policy formulation and implementation, and a pressure on the planner. The planning of Jerusalem is officially run by Israeli authorities, as the Palestinian population in Jerusalem has chosen almost unanimously to boycott the Israeli political and administrative systems. The main reason is that their participation would legitimize what they regard as an illegal occupation of the city. It is impor-

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2 Israeli identity discourses is in this dissertation synonymous with Jewish-Israeli identity discourses, although bearing in mind that post-Zionism is a broader approach.
tant to remember that Jerusalem is a contested space. That this study takes its point of departure in Israeli identity politics and planning is motivated by the Israeli control over the planning of Jerusalem. The question is in what way identity and planning interplay. The dissertation focuses on concepts such as identity, territory, city policy, control, and planning, captured within the concept of territoriality (Sack, 1986; White, 2000). Territoriality is the bridging concept between the abstract and the concrete.

The overall purpose of this dissertation is therefore to analyze the interplay between the role of Jerusalem in Israeli identity politics and planning as a policy area, by focusing on the following issues:

1. the commemorative construction of Jerusalem within the Israeli identity politics,
2. the interrelation between Israeli identity politics, Jerusalem city planning and strategies of territoriality,
3. the coping strategies and roles of Jerusalem planners in relation with the identity politics of Jerusalem, and,
4. the campaign for and against, and the consequences of the rejection of the “Safdie Plan”, related to Israeli identity politics.

1.1 A framework for identity and policy analysis

A common assumption, and a research finding, is that it is difficult to theoretically and empirically link more abstract political theories with concrete and practice-oriented studies. For instance, Yael Tamir discusses this relation and comes to the conclusion that

...when one looks at the most important contributions to political theory in the last two decades [...] it is noticeable that none of these combines the philosophical analysis of political principles with an empirical understanding of political processes in a wholly successful way. (Tamir, 1999:85)

This study is thus an attempt to cross-fertilize abstract theories of territorial identity with theories on policy-making. It is also connected to a more empirical desire to illustrate practical processes with importance for both the everyday life of the city and the identity politics. The overall framework presented here is an attempt to alleviate the search for new knowledge in the interplay between the two theoretical fields. It is at the intersection between the two that this dissertation seeks its core findings. In practice, these two fields are a lot more intertwined than in theory.

The structure of the dissertation has been inspired by studies linking ideas and territorial identity with institutionalization and policy-making. A model presented by Barry Buzan in his book *People, States & Fear* (1991)
combines ideational components with the role of the territory and of institutions. The model focuses the necessity for a state to be based on a political identity and a distinctive idea, otherwise the security of that state could be challenged within the international system. This idea is based on the nation and the collective ideology (Buzan, 1991:64pp). The idea of the state could also be referred to as hegemony or as the governing ideology (Bollens, 2000:20). For Buzan, states must have;

...a physical base of population and territory; they must have institutions of some sort which govern the physical base; and there must be some idea of the state which establishes its legitimacy in the minds of its people. (Buzan, 1991: 65–66)

The physical base is the actual territory, with its population, economic, and natural resources. The institutions of the state are, laws, regulations, administrative bodies, and everything that can be connected to government (Buzan, 1991:82pp). The main purpose of Buzan’s model is to facilitate an analysis of the power and strength of a state, from a security point of view. In this study, the model is mainly used as an inspiration for the structure of the presentation, but not only. Since security is one of the main priorities of the state of Israel, the approach helps to reveal how the interplay between ideas, territory, and policy-making is connected to one of the main motives for creating the state of Israel – to provide a safe-haven from persecution.

Translated into the topic of this dissertation, the main idea of the state of Israeli is the hegemonic traditional Zionism (although challenged), and the role of Jerusalem within it focuses on its role as the indivisible, eternal capital of Israel and for the Jewish people, which will be further developed in chapter 5. The physical base is the territory of Jerusalem including its history, population, and economic resources, which are related to city planning policy and various strategies of territoriality. Chapter 2 presents an analytical model based on the concept of territoriality and chapter 6 analyzes the strategies of territoriality empirically. The institutional expression is identified by analyzing the planning system and the role of the planner. The system is closely interrelated with the Zionist construction of governing institutions. The planners must relate to the identity politics of Jerusalem whether they want to or not. This perspective will be theoretically approached in chapter 3 and empirically developed in chapter 7.
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Figure 1:1. Framing the identity politics of Jerusalem

The figure above also contains two of the challenges facing national identity construction today: the impact of global issues, and the growing importance of place, in this case the city as an independent factor, and the local level as a specific political arena. These aspects will mainly come to the fore in chapter 8.

1.1.1 Bridging the structure-agency divide

A study on identity politics and planning, obviously relates to an interplay between structure and agency. When referring to structures we normally mean norms, rules, practices, and societal relations, defining how we act and behave (Aggestam, 1999:36). The concept of agency is also wide and the choice of an actor is often associated with interest, rationality, materiality, and causality (Checkel, 1998:327p). The rational perspective can for
instance be described in loose terms as “Whatever actors want, they choose what they believe to be the best means available to attain it”. (Jupille, Caporaso & Checkel, 2003:12).

Studies in International Relations and European studies (see for instance Jupille, Caporaso & Checkel, 2003; Zürn & Checkel, 2005; Císař, 2003; Rieker, 2004), using a structure-agency approach, have become entangled in a debate on whether it is possible to combine a structural perspective and an actor-centered approach. According to Jeffrey T. Checkel, studies in International Relations based on a constructivist perspective have a tendency to neglect agency in favor of structure (Checkel, 1998). This is also part of an academic debate about a potential difficulty in establishing how the results of constructivist studies may be used in the wider academic society (Carlsnaes, 1992; Checkel, 1998). On the other hand Alexander Wendt argues that actor-centered studies have to a large extent avoided an in-depth discussion about structure and have taken identities and interests as given (Wendt, 1999:27). Are these two perspectives as incompatible with each other they seem? According to Jeffrey T. Checkel and Michael Zürn:

There is a constructivist and a rationalist account for all the cases, which supports the notion of the constructivist-rationalist debate – in pragmatic terms – as one between different analytical tools or lenses for explaining social events, and weakens the notion of the debate as a theoretical battle that can be resolved through empirical research. (Zürn & Checkel, 2005:1075)

Does this mean that these two approaches should not be used in the same study as researchers claim that they are based on different views of ontology and epistemology, thus leading to incompatible results? In practice, they are highly intertwined and do not necessarily constitute two different theoretical tools. Although departing from constructivism, this dissertation incorporates an actor-centered perspective, thus bridging the structure-agency divide. This constitutes a middle-ground approach. It is particularly beneficial to analyze different types of conflicts by applying an agent-structure framework (Aggestam, 1999:35pp).

The dissertation draws upon a constructivist view on identity, meaning that norms, identities, places, and policies are socially constructed rather than given by nature. These structures define how we should behave. The constructivist perspective not only views ideas and identity as socially constructed, but also actors. They are guided by shared ideas rather than materiality (Wendt, 1999:1, 7), and these shared ideas “constitute” and shape the actors (Checkel, 1998:326). According to Alexander Wendt, the construction of identities takes place in a learning process, which also includes some kind of confirmation of the identity from those who are outside of a
certain identity construction (Wendt, 1999:318pp). In contemporary studies on collective identities, constructivism is the dominant approach, whether it concerns strengthening an existing identity construction or reconstructing a community through ethno-symbolism (Smith, 1999), inventing a new identity (Adama, 2007), or imagining a community (Anderson, 1991).

Identities, as well as political systems, are constructed in a constant interaction between structure and actor, where causality is often difficult and not always necessary to pinpoint. A society is constructed both through an evolutionary process over many years, not necessarily steered consciously in a certain direction, and through conscious choices by actors with an agenda. There are actors who pursue their self-interest and at the same time being aware of the surrounding structures. The question is to what extent actors are aware of the various surrounding structures, which we will return to in chapters 3 and 7. Although departing from a constructivist perspective, the interplay between structure and agency is central to this study. The approach is drawing on a perspective that “…social agents do not act instrumentally.” (Císař, 2003:9).

The role of Jerusalem in Israeli identity construction and discourses is related to both structural aspects of identity and the behavior of the planners. The meaning of Jerusalem is socially constructed and connected to a specific period in time, as the construction of Jerusalem is a constant process. This is connected to the development of Zionism and the construction of the state of Israel (Mayer, 2008:240). For instance, Jerusalem was not mentioned specifically in the 1948 Declaration of the independence of the state of Israel, although the city certainly plays a central role in contemporary identity politics. There are a number of structures guiding the planning of Jerusalem but the roles of these structures also depend upon the behavior of the planner. The interplay between identity politics and planning can be thus analyzed by a structure-agent approach with the purpose of broadening and strengthening the analytical framework and the possibilities to understand complex processes, not in order to take part in a theoretical struggle between the two.

1.2 Deconstructing identity politics

Identity politics is not a completely fixed academic concept. It is used in a wide variety of studies on individual identity as well as in a systems perspective. Identity politics in this dissertation refers to “…the claim to power on the basis of a particular identity…” (Kaldor, 1999:6). This is not necessarily a conscious process and performed with intention. Identity politics is linked to complex societal structures and relations between ac-
tors. It could be linked to the politics of the state or to groups connected to local, national and global levels. This dissertation departs from the concept of national identity and more specifically from the territorial identity politics of Jerusalem based on the Israeli territorial claims on the city. It focuses furthermore on the ideas and visions of mainly three identity discourses; traditional Zionism, new Zionism and post-Zionism, as well as a number of narratives constructed in order to strengthen the claim on Jerusalem.

From a constructivist viewpoint, contemporary ideas and future visions of Jerusalem are not given by nature. To use the language of discourse theory, Jerusalem is an empty signifier (Torfing, 1999:98p & 301), whose meaning and identity are not fixed. A wide variety of actors are trying to fill this void with significance through a complicated process of identity construction. This construction process is closely related to ideas, ideology, hegemony, and power. One important task of this dissertation is to deconstruct the components of national identity. This is performed in different stages, the first being to deconstruct Israeli identity discourses in order to understand the importance of Jerusalem in the Israeli context. The next step is to identify the commemorative narratives of Jerusalem. Chapter 4 will further elaborate on how this deconstruction will be executed. We will first pinpoint the role of discourse theory and narratives in this study.

1.2.1 Discourse and ideology

Traditional Zionism is sometimes referred to as an ideology (see for instance Pappé, 2003:45) and sometimes as a discourse (see for instance Silberstein, 2008:6). It is therefore important to briefly clarify the difference between the two concepts, although both can be used when describing different periods and parts of Zionism. An ideology can be defined as a complex and slowly developing set of beliefs and a kind of socio-cognitive framework communicated through practice (Van Dijk, 1998:22p; Van Dijk, 2008). The conceptual problem is that discourse can be described in a similar way. However, the advantage of departing from discourse theory is that it develops an approach suitable for this dissertation regarding power relations and hegemony, discourse as a larger societal framework, and how discourses are converted into practice. Zionism is certainly a nationalist ideology, but is today also something significantly wider. Therefore discourse theory better reflects the role of Zionism within contemporary Israeli society. According to Laurence J. Silberstein:

Approaching Zionism or any other nationalist movement as discourse helps to make us aware of the multiple and diverse forms of power relations it entails. It thus enables us to see the many ways in which Zionism functions to
produce, distribute, and perpetuate the knowledge that renders its existence possible. (Silberstein, 2008:6)

1.2.2 Discourse and hegemony
This dissertation has been inspired by two aspects of discourse theory: the perception of power and hegemony, and the link between discourse and practice as presented in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). There are many ways of interpreting discourse. Discourses can be viewed as cognitive frames but also as objects with their own agenda (Howarth, 2000:3). According to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, discourses are collections of meaning in which conflict and power are intrinsic concepts. Discursive struggles are therefore natural, and antagonistic identity discourses are found in situations where different identities clash, as in Jerusalem. Geopolitically the struggle is between Palestinian and Israeli claims, but there are a number of competing views within these two groups as well. If one discourse succeeds in suppressing the others, then a hegemonic discourse has appeared (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:122–143). The criteria for a hegemonic discourse are the presence of antagonistic discourses and of unclear and constantly changing boundaries between them (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:136). This implies a difficulty in pinpointing what is actually hegemonic, as “hegemony is, quite simply, a political type of relation, a form, if one so wishes, of politics; but not a determinable location within a typology of the social”. (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:139).

Policy theories can help us determine whether or not a discourse is hegemonic. Maarten Hajer presents two criteria that must be fulfilled. First, the discourse has to be so strong and influential that actors in a certain policy area must position themselves in relation to the ideas of that particular discourse in order to be credible. Furthermore, it is imperative that the discourse is incorporated into institutional arrangements and concrete politics. One method of achieving discursive hegemony is to form so-called discourse-coalitions, based on a set of common narratives (called storylines) and a specific practice (Hajer, 1995:60pp). This discussion is related to two central research questions in this study: how identity discourses interacts with planning policy and practice, and the coping strategies of planning actors.

1.2.3 Discourse and practice
A main feature in Critical Discourse Analysis and according to Michel Foucault, a unifying factor of a discourse, is how the message is dispersed (Foucault in Fairclough, 1992:41pp; in Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000:64; in Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:105). In 1991, Norman Fairclough
presented a model which was intended to facilitate the understanding of how discourses are communicated and used in the wider society, by using the concepts of text-, discursive and social practice (or socio-cultural practice as in Olausson & Berglez, 2008:131). The text is the object of the more detailed linguistic analysis and according to Fairclough a text is always produced in a specific context and often with a specific purpose. He argues that it is possible to analyze the motives and intentions of the producers of the text by examining how the text is used in practice (Fairclough, 1992:73–78) as “…they inevitably take place within a constituted, material reality, with preconstituted ‘objects’ and preconstituted subjects.” (Fairclough, 1992:60).

In Maarten Hajer’s opinion, discourses are not deliberately used by actors in pursuit of specific interests. The course of society is determined by a constant interaction between agents and structures that constantly reformulates and reconstructs power relations and policy issues (Hajer, 1995:57–58).

In this study, we shall see that texts are produced with a certain intention, but also that discourses are not necessarily products of conscious choices. The discursive practice can be found in the production of text concerning choices, norms, identities and assumptions, but also in its distribution and process of reception (Olausson & Berglez, 2008:130). Related to the topic of this dissertation, the discursive practice can be identified in the production of policy documents, but also when political goals are implemented and when policies are turned into action.

The socio-cultural practice is connected with the overarching structures and frames, such as norms, culture and identity (Wodak, 1996). There is a constant interaction between the discursive and socio-cultural practice (Fairclough, 1992:78-90; Olausson & Berglez, 2008:131, Gustafsson, 2003:73). This study departs from the actual text and focuses on the interrelation with the discursive and socio-cultural practice. Based on Foucault, Fairclough claims that the social practice contains non-discursive or material elements (Fairclough, 1992:48, 66). In the case of Jerusalem, there are very few elements that can be referred to as non-discursive, except the geology and geography which of course are important preconditions.
Critical Discourse Analysis thus provides us with tools to deconstruct identity politics, and this process makes it possible to connect documents, statements, and practices with ideational perspectives. Although power relations and the general developments of society are constantly being renegotiated and reconstructed, there are still perceptions of roles, structures, and intentions to which actors relate in any given moment. Although nothing in society is fixed, there are actors who act as if everything was, to which we will return in chapter 7.

1.2.4 Discourse and commemorative narratives

More and more attention is given to the role of memories, and particularly collective memories, in the social construction of identities, whether in a study about planning politics in Jerusalem and London (Fenster, 2004) or about narratives in the history of the Jewish people (see for instance Pardes, 2000). The Israeli identity politics of Jerusalem contains a number of narratives and one main feature is that they are based on memories and so-called commemorations (Gillis et al. 1993). The commemorations play a large role in the construction of a collective Jewish memory for Jerusalem – a collective memory that has a central position in the Israeli identity discourses. Maarten Hajer (who uses story-lines instead of narratives) argues that narratives are firmly rooted in more abstract political discourses and thus connected to power relations and hegemony (Hajer, 1995:62pp). These narratives contain both a story (what is being told) and a discourse.
The commemorative narratives are communicated within the complicated game of identity politics. These collective memories are created in schools, in the army, by politicians, by authors, etc., through acts of commemoration. These commemorations lead to the construction of what Yael Zerubavel (1995) calls **commemorative narratives**. The process of selecting historical events is very specific and many events are deliberately left out. The process of producing narratives is ongoing and “Collective memory continuously negotiates between available historical records and current social and political agendas”. (Zerubavel, 1995:5).

There are a number of commemorative narratives covering specific events, periods in history and political visions for the future, and each of these narratives covers a small portion of what happens in society. Commemorative narratives could be connected to a larger issue – a so-called **master commemorative narrative**. This master narrative gives a wider picture of the collective memory (Zerubavel, 1995). There are different interpretations of what a master commemorative narrative is and in this dissertation these narratives are larger collections of narratives but not necessarily the only master narrative. One example is the Jewish yearning for their ancient homeland, which could be deconstructed into a number of micro-narratives.

Memories and narratives are rarely undisputed. There is often another side to the story. Where we find memories, we also find counter-memories and counter-narratives (Zerubavel, 1995:10; Newman, 2008:68). This is very much the case for Jerusalem, and the communication of one commemorative narrative is met by a counter-narrative, whether it has to do with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or internal Palestinian or Israeli narratives.

In chapter 5, the connection between the identity politics of Jerusalem, Israeli identity discourses, and the commemorative narratives will be further analyzed. This connection is identified in various types of texts, from political speeches to literature, previous research on Jerusalem, and interviews. Chapter 4 will further elaborate on the methodological choices and material used in this study.

**1.3 Why the city and why Jerusalem?**

Before turning to the choice of Jerusalem as a case, we will discuss why the city in general is a particularly illustrative object in the intersection between identity politics and planning. Our globalized world demands new or improved theories and perspectives that are better developed for the increasingly complex relations between states, individuals, regions, cities,
multinational corporations, and international organizations. Although globalization and cosmopolitan values have an impact, Thomas Hylland Eriksen argues “…that perhaps it is true that the world is a single place – but if so, it is locally constructed.” (Hylland Eriksen, 1993:150). It is therefore necessary to re-scale or re-territorialize world politics (Brenner, 2004). These new patterns of relations have consequences throughout the Middle East as well, and particularly for a small country like Israel with its many ties to liberal economies. Cities such as Jerusalem are exposed to growing competition for investment and tourism between cities in different countries. The term glocalization is often used to describe this connection between the local and the globalized world (Swyngedouw, 1997). There is no abundance of studies linking the urban or the city with national identity. They are mostly concerned with either the city as an arena for violent conflicts or terrorism (Graham, 2003; Coaffee, 2003), or with the city, mainly the capital, as a commemorative site or a symbol for a nation or a state (Vale, 2008; Gordon & Osbourne, 2004; Nilsson, 2000). Territory is a vital part of both nation- and state-building, and one major contribution of this dissertation is to re-scale the territorial concept when studying national identity. Such a study can give us new insights about identity, territory, and power.

The city as a specific place, can be an important geopolitical arena where, for instance, war takes place, but it can also be constructed for various urban purposes, and it can have great symbolic value on its own. The question is whether the “urban” and the city are the same. There are researchers who claim that the “urban” is not a distinct object, therefore difficult to assess. Urbanity is often connected to certain values, visions, and a special way of life, which together create an urban lifestyle. On the other hand, the “urban” is no longer distinct from the rural in the same way as it was, at least in the so-called “western world”. Rural areas have become urbanized when it comes to lifestyle, housing projects, and new infrastructure. Globalization, which brings new technology and Internet, has made it possible to live in rural areas while obtaining or maintaining access to an urban lifestyle (Short, 2006). In other parts of the world, the rural population is also shrinking, and large cities are getting even larger, creating megacities with huge slum areas (Davis, 2006). John Rennie Short (2006) describes the “urban” as an umbrella term, comprising both the city and city life (Short, 2006). The focus of this dissertation is not on city life but on the city, which is an arena, but also an entity in itself. Cities

... define everyday lives in which class, gender and ethnic identities are constructed as “imagined places”. (Taylor & Flint, 2000:288)
Why discuss the city as a unique and separate entity? One answer is that the city, in many ways, is an ideal category, a kind of microcosm in which it is possible to study the distribution of power, creation of difference, relations, conflicts, and level of tolerance, among other things. A focus on the city gives an opportunity to discuss identity construction from below as national identity is often seen as a construct from above. The city is often a distinct territorial unit with municipal boundaries and a specific local government. The local level has long been suppressed, as the attention has been directed to the national or state level. In social science, the focal point has shifted over time, starting with early historical accounts of city-states, changing with the creation of nation-states, and returning to the city when the interest in the “urban” grew during the later part of the 20th century. The constant shift of focus from the local to the state level and vice versa has led to a research tradition concentrating on the relationship between the local and the state level, using different illustrative cases (Rhodes, 1981; Agnew, 1987; Elander, 1991; Sellers, 2002). This relationship is highlighted in this dissertation as local issues and local actors have come to challenge the hegemonic national identity discourse as well as state-based planning doctrine.

The focus of this dissertation is mainly on the city of Jerusalem and particularly the role of the capital, not the urban life itself but many aspects have clear urban implications. What kind of city is Jerusalem? Jerusalem is both a unique case concerning its role in Israeli national identity but it is also a more general case related to planning. Jerusalem is described in some of the 63 interviews as;

...a very cosmopolitan city but in a fragmented non-integrated way. There are many segments of the population that don’t really intermingle. (Interview Chaim Fialkoff)

A place of contrast and contradictions. [...] Jerusalem is a very, very ancient city on the one hand but on the other hand it is a very, very new city. (Interview Ofer Manor)

These contradictions are one of the intriguing aspects of studying Jerusalem as a unique case. On the other hand, planning is described as a practice based on a universal perception of what is good planning and a view of planning as an objective profession. The choice of case will be developed methodologically in chapter 4. The specific function of the capital and its role in nation-building will be further illuminated in chapter 2.
1.4 Why land use planning?

Planning is intimately connected to territory and the identity politics of place but few studies have been performed connecting planning with national identity (Allmendinger, 2001b:33). According to earlier research (Bollens, 2000; Nitzan-Shiftan, 2005), the planning of Jerusalem is closely related to the city’s role in Israeli identity construction. In order to grasp how this relationship is structured, it is necessary to understand the basic ideas and structures of the policy area of planning. Planning is often related to an objective profession steered by certain goals and plans (Granberg, 2004:63). This is normally connected to a rationalist perspective. This model has been challenged by more critical and communicative planning perspectives (Forester, 1993; Healey, 1999; Healey, 2003). These approaches focus on bringing the citizens back in and the development of planning both in theory and practice is an important context in which the Jerusalem planning politics takes place. Planning today is a complicated and multifaceted policy area. It involves many actors, levels, and processes connected to broader ideological frameworks and ideas.

Since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, the planning of Jerusalem has been dominated by state-based actors (Dumper, 1997), and the state, in different forms, has been the initiator of most construction projects in the city. Furthermore, through the Israel Land Administration (today privatized and called the Lands Authority), the state controlled 93% of the land. The land itself is important in order to strengthen national identity, and a number of commemorative narratives are connected to the role of territory. Territory is also important for security reasons. The Ministry of Housing and Construction was the main planning actor after the 1967 war, and it was responsible for constructing new Jewish neighborhoods or settlements in the de facto annexed East Jerusalem.

Arie Shachar, claimed in an article from 1998 that the planning doctrine in Israel is changing from focusing on the collective to an individual-centered approach, mainly as the result of the growing focus on economy in Israel (Shachar, 1998). These transformations can be connected to individualistic or civic aspects of post-Zionism, which focuses on moving on from nation- and state-building and a situation of conflict, to building a modern society for all its residents. It is also related to a neo-liberal economic agenda, not necessarily disconnected from Zionism, although moving away from the earlier dominance of the Labor party.

A dominant or hegemonic discourse is connected to power, and power is intimately related to knowledge. Knowledge is a crucial part of the planning process. Professional planners can use their knowledge and expertise as an instrument of power which gives them an advantage over the public.
or politicians, who have to measure and evaluate the information from the professional. The question is whether planners have the intention to use their expertise to promote a certain standpoint in policy documents and in the communication of planning policy.

There is no doubt that the Jerusalem planners and the national planning hegemony are facing a number of challenges today. These challenges can be linked to the ongoing discussion in Political Science regarding the role of the nation-state (see for instance Bache & Flinders, 2004; Sassen, 2006). Globalization and global trends, such as the interest of multinational construction companies to invest in Jerusalem or a growing cultural and religious interest in the city, are challenging the old collective planning discourse. The urban, everyday-life perspective constitutes a second challenge. Individuals or organizations are getting more and more involved in specific planning issues, and local identity has an impact on where Jerusalem is heading. The local population or the municipal planners do not necessarily want the same course of urban development as the planners and politicians on the national level. The question is whether these challenges have shifted the planning of Jerusalem from being an integral part of the effort to construct Jerusalem as a capital and thus an important identity component in Israeli national identity, to planning policies more influenced by specific economic interests, cosmopolitanism, or local agendas. Focusing on the planning of Jerusalem thus reveals the direction of contemporary Israeli identity politics.

1.5 Disposition

This dissertation is divided into four sections. In the first section, the theoretical framework guiding this study is presented. Chapter 2 focuses on national identity, territoriality, and the role of the city in identity politics. In chapter 3, the institutionalization of ideas in policy-making with a focus on planning is scrutinized as well as the role of the planner.

The second section comprises chapter 4, which outlines the methodological tools used to analyze the material used in the dissertation. The chapter concentrates on case-study method; text, discourse, and narrative analysis; and interview method.

The third section includes chapters 5–8 and focuses on the analysis of the empirical data. In chapter 5, the role of Jerusalem in Israeli identity politics is ascertained and analyzed in relation to identity discourses, commemorative narratives, and city policy. The focal point of chapter 6 is how the city policy is translated into strategies of territoriality. The strategies are further analyzed in relation to discursive and socio-cultural practice. Chapter 7 reveals how planning actors, mainly current and former public
planners, relate to the identity politics of Jerusalem. A brief analysis of power relations and the institutional set-up is presented. From a structure-agency perspective, the chapter dwells on the self-proclaimed role of the planners’ as professionals within the framework of identity politics. In chapter 8, insights from chapters 6 and 7 are applied when analyzing the role of identity politics, strategies of territoriality, and the role of the planner in a specific planning process – The “Safdie Plan”. This process reveals contemporary challenges facing both the hegemonic planning doctrine and Jerusalem as a national identity project.

The final section consists of chapter 9, which returns to the initially stated research questions, highlights the main findings, and relates them to the conceptual framework of the dissertation, ending in a discussion of political prospects for the future, i.e. in what direction Jerusalem is going.
2. National identity, territoriality, and the city

The formation of national identity is strongly tied in with territory. The link between nationalist aspirations for self-government, autonomy or sovereignty and the eventual formation of a State is dependent on the parallel formation of a national territory, defined as “homeland”. (Newman, 2001:237)

In looking at the city, one identifies footholds and crevices where nationalist projects are being negotiated and modified in a contemporary global world. It is in a city where nationalist political projects must take stands on concrete and complex urban processes and issues... (Bollens, 2007:245)

Globalization and the growing importance of the local are commonly seen as factors undermining the role of the nation-state and nationalist aspirations. On the other hand, the conclusion of contemporary research is that national identity construction is still of major significance (Özkirimli, 2005; Smith, 1999). National identity theories have been unsuccessful at fully analyzing the importance of territory (Yiftachel, 2006:44). This dissertation therefore aims at filling parts of that void by focusing on territorial identity and the role of the city, which is a physical and symbolic territory, in which identity politics is played out and involving a multitude of actors. Closely connected to state-building, the capital city has a particularly important role as a uniting symbol and physical arena for constructing national identity. By later on grounding national identity discourses in planning it is possible to identify the interaction between the construction of identity and policy-making. This chapter is structured according to the following two issues:

1. To construct an analytical model based on territorial identity theories, and,
2. To identify the role of the city in national identity construction.

2.1 Deconstructing national identity

Within the research on nationalism, there is a debate on whether national identity is losing momentum as a result of globalization processes (see for instance Kinnvall, 2004). Globalization can potentially contribute to cosmopolitan values or a cosmopolitan citizenship by promoting universalism and common norms (Castles & Davidson, 2000:4; Delanty, 2000:18) thus challenging processes of identification. Although adding new dimensions, the conclusion from contemporary studies on national identity is that these
trends have not led to a decline in the search for individual or group identity nor in the importance of maintaining, reinventing, and constructing national identity. According to Anthony D. Smith

... collective identity is likely to continue to command humanity’s allegiances for a long time to come, even when other larger-scale but looser forms of collective identity emerge alongside national ones. (Smith, 1991:175–176)

For instance, the globalization processes have led to what Benedict Anderson calls “long-distance nationalism” (1998:58pp), as the cultural identity of migrants becomes important away from their homeland. Long-distance nationalism could in a broader perspective be connected to the tendency of migrants to hold on to their original culture or nationalist emotions, although that culture may have changed in their absence (see among others Deniz, 2001:285). This leads to the conclusion that new trends on a global and local level, despite posing challenges, are compatible with processes of national identification.

National identity consists of two conceptual parts, the nation and identity and this section contains a discussion on both concepts and what role they play in the dissertation.

2.1.1 The conceptual quagmire of identity

Identity is a complex concept and a focus of research in many disciplines and on different levels, such as the individual, the group, or the system. Identity studies was originally a field dominated by social psychologists, and one main issue was whether to focus on the individual or on the group. This dissertation is based on community-building, although it acknowledges individual processes of identification. This is not necessarily a conscious process, as our assimilation to certain groups is to a large extent controlled by ideas and emotions. Thus, our categorization and identification process is not necessarily an act of rationality or done with malicious intent; it is neither something positive nor negative, but just something inherently human (Allport, 1954:20–22).

Identity is a difficult analytical category because it contains so many different aspects. First of all, Craig Calhoun argues that making an analytical distinction between individual and group identities is not easy, as they are intertwined. You cannot have one without the other and they exist alongside each other. This is connected to a wider perception of social identity (Calhoun, 1994:9). Rogers Brubaker criticizes studies on identity for making too much or too little of the concept. “Strong” interpretations of identity focus above all on sameness and assume that every person or group has
an identity. The “soft conception” understands identity as fluid, evasive, unstable, and ever-changing. These understandings are undermining the possibility to use identity as an analytical category (Brubaker, 2004:28pp). Instead Brubaker proposes a number of ways to escape from this conceptual quagmire, one of which is to focus on identification as a process. This can help us to identify the agents, actions, and structures of identity politics. To sum up, “...identification’ calls attention to complex (and often ambivalent) processes, while the term ‘identity,’ designating a condition rather than a process...”. (Brubaker, 2004:44). The term identification contains a sensitivity to change and exposes both an intentional choice and more complex structures which I find compatible with the constructivist approach of this dissertation. Although agreeing with many of the points regarding identification, Richard Jenkins criticize Brubaker for relating to groups as bounded and almost static, not fully grasping the dynamics of group identification (Jenkins, 2008:12).

On the other hand, as a concept and phrase, identity is sometimes used in political rhetoric to describe something static. Therefore it is necessary to distinguish between identity as an analytical tool and identity as a political phenomena, political goal, or individual perception. This dissertation focuses on identity formation as a process and as a political construction rather than a fixed category. Our identification processes are linked to self-perception, choices, and societal structures, but could also be complemented by or based on a particular territory, such as a neighborhood or an entire city. Some people identify with their region while others see themselves as cosmopolitans – connected to a variety of cultures all over the world. All these identifications could be complemented by identification with a nation.

2.1.2 When is the nation?
Even though Zionism is commonly accepted as the founding ideology and dominant identity discourse of the state of Israel, and as such functions as the point of departure of this dissertation, theories on nation-hood give us tools to identify and discuss the roots and the development of national identity. More specifically, theories on how nationalism emerges provide a historical framework in which Zionism can be placed. As any other academic field, studies on national identity have been exposed to many trends over the years. The research field reached a high-point in the 1980s and early 1990s with influential works from modernist Ernest Gellner (1983), modernist-constructivist Benedict Anderson (1991), and ethno-symbolist Anthony D. Smith (1991). These studies took place in an environment of great changes in international politics. The end of the Cold War was of
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major significance and the following nation- and state-building processes in Eastern Europe (Ekman, 2001:16). The end of the Cold War opened up for more internal nationalist movements rather than inter-state quarrels (Kaldor, 1999:4). Studies on national identity today have taken on more of a case-study orientation often from a critical perspective dealing with culture and minority issues rather than nations in the strict sense (Özkirimli, 2005:50pp).

In the book When is the nation? (2005) Ishijo & Uzelac discusses whether we can trace our current nations far back in history or if the nation and national identity is a product of 18th or 19th century European ideologies. Is national identity constructed subjectively or is it part of an objective context containing unchangeable characteristics (Özkirimli, 2005:15p)? According to primordialism, nations as we know them today can trace their roots back in history even though they did not go by the name of nations. They were communities with common cultures, languages, religions, rites, etc., and traits of our contemporary national communities can be traced back to those early nations (Hastings, 1997). Eric Hobsbawn (1990) and Benedict Anderson (1991) argue on the contrary that nations were mainly a European product based on the values of the Enlightenment and the “Age of Revolution” (Hobsbawn, 1990:18) and did not arise until nationalist emotions and symbols could be spread with modern technology such as the printing press. According to the modernist and constructivist approach there were political reasons for the emergence of nations. National identity is in this perspective often connected to state-building processes and these nations and nation-states were politically constructed “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1991). This dissertation draws on the Ethno-symbolist approach, established mainly by Anthony D. Smith and it is a middle-ground theory. Ethno-symbolism points to

…the centrality of symbolic elements – myths, memories, traditions, values, rituals and symbols – in the formation and persistence of nations. (Smith, 2005:98)

Smith argues that there are relevant aspects in other theories on national identity. Although he does not agree with the claims that communities are primordial, Smith relies on the research of Clifford Geertz (1963), when pointing to the feeling among community members that they are (Smith, 1999:99). It is thus important to distinguish between identity as a fixed category and the perception of identity. Based on these perceptions, national identity contains a common core concerning territory, language, culture, and religion which has survived in some communities until today, which consequently supports a primordial view. Smith argues that they can
trace their traditions far back in history and takes the Jewish community as an example (Smith, 1999:220). On the other hand, nationalism as an ideology is a recent innovation (Smith, 2001:46), and the development of Jewish nationalism supports the modernist perspective, as the Zionist project was not established until the 19th century, despite Jewish communities having kept core traditions for a very long time (Smith, 1999:209). According to Smith, primordialism and modernism are not sufficient tools for analyzing contemporary nations. In his view primordialism is too focused on the culturally given and the modernists are confusing the nation with the state by not entering into the “inner world of nationalism” (Smith, 2001:60). Ethno-symbolism thus fills a void, particularly when studying complex conflicts.

Such a paradigm, while not neglecting external political, geopolitical and economic factors could focus on subjective symbolic and socio-cultural elements, encourage more nuanced perspectives and approaches, and thereby address the vital symbolic issues of ethnic identity, myth and memory that so often prove intractable. (Smith, 2001: 60)

Ethno-symbolism can be applied in this dissertation to understand the political development of Zionism, its components and the role of Jerusalem.

2.1.3 Components of national identity

This dissertation is guided by a constructivist approach which leads to the understanding of national identity components as continuously modified. Nonetheless, research shows that there are a number of more-or-less stable ingredients. Anthony Smith claims that a nation shares a “…historic homeland, common myths and memories, a common culture, common legal rights and duties, and a common economy.” (Smith, 1991:14). Smith further elaborates on these components, adds motive as a foundation, and argues that the ideal type could be used in a comparative perspective. A nation is constructed through

1. the growth of myths and memories of common ancestry and history of the cultural unit of population;
2. the formation of a shared public culture based on an indigenous resource (language, religion, etc.);
3. the delimitation of a compact historic territory, or homeland;
4. the unification of local economic units into a single socio-economic unit based on the single culture and homeland;
5. the growth of common codes and institutions of a single legal order, with common rights and duties for all members. (Smith, 1999:104)
To this could be added that myths and memories are created not only in connection with common ancestry, but with all five components. This analytical model also serves as a tool when nation- and state-building processes are intertwined such as the case of Israel. What is particularly interesting about Smith’s model is its incorporation of a common economy which I find compatible with Buzan’s physical base and its resources.

Another addition to the model is that national identity is often a reaction to other, sometimes competing, identities. Without “the other”, national identity is rarely nationalistic (Smith, 1999:13; Billig, 1995:78). As human beings we identify ourselves in relation to “the other” in order to guide our everyday life and we tend to overestimate the positive attributes of our own group – the in-group – and exaggerate the negative features of the out-group – the group to which we do not belong (Tajfel, 1982). Intergroup relations are often based on conflict, difference, and exclusion, but there are also other reasons for joining together as a group, such as the sharing of motives and goals (Billig, 1976:371). The image of “the other” is often connected to the production of stereotypes (Hinton, 2000).

Traditional national identity theories have contributed greatly to identity studies, but have not sufficiently developed the concept of common territory and the homeland. Territory is rather described as something given within the identity model or “…a passive nest in the nation, not an active determinant of national trajectory and identity.” (Yiftachel, 2006:44). Smith’s model constitute the foundation of the analytical framework for analyzing how Zionist identity discourses and narratives interplay with the policy area of planning, related to the territory of Jerusalem. The following section presents a model, based on territorial identity and more specifically the concept of territoriality.

2.2 Territorial identity theories – Developing an analytical model

…”place” has become as much part of human identity as language, religion, or shared history, and likewise we often feel as passionate about protecting our “place” as we do about our language, our religion, or our history. (White, 2000:5)

Territory has always been a source of conflict and many wars have been fought over larger or smaller pieces of land. The physical land mass can also be interpreted in a broader perspective as including its resources (Jönsson, Tägil & Törnqvist, 2000:20; Buzan, 1991:90pp). In People, States and Fear, Barry Buzan argues that territory is closely related to its population and its resources which constitutes the physical base of a state. A threat to a state’s physical base is therefore a potential threat to the well-being and
prosperity of that state (Buzan, 1991:91pp). This is one reason why some territories are valued higher than others. Territory is described as one of the main components of the nation (Smith, 1991:14; Ekman, 2001:80; Armstrong, 1982:14pp), but it is also important for the identification process of individuals as it is associated with our everyday lives. It can be connected to safety, home, tradition, memory, etc. (Tillett, 1991:115p). Territory is even considered the most important part of human identity (White, 2000:4).

Globalization processes have provided us with new arenas for social relations and have an effect on the time-space relationship which could potentially undermine the importance of territory. These processes however do not replace or decrease our interest in territory (Lundgren Jörum, 2011:22). One specific lesson of this dissertation is rather that different identification processes can exist side by side and national identity construction and the role of territory can be studied on different levels involving a growing number of actors.

The concept of territory has traditionally been connected to a physical area, but it can also have a more symbolic value. According to George White, territory comprises both the actual natural resources and a cultural landscape which “… reinforces the shared national identity within the psyche of every individual on a daily basis…” (White, 2000:26). This cultural landscape contains symbols of the community such as monuments, street names, or religious sites. A territory could also be connected to mental maps and images (Tuan, 1975). One example is the case of migrants and refugees constructing mental maps and nostalgic images of places and territories they might never have seen. Territory and where we live is thus a natural part of our identity. We relate in one way or another to our countries, our regions, our villages or cities, and our neighborhoods. Identity is also connected to our houses or apartments and the personal belongings they contain.

When analyzing the importance of territory in national identity construction and its relationship with planning, both the physical and the psychological aspects are relevant. Planning concerns the physical construction of, for instance a city, and has long been dominated by ideas of modernism, of breaking with the symbolic and with the past, and of rationally building for the future with the support of the government (Sandercock, 1998:23). On the other hand, quite of lot of the work of architects and planners can be associated with the creation of symbols such as monuments or particular landmarks (Geisler, 2005). Jerusalem is both a physical territory, where buildings and infrastructure are being constructed, and an
arena for social relations. It is a psychological category in the minds of not only Jerusalemites, but people all over the world.

2.2.1 Conceptualizing territoriality

The importance of territory for community or individual identity is reflected in the concept of human territoriality. It is not a fully developed concept, as many researchers use it as something more or less given. Territoriality will be used in this dissertation as a link between identity, control, and territory. The concept is connected to a sense of protectiveness and ownership of territory and to theories on animal’s desire to protect a certain area, gangs’ determination to control a neighborhood, or a state’s aspiration to decide over the fate of its territory. Territoriality is thus a kind of

...behavior that uses a bounded space, a territory, as an instrument for securing a particular outcome. By controlling access to a territory through boundary restrictions, the content of a territory can be manipulated and its character designed. (Taylor, 2003:101)

From a power perspective, there is a soft and a hard interpretation of the concept. The soft version is the general importance of territory for collective and individual identification processes. George White associates territory intimately with identity and elaborates on the concept of territoriality as the protectiveness of place, cultural landscapes, and more specifically, “…the expression of a group’s need to protect its language, its religion, its essential identity.” (White, 2000:5). The first expression of territoriality consists of government buildings, monuments, and the like; the second can be found in literature, poetry, and art; and third, the tenacity factor, which is the “…history of a group’s determination to protect or seize individual places or pieces of territory…” (White, 2000:6).

The hard perception, on the other hand, is based on control and rational behavior. Robert David Sack argues that

Territoriality is intimately related to how people use the land, how they organize themselves in space, and how they give meaning to the place. (Sack, 1986:2)

Territoriality is thus related to managerial, political, and ideological operations. Territoriality is in Sack’s view related to three aspects: classification – how an area is established and maintained; communication – who is included and excluded; and control – what is going on within the territory. The control of territory seized in conflicts often leads to strong narratives, produced and reproduced over generations. These categories will mainly come to the fore when analyzing how the territory of Jerusalem came into
Israeli control, when identifying political discourses and narratives as means of communication, and when presenting Israeli control and hold of contemporary Jerusalem. The territory is not just a place, it has a specific meaning. It is a phenomenon, an arena for inclusion and exclusion, and is controlled by relationships and interactions. It is a physical, social, and psychological category (Sack, 1986:19pp).

According to Claire Sutherland, discourse theory is particularly useful when analyzing territorial aspects of national identity, the role of ethnic markers, and hegemony. These aspects are best understood using ideological perspectives within discourse theory. Sutherland particularly emphasizes the research by Laclau & Mouffe (1985) and studies of critical geopolitics such as Gerard O’Tuathail’s from 1996. “Critical geopolitics sets out to deconstruct spatial tropes in order to understand how they are manipulated by political elites…” (Sutherland, 2005:187).

Territoriality is in this study interpreted as both intentional and unintentional ways of controlling and giving meaning to a territory. It is closely connected to how people and communities identify with territory from both a physical and symbolic point of view. National identity discourses consist of a number of narratives and micro-discourses and according to Sutherland they provide “…a solid framework within which to embed empirical study.” (Sutherland, 2005:200). This will be further developed as we identify possible components of territorial identity. These components all contain both a physical aspect and psychological perspectives. They are closely related to strategies for controlling territory, hereafter called strategies of territoriality. The model presented below have been inspired by and developed from Smith (2001:60; 1999:104). The following section will scrutinize the territorial aspects of 1. common laws and state-building, 2. common history and religion, 3. common ethnic background, 4. a common economy, and 5. the construction of a common “other”. These components are linked to specific policy goals and strategies of territoriality, which will guide the analysis in chapters 5, 6 and 8.

2.2.2 Legal-political territoriality

Laws and institutions serve as a common framework for the citizens of the state of Israel. They can also be vital tools for controlling what happens to and in Jerusalem as a specific territory. The first component in the model for analyzing the link between identity and the planning of Jerusalem is common laws and regulations, based on a community obeying the same laws and institutions within a given territory. Members of that community have the same legal rights and duties (Smith, 1991:9pp). This is translated into the concept of legal-political territoriality. The inclusion of the legal
component has been criticized for blurring the boundaries between the nation and the state (Guibernau, 2004:127pp).

The legal framework and institutional set-up is often based on common norms that have been developed over centuries. The state is usually the constructor and enforcer of this common legal and institutional framework, but the norms are based on the culture and behavior within specific communities. (Smith, 1991:12). In Smith’s view, the nation and the state are intertwined in the case of laws and institutions. This is reiterated by the research of Stein Rokkan, who sees nation-building as a process closely connected to state-building following the patterns of the creation of the European nation-states. According to Rokkan, the process of building nation-states starts with economic and cultural integration in a specific territory. Later on important institutions such as the military and the school system are added. A political system is established that reaches further out into the periphery and forms a system of rights and duties (Rokkan in Flora, 1999:65pp).

On the other hand a nation does not always have to be related to state-building or nationalist processes. Researchers of nationalism have distinguished between a state built on common ethnicity (ethnic nationalism), or a state as a political unit, among other things by providing services to the citizens (civic nationalism) (Özkirimli, 2005:22f). This classification is based on Hans Kohn’s ideas on “Western” civic and “Eastern” ethnic nationalism (Kohn, 1994). The classical definition of a state as an administrative unit, based on rationality and with a monopoly on violence shows, that the state can be separated from the nation as an analytical category. Switzerland is often cited as an example of civic nationalism, but even if the Swiss state is made up of a number of nationalities united around a common political system, there is still a common value system holding the society together. This value system has been part of the regional development for centuries (Kriesi, 2004:17). In the case of Israel, the nation and the state are intimately connected. The ongoing state-building process is based on Zionism as a hegemonic identity discourse and is connected to ethnic nationalism.

If a nation is dominating societal processes within a state it is likely that most of the laws and institutions are created by the majority and reflect the territoriality of that group. Laws could therefore be constructed in such a way that they facilitate community- and nation-building. This involves the risk that the laws might discriminate against minorities. Some claim that Israeli laws are used to territorially discriminate the Palestinian inhabitants of Jerusalem (Margalit, 2006) and to strengthen the Zionist identity discourse by using legal interpretations and custom-made institutions.
This type of territoriality is widened to include not only institutions connected to administration and decision-making systems but also to the actual physical construction of, for instance, government buildings, national institutions such as museums, and places for public gatherings. The legal-political component is particularly suitable in the case of Israel because the concepts of nation and the state are intertwined. Legal-political territoriality is connected to a number of aspects related to state-building in which territory is a basic component. It relates to laws regulating what happens within a territory and between territories. These laws cover everything from building standards, and infrastructure, to regional and municipal borders, and statutory plans. Laws and administrative regulations consequently facilitate the control of a specific territory. Territory, nation, and an internationally recognized state were and still are considered key elements in the future of the Jewish people. Jerusalem planning is embraced by several laws, both regarding the actual planning system and specific territorial aspects of planning. The question is whether these laws are connected to national identity discourses.

### 2.2.3 Historical and religious territoriality

There is another sense in which history has power, of a more experiential kind, where history meets geography, and that is the power of place. Planning seeks to exert some control over society's spatial arrangements. But spaces are also places, and places have histories. And people are usually attached to places precisely because of these histories. (Sandercock, 1998:33–34)

Jerusalem plays an important role in the history of Israeli and Jewish national identity. It has a rich but contested history and the battle over who was there first is still raging. Who has the right to call Jerusalem home and what culture should dominate the streets and minds of the Jerusalemites? One aspect of historical and religious territoriality concerns giving meaning to a place, and there are many historical narratives and counter-narratives about Jerusalem that require knowledge of contemporary discussions, historical events, and where they took place. History thus plays an important role when studying national identity construction (Ekman, 2001; Smith, 1991), as historical events and historical documents are often invoked in a national narrative and in the political rhetoric.

As concluded in the introduction, increasing attention is given to the role of memories and particularly collective memories in the social construction of national identity and in planning (Fenster, 2004). It is clear that history and memories connected to territory have profound effects on current Is-
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Israeli Jerusalem politics and play a significant role in the construction of a collective Jewish memory for Jerusalem. These collective territorial memories are internalized and socialized through education, in the army, in politics and in literature (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005). The process of selecting historical events and places is very specific; many events are deliberately left out and the selection and commemorative narratives change constantly or are constantly renegotiated. “Collective memory continuously negotiates between available historical records and current social and political agendas” (Zerubavel, 1995:5). Territorial memories and narratives are rarely undisputed. There is often another side to the story. Where we find memories we also find counter-memories and counter-narratives about the same piece of land.

Jerusalem is not only important from a historical point of view; it is also a religious space, which becomes apparent as soon as one arrives in the city. Religion is closely connected to the narratives of the city’s history, but also its culture and common ancestry. These identity components are often intertwined in the case of Jerusalem, even among actors who present themselves as secular. The territoriality of religion is mainly related to two perspectives: holy sites and the control of these sites; and land and properties owned by various congregations (inspired by Sack, 1986:93). This kind of territoriality can create violent clashes within religions, as in the case of the Holy Sepulcher (Dumper, 2003:107) or between religions, such as the role of Haram Ash-Sharif or Temple Mount in Jerusalem (Armstrong, 2005:428). In physical terms, holy sites are connected to legal, administrative, and technical issues (Dumper, 2003:17pp), but they also have great symbolic value.

In this study, history and religion are also related to rehabilitation, revitalization, and architecture. National identity is strengthened with public squares, parks, monuments, museums, and the like (Geisler, 2005; Vale, 2008). These features contribute to beautifying the city and improving the everyday life of the inhabitants. The process of rehabilitating heritage is also related to tourism, and this is sometimes referred to as urban heritage tourism (Chang, Milne, Fallon & Pohlmann, 1996). A further goal of revitalization is to make the city more appealing in general, both to attract educated professionals, and to encourage the establishment of businesses.

History and religion are important components of this study, particularly when accounting for the commemorative narratives of Jerusalem and analyzing the interplay with planning policy.
2.2.4 Ethnic territoriality

The fundamental idea of Zionism is the creation of a homeland for the Jewish people. It is based on a perception of common ancestry and a common core. Territory, in the case of Israel, is intimately linked with the belief in being a chosen people. The Armenian community, with Mount Ararat as its territorial center, is another example of a chosen people (Smith, 1999:137). When discussing the people we often encounter the word ethnicity, and the concept is sometimes used without proper definition. It has become an important marker for describing an individual or a group, as well as being part of the foundation of identities. The concept of ethnicity refers to individuals and groups who see themselves, or are viewed by others, as culturally distinct. An ethnic group is “…a type of cultural collectivity, one that emphasizes the role of myths and descent and historical memories, […] recognized by […] cultural differences like religion, customs, language and institutions.” (Smith, 1991:20). An ethnic community has six distinctive features:

1. a collective proper name, 2. a myth of common ancestry, 3. shared historical memories, 4. one or more differentiating elements of a common culture, 5. an association with a specific ‘homeland’, 6. a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population. (Smith, 1991:21)

An ethnic community may be self-aware, but it does not necessarily strive for a more formalized position in the global community such as by creating a nation-state. An ethnicity is not to be confused with class or other group markers, although it is not unlikely that an ethnic group also belongs to a specific class (White, 2000:17). Regardless, an ethnic group is socially and culturally produced (Hylland Eriksen, 1993:161). In the case of the Jewish nation, there are first of all discussions regarding the existence of a Jewish people at all, whether Jewishness is exclusively connected to Judaism as a religion, and if Israel is the center and aspiration of all Jews in the world. In a global perspective, Jewish identity is evidently something very fragmented and heterogeneous (Evron, 1995:41; Zerubavel, 1995:14p). These internal identification processes is complemented by an ascribed identity pointed out by other groups (Lindholm Schulz, 1996:49). This is also referred to as ethnic categorization (White, 2000:17). An ethnic group can also be distinguished and recognized as a nation by other communities (Brubaker, 2004:42).

Territories connected to a certain ethnic group is sometimes called ethnoscapes and

...historic “ethnoscapes” cover a wider extent of land, present a tradition of continuity and are held to constitute an ethnic unity, because the terrain in-
vested with collective significance is felt to be integral to a particular historical culture community or ethnie, and the ethnic community is seen as an intrinsic part of that poetic landscape. (Smith, 1999:150)

Memories, sacredness, martyrdom, and contestation are crucial aspects of ethnoscapes, which could be everything from the actual natural geological landscape where an ethnic group resides, to more symbolic views of a group’s connection to a specific territory.

The role of ethnic territoriality in the case of Jerusalem can be translated into the concept of demography. Who lives in the city and who should live in the city? The political assumptions concerning who has the right to live in a certain territory are also closely related to the concept of ethnocracy, which means

… the expansion, ethnicization, and control of a dominant ethnic nation […] over contested territory and polity. […] The state is the main vehicle of the regime, providing institutions, mechanisms, laws, and legitimized forms of violence to implement the projects articulated by the regime. (Yiftachel, 2006:11)

There are several examples of so-called ethnocracies in the world, such as 19th century Australia and New Zealand, or contemporary Latvia and Estonia. Yiftachel states that Israel is an ethnocracy and that these regimes are based on some sort of settler aspect, ethno-nationalism as a mobilizing force of, and capitalist consequences (Yiftachel, 2006:12pp).

Ethnic territoriality is the third component in the analytical model and will mainly be used as a tool to analyze the demographic patterns of Jerusalem and how they interplay with the planning policies of the city.

2.2.5 Economic territoriality
Jerusalem is a city not only associated with myths, symbols, and geopolitical conflict, but also with concrete everyday-life issues such as employment opportunities, education, and general living standards. Although the city remains poor in a comparative perspective (Alfasi & Fenster, 2005), in recent years there has been a growing interest in the economic development of the city. In May 2011, the government launched the Merom plan to strengthen the economy of Jerusalem at the cost of around 300 million NIS (Israeli Cabinet Press release, May 20, 2011).

In a geopolitical perspective, there are a number of reasons for wanting to control a certain territory, one of which is to secure the control of natural resources (White, 2000:22), which is one of the foundations of economy. Related to ethnic territoriality, another important factor is to control the population – the potential workforce. The population enters into a
social contract with the state to mutually develop the state in every possible way, with the citizens receiving services in exchange for work or taxes. This discussion is related to the role of the physical base in the interpretation of Buzan’s model of the components of a state.

Anthony D. Smith claims that uniting separate localities into a single economic base or unit to benefit the entire nation is an important part of the national identification process (Smith, 1991:69). Nonetheless, in his article “When is the nation” from 2002, he removed that particular part of his ideal type and modified others, for instance, changing a common legal code to common laws (Smith, 2002). Monserrat Guibernau criticizes Smith’s use of this component as too wide to be analytically accurate, and speculates as to whether these deletions may be connected to the difficulty of measuring and obtaining a common economy in our globalized world (Guibernau, 2004:128pp).

Economic development is global but it is also related to the international status of a state. In 2010 and 2011 we witnessed an economic crisis in for instance Iceland and Greece, which was a hard blow to their self-esteem and international image. I find economic territoriality to be a significant part of the analytical model, although the relevance of economics to national identity construction may differ from case to case. It is important to remember that economic strategies of territoriality may be enforced to strengthen other strategies. Economic resources can be an important part in a territorial struggle. Economic priorities could be connected with the role of demography and the desire to build a community on strong socio-economic groups. This is of course desirable for any government for tax reasons, but economic capacity is also a resource in a struggle over territory, a struggle that requires capital in order to for instance build or maintain a military presence. Despite the connections between territorialities I have chosen to see them as separate categories in order to deepen the analytical capability of the model. Being an economic hub is one of the usual roles of a capital city and the capital is expected to unite a nation in many respects, not only being the cultural and political capital, but also the economic.

Although still poor, Jerusalem is expected to develop considerably in the next 10–15 years. Economic development is thus an important part of a planning process because it often entails large investments. In some cases, the authorities must form coalitions with non-state actors in order to push a project through. In a case like Jerusalem, this could mean giving up a certain amount of control over territory that is deeply connected with identity. These non-governmental actors may have other ideas for the development of the city. When analyzing the economic territoriality of Jerusalem,
the focus falls on two issues: constructing the economic capital and the involvement of non-state actors.

2.2.6 Exclusive territoriality
One basic assumption of national identity is that it is always a reflection of or a reaction to other identities. Jerusalem is inhabited by a number of groups, but from a geopolitical perspective, the Palestinians and Israelis spring most readily to mind. The struggle over land has lead to the construction of images of “the territorial other”. On the other hand, “the other” could also be related to internal constructions within the groups.

We have discussed a number of concepts and issues that are related to other identities such as ethnoscapess, commemorations, and demography. In the case of Israel, we can also add the very broad concept and discourse of orientalism. Closely related to post-colonial theory, orientalism is concerned with the image of a specific “other” – the oriental “other”. In Edward Said’s book *Orientalism*, the concept is mainly related mainly to the place of the Orient in “western” societies.

The Orient […] is also the place of Europe's greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other. In addition, the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience. Yet none of this Orient is merely imaginative. The Orient is an integral part of European material civilization and culture. (Said, 2003:1–2)

The image of the Arab or the Palestinian among Jewish Israelis is both consciously and unconsciously created by prejudice and stereotypes. According to Teichman and Bar-Tal, stereotypes contribute greatly to the image of “the other” and to continuing violence. Changing this negative psychological repertoire, through intervention, it is possible to reverse this negative trend (Teichman & Bar-Tal, 2005:391pp).

In terms of territory, the image of “the other” is connected to opinions on how land is managed and developed. It is related to building styles and the concept of good planning. Good planning is always on “our” side and bad, chaotic planning is always performed by “the other”. On the other hand, good examples of “otherness” may also be highlighted, but there is a risk that those good features will be pushed aside or even internalized as “our” invention. The addition of exclusive territoriality to the model will facilitate an analysis of the role of “the other” in the construction of Israeli identity discourses, mainly in commemorative narratives and the construction of strategies of territoriality.
The territorialities presented above constitute an analytical model which facilitates the understanding of the interplay between territorial identity and the policy area of planning from different perspectives, bearing in mind that these territorialities are in practice interconnected.

![Five strategies of territoriality](image)

**Figure 2:1. Five strategies of territoriality**

### 2.3 The role of the city in national identity construction

The city of Jerusalem is the territorial focus and object of this dissertation. Jerusalem is both an *arena* where a geopolitical conflict is played out and significant *in itself* as a symbol. The role of cities, and particularly capital cities, has not been thoroughly studied from a national identity perspective, although researchers take an increasing interest in this research field. This section is therefore an attempt to construct a framework for such a research area.

The territorialities described above can all be related to the role of the city and to local processes. The city is a microcosm where all these processes take place through local political negotiations. Throughout history, cities have had a natural place in nation- and state-building, whether in the form of city-states (Jönsson, Tägil & Törnqvist, 2000) or as capitals in larger territorial states. Capital cities in particular are crucial for state-building and as symbols for a larger community, but they also have their own identities and symbolic importance. It is also the place where people live and conduct their everyday lives. A growing sense of local identity...
instead of national identity could challenge the symbolic value for the broader community.

Cities are specific territories revealing geopolitical aspects, symbolism, and psychological perceptions. Pierre Beckouche presents two main perspectives on why we tend to protect and control our local territory or why some local communities “succeed”. First, territorial boundaries, and particularly the striving for local boundaries, are based on a natural human search for freedom, and this can be considered a kind of decentralization process which is efficient for a prosperous local economy. The second perspective has a more negative character in the sense that boundaries are barriers protecting the local identity and local values from outside threats (Beckouche, 2004:382). Boundaries also differentiate one group from other groups. The city can thus be an arena of both inclusion and exclusion.

This section focuses on two examples of the city in a national identity context with relevance to the case of Jerusalem. First, the city can be an arena of internal and interstate conflicts and wars. Second, the capital city plays an important role in itself in national identity construction.

2.3.1 Territoriality and city geopolitics

Growing worldwide migration and the creation of multicultural societies, have led to an increased focus on cities and regions as arenas of conflict and difference (Sandercock, 1998) and a general demand to include all kinds of levels. Traditional studies on conflict are often connected to territorial rivalry, struggle, or dominance on the state-level or to minorities struggling for independence. The question is how the city-level fits into this framework.

One way to understand the role of the city is to look beyond the international political rhetoric and determine where conflicts actually take place. The city has been a constant arena of conflict, from the wars in ancient Greece to the 9/11 attacks in New York in 2001, and the post-election riots and violence in Kenya in 2008. The wars of the 20th century left many cities totally devastated and it took decades for the damage to be repaired. The bombings of cities during the Second World War had the deliberate goal of making the enemy surrender – an enemy that was so exceptional that these measures were regarded as the only way to end the war. Attacks on cities are spectacular and brutal because of the civilian impact and the destruction of streets, famous buildings, and whole neighborhoods. Cities have met this threat, particularly after 9/11 with privatization and militarization (Coaffee, 2003). Today, cities are more than ever targets. Stephen Graham states that “…the world’s geopolitical struggles increasingly articulate around violent conflicts over very local, urban, strategic sites.”
Graham uses the phrase urbicide to describe how cities and city-based living is a deliberate target in wars. “Both sides are attacking the spaces of everyday urban life”. (Graham, 2004:193). He refers to the Israel–Palestine conflict as an example, where two parties are each trying to achieve geopolitical dominance. Palestinian suicide bombers are targeting specific symbols of everyday life, such as restaurants, public places, houses, and streets. Israeli army (IDF) operations in refugee camps, nightly incursions, and restrictions of entry and exit to and from urban areas, have been criticized as collective punishment (Graham, 2004:193pp).

The city can thus be used as an arena for terror attacks, military strikes, and violence. But through its meaning for groups, the city can itself become a battlefield. This kind of city can be, not just an arena, but the root of a conflict. These conflicts arise from competition regarding a specific territory. Cities where the territory is disputed are called contested cities (Hepburn, 2004; Bollens, 2000). They are sometimes so-called frontier or border cities and form part of a broader border dispute. These cities are looked upon as an outpost defending certain values in a hostile territory. Jerusalem is an example of a contested city and is, together with Israel as a whole, seen by parts of the Israeli society and the international community, as the only “Western” outpost in a fundamentalist region or the only democracy in the Middle East (see for instance an official Israeli report by Karniel, 2005). Through turns of history, similar situations can be found in Nicosia on Cyprus, in Sarajevo, and in Belfast. Wars and violent confrontations over territory have created deep divisions, and in the case of Nicosia there has been a total separation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots with a wall running through the city, although the wall has been opened up lately. These kinds of cities are both arenas for conflicts and important territories in themselves.

There are also plenty of examples of other kinds of mostly non-violent urban conflicts of a more social, ethnic, and/or class character. These conflicts are often specific to each city, even if all cities experience some sort of conflict. The demography of a city is shaped through history by migration, immigration, war and conquest, occupation, transfer of population, genocide, etc. Cities characterized by some sort of division and separation, are referred to as divided cities, although other related expressions are also used, such as the dual city (Fainstein, 1992) or the polarized city. A city can be divided by ethnicity, economy, territory, nationality, religion, or through architectural and social barriers. In most cases these factors are combined. Terms like segregation or social exclusion are used when examining divided cities, focusing on ethnicity/race, class, or other forms of
equality gaps (Andersson, 1999; Beall, Crankshaw & Parnell, 2002). Besides being a contested city, Jerusalem has also been connected to division, polarization and segregation. Examples of these discussions are presented in chapter 6.

There are situations where multi-ethnic cities have a broader regional importance, such as in the case where ethnic minorities are discriminated against, at least according to their own statements, and where these minority groups can be used by politicians in their “native” countries as pawns in territorial disputes or conflicts. Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan point out that it can be hazardous for a state or a city to pursue discriminatory actions against the minority if their co-nationals live in a neighboring country. This can enflame an already tense situation (Linz & Stepan, 1996:26p). In Latvia for instance, a majority of the population are city-dwellers and in Riga, the capital and largest city, the Latvians are a slim majority and where the Russian population is slightly smaller. Riga is one of the most important symbols for the reconstruction of Latvian national identity, and this reconstruction creates tensions between the groups. Particularly since many of the Russians are so-called non-citizens, constituting 14,61% of total population in Latvia (Latvian Bureau of Statistics, Population index 2011, www.csb.lv). A majority within this group do have a legal right to become citizens after some years of living in Latvia, if they take a test in Latvian history, culture, and language (Dreifelds, 1996:173pp), but many refuse to do so because they regard it as an illegitimate and insulting requirement.

In this section we have established that a city can be geopolitically important, which in some cases leads to violent conflicts if there are numerous actors claiming the same territory. Cities can also be targets of military attacks because this strikes at the heart of the everyday life.

2.3.2 Territoriality and the capital city

It is in the capital city of a country that the relationship between urban planning, architecture and evolving conceptions of national identity is likely to be the most direct and most closely under political influence. (Neill, 2004:17)

The capital of a state in itself is an important symbol for statehood and state-building but capitals come in various shapes and have different backgrounds. A capital city represents a specific state and sometimes a nation as well. This means that the territory of the capital has to reflect the true “soul” of the nation in its monuments, its buildings, and its planning in general, but also regarding the demographic composition. Capitals are thus connected to the territorialities presented earlier. Connected to legal-
political territoriality, government buildings and other kinds of headquar-
ters are often located in the capital city. Cultural institutions are usually
centered in the capital, and the local culture of the capital often has wider
repercussions (Nilsson, 2000:6). Capital cities contain specific sites and
symbols based on religion, historic events, or particular individuals (Vale,
2008; Geisler et. al, 2005), which relates to historical and religious territo-
riality. The question is whether capitals can be designed or constructed in
order to strengthen national identity. According to Lawrence Vale, “Archi-
tects and urban designers cannot determine symbolism over time, least of
all a symbolism as amorphous as a national one”. (Vale, 2008:337). In
connection with economic territoriality, capitals were previously the given
economic centers, but are today challenged by economic globalization,
which may bring other cities than the capital to the fore as growth centers.
Ever since the establishment of the state of Israel for example, the main
economic center has been Tel Aviv and not Jerusalem. A capital is sup-
posed to relate to the community in question, but it is also often a symbol
of the state’s relation to modern lifestyle. Capitals are constructed to be a
gathering symbol, but there are cases where physical appearance of the city
only reflects one ethnic group and cases where this process is promoted.
This ethnic and exclusive territoriality can lead to violent confrontations.
In the case of Jerusalem this could be related to the concepts of ethnocracy
and ethicizing (Yiftachel & Yacobi, 2002).

The origins of capitals vary and particularly concerning the influence of
the state in the establishment and administration of the capital. Browsing
through the literature, we find that there are many types of capitals. One
distinction is between cities that have evolved into the role of the capital
and those that have been constructed (Vale, 2008:15p). We will concen-
trate on six examples to illustrate in practice the development of capitals
and they are all positioned in one way or the other to the five territorial-
ities presented earlier.

The first category consists of major cities that became capitals in connec-
tion with the establishment of nation-states in Western Europe, where
many of the capitals have a long history as important cities and became the
national center rather early (Vale, 2008:16pp). Sometimes the road to-
wards building a nation, a nation-state, and a common capital was violent,
often leading to competition between two or more dominating cities or
regions. Berlin and Paris were national projects where the central authori-
ties had a large amount of influence over the planning of the cities. The
development of London, on the other hand, was more uncontrolled and
“local”. This indicates that one of the main challenges is the potential clash
between local identity and the capital as a national project. To what extent
can the inhabitants, the local politicians, and local civil servants influence the development of the capital city (Van Dijk, 2000:180pp)? This aspect is relevant when discussing the role of public planners in the development of Jerusalem. These capitals have a long history and could rather be connected to primordial assumptions than modernist or constructivist. On the other hand, they were eventually constructed as political, ethnic, economic and historical symbols of a nation and of the state. London is also a global city which image is rather inclusive than exclusive.

A second category of capitals evolved under the colonial system all over the world. These cities already existed, but became the tools of the colonizing states. There are cases where cities grew in importance as a result of colonialism, causing the decline of others (see for example Adama, 2007:88). Calcutta, or Kolkata, for instance was the capital of British India until 1912 when the capital was moved to New Delhi. This kind of process during the colonial era was damaging to the natural development of important cities and it changed the conditions for Kolkata and had great repercussions for the new capital city. These planning initiatives were intended to maximize the British control over the territory (King, 2010:368). The influence of the colonial past is still a relevant aspect in many parts of the world including the territory in focus in this dissertation. The colonial history has set preconditions both regarding architecture, decision-making, and planning doctrines.

In order to shake off the last remnants of the colonial influence some former colonies have changed the geographic location of their capitals. This third kind of capital represents a process of changing back to a former capital or moving the capital to another city of domestic importance. Another way to send a strong message to the former colonizers is to replace the colonial name of a city, such as changing Bombay to Mumbai. One example of moving a capital is Ankara, the capital of Turkey. Istanbul was considered too affiliated with and symbolically connected to the Ottoman Empire and West European states, and in the 1920s, the nationalist movement led by Kemal Atatürk sought to establish a new capital. All government institutions were moved to Ankara, despite the logistically more problematic location of the new capital, and the move was followed by a campaign to identify Ankara with the new regime and to strengthen Turkey as an independent state (Kacar, 2010).

In territories where there was no natural main city, such as in the case of Canada or the United States, capitals had to be selected, established, and developed. This is a fourth type of capital and, according to David Gordon and Brian Osborne, researchers in urban and regional planning, the Canadian capital Ottawa is an example of a constructed “…symbolic centre of
an imagined and performed Canada.” (Gordon & Osborne, 2004:619). Ever since the creation of the state, the population of Canada has consisted of a mixture of backgrounds, from the native population to the French-Canadians and the English-speaking group. Therefore, it was important to create a capital that could bring all these different nationalities together in a new national community, and the choice fell on Ottawa to be a unifying capital built and planned for all these groups. The architectural vision of the capital, with monuments, war memorials, and plazas, was intended to evoke images of a common nation and a collective memory. One of the most important goals was to eliminate conflict by creating a unifying symbol. The mall area in Washington and the squares of the old European capitals were the source of inspiration for this. The conclusion of Gordon and Osborne is that Ottawa, with its monuments and squares, did not become the national center. The national core of Canada is rather its multiculturalism which is connected to many different places (Gordon & Osborne, 1994). The question is whether squares and monuments constructed as symbols of the nation can be forced upon the citizens and what the repercussions are for the city itself. There is a risk of a clash between local architecture based on local culture and a state-controlled or nation-oriented architecture.

To construct a completely new capital more or less from scratch, to build a new city altogether, is an extreme measure which constitutes a fifth type of capital. This is, of course, a great challenge for everyone involved, but it also offers new opportunities. Onyanta Adama (2007) examines the construction of Abuja, the new capital of Nigeria. One of the reasons for building a new capital was to create a city for all ethnic groups, which is important in a state torn by bloody civil wars. From a planning and architectural perspective, it also provided a chance to build a city based on new technology and modern planning methods. Adama’s conclusion is that Abuja has not become the national symbol it was intended to be and the planning of the city has not reduced violent confrontations. The planning vision for the new capital was unfortunately not implemented to its full extent. The problem in Nigeria, as in many other states in Africa, is the high unemployment rate which drives people to the cities, where slums arise and grow out of control (for more on slums see Davis, 2006). The intention to start fresh has produced major urban problems connected to poverty, poor infrastructure, lack of services, and the like – problems that have to be dealt with by local authorities. The creation of Abuja is an example of a state trying to create a uniting symbol and enforce state policies affecting city life and politics, which leads to a conflict between local interest and national elites (Adama, 2007:185pp).
One of the most significant categories for this chapter and the case of Jerusalem is the reconstruction of former capitals, although the other categories also contain relevant elements. This is our sixth type of capital city. They have, according to one specific interpretation, been under some kind of foreign rule for decades, centuries, or even thousands of years. Reconstructing an Israeli capital in Jerusalem after a long period of control by other regimes is a complicated process, to say the least. There is a constant risk of confrontations with other groups in the city, especially when the other group, the Palestinians, is trying to promote Jerusalem as their capital as well. Another example is a capital city which is being reconstructed after a period of influence from other groups or states, such as the capital cities of states in the former Soviet Union. Most of these capitals were main cities in the Soviet state system, and during this period they were changed and rebuilt. In the case of Latvia, for instance, which gained independence in 1991, the capital Riga was transformed quite considerably after the Second World War as new housing projects were initiated and new government buildings were erected. To restore and reconstruct Riga as the Latvian national center is an ongoing process in which symbols, such as the freedom monument or the Old City, are important for both identity and tourism (see for example Riga Old City development vision 2025). This reconstruction process can be of crucial importance for the ethnic Latvians, but more problematic for the Russian population.

The purpose of this section is not to ascertain whether it is right or wrong to pursue the establishment of a strong national identity connected to a capital, such as in Jerusalem, Ottawa, Abuja, or Riga. Nonetheless, we need to keep in mind that these processes have an affect on local and national relations. These types of capitals are in many ways interconnected with territoriality.

This chapter has established a theoretical background concerning national identity and, more specifically, presented a model based on five territorialities for analyzing the interplay between identity politics and the planning of Jerusalem. The city is a rather new object of national identity studies, and this chapter attempts to frame this research topic. Jerusalem is central to Zionism – the dominating Israeli identity discourse – and the theories presented in this chapter provide a basic understanding of the development of Zionism, including the role of Jerusalem. The next chapter will reveal the interplay between ideas, discourses, and policy-making with a focus on both structures and actors.
3. Policy-making and city planning as discursive practice

The translating of governing ideology into urban policy is not straightforward. Ideology must be translated into technical prescriptions that seek to move a society, or in this case a city, toward those final goals or vision. (Bollens, 2000:22)

...a key purpose of planning is to create, reproduce or mould the identities of places [...] into place identity. Planning is a set of institutions, ideas, and practices that sits within a social context and is embedded in power relations. (Hague, 2005:8)

In one way or another, processes of nation-hood and national identity construction are institutionalized and internalized in society as “…the discourse of nationalism operates through institutions. […] National identity has to be learned and internalized through socialization”. (Özkirimli, 2005:33). This is performed intentionally or unintentionally in the construction of political goals and visions, in implementation, and in practice. For Rogers Brubaker (1996), nationalism as an idea comes with a political motive and it is not a question of if it affects a policy area but how.

I have argued that we should think about nation not as substance but as institutionalized form, not as collectivity but as practical category, not as entity but as contingent event. (Brubaker, 1996:18)

The process of institutionalization is visible in many sectors such as education, military service, political and administrative systems, law, architecture, economic development, and planning. The purpose of this chapter is accordingly to scrutinize the interplay between ideas, discourses, and planning with a focus on policy content and formulation, on policy implementation and practice, and on the role of the planner.

This chapter focuses on three issues:

1. The first section covers the role of ideas and discourses in formulating planning policy and in practice.
2. The second part contains a presentation of planning ideals and planning theory.
3. The third and final section elaborates on the role of the planner in policy-making and how the planner relates to cognitive frameworks such as ideas and political discourses.
3.1 Policy-making as discursive practice

This dissertation follows in part the advice of Rogers Brubaker who recommends focusing on the following questions: “…how is nation-hood as a political and cultural form institutionalized within and among states? How does nation work as practical category, as classificatory scheme, as cognitive frame?” (Brubaker, 1996:16).

One assumption is that we internalize national identity discourses by socialization when

...national community becomes reality in the realm of convictions and beliefs through reifying, figurative discourses continually launched by politicians, intellectuals and media people and disseminated through the system of education, schooling, mass communication, militarization as well as through sports meetings. (de Cillia, Reisigl & Wodak, 1999:153).

This process is something that we as individuals encounter in our everyday lives but it is not necessarily a conscious internalization. In the policy area of planning, national identity discourses are communicated and institutionalized when articulated in texts, political speeches, policy documents, in practice, and in the institutional set-up. On the other hand, it is important to recognize that formulating policy goals and performing policy implementation is a constantly changing process and should not be regarded as fixed. Some planning policies presented in this dissertation are products of longer processes of policy formulation and others are connected to contemporary trends.

The institutionalization of national identity in city planning takes place through complex processes of decision-making, policy formulation, implementation, and city-state relations. Few studies focus explicitly on the relationship between national identity and land-use or spatial planning (Allmendinger, 2001b:33). As presented in the previous chapter connected to the capital city, some focus on architecture and other physical constructions as symbols of the nation. This is connected for instance to constructing commemorative sites (Vale, 2008). Others concentrate on the broader term “cultural planning” (Neill, 2004; Monclus & Guardia, 2006), of which national identity is one potential component. Even fewer studies focus on the interrelation between actual practice-oriented policy processes connected to the city and national identity. Despite the absence of a cohesive research field, there are a few conclusions to be drawn from this literature. The construction of the decision-making system plays a central role in the impact and influence of national identity on planning; globalization has an independent impact on the ability of national and local authorities to control the physical development; and planning can itself become an insti-
tutional expression of national identity. Having the power to perform planning is thus viewed with pride in certain geo-political contexts (Allmendinger, 2001b).

Power over the formulation of public policy is particularly relevant in a case connected to ethnic conflict.

When there is a single dominating ethnic group in control of the government apparatus, the morally based doctrines of that ethnonational group regarding sovereignty and cultural identity will merge with the state’s urban policy. (Bollens, 2000:22)

Issues connected to national identity do not go through the planning system in a straight linear flow; instead, issues take unpredictable paths back and forth in the process. The institutionalization of national identity can be illustrated by looking closer at the interactions within the political system. According to David Easton, research on the political process and political systems should start from the context in which the political system exists.

...systems analysis [...] takes its departure from the notion of political life as a boundary-maintaining set of interactions imbedded in and surrounded by other social systems to the influence of which it is constantly exposed. (Easton, 1965:25)

These interactions are not as bounded as illustrated in figure 3:1. In practice, there is a flow back and forth between the boxes. The process is not automatically path-dependent. A policy process is characterized by a flow of demand and support, and decision-making, policy formulation, and implementation create an output in the form of policy regulations and guidelines (Easton, 1965:112). The list of flows between the boxes is long and will be exemplified in the empirical chapters. Policy research has henceforth continued to enhance this model by adding new components such as policy implementation, policy advocacy, and policy evaluation (Hill, 1997).

This dissertation has been inspired by four aspects of policy research: the role of political discourses in the institutional set-up including decision-making systems and public administration; the process of policy formulation focusing on power relations; policy implementation as discursive practice; and the role of the public official, in this case the planner. The figure below summarizes the structure of the analysis.
As research on the interplay between national identity and planning is not yet a fully established research field, this section takes its departure from more general research on the role of ideas and discourses in policy-making. Another reason for relating to a broader view on policy is that planning theory has been criticized for being too introverted and not open to the role of context and ideas in the planning process (Granberg, 2004:64). A policy is commonly evaluated by its contents, outcomes, and intentions, and the purpose of a policy is to define objectives, to set priorities, to describe a plan, and to specify the rules of decision-making (Gordon, Lewis & Young, 1997:7).

3.3.1 The role of ideas and discourses in policy-making

Until the 1980s, policy theory was mainly dominated by an approach based on rational actors and self-interest – a view that often failed to recognize the role of ideas in the policy process (Fischer, 2003:5, 21–22; Campbell, 2002:21). Although there have been exceptions over the years,
for instance among more traditional policy researchers such as Max Weber
in the following statement, the basic foundation was still materiality.

Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct.
Yet very frequently the “world images” that have been created by “ideas”
have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been
pushed by the dynamic of interest. (Weber, 1946:280)

Policy theory has been modified over the years and integrates, to a larger
extent, ideas in the policy process, although it still focuses on self-interest.
Frank Fischer claims that policy theory still does not succeed in incorporat-
ing the fact that “...ideas often shape the interests themselves.” (Fischer,

Ideas such as identity discourses and personal views of society constitute
so-called cognitive paradigms and normative frameworks that “…reside in
the background of policy debates and that limit the range of alternatives
policy makers are likely to perceive as useful.” (Campbell, 2002:22). These
ideational structures also influence the construction and organization of
the administrative and political systems in order to achieve certain goals.
Studies have shown that ideas are often embedded within laws and institu-
tionalized in the bureaucracy, in political processes, and in administrative
procedures. This process of institutionalization also helps us to identify
potential path dependency (Campbell, 2002:31).

Traditional policy theories have been ill-equipped to analyze the role of
ideas and discourses, and according to Paul Sabatier it is necessary to make
both theoretical simplifications and apply a more inclusive approach than
strictly rational perspective (Sabatier, 2007:3–5). One solution is to focus
more on so-called belief systems than on institutional affiliation and to
recognize that actors pursue many different objectives and not only strictly
material self-interest. These belief systems could be described by using a
three-level hierarchy. First, we have the deep core beliefs, those which are
connected to assumptions about human nature and society. Here we can
find deep ideological values. The second level is the policy core beliefs, and
these are applied to a specific policy area such as planning. Secondary be-
liefs constitute the third category, and these concern details within a policy
area such as a specific plan or even parts of plans (Sabatier & Weible,
2007:195–196). The belief systems are particularly applicable when study-
ing the policy documents identifying policy goals and political strategies.

The starting point in the role of ideas and discourses is thus highly rele-
vant in examining a policy area in general, the formulation of policy goals,
and what constitutes a societal problem. If ideas shape our societies, then
all the political problems that we put on the agenda are based on certain ideas and values.

The problems that political systems attempt to deal with are not seen, in this view, as having altogether objective foundations in the material or economic base of society; rather, they are in significant part constructed in the realm of political discourse. (Fischer, 2003:23)

If discourses shape our policies in a much more profound way than policy theory has so far acknowledged, it is vital to gain a deeper understanding about this interplay. The relation between ideology and political discourse is not straightforward. Researchers sometimes use the two as synonyms, but in this dissertation they are interconnected, though affecting society in different ways. “Even though they are not ideologies per se, discourses will generally have an intentional or unintentional relationship or position to one.” (Fischer, 2003:77).

According to Maarten Hajer, it is fruitful to study policies using a discursive perspective but we need to be careful when dealing with intention. Political discourses and social constructions are not deliberately used by actors in pursuit of a specific interest. The course of society is determined by constant interaction between agents and structures that constantly reformulate and reconstruct power relations and policy issues (Hajer, 1995:57–58). Hajer claims that;

Discourse has been defined as a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that is produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities. (Hajer, 1995:60)

Even though intentions are difficult to measure, discourses are sometimes gathered into competitive discourse formations (Fairclough, 1992:31) or discourse-coalitions (Hajer, 1995:62pp). These coalitions emerge in order to promote a certain policy issue or idea. They can be both structure- and actor-centered. Within each discourse it is possible to find narratives promoting certain micro-discourses. This is closely related to policy change.

One important issue addressed in this dissertation is whether traditional Zionism is challenged and whether the policy of collective planning is changing. Why do policies change or remain stable and what is the role of ideas in this process? Policies may change because the discourse-coalitions launch political campaigns in order to promote a certain issue on a more long-term basis. This could take the form of advocacy coalitions, one of the goals of which would be to put members of the coalition in influential positions, which could be a key to wielding influence (Sabatier, 2007:203).
Another reason for policy change is related to some sort of contextual shock, such as economic crises, natural disasters, conflicts, and the like. The necessary policy changes can have wider societal repercussions (Hysing, 2010:36p).

Change is a natural order in our society and one example during the last ten years is a change towards individualization in society. These kinds of large societal transformations naturally lead to policy changes. In the words of James March & Johan P. Olsen, “When values change, political coalitions change”. (1996:146). On the other hand, political trends can change rather quickly, though it can take quite some time for ideas and ideologies to respond. We can cite the example of the aftermath of the terror attacks in New York in 2001, when few politicians publicly voiced their opposition to the military operations that followed. Today in 2011, it is much more legitimate to promote other policies. Policies and institutions do not automatically change when the environment changes, as the political institutions are also controlled by internal forms and dynamics.

Another perspective, presented by Ellinor Ostrom, is that self-interest pushes policies in new directions. Individuals learn from experience and make strategic choices in order to promote certain goals (Ostrom, 2007:30p). This learning process can also lead to an upsurge of new issues or strategies (Hysing, 2011:37p; Sabatier & Weible, 2007:198). Ideas and discourses in different forms thus play a role in the policy process, and this will be particularly illustrated when looking more closely at policy formulation and implementation.

3.1.2 Policy formulation
Planning can roughly be described as a process containing three parts: formulation, content, and implementation of specific territory-related policies (Yiftachel, 1998). Planning is thus a process connected to prioritizing, organizing, and problem-solving (Alexander, 1992:72). In this section we will discuss how policy content is formulated. Planning policies are formulated in a constant process of negotiation (Forester, 1993:11), and are also connected to “contested loyalties” (Campbell & Fainstein, 2003:7), as planning priorities can be based on public interest, professional planning doctrines, regulations, and directives from authorities or the employer. The question here is how ideas in the form of identity discourses interact with policy formulation.

According to Carol Lee Bacchi (1999), too little attention has been devoted to policy formulation and the process of establishing priorities. A policy is traditionally seen as the “remedy” to a specific problem, and what constitutes a problem is based on assumptions, representations, and per-
personal interpretations. What is seen as a problem by some individuals or groups might not be as important to other groups and individuals. The traditional view is that problems are defined and identified by authorities through some kind of bureaucratic process of evaluation (Bacchi, 1999:18pp). This view has been contested, as policies are also formulated and problems identified by other actors such as expert groups, organizations, social movements, and so on. The system of influence from a broader field of actors is sometimes referred to as governance (Hysing, 2010, Rhodes, 2000). Bacchi suggests focusing on problem representation instead of problem identification or definition (Bacchi, 1999:21). We should ask ourselves what the problems represent.

How discourses interact with policy formulation is also a matter of democracy and an indicator of respect for different forms of diversity. Certain territorial policy goals are more controversial than others in a conflict context, and they become even more important to influence. Examples are goals related to infrastructure, land use, demography, and housing. In the establishment of what constitutes a planning problem, it is necessary to assess the context in which the problem resides and the communicative aspects: first, is the problem based on fact or some kind of objective state?; second, is the problem legitimate from a legal-moral perspective?; third, is the problem connected to certain intentions of specific actors?; and fourth, is the problem connected to a cognitive frame based on specific meanings, symbols, and ideas? (Forester, 1993:146p). Policies are rarely completely objective unless connected to a concrete and acute physical problem with only one solution. Most policy issues can be viewed from different perspectives and are based on various values and ideas. It is therefore indispensable to deconstruct policies in order to trace their cognitive foundation, intention, legitimacy, and so on.

The topic of this dissertation requires a discussion about the role of power and influence over what finally becomes city policy and a strategy of territoriality. The community power debate (see for instance Hunter, 1953, Dahl, 1961, Lukes, 1974) took its departure in the theory that one group often dominates other groups in society. This potentially leads to a situation where policies are formulated in the interests of only one group. The actions of this elite can be interpreted as opposing the interests of the citizens, and as favoring the elite, even though, the actions are often carried out with the tacit or open support of other groups in society (Harding, 1995). This support derives from a belief in the expert knowledge of the elite, who in this position are considered to act for the common good of all citizens. On the other hand, Robert Dahl (1961) claims that no single actor or group holds a dominant position in all policy areas. A multitude of ac-
 tors influence the decisions made, and one of the reasons for this distribution of power is that different groups in society are interested in different policy areas. This pluralist approach claims that power relations can be measured by examining who actually participates in politics and also asserts that interests are the determining factor. Since each individual is unique, there are of course all kinds of political behavior, from trying to influence the governing system of a city to not doing so, regardless of background or roles. On the other hand, the possibility to influence or take an active interest in an issue is also related to the structure and context in which the individual exists.

Power over policy formulation is also connected to invisible issues that never reach the agenda – so-called non-issues. Dominant actors decide what issues finally end up on the political agenda, based on structures that set barriers in order to limit the possible engagement of each individual (Bachrach and Baratz in Johansson, 2002). If we look at Jerusalem, the Israeli organization BIMKOM, (Planners for Planning Rights, http://www.bimkom.org) for instance, claims that planning for the Palestinians has long been a non-issue, or a case of so-called non-planning.

The discussion about policy formulation constitutes a theoretical guide when analyzing how and why specific strategies of territoriality are used in the planning of Jerusalem. They also help us understand the significance of the policies written into the statutory and non-statutory plans. We have so far concluded that policies are not automatically based on objective goals set for the common good but rather on political discourses, which risks favoritizing certain groups. It is thus relevant to problematize the outcome as well as the input. This can metaphorically be connected to war-time battles for the control of bridges. The best strategy is to attack both ends at once.

3.1.3 Policy implementation

One advantage of integrating the role ideas in an analysis of policy-making is that it “...greatly enhances our understanding of policy outcomes.” (Bleich, 2002:1055). Policy research has not successfully managed to integrate ideas and discourses into the analysis of policy implementation. One way to connect implementation with the discursive context is to focus on policy implementation as discursive practice. This practice can give us information about the way hegemonic identity discourse and strategies of territoriality interact with planning policy. This can be achieved by connecting policies as formulated in policy documents with actual “facts on the ground”. Are they interlinked or does the practice focus on other issues? Territorial discourses may have a strong influence on policy docu-
ments and political visions yet fail to translate into practice. Territorial discourses may affect the practice directly but not have any repercussions in formal policy formulation. The discursive practice can conversely affect identity politics. As stated in the introduction, the socio-cultural practice, i.e. the cluster of identity discourses, is socially constituted and socially conditioned (Wodak, 1996:15) which means that the socio-cultural practice is constituted by an interaction with discursive practice.

In policy research a great deal of the discussion has centered around which level should be responsible for implementing policies. In the 1970s, Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky (1973) separated the process of formulating a policy from the phase of implementing it. Thereafter many researchers have been inclined to focus on one or the other. Even if policy implementation is in many ways a separate and complicated process, we must bear in mind that when a policy is decided upon it comes complete with a goal, a vision, and probably a set of enthusiastic proponents. It is difficult to separate the phases of goal-setting and implementation, as the later can be considered the political expression of the former. This does not mean that ideational perspectives in setting policy goals always steer policy implementation.

Research on policy processes has distinguished between three different ways to implement a policy (Hill, 1997:213p). The first-generation theories focused on policy implementation as a top-down process, which often meant implementation led by public authorities and high level “policy-makers” (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973). The second phase of policy implementation research focused on whether decisions at the “top” could produce goals possible to implement on grass-roots level. A policy sometimes has to wander far through the system and overcome many hurdles before reaching its final destination (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980). The focus of the third perspective was a bottom-up analytical approach based above all on democratic concerns (Lipsky, 1980; Hjern & Porter, 1981). This is related to the importance of citizen participation and the influence of social movements, but also to a growing demand from regions and cities to delegate and decentralize policy-making.

In practice all these models are applicable because there is a constant interaction between policy formulation processes and what ends up as facts on the ground. We can draw a few conclusions from the planning literature as to why certain policies are implemented and others are not. First, it takes determined actors to promote a policy, to which will return to later in this chapter; second, having comprehensible goals in the right kind of package, able to be evaluated at a later stage, is an advantage; and third, it is particularly beneficial to construct a robust planning system (Alexander,
We can also add that timing might be a factor in whether it is possible to implement a policy. A policy goal formulated ten years ago could be totally irrelevant today.

Planning practice is ultimately connected to power and influence. It is a political practice based on values, which means that planning is connected to ethics, appropriateness, and intention (Forester, 1993:15p). If planning practice is laden with political connotations, it is particularly important to involve a multitude of actors in the policy implementation process. Planning policies must be implemented in cooperation with those concerned by the actual policies (Granberg, 2004:65).

In a situation of multiple territorial identity discourses, such as in Jerusalem, groups have different ideas on how policies should be implemented. If citizens are involved in the policy formulation, it is much more likely that the implementation will be smooth if the ideas have already been anchored in the community. Nationalist ideologies and national identity tend to have top-down orientations and could cause a split between for instance national policymakers and city planners. It has been established that ideas and discourses can have an impact on the construction of the decision-making system (the institutional set-up), on policy formulation, and on policy implementation. We will now turn to discussing these aspects in relation to planning as a policy area.

### 3.2 City planning theory

After having discussed how policies are formulated and related to practice more generally, we will now turn to policy-making concerning planning. City planning policy has been and is influenced by a multitude of ideas and discourses, and planning policies are connected to a wide range of actors, which makes planning a somewhat complicated subject to study. Planning theories refer to many parts of the planning process. Some theories address the decision-making structure, others focus on actors, yet others relate to the actual land-use management, and others still to planning ideas or ideals (Fainstein & Campbell, 2003:2). Patsy Healey identifies three different planning traditions: economic planning based on the city as a marketplace and a place for class struggle; physical development, focusing mainly on land and design; and public administration and policy-making (Healey, 2006:10pp). This dissertation focuses mainly on planning as procedure, by concentrating on the decision-making system, and planning ideals, mainly ideas about how to create the ideal city, while still recognizing the impact of economic planning. When studying the planning literature, one is struck by the intermingling of these two aspects. Perhaps this is a result of the interconnection between early planning ideals and the initial development
of decision-making. We need to recognize that different parts of the planning process are interconnected but can also be studied as different research areas.

3.2.1 City policy and politics

Urban policy and planning approaches and their effects, are not necessarily predetermined by ideological goals and parameters [...] The city [...] constitutes nonetheless an active mediating channel through which ideological and ethnic conflicts may be enhanced or lessened. (Bollens, 2000:19)

Before going into more specific city planning trends, we should take the opportunity to discuss city policy-making and city politics. The introductory chapter stated that although the “urban” contains aspects that may be related to this study, it is mainly an umbrella term covering values, events related to the urban lifestyle, and above all relations within the city. Instead, this study focuses conceptually on “city policy”. The city constitutes a microcosm around which identity discourses and planning revolve. Ideas, through political discourses, policies, and strategies, play a crucial role in developing a city in a certain direction.

The city can, as mentioned, be an important object of identity politics on both the local and national level. The city also has symbolic and physical importance for its inhabitants. The city is a marketplace, it contains holy sites, it is connected to the history of peoples, and it is sometimes a specific legal entity. City politics revolves around all these issues and could more specifically be defined as measures taken by public authorities with an aim to develop the city in a specific direction, particularly based on economic concerns. City politics is related to a number of policy areas, often presented as broad visions, and is normally related to specific goals used as a steering mechanism in order to reach the full potential of the city (Granberg, 2004:15). Research on city politics stands in relation to everything from Aristotle and Plato and their writings about city-states (Tilly & Blokmans, 1994); the community power debate focusing on local elites, local parties, and local decision- and policy-making (Dahl, 1961; Lukes, 1974); to urban governance (Stone, 1989).

This dissertation focuses on the city as a territory, and the concepts of city policy and city politics can be linked to aspects of place-making, which in turn is connected to formulating policies that point to a vision of the future identity of the city. These policies relate, for instance, to economic, social, architectural, and cultural development (Montgomery, 1998:94p). The attributes of an attractive city are often reproduced in texts, myths, and slogans (Tuan, 1991), and place-making policies may change the men-
tal map and image of a certain city. Recent studies have emphasized the concept of “city branding” (Kavaratzis & Ashworth, 2005; Vanolo, 2008), which mainly concerns policies for marketing a city. These aspects are related to economic planning tradition. Jerusalem is not different from other world cities in terms of place-making, although the city-branding process has a unique context. The overall city policy goal is to make Jerusalem more attractive mainly for tourism, investments, and education, but not at the expense of the Jewish identification with the city, i.e. a combination not without conflicts. Place-making naturally has repercussions for urban policy, as it has profound effects on urban life and the development of relations within the city. For instance, a city policy based on planning for more tourists will change the physical appearance and atmosphere of the city center. A focus on education and employment opportunities may change the demographics of the city. There is thus a flow back and forth between the city policy and its urban effects.

The planning of a capital city such as Jerusalem has repercussions for policy-making relations between the city and the state. Local politics is national politics when related to Jerusalem. The relationship between the local and the central governing can be described in terms of the concept of multi-level governance. Multi-level mainly refers to a flexibility of scale, territory, and level. There are different types of multi-level governance, one of which can be described as the power relations between governing institutions on a limited number of levels. This type is more closely bound to a certain territory. Another type can be found on various territorial levels, and is related to an increasing number of actors. It is based on shared values and interests (Marks & Hooghe, 2004:17pp).

The relationship between the city and the state has intrigued researchers for a long time (Elander, 1991; Goldsmith, 1995; Rhodes, 1999), and one opinion is that the balance of power between local authorities and the state is constantly being altered due to changes in economy, law, social relations, and the like. According to R. A. W. Rhodes, state-local relations have been centered around legal-institutional discussions (Rhodes, 1999). The influence of local politics can be analyzed using a model presented by Joachim Jens Hesse & Laurence James Sharpe (1991). In the first category, the local government is more of a legal-political entity than a functional one; the second category focuses on the local government taking autonomous decisions, but is neither political nor in a strong legal position; and the third type of local government has a high degree of autonomy, with both a local political life where local authorities possesses a broad area of responsibility (Hesse & Sharpe, 1991:606pp). These types can be complemented by focusing on the ability of local authorities to initiate new issues and to carry
out its tasks, and to resist the involvement of the state. If local authorities neither initiates nor resists state influence, it is simply a local administration (Clark, 1984:199).

The top-down decision-making structure dominates planning policy making and the case in this dissertation is not different. The Israeli planning system has a top-down hierarchy, and in the case of Jerusalem, the state has a great interest in controlling the planning and development of the city due to its being so central to national identity. We will now turn to city planning ideals and the institutional set-up of planning systems.

3.2.2 Cooperative and rational modernist city planning
Societal ideas and discourses have a profound effect on planning theory and practice. Some of the first planning policies and models originate from the early 20th century, when the industrialization processes all over the world had created large urban and suburban areas characterized by poverty and crowdedness. The main task of architects and planners was to respond to this disorder by establishing urban planning principles that would solve the imminent urban problems. The concept of city planning came to be connected with visions of an ideal society (Strömgren, 2007).

These planning models had the goal of changing society from the inside and out, and planning was performed for the common good. The vision of Ebenezer Howard’s garden city, for example, was centered around a city in the countryside, with a green belt around it, and the model was based on the idea that the inhabitants of the city would own it together. It was based on a cooperative decision-making model and direct democracy. Planning was directly connected to community-building (Fishman, 2003:22p). The cooperative model could thus be connected to the creation of a national community.

Le Corbusier on the other hand presented a very different model called the radiant city (la ville radieuse) based on a well-organized bureaucracy in charge of planning and the city being planned and inhabited according to social class. The old city centers would be replaced by towers and high-rises (Fishman, 2003:24). Many of the planning models presented in the early 20th century had this kind of modernist touch, seeking to break with the past and what was regarded as old-fashioned. Modernist planning was based on technological advances and had a profound effect on planning, and many of the modernist projects were standardized and copied all over the world. Modernist planning focused on pioneering in general, on modern architecture and on new types of building materials in particular, needed to construct the way into the future. The modernist planners did not necessarily focus on the decision-making process, but the school is
often linked to a rational approach (Sandercock, 1998:22pp; Allmendinger, 2001a:93pp). Modernism, in the meaning of breaking with the past, seems to be difficult to combine with national identity construction. Nonetheless, the modernist approach was a strong element in constructing the state of Israel and breaking with the past in the Diaspora which will be presented in chapter 5 and 6.

As concluded in the earlier discussion on policy theory, in the period both before and after the Second World War, the view of the political system as built on rational principles was a dominant perspective in studies on decision-making and public administration. This naturally had an effect on planning as a policy area. Thus, rational planning, with a top-down approach and based on a formal public decision-making process rather than the rule of the market, brought professionalism into focus. This professionalism includes the production of impartial and objective plans based on planning standards (Fenster, 2004:22; Alexander, 1992:39pp). Le Corbusier’s modernist ideas could be linked to rational planning as he claimed that “plans are not political” (Le Corbusier in Fishman, 1996:59). The problem with rational planning is its inability to deal with other interests, for instance the division of society into different groups based on class, sex, and ethnicity, and so on. This planning approach lacks an awareness of the fact that the planner also has an identity and belongs to a certain group. Another criticism of the top-down construction of this approach points to its failure to include local knowledge that would bring the plans more in line with public demands. The rational model also fails to elaborate on the role of economy in the physical development of cities (Fenster, 2004:22). The top-down model based on rational decision-making is still used in many planning systems all over the world. One reason for this is its seemingly straight-forward approach based on order and regulations. The two planning ideals presented here are different visions of how the territory should be used and what the territory represents from an identity perspective.

3.2.3 Communicative and democratic city planning

Tovi Fenster states that rational and modernist planning are still the predominant approaches in Israeli planning, but have from the 1960s and onwards been challenged by other planning schools (Fenster, 2004:22). These planning models have questioned whether it is possible to achieve objectivity in planning when it is in the hands of so few planners and decision-makers, and is formulated in an ideational context. These actors may affect planning policy in political rather than rational ways. It is no longer acceptable, from a democratic point of view, for decision-making to be in
the hands of only a few individuals. Therefore a *communicative approach* to planning was introduced by planning theorists and practitioners with the goal of finding a common ground among all the different groups in society. This process involves discussion, compromise, and evaluation, and there are no issues that cannot be solved, as there are no right and wrong. The communicative approach is furthermore based on transparency and openness (Healey, 1996:245pp; Forester, 1993:24pp).

When applying a democratic approach to planning, the planner represents the citizens, just as the politicians do, and some researchers state that they also have the responsibility to educate the citizens in planning principles and issues. It is important that every citizen can participate in the planning process and that there are no substantial obstacles for doing so. One problem is that every citizen has specific interests, and weighing all these interests could be quite laborious. Another challenge is that the policy area of planning can be quite complicated to grasp. Yet another issue is whether expert knowledge always provides a better result than a potentially populist majority decision (Fainstein & Campbell, 2003:276p). In any case, in terms of the constructivist perspective, planning is a process that is constructed through the interaction between different actors, though taking into account the physical aspects of the planned territory.

### 3.2.4 Advocacy and equity city planning

Advocacy planning is described as one of first challenges to the rational model (Sandercock, 1998:89p) and was established mainly during the “revolutionary” 1960s. Advocacy planning can be provided by interest groups or by individual planners and has normally an equity perspective, dealing with underprivileged socio-economic groups or minorities. Advocacy planning can also give a voice to the so-called non-issues that for some reason never end up on the agenda. This kind of planning might also come from activist groups temporarily organized to protest a certain plan or a certain policy, and they normally present their own alternative plan (Davidoff, 1996:313p). The advantage of advocacy planning is that it highlights excluded groups or excluded issues, but there is a risk that this kind of alternative planning will create conflicts, making it more difficult to find a sustainable solution. Advocacy planning played a major role in the policy process presented in chapter 8 and gave a voice to a political issue that for some time took a back seat in Israeli politics – the environment. We can also link these ideas on planning with other critiques such as postcolonial criticism against the “western” planning standard that has a hegemonic grip on planning theory. Too little has been done to incorporate other narratives into planning (Sandercock, 1998:73p).
David Harvey criticize the rational planning model and liberal ideas on planning as just being tools of capitalism, and traditional planning models for including too few actors (Harvey, 1982). For Harvey it is not just a question of who is planning or who the planning is for, but how different classes in society relate to the built environment. In the liberal planning tradition, freedom for the individual is crucial and planning decisions should be made by a number of actors. Advocating for a certain group or an issue within the planning process could thus be intimately connected to promoting identity discourses and particularly those that are not visible. Advocacy and equity planning highlights the role of the internal and external “other”.

3.2.5 Strategic city planning
The planning policy process is ultimately about making decisions (Mintzberg, 2000:9pp) and two important aspects of planning decisions are their short- and long-term consequences, sometimes referred to as visionary or pragmatic (Hershkowitz, 2010:263). Future developments and trends are difficult to predict, and strategic planning is therefore an important tool to steer the development of a city in a certain direction. Are not all planning decisions strategic? In practice, the answer is yes, but in theory it can be useful to conceptualize strategic planning. It can be regarded as a strategic layer of planning, consisting of efforts to convince a broad spectrum of actors of the advantages of a certain planning policy goal (Granberg, 2004:66). A planning strategy is related to plans and patterns, and is mainly linked to some kind of intention and deliberate strategy (Mintzberg, 2000:23pp). Strategic planning elaborates on future visions, goals, and scenarios with both positive and negative implications. The purpose is to develop a city in every possible way by being prepared for eventualities, but strategic planning is also connected with working towards clear goals. The question is who decides on the strategic priorities and what they contain. This is related to knowledge and the power of definition (Granberg, 2004:67p).

This perspective is highly relevant in the case of Jerusalem as it is theoretically linked with establishing the strategies of territoriality.

3.2.6 Contemporary city planning
We have so far discussed cooperative and modernist planning as expressions of the physical development of the city, but what are the planning ideals of today? Are we still talking about planning ideals? Some planners use the phrase planning doctrines (Shachar, 1998; Faludi, 1997) when describing how planning goes from paradigm to paradigm. Leonie Sander-
cock claims that we are moving into a postmodern planning phase (Sandercock, 1998), but the problem is that physical development is no longer in focus in planning theory, instead the question of influence in the decision-making process and the planning target groups, has come to the fore.

The modernist planning model has in many ways led to a process of rehabilitation. Politicians and planners have pointed out problematic areas in need of renewal, and in some of these areas the improvements have led to gentrification, which made the “problem” move elsewhere. In other cases, the renewal did little for the actual everyday life in the neighborhood. Jane Jacobs (1961) is highly critical to this process and the knowledge base on which decisions on renewal are made. Jacobs claims that these planners fail to understand the dynamics of the city and the local culture (Jacobs, 1961). Some of the projects of urban renewal have become flagships of modern design and tourist attractions, such as old harbor areas, for example in Liverpool. The renewal perspective can to some extent be connected with New Urbanism, which is a planning vision based on building more densely both for environmental reasons but also in order to build on a smaller scale. The citizens are brought closer to all the necessary services which are located in the city or neighborhood center, and the American small town is the ideal, and this also counters the anonymity of the big cities which is not conducive to safety and security. New Urbanism has been criticized for being nostalgic and looking backwards instead of creating solutions for the future (Tunström, 2009:75; Fainstein, 2003:181p).

Densification is another important trend in land-use planning, and is a result of continuing urbanization and also environmental concerns (Neuman, 2005:12p). Another reason for densification is the growing market value of property in the city center. Densification and urban sprawl are often seen as two dichotomous planning trends. The problem of densification is the encroachment on public parks and public space in general. The problem of urban sprawl, on the other hand, is the pressure it puts on infrastructure such as roads and public transportation, and that it is difficult from a planning perspective to get an overview of the entire city.

The ideas, visions and decision-making systems presented in this section can all be related to the interplay between context – such as identity discourses – and planning.

3.3 The roles of the planner

The inculcation of a territorial identity is an integral part of the process of political socialization. Together with territorial practice, notably the agents
of planning control, perceptions of territorial identity and belonging are strengthened amongst national and ethnic groups. (Newman, 2001:238)

In a situation with a very strong ideational pressure on practitioners, it is revealing to analyze how planners view themselves within this context. Do they see themselves as rational actors, taking well-founded decisions for the common good, or do they envision themselves as agents in an ideational struggle? One can also ask whether planners are aware of the strong influence of identity politics, and if so, what are their professional coping strategies? As we are all influenced by ideas, values, and belief systems, it is also imperative in this study to analyze the role of the planner as an identity agent. This is vital to the understanding of the discursive practice within planning.

3.3.1 The role of the planner – Bureaucrat, expert, mobilizer, or advocate?

Confronting messy issues involving diverse populations with multiple and conflicting interests, they have to learn to balance the technical and the political components of the job. (Fischer, 2003:184)

Although Fischer is referring to the role of the policy analyst, this reasoning can be used to describe anyone working with challenging problems, be it a politician, a civil servant or as activist working for a social movement. An idea-based political vision can sometimes cause problems for a professional planner in the policy formulation and implementation process. It can create conflicts between the ideological visions of the politician and the supposedly professional role of the planner. According to the rational model, planners base their decisions on impartial facts and methods.

Planners’ authority derives in large measure from a mastery of theory and methods [...] Planning knowledge and expertise are thus grounded in positive science with its propensity for quantitative modelling and analysis. [...] Planners present a public image of neutrality... (Sandercock, 1998:27).

The first thing to clarify is therefore the relationship between politics and the bureaucracy or administration. According to James Svara (2006), the politician is normally higher up in a decision-making hierarchy, but the reality can look somewhat different. Policy documents, be they visions or statutory, guide the practitioner in a specific direction, but the political bodies that make decisions regarding these policies are also dependent on professionals for their expertise. Svara identifies four standard models of the relationship between politicians and public servants: 1. separate roles with clear politician superiority, 2. autonomous administrator with more
influence, 3. responsive administrator where political norms dominate, and 4. overlapping roles (Svara, 2006:955).

Roles are never that clear-cut, which necessitates a discussion on what sets the limits for a planner’s scope of action. Ann-Sofie Lennqvist-Lindén states that in order to understand the actions of a professional at least two aspects must be considered: the identity of the professional and his or her assigned role (Lennqvist-Lindén, 2010:52). Society’s expectations on the professional are part of the structural preconditions and are often codified in laws and regulations. The role is also formulated by the institutional setup of a particular political area. These institutions set the boundaries for the actions of the professional planner. The individual identity could also have structural implications if that identity is strongly related to the hegemonic identity discourse. As the boundaries of the role of the planner are unclear, there is a chance that the professional planner will have several roles.

The interviews will be analyzed by applying a model based on four roles of the planner summarized in figure 3:2 and inspired by the planning roles presented by E.R. Alexander (1992). These roles can be divided into two groups of coping strategies: the professional as responsive or reactive, and the professional as initiator. First, some planners assume the role of bureaucrat, which is the traditional role of technical expertise. Bureaucrats are expected to work for the common good as rational civil servants, but at the same time they are executers of political visions based on ideational constructions of society. An interesting issue is whether the bureaucrat is aware of the ideational context. A bureaucrat can be aware of this context and act strategically. This is related to what Fritz M. Scharpf calls “intentional action”, which is boundedly rational and socially constructed. This means that the actor has subjectively defined the context and defined reality. He or she then makes decisions based on this perception. The planner evaluates the context and this evaluation is the base for how the actor behaves under the circumstances (Scharpf, 1997:19). A planner can thus be rational within the boundaries of his or her construction. This could be regarded as a coping strategy, because highly contested contexts constitute major challenges to the professional. In this perspective, it is possible for the planner to retain a self-image of impartiality for the common good by creating a strategy to cope with a strong ideational foundation. The bureaucrat can in this sense also be regarded as an executor. On the other hand, a bureaucrat could also have a significant influence on policy formulation due to the limitations of the mandate-periods of the politicians and the potentially longer time-frames of the bureaucrat (Kingdon, 1995:32p). Planners who work closely with the citizens, as is required when dealing
with zoning and detailed plans, can be referred to as street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980:4). In this position they have the opportunity to make decisions with both positive and negative consequences for individual citizens. These planners are thus potential identity agents.

A second role is the expert, who provides technical support to the politicians (Alexander, 1992:107). The expert could be a civil servant but also within private practice. The distinction between experts and bureaucrats is crucial. The role of the expert has traditionally been looser and closely tied to providing expertise to politicians, while the bureaucrats have a more fixed position within an administrative system (Lennqvist-Lindén, 2010:71). This relates to expressions such as line and staff bureaucrats (Kingdon, 1995:31), where the staff bureaucrats have a more initiated role and where line bureaucrats are often linked to a specific political administration.

The third role concerns the professional as a mobilizer who gathers support for a certain plan. This role requires the skills of an entrepreneur and a mediator who manoeuvres around different opinions and stakeholders in order to find common ground and who manages to put together the funds for a project (Alexander, 1992:107). The mobilizer does not have to possess a key planning position, but it helps. The mobilizer tends to promote policies favoring his or her own interests and to push other issues to the side (Kingdon, 1995:204p).

Finally, the professional can assume the role of an advocate who represents specific groups or issues in society (Alexander, 1992:107). These groups are often not represented in the arenas where things get done, and they furthermore lack economic resources as well as other assets such as education or language skills. The advocate can also promote a certain issue or a plan as well as being the driving force against initiatives (Sandercoc, 1998:89p). The planner as an advocate can be regarded as assuming the positive attributes of a street-level bureaucrat.

These roles are intimately connected with the planning theories and ideals presented earlier in this chapter. The planners interviewed in this study argue that all these roles are connected with professionalism, and they all claim that these roles are based on good planning and strategies on how to reach the best result.
These roles can be found in varying degrees in the case of Jerusalem. In a study on urban policy in Jerusalem, Scott Bollens (2000) recognizes four strategies of the planners: partisan, neutral, equity, or resolver. These strategies are related to the model above, but are more case-oriented. Planners can either be directly connected to one of the sides in the conflict over Jerusalem or remain neutral in their profession. They can choose to associate professionalism with striving for equal rights and duties. One of Bollen’s main arguments is that planning itself can actually shape or help resolve a conflict (Bollens, 2000:24p). Planners working with Jerusalem, particularly on the state level in Israel, have been accused of only implementing the identity politics of the state of Israel, without taking into consideration other perspectives, and thus being partisan. For many planners to be accused of being partial is a considerable blow to their role and self-image of being professionals working for the common good. From a discursive and constructivist perspective, a planner can hardly be neutral, as the ideational context sets the framework. Although the intentions behind a planner’s decision may be based on neutrality, the actions are always connected to some sort of framework, whether it legal or ideational. In connection with the planning role, it is also important to discuss responsi-
bility. What self-image and coping strategies do the planners of Jerusalem have? Are they executers or initiators?

This chapter has established how ideas and identity discourses interacts with policy-making. We have discussed how policies are created and implemented as well as the role and coping strategies of the professional. The chapter has also discussed various planning ideals, synthesizing ideas, decision-making frameworks, and roles. The theories on policy formulation and implementation will guide the structure of chapter 6. The model based on the roles of the professional will guide the analysis in chapter 7 along with a general analysis of decision-making systems and bureaucratic procedure. The analysis in chapter 8 is based on the theories concerning policy formulation, implementation, change, and roles. These concepts and theories help us understand the impact of identity on policy-making, the complexities of agenda-setting, the intricacies of policy implementation, the strategies employed when confronted by strong identity discourses, and the relationship between different levels. The next chapter moves on to establish how these analyses will actually be performed.
4. On method

The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the interplay between the role of Jerusalem in Israeli identity politics and planning as a policy area. This chapter focuses on theories of science, method, and material. The structure of the discourse-based policy analysis performed in this dissertation has been guided by an interpretative approach to policy analysis presented by Dvora Yanow. The advantage of using this approach is that not only the specific policies are studied but also what they mean in the wider society with regard to ideas and discourses. By integrating both structure and agency it is possible to analyze how policy meanings are received and communicated (Yanow, 2000:8). I have chosen to approach the policy area of planning by using four “steps” of policy analysis (Yanow, 2000:22). These steps will

1. distinguish relevant discourses and their specific meanings (chapter 5);
2. seek the carriers of meaning such as policy documents, statements, etc. (chapter 6);
3. identify the communities of meaning such as influential actors (chapter 7);
4. pinpoint relevant conflicts (several parts of the dissertation, but mainly chapter 8).

These four aspects form the structure and the main contents of the empirical chapters. The material analyzed consists mainly of policy documents, both statutory and visionary, and interviews with planners and other actors related to the policy area of planning. These are accompanied by political speeches, other political statements, newspaper articles, and secondary literature. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the methodological design with a focus on case study method, document analysis, and interviews.

4.1 The power of the good example

A case study can provide specific knowledge about the case in question but it might also be possible to use the same research design or the results in order to analyze another case. In my interviews I have been told that Jerusalem is an extreme case that cannot be compared to other cities, but also that in many ways Jerusalem is just like any other city. Current deputy Mayor Naomi Tsur said in 2007 that “Jerusalem is not in the terrible conflict that everyone says it is. [...] So why are we in the news all the time?”
The research questions and the point of departure of a study decide what method will be the most appropriate. There are exploratory, explanatory, and evaluatory case studies (Yin, 2003; Merriam, 1988) and the choice depends on the research questions. The exploratory cases are based on “what-, who-, and where-questions” and the explanatory case asks “how- and why-questions” (Yin, 2003:6). In this study, the ambition is mainly to explore.

4.1.1 What is Jerusalem a case of?
What is Jerusalem a case of? This is one of the most common questions asked when a researcher uses a research design based on one or several case studies. The question is whether Jerusalem is a) an extreme or an intrinsic case, in which there is no intention of generalizing the research questions or theoretical framework for usage in any other context, i.e. the case is interesting in itself; b) a critical case that is selected because of its ability to shed light on the validity and reliability of a general problem, hypothesis, or theory; c) a paradigmatic case that, based on Thomas Kuhn’s discussion on paradigms, illustrates a larger societal phenomena; and/or d) a case chosen for comparison (Flyvbjerg 2001:79; King, Keohane & Verba, 1994:209pp; Silverman, 2005:127). The researcher has to evaluate and consider whether it is a least-likely case or most-likely case (Eckstein, 1975).

The varieties of cases presented above are not necessarily conflicting views. The case of Jerusalem, using the theoretical framework applied here, is mainly a combination of an extreme/intrinsic and a critical case as it should be able to tell us more about the validity of the theoretical construction, and whether the result can be generalized, but the case can also provide results relating to Jerusalem specifically. It is thus possible to combine deduction and induction. The very combination of the abstract field of identity studies and the more practice-oriented policy analysis provides an opportunity for such an abductive approach.

4.1.2 Advantages of case-study method
In the world of movies and plays, some actors always seem to be typecasted or to choose similar roles over and over again. The same could be said of research designs and some scientific methods; they are expected to work in some studies and not in others, yet some researchers tend to use the same design in every study. It is therefore important for the researcher
to reflect on the theoretical and methodological risks and advantages of each approach. A case study could be measured against the following statement “...a research project should pose a question that is ‘important’ in the real world.” (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994:15). This statement can be interpreted as expressing a view of research firmly rooted in and intended for practice. This does not of course rule out that the question may be based on a theoretical foundation. This quote also raises the question of who decides what is “important” enough to study.

The advantages of using one single case study are many. In-depth single case studies contribute to both our empirical and theoretical knowledge and help us to dig deeper into the real world. Case studies can help us “understand complex social phenomena” (Yin, 2003:2) and identify trends, processes, and characteristics. Bent Flyvbjerg argues that case-studies provide knowledge about the case that is interesting in itself and that a case study is well equipped to identify deep-rooted causes of societal problems and context-bounded stories. “Case studies often contain a substantial element of narrative. Good narratives typically approach the complexities and contradictions of real life”. (Flyvbjerg, 2006:237). Case-study research may in that sense come close to what is “important” to study.

Case studies are particularly useful for evaluating specific programs and for policy analysis. Such studies could have great influence on how to develop certain routines and administrative systems, as the results can provide concrete advice on practice-oriented issues. They are often performed as field studies and are particularly valuable when examining social change (Merriam, 1988:46). Planning practice is a good example of an area suitable for case studies as it often entails specific knowledge about a certain judicial and geographic context.

A deeper study based on one single case can be beneficial for future comparisons and it provides a solid foundation for detailed comparison. King, Keohane, and Verba call it “increasing the number of observations” (1994:219). The case-study method thus provides important theoretical and empirical results that can be used in practice and in further research. Research is a cumulative process and is connected to a web of knowledge production whether you perform a qualitative case study or analyze quantitative material.

The case of Jerusalem is thus interesting from both a general theoretical point of view and an in-depth case-oriented view. Jerusalem is a vast research field in itself and few would argue with the fact that the city has a large number of unique complexities. But as Jerusalem is important to many people all over the world, a study on the city may reach a larger audience than other case studies. Jerusalem has additionally been the sub-
ject of many comparative case studies (Bollens, 2000; Hepburn, 2000), and the theoretical framework in this dissertation can be used in future studies of other cities. The framework is constructed to fit other examples and the original idea was to also include the city of Riga, but the vast material about and the specific role of Jerusalem made it difficult to include both cities. In any case, the empirical and theoretical contributions concerning the planning politics of Jerusalem are interesting in themselves or, in the words of Flyvbjerg, “... the power of the good example is underestimated.” (Flyvbjerg, 2001:77).

4.2 Discourse and narrative analysis

On this research journey I have had a number of promising methodological travel companions each of which would have led to an interesting but slightly different results. When you finally choose a path, you realize that few analytical tools are undisputed and are used in only one way. In chapter 5, the ambition is to identify identity discourses, their narrative components, and their counter-discourses. In this section I will briefly clarify how to reach that goal. I have chosen to combine discourse and narrative as analytical concepts because they identify slightly different societal phenomena and because both are particularly relevant to this case. Political discourse is closely connected to ideas and ideologies, and these are often communicated by specific narratives. Therefore both concepts have a natural place in this study.

4.2.1 Identifying identity discourses and strategies of territoriality

So far, we have discussed discourse mainly from a theoretical perspective. It is now time to establish how discourses relevant to this study will be identified. I have chosen to depart from secondary literature in the account of contemporary Israeli identity politics. The micro-level discourses within identity politics in the form of strategies of territoriality have been identified through policy documents, political statements, newspaper articles, and so on. The strategies of territoriality are intimately related to power and control. One major issue within discourse theory is whether there are conscious ideational agents trying to promote a specific discourse or whether the discourse has a life of its own. Both aspects are relevant when trying to identify discourses and I believe that there are both conscious and unconscious societal processes with a bearing on discourses. The examination of the interplay between the role of Jerusalem in Israeli national identity construction and planning as policy area will reveal whether the identity discourses are “...the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legiti-
mate and motivate collective action.” (McAdam et al. 1996:6), or whether they are “particular objects with their own properties and powers.” (Howarth, 2000:3). In any case, discourses are a type of frames or structures guiding, hindering, and encouraging community-building and identity construction. A hegemonic discourse could be interpreted as having a profound influence in itself. Although various types of actors have contributed to the content of the discourse, they are also restricted by it due to its deep societal impact.

Discourses can be identified with these kinds of definitions, but they can still be too vague. We need to make additional delimitations. In order to specify what we are looking for it is most useful to make a distinction between macro-level and micro-level discourses (Van Dijk, 1997:9). Macro-level discourses are broader societal frameworks or discourse formations (Foucault in Fairclugh, 1992:31; Torfing, 1999:101). In this study I define identity discourses on a national level as macro-level discourses and they could be hegemonic or counter-discourses. Micro-level discourses are in my definition connected to the strategies of territoriality concerning Jerusalem. This distinction, between macro- and micro-levels alleviates the identification of discourses. These discourses are bound to the specific time period and context of this study, recognizing that in a longer time frame, discourses will be constantly modified in a continuing process.

Following Fairclough (1992), the discourses will be identified in different types of texts such as policy documents, interviews, political statements and speeches, newspaper articles, and also secondary literature.

4.2.2 Deconstructing identity discourse – Discovering commemorative narratives

Narrative analysis was mainly developed by historians who used the method to connect certain historical events and thereby construct a coherent story. Such “historical” roots are beneficial when studying the role of narratives in the construction of national identity. This cross-disciplinary method is often connected with postmodernism and/or structuralism, as it developed from a way to describe society to a perception of society as made of narratives, or as Alistair MacIntyre describes it, “social life is a narrative”. (MacIntyre, 1981, Somers, 1994:614). These narratives guide our actions and constitute the basis of our identity and these identities are not given but are constantly renegotiated. This shift in approach is often referred to as the narrative turn (Charniawska, 2004:1pp) and could be regarded as a response to the rational approach in social science method. This particular view of narratives argues that an actor bases his or her decisions about all kinds of issues in life on narrative frameworks that
guide us in our movements in society, rather than making strictly rational decisions (Somers, 1994).

We have already concluded that the concept of commemorative narratives is highly applicable to analyzing national identity construction (Zerubavel, 1995; Strömbom, 2010), but how do we know when we have encountered an identity narrative? Narrative analysis has shifted from a representational to an ontological form of interpretation during the last decades (Somers, 1994:619). In earlier research, narratives were mainly stories about how things were or are, that can be accepted or rejected as epistemological truths. Today, they are interpreted as more connected to the creation of social life itself. These ontological narratives guide our behavior and actions and can also, in the interpretation of the interviews, be related to individual identity such as planners’ self-image. This approach is in tuned with the constructivist perspective of this dissertation and to the construction of identity discourses. The documents and interviews analyzed in this dissertation contain what Margaret Somers call public narratives (Somers, 1994:619). These can be located both within macro- and micro-level discourses and are connected to cultural or institutional perspectives beyond the individual. More specifically, the analysis and identification of narratives will be performed by; (1) sorting the empirical material in detail in order to (2) identify patterns in a broad range of material. The narrative method requires (3) interpretation and (4) a convincing presentation, for instance by using illustrative quotes. The result depends on a meticulous overall research design. A narrative analysis can provide a more grounded result particularly if the narrative material comes in the form of interviews, as each interview study is unique.

4.3 Analyzing documents

The results of a text analysis vary depending on the chosen method and approach. From a more linguistic perspective, the words themselves are in focus, but in this study the ideas behind and within a text are emphasized. We have earlier established that the boundaries between Fairclough’s three concepts text, discursive, and socio-cultural practice are not completely clear. Text, in this study, refers mainly to the written material employed, in the form of reports, policy documents, speeches, articles, and similar, but also to the interview material. The text is primarily studied by using a critical discourse and narrative analysis but there are a number of specific analytical tools useful when studying texts.
4.3.1 The document study

This dissertation contains an analysis of a number of primary sources and the material has been selected according to its relevance for the research questions and detailed issues dealt with in each chapter. In order to establish and illustrate the role of Jerusalem in Israeli national identity discourses, documents such as political speeches, political statements from politicians and ministries, political platforms and party programs, documents from social movements, and laws, have been selected. The documents give a wide picture of Jerusalem as a city, although focusing on identifying Israeli identity discourses and narratives. Furthermore, statutory and non-statutory planning documents are analyzed with the purpose of identifying the interplay between Israeli identity politics of Jerusalem and strategies of territoriality. 63 interviews have been performed relating to both identity discourses, but focusing mainly on planning, which will be presented further along in this chapter. The primary sources have been complemented by secondary sources, such as scientific literature and popular publications, newspaper articles, biographies, and documents from international organizations.

The main documents in this study are speeches and statements by Israeli national politicians and mainly the Israeli Prime Minister, particularly the Jerusalem Day speech; speeches and statements from other national and local politicians; statements from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; general policy documents from the Jerusalem municipality; laws regarding Jerusalem in general and land administration in particular; and reports and statements from interest groups such as BIMKOM and ICAHD. Statutory plans from the entire 20th century, available in English, have been read, but the focus is on statutory and visionary plans from the early 1990s until 2009. The plans in question are the Jerusalem section of the National Plan 31 (NOP 31) which was approved in 1993, the Jerusalem section of the National Plan 35 (NOP 35) which was approved in 2005, and the early version of the Jerusalem Outline Scheme 2000 which was approved by the Local Planning Commission in 2007, but has since then been considerably revised, awaiting approval by the District Planning Commission. The outline scheme will therefore be analyzed as representing the local vision at a particular period in time. In addition more recently published local political visions will complement the local outline scheme. The primary sources selected for this dissertation has been examined in order to identity connections with identity discourses, commemorative narratives, and strategies of territoriality.

The Jerusalem sections of the NOP 31 and NOP 35 have been translated from Hebrew as well as the entire text accompanying the Local Outline Scheme 2000.
Scheme. The interviews performed have to some extent complemented the analysis if issues were lost in the linguistic transfer of the plans. On the other hand, the plans are not used to ascertain the extent to which identity discourses are incorporated into planning but rather connected to an ambition to illustrate in what way and connected to which issues. There are books and articles about planning Jerusalem in Hebrew that I have not been able to study in-depth. On the other hand, being a guest at the Institute for Urban and Regional Studies at Hebrew University during my field work, allowed me to acquaint myself with the results of the many relevant studies through Hebrew-speaking colleagues. Being simultaneously a guest at PASSIA – the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, provided an opportunity for insightful comments on this research project and crucial contacts in the Palestinian society.

4.3.2 Avoiding anachronism

When studying narratives referring to different periods in time, it is essential to keep in mind that architecture, politics, expressions, and meanings were intended for readers in that particular context. On the other hand there is no need to be overly careful when approaching a historical document or a commemorative narrative, as long as it does not result in pure anachronism. What is important to remember is that we sometimes impose intentions on actors that they did not have or did not want to reveal. One example is how we tend to arrange authors into schools – schools that they did not invent and perhaps would strongly disapprove of (Skinner, 1988:30-34).

The meanings of specific concepts and words might vary over time, such as with Reinhart Koselleck’s example revolution. This word has a rebellious ring to it today, but at another time it had a more conservative sense – to go back to what once was. A society creates common concepts as a way of building the community and this construction might only be comprehensible in the light of that specific context (Koselleck, 1985:43p and 74).

The same goes for descriptions of territory, architecture, and buildings. Contemporary texts might refer to a house, a neighbourhood, or an open space in a certain way that contradicts the historical use. In Jerusalem we have many examples of these changed meanings.

As Jerusalem in many ways is determined and characterized by its contested history, these aspects need to be kept in mind. This perspective is above all used when analyzing the commemorative narratives in order to understand how actors today are discussing and using historical events and texts as political tools or as the truth.
4.3.3 Linguistic aspects

When studying texts in order to identify identity discourses, commemorative narratives, and strategies of territoriality, it is common to come across certain concepts or metaphors that reflect upon the long-term meaning and importance of identity. Our use of concepts often follows certain patterns or creates a system. For example, there are a number of expressions that we use in our everyday lives without really reflecting upon them, such as *waste of time*, that literally relate to the value of time (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980:7–13, 46–51). It is also important to remember that concepts and expressions have different meaning in different cultures. The word *segregation* for instance is regarded as something negative in Sweden, but does it also have that connotation in the case of Jerusalem?

These expressions, metaphors, and allegories could help us to identify how certain words frequently occur when describing Jerusalem more generally or within the area of planning. It gives us an opportunity to recognize rhetorical patterns in political speeches and when the meaning of words is taken for granted because they are deeply rooted in history or the hegemonic interpretation of history. In the case of Jerusalem, words and expressions come and go and the credibility of the researcher could depend on a deeper knowledge of different periods and the crucial documents relating to these periods. History becomes a tool in the hands of the storyteller. The policy documents have been analyzed in accordance with the analytical models presented earlier and also according to recurring words and expressions.

4.3.4 The discursive construction of the “other”

Collective identity is often established in contrast to other identities. Stating national sentiments or giving voice to national expressions in text, are often performed in relation to “the other” or at least to the common epistemological image of “the other” (Somers, 1994). It is connected to the production of knowledge about adversaries, and knowledge is, as stated, related to power. The construction of the role of Jerusalem in identity politics is certainly part of such a production. Gerald M. Steinberg refers to the Israel–Palestine conflict as a narrative war (Steinberg, May 30, 2009), but it is not a war waged only between Israelis and Palestinians, but rather a battle between different political positions, which means large discrepancies also within the communities. Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter have studied the narrative construction of “the Other” and claim that narratives about otherness are created in a certain context and for a reason. A document is produced with an intention, and
...there is no “versionless” reality. [...] The crucial aspect, [...] is whose story will be accepted and become part of the general currency of explanation, whose version of events, whose account of the way things are? (Wetherell & Potter, 1992:62)

In a society it is natural that there are a number of different ideologies and interests. The expressions of difference could be filled with flattering images of Self and not-so-flattering words about “them” or “the Other”. This activity is called positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation (Van Dijk, 1998:24p). These “polarized oppositions” (Eckert & McConnell-Ginet, 2003:242p) are based on membership (who belongs), activities (what we do), goals (where we are heading), values (how to do things), position (who we are), and resources (what we have) (Van Dijk, 1998:24). The party that has the most convincing presentation will win the narrative battle.

The documents, as well as the interviews, will be analyzed in the search for the image of “the other”. This image may be connected to the counter-discourses and counter-narratives from within. What is “counter” naturally depends on the specific context. This aspect can be exemplified by using the concept of counter-memory which “...denies the validity of the narrative constructed by the collective memory and presents its own claim for a more accurate representation of history.” (Zerubavel, 1995:10). Identifying “the other” is important throughout this dissertation, and is a way to clarify the position of Israeli national identity and the role of Jerusalem.

4.4 Interview method

Loud voices from guests at the café, an archive that was not complete, roaring cars and trucks in the background, costs of translations that went through the roof, a big hall-way with terrible acoustics, policy documents that were changed considerably between two field studies, respondents who did not want to be taped, a meeting that was re-scheduled three times and then cut terribly short, a respondent who turned out to be a another person than the one I was looking for, unexpected traffic jams, interrogations by security staff, blistering headache due to heat, and lack of replies on important e-mails. Even with the most meticulous preparation for a field study and a seemingly reassuring research focus, the reality illustrated above always seems to come as a surprise. As a researcher doing interviews and searching archives, libraries, research and governmental institutions for specific documents, you have to be prepared for unforeseen events, particularly in a place like Jerusalem, where everyone always expects the unexpected. The theoretical framework needed some adjustments after
each field study and even adaptation after each interview, and the brutal act of “killing your darlings” was inevitable.

In the book *InterViews*, Steinar Kvale states that “An interview inquiry is a moral enterprise” (1996:109) and paints a picture of the interview process as consisting of seven steps. 1. The purpose of the study should be related to the scientific value of the produced knowledge. 2. The elaboration of the research questions and the selection of respondents are crucial elements when designing the study. 3. During the actual interview, the researcher has to be prepared to handle stressful and unexpected events, and not let the interview lapse into a therapy session for the respondent. 4. The interview material is transcribed in such a manner that it is loyal to the respondent’s answers. 5. The analysis has to be adjusted according to that material. 6. The study has to be scientifically verified. 7. The presentation of the study must follow ethical guidelines. This discussion on interviews will be narrowed down to three phases: preparation, implementation, and interpretation.

4.4.1 Preparation
This dissertation contains an analysis and interpretation of 63 digitally taped semi-structured interviews with planners and architects, politicians, academic researchers, and members of the civil society, including interest groups and organizations, in Jerusalem. A policy analysis benefits from thinking outside the box and from including groups, such as researchers and journalists, that commonly are not part of these kinds of studies as respondents (Sabatier, 2007:3pp). These interviews were conducted during three field trips of varying lengths, two in 2007 and one in 2009. The first two trips were concentrated on encircling the project and meeting with a large number of actors connected to the politics of Jerusalem. The field research in 2009, focused on the planners. As mentioned, during these trips I was a guest at an Israeli and a Palestinian research institution.

The selection of the respondents was made based on their specific positions, but respondents were also located by the method of “snowballing”, as most of the respondents mentioned other actors. I have deliberately tried to interview both men and women in order to get a wider picture of planning issues. Fontana & Frey (2000) advise us to be aware of ethical concerns when selecting and working with respondents, and to work according to so-called informed consent, the importance of the respondent being well informed about the purpose of the study. It is vital that consent be given to the entire process. Confidentiality can be the key to a good interview situation. I decided to offer anonymity to my respondents due to the sensitivity of the case of Jerusalem, but only two decided to be anonymous.
The questionnaire is constructed in accordance with the overall purpose and the research questions. The themes surrounding the interview questions are presented in the appendix. To do an interview study in Jerusalem, as a complement to the document study, was absolutely necessary in order to answer the research questions and to cover issues that are never explicitly mentioned in policy documents, such as personal opinion and criticism. The interviews can provide a deeper understanding of Jerusalem in general and planning issues in particular. When designing the actual questionnaire, the first step was to summarize the main themes, so-called content mapping questions and the next step was to identify and develop sharper and more detailed probes (Legard, Keegan & Ward, 2003:148). It was also imperative to think about follow-up questions, which to be honest is easier after having done a few interviews, because sometimes you tend to get very similar answers. The interviews with the respondents in Jerusalem were semi-structured, which means having a prepared question form but that the questions are predominantly open-ended. In constructing the questionnaire I included both the exploratory what-, where-, and who-questions, as well as the explanatory how- and why-questions. It is important to remember that a questionnaire is not static; it changes after every interview to some degree.

Apart from designing a questionnaire, one of the most important preparations is to build a knowledge base regarding the actual research fields connected to the study. This knowledge and familiarity will enhance the confidence-building process before and during the interview, as it will create "...sharedness of meanings" (Fontana & Frey, 2000:660).

The research interview is an interpersonal situation, a conversation between two partners about a theme of mutual interest. It is a specific form of human interaction in which knowledge evolves through a dialogue. The interaction is neither as anonymous and neutral as when a subject responds to a survey questionnaire, nor as personal and emotional as a therapeutic interview. (Kvale, 1996:125)

4.4.2 Implementation

In the interviews I used many types of questions, introducing, follow-up, probing, specifying, direct, indirect, structuring, and interpreting questions as well as silence (Kvale, 1996:133pp). There is always a risk of the interviewer leading the respondent in a certain direction, making it more difficult to obtain a reliable interpretation. But everything depends on the interview situation, which is not always an interpersonal situation, a friendly conversation, or about creating confidence. It can be quite intimidating when interviewing a high-ranking civil servant, a well-known columnist, or
a controversial politician especially in a different cultural context. In every culture there is tacit knowledge (Spradley, 1979) and the respondent counts on you understanding it.

Therefore it is more appropriate to characterize an interview as an Inter View (Kvale, 1996) in which there is a mutual sharing of knowledge and ideas. This perspective is beneficial for knowledge production but it can also create problems. There are interview situations when a sort of friendship develops between the researcher and the respondent. This may cause analytical dilemmas for the researcher. It is also a problem when the respondent is looked upon as a source of facts (Czarniawska, 2004:48). On the other hand, if a large number of interviews are performed, as in this dissertation, the facts may be confirmed by many respondents.

The gender perspective could have an effect on the interview situation. According to Fontana & Frey, women from a different culture than the interview context can in some situations be granted an honorary male status (Fontana & Frey, 2000:658) but the interviews could also be negatively affected. I did not experience any clear negative consequences based on my gender; instead sometimes it was the other way around. Although it was easier for me to get access to some of the women respondents in the study than for some colleagues, as well as some of the men, it was rather my ethnicity and background that played a positive role. Quite a few of the planners have a positive attitude towards the Swedish planning system and this worked as a door opener.

It is always a challenge for the interviewer to have the right timing in an interview situation, and this is an art that requires a lot of training. It was important to create an interview setting in which the respondents felt comfortable telling their stories. There are also a number of unexpected circumstances in an interview context. In my case such circumstances have been everything from delays due to checkpoints, over-zelous security guards, loud traffic noise, and unexpected revelations. The purpose of the interviews was to gain more knowledge about the planning policy area and also its context in general. One general conclusion is that a majority of the respondents talked about Jerusalem in broad terms as well as focusing on their area of expertise.

4.4.3 Interpretation

A successful interview depends not only on the information from the respondent but on the interviewer’s situational competence (Flick, 1999:181). Flexibility, knowledge, and focus are three key words. The interviews have been thoroughly transcribed, word for word, except for a number of interviews that were less relevant for the study. With meticu-
lously performed transcriptions, the reliability of the material can be checked by other researchers. It is easy to control the validity of the transcript if the interviews are taped. Altheide & Johnson describes reliability as “…the stability of methods and findings” and validity as the “…accuracy and truthfulness of the findings.” (Altheide & Johnson, 1994:487).

Guba & Lincoln, who have written numerous studies on evaluation and qualitative studies, prefer using words like trustworthiness, credibility, dependability, and confirmability instead (Guba & Lincoln, 1989:242pp). It is important to have consistency and stability in the methodological framework, but I find it is much harder to talk about the accuracy of an interpretation. The researcher must present the conclusions in a credible way and check the consistency of different parts of the research, thus making the conclusions scientifically trustworthy.

Each interview study is unique and cannot be repeated with exactly the same result. Another researcher could potentially have posed the questions in a slightly different way and interpreted the answers differently. On the other hand, it is plausible to assume that the overall empirical results concerning, for instance, planning goals would be similar although the focus could vary due to the interest of the researcher.

To sum up, the interplay between the role of Jerusalem in Israeli national identity construction and the policy area of planning will be scientifically approached through a discourse and policy analysis. This will be performed in the following steps:

(1) Analyzing policy documents, political speeches, interviews, and secondary literature in an attempt to pinpoint the role of Jerusalem in Israeli identity politics and discourses and to identify the narrative components, and the current city policy of Jerusalem,

(2) Analyzing planning policy documents and interviews in order to identify the interplay between the five strategies of territorialities and the policy area of planning,

(3) Analyzing interviews in order to assess the role of the planning system and the planner in connection with identity politics, and

(4) Analyzing interviews, newspaper articles, and planning documents in an attempt to grasp the “Safdie plan” process and its impact on both identity politics and planning policies.

The first task is to identify the role of Jerusalem in Israeli identity discourses and politics, to analyze its narrative components, and connection to contemporary city policy.
5. Politics of commemoration – Jerusalem in Israeli identity discourse

Our future is based on our past, and our past creates our future. (Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu, Jerusalem Day speech at Mercaz Harav Yeshiva, May 12, 2010)

[Jerusalem is] an axis of our history, identity, faith and legacy. Three times a day, for over 3,000 years, every believing Jew stands in prayer, and faces Jerusalem. The song of endless yearning and longing was written about it in every exile, and a sea of tears was spilled over it. Therefore, it will eternally be ours, our one and only. (Prime Minister Ehud Olmert Speech at the Jerusalem Day Ceremony at Ammunition Hill, May 25, 2006)

Jerusalem is a central component in the hegemonic traditional Zionism. The city has throughout history been an important territorial symbol for Jews, in the Diaspora, for those who remained in the territories, and for the Jewish immigrants in modern time. The city is described as a beacon of hope in times of pogroms and persecution. The mental map and image of the city is illustrated in poems and prayers.

Our feet shall stand within thy gates, O Jerusalem. Jerusalem is built as a city that is compact together. [...] Pray for the peace of Jerusalem: they shall prosper that love thee. Peace be within thy walls, and prosperity within thy palaces. (Psalms 122:2–3, 6–7 King James version)

The history of Jerusalem is the main ingredient in commemorative narratives constituting the foundation of the Israeli identity politics of Jerusalem and for legitimizing Israeli claims on the city. The interpretation of history will therefore dominate the presentation of the role of the city. These narratives are used as common references in the daily vocabulary of Israeli society and they furthermore connect to a number of city policies and strategies of territoriality about what Jerusalem should be in the future. On the other hand, Jerusalem did not become a wholly integrated part of the national agenda until after 1967, and the reconstruction process is thus fairly new and open to interpretation. There is no common and accepted truth about the history, the everyday life, the development, or the future of the city. There are many actors and ideas within Israeli identity politics and this chapter focuses on Zionism, more specifically: traditional or mainstream Zionism, new Zionism and post-Zionism.
The city is not just an Israeli national interest. Jerusalem is one of the most discussed and disputed cities in the world, primarily because of its symbolic and physical importance for three monotheistic religions, but also due to the ongoing Israel–Palestine conflict, which has implications for international relations and political interactions in the Middle East. Political discussions regarding Jerusalem are often conducted in a trial-like way, with accusations, defense, argumentation, and counter-argumentation (see for instance The case of Israel, Dershowitz, 2004 and The case for Palestine, Quigley, 2005). Legal terms are often used as metaphors in order to state a claim to the city. Jerusalem is also “just another city”, where the residents are living their everyday lives – paying taxes, going to work, feeding their children, and shopping for groceries. The two images: Jerusalem as the spiritual and symbolic center, and Jerusalem as an everyday life environment, are often referred to as the “heavenly” and the “earthly” Jerusalem respectively (see for instance Wasserstein, 2002:4; Mayer & Mourad, 2008:1). These two perspectives are not as dichotomous as they sound, as they are intertwined and imbedded in most political issues. Jerusalem has been studied from various perspectives, such as history (Armstrong, 2005; Asali et.al., 2000; Thompson et. al., 2003) or conflict (Klein, 2003; Segal, Levy, Sa’id & Katz, 2000), but there is a lack of literature covering identity politics and ideology (Hulme, 2006). Therefore this chapter will concentrate on identity discourses and narratives related to the city that together constitute an evolving and conflict-ridden identity politics.

The purpose of this chapter is threefold:
1. to identify the main Israeli identity discourses and discuss their contemporary struggle for hegemony,
2. to deconstruct Jerusalem identity discourses in order to distinguish how the claims on Jerusalem are legitimized and narrated in political speeches and statements, and,
3. to analyze the relationship between these discourses and narratives on the one hand, and the construction of city policy and strategies of territoriality, on the other.

5.1 Constructing Israeli identity discourses
The development of Jerusalem is interconnected with Zionist identity discourses, and the Israeli politics of Jerusalem are an illustration of continuity and change in the discursive struggles between these different identities. The challenges to the hegemonic traditional Zionism are apparent in the case of Jerusalem and the city is often the catalyst for inter-discursive antagonism. With the changes in Israeli identity discourses come changes related to territorial identity. “Thus territories and identities are experienc-
ing parallel and related processes of reconfiguration as part of the contemporary dynamics of Israeli society and space.” (Newman, 2001:237). Before analyzing the territorial identity politics of Jerusalem, three forms of Zionism and their territorial components will be further illuminated as well as their positions towards “the other“.

5.1.1 Traditional Zionism as a hegemonic identity discourse

Zionism as a territorial national identity discourse is just as multifaceted as the city of Jerusalem. As stated by Brubaker (2004), identification is a constantly changing process, but on the other hand, identity politics often highlight primordial aspects, myths, and memories in order to fortify the sense of continuity and homogeneity. History plays a particularly important role in strengthening the “feeling” of belonging to a national community (Smith, 1999). Therefore, this section of the chapter will concentrate on exploring the roots of Zionism but also its contemporary expressions.

Zionism can be interpreted as an ideology closely connected to nationalism, but also as a specific political discourse deeply rooted in all societal functions in Israel (Silberstein, 2008; Newman, 2001). Traditional or mainstream Zionism commonly refers to the development of a Jewish nationalist ideology based on territorial claims, aimed at constructing a homeland in biblical Israel. Although Jews have prayed, written poems, and created traditions connected to Zion, or the homeland, for a long time, Zionist national aspirations became international during the 19th century, for two reasons. Zionism in a broad sense was inspired by European nationalist movements, but the main motivation was the pogroms and persecution against Jews. This development motivated the creation of Zionism, but also waves of migration (aliyah) to Ottoman Palestine. Some groups concentrated on political-nationalist aspects of Zionism while others aimed at constructing a religious and cultural community (Jones & Murphy, 2002:6). For secular Jews, highly assimilated into their respective societies in Western Europe, the wave of anti-Semitism came in many ways as a shock and it was mainly among these Jews that political Zionism progressed. Theodor Herzl (1860–1904) is often referred to as the father of the political Zionist movement, and through his writings and the first Zionist congresses, Zionism turned into an international Jewish issue. Herzl’s Zionism was secular rather than religious (Silberstein, 1999:32) and the strategy was to gather the support of European states for the creation of a homeland, motivated by the persecution of Jews. “Political” Zionism was criticized for not including culture, such as language and literature, or

1 Aliyah is Hebrew for "going up" or becoming part of the Jewish nation in Israel.
more spiritual aspects into the nationalist efforts, and for continuing the European colonialist tradition and incorporating its view of “the oriental other” (Jones & Murphy, 2002:7p). Consequently, traditional Zionism has always contained a tension between religion and secularism (Aggestam, 2004:122), though these views have one thing in common – the focus on territory and creating a homeland.

The first waves of Aliyah took place from the 1880s, and comprised mainly Ashkenazi Jews (with European decent), and the Jewish immigrant community in pre-state Israel (the Yishuv) was dominated by labor or socialist Zionism, particularly from 1922 (the establishment of the British mandate). The leading figure of the early years was David Ben-Gurion, and the pillars of labor Zionism were the kibbutz movement, the pre-state army (Haganah), the Jewish Agency (which was the Jewish administrative body), and the union movement (Jones & Murphy, 2005:35). The leadership of the Yishuv (the forerunners of the Labor Party and other socialist parties), and labor Zionism, was harshly criticized in the 1930s by revisionist Zionists led by Ze’ev Jabotinski and later on Menachem Begin, for giving in to the British mandate authority and for making territorial concessions. The revisionists propagated a return to the vision of Herzl, focusing on establishing Eretz Israel, and on security and defense. This movement eventually led to the creation of the Likud party in 1973. The revisionists were mainly supported by Sephardi (Oriental) Jews. Besides these identity discourses, there were also groups of ultra-orthodox (Haredim) Jews within and outside of the Yishuv and later on the state. These groups form their own separate communities and are not necessarily Zionist. Therefore, less attention is directed towards the Haredi society in this dissertation.

As stated, traditional Zionism is far from being homogenous, although consisting of a common core: there is a Jewish nation which serves as the target group for Zionism and this nation is also distinguished by anti-Semitism and persecution; there is a natural relationship between this nation and a specific piece of land – Eretz-Israel; the creation of a state in the ancient homeland will gather and save the Jews from the destructive life in the Diaspora; and the homeland as a safe haven from further aggression (see for instance Evron, 1995:41p). To sum up, the basic principles of traditional Zionist identity discourse are the “redemption of the land, conquest through labor, ingathering of exiles, and defence.” (Silberstein, 2008:4).

The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 departed from a Zionist reconstruction of Jewish history (Zerubavel, 1995:xviii) and the redemption of Eretz-Israel.
ACCORDINGLY WE, MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE’S COUNCIL, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY OF ERETZ-ISRAEL AND OF THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT, ARE HERE ASSEMBLED [...] BY VIRTUE OF OUR NATURAL AND HISTORIC RIGHT [...] HEREBY DECLARE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JEWISH STATE IN ERETZ-ISRAEL, TO BE KNOWN AS THE STATE OF ISRAEL. (The Declaration of Establishment of the State of Israel, May 14, 1948)

One important component was to create the Hebrew Israeli (the Sabra) instead of focusing on Jewishness, and this entailed a reconstruction of the Hebrew language, Hebrew names, Hebrew music, and so on. The life in the new state was contrasted to the suffering in the Diaspora (Aggestam, 2004:125; Zerubavel, 1995:19pp). Zionism is thus connected both to a modernist perspective of creating a state and to a primordial assumption of reconstructing the common cultural core (Smith, 1999:207).

The establishment of the state reiterated that traditional Zionism is a territorial identity discourse. For a long period, the period of exile, the homeland was something utopian, an imagined territory, and a future goal mainly connected to religion, but after 1948, a socialization process was initiated. There was and is a comprehensive knowledge production regarding the components of Israeli national identity and thus connected to power.

Zionist discourse is produced and disseminated through an apparatus [...] of institutions, spatial arrangements, laws, administrative organizations, and philanthropic activities. …Zionism generates and legitimates specific power relations. (Silberstein, 1999:17)

Territorial aspects of Zionism were integrated into every aspect of society. In addition music, poetry, language, and art were main features in the territorial identity construction (Zerubavel, 1995:22). Planning practice and agents of planning played a central part in this process (Newman, 2001:238). The territorial reconstruction was performed using maps, cartography, naming processes (for example terming the West Bank as Judea and Samaria), narratives of historic events, establishment of museums, and rehabilitation of historical sites, such as Masada,4 which is today an important place for the swearing-in ceremony of IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) soldiers (Zerubavel, 1995:114pp, 129). One of the most important institutions for strengthening the link between the Jewish people and the territory is the education system. Socialization is consequently an important compo-

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4 A famous Roman fortification near the Dead Sea where a group of Jews allegedly committed collective suicide instead of falling into the hands of the Romans in the year 73 CE.
The Zionist construction of the homeland was also connected to specific slogans, regarding the territory itself under which Zionists could unite. The first significant slogan was that the land in question was empty; second, that there had never been a Palestinian state; third, many of the Arabs who left during the 1948 and 1967 wars did so voluntarily; fourth, that Israel has always been defensive, not aggressive; fifth, that the Yishuv built and modernized the land; and sixth, that Israel was established on a foundation of humanist and democratic values that were rejected by minority groups (Strömbom, 2010:122pp; Pappé, 2003: 46p). These slogans or strategic narratives became “truths” in the political rhetoric.

The 1967 war between Israel and its Arab neighbors led to the inclusion of the Eastern parts of Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights into the realm of the Zionist project. This led to a situation which in one interpretation is an occupation of Palestinian territories and in another a liberation of Judea and Samaria. After the war, Jerusalem was enlarged and de facto annexed to the state of Israel. The events in 1967 are described in a vast number of books as groundbreaking concerning both the Zionist project and Israeli territorial identity (Yiftachel, 2006:64; Jones & Murphy, 2002:46p).

Labor Zionism was the dominant identity discourse until 1977, represented by the Labor Party (Silberstein, 2008:3p), but in conjunction with the 1977 elections, the revisionists, represented by the Likud party won a historic victory. The basic premise of the revisionists was to lay claim to the entire area of Eretz Israel on both banks of the river Jordan. Prime Minister Menachem Begin pledged his allegiance to the settlement project, and developed the territorial goals of Zionism. The settlements in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights were grounded out of both national and religious attachment to territory, with another motive being to provide safety and security (Yiftachel, 2006:64p).

The unresolved situation of the occupation and the escalating violence between Israel and the Palestinians increased the pressure on Israeli politicians. A political debate ensued regarding the direction of Israeli politics. This challenge to traditional Zionism came from academia, left-wing parties, the ultra-orthodox community, and the national-religious right (Ram, 2000:419p). There was also a growing dissatisfaction among social movements and citizens. The violence of the Palestinian first Intifada in 1987 and a peace-oriented international atmosphere, in connection with the end of the Cold War, contributed to the mobilization of the Israeli peace movement. The Oslo accords in 1993–94, constituted a major challenge to the
territorial aspects of Zionist identity discourses and particularly the national-religious movements in Israel (Newman, 2001:242). In addition, events during the last ten years have provoked actors from the left and right. The unilateral withdrawal from the settlements in Gaza in 2005 was criticized by the nationalist camps. The Gaza war in 2008–2009 created great challenges for the left. The current situation of a growing influence of national-religious representatives in the government has led to Israel taking a path to the right.

5.1.2 Continuity and change in new Zionism

In the spirit of the revisionists, new Zionism or neo-Zionism has during the last decades evolved as a critique towards traditional Zionism and the political “establishment” in Israel, mainly labor Zionism, but new Zionism is not something strictly new. It is rather a combination of already existing identity discourses.

From secular Zionism it adopts the territorial stipulation, the centrality of territory in the national project; from Orthodox Judaism it adopts the imperative of the Jewish codex, the Halakah, and the expectation of messianic redemption. Fusing the two, territory and community become religiously sanctified. (Ram, 2001:50)

According to the new Zionist perspective, traditional Zionism has failed to properly develop and hold on to the territory of Eretz-Israel and also to give adequate attention to national affiliation, security, historical attachment, ancestry, heritage, and religion. Besides resting on the ideas of Herzl, new Zionism has also been inspired by Avraham Yitzhak Ha-Cohen Kook (the first Ashkenazi chief Rabbi of the British Mandate), who connected Zionism with messianic ideas (sometimes referred to as religious Zionism). In this national-religious interpretation, the territory is sacred and Zionism is the method in order to reach the goal to control and create the homeland in the entire area of Eretz-Israel (Aggestam, 2004:130). The role of the state is in new Zionist interpretation to administer the territory based on Halakha (the divine law). If the state should fail to adhere to these ideas, an alternative state could be established (Newman, 2001:242). This leads to the question whether Israeli nationalism is becoming more religious. The answer is rather that “…Jewish religion is becoming more and more nationalistic.” (Ram, 2000:413).

Many of the arguments and narratives within new Zionism can be found in the settler movement. The national-religious camp traces its foundation mainly to the Gush Emunim movement created in the 1970s, with the purpose of settling the land and hindering territorial concessions. For new
Zionists, Israel is not a state like any other; the territory is the safe haven for Jews given by God, and the historical and religious attachment is unbreakable. Traditional Zionism has, in the eyes of new Zionists, failed to make the Jewish inhabitants of Israel realize this special bond (Newman, 2001:241; Newman, 2008:72). The new Zionists describe themselves as the true Zionists.

New Zionism rejects the demands from the Palestinian “other” and one new Zionist narratives is that the conflict with the Palestinians will never be resolved by giving up land, because the other side will always demand more. In this perspective, it would therefore be preferable if the Palestinians would move or accept Jewish supremacy. This is a long-term process which could take hundreds of years and the eventual goal is a homogenous Jewish homeland (Interview Arieh King, 2009).

New Zionists claim that they are not bothered with the critique from the international community, which is mainly directed at the settlement enterprise, particularly in East Jerusalem.

…the new religious nationalists and their secularist allies view such isolation and world hostility as a blessing: this, they believe, is why Jews have managed to keep their identity and uniqueness throughout history. The Jewish people has always stood alone, on the one side of the barrier, while the rest of humanity has stood on the other. (Evron, 1995:224)

On the other hand, the current government has put a great deal of effort into ameliorating international image of Israel, but at the same time it initiates laws and regulations which arouse criticism. The amendments to the Citizenship law, requiring new non-Jewish citizens to swear their loyalty to Israel as a Jewish and a democratic state, can be seen in this light (Lis, Ha’aretz, October 10, 2010), as well as the “Boycott law” sanctioning calls for boycotting Israel (Azulay, Ynet News, July, 11, 2011).

New Zionism has a strong impact on Israeli politics, at least since the 2009 election, when these views were included into government policies, and it constitutes a major challenge to traditional Zionism and more civic-oriented perspectives such a post-Zionism. New Zionists portray their vision as the way out of inertia and stand-still, and democracy as a society framework could be questioned. According to Ilan Pappé (2000), new Zionism is attractive because of its simplicity and the straight-forward communication of solutions for the future (Pappé, 2000:38). One interesting aspect to consider is what happens when new Zionism becomes part of the “establishment”, as they now have representatives in the government. Nonetheless they see themselves as constantly thwarted or as victims (Levy, Ha’aretz, July 3, 2011).
The two major counter-discourses to traditional Zionism, described in this dissertation, present two very different post-national views of what the future of Israel should look like.

New Zionism elevates to an exclusive (and exclusionary) status the ethnic dimension of Israeli nationalism; post-Zionism elevates to an exclusive (and in this case inclusive) status the civic dimension of Israeli statehood. (Ram, 2003: 29)

5.1.3 The post-Zionist critique

Zionism as ideology and identity discourse has always been subjected to discussion and criticism, but post-Zionist critique takes the discussion further. According to Lawrence J. Silberstein (1999), post-Zionist criticism comes both from within, focusing on reforming Zionism as a political discourse, and from without, questioning the very existence of Zionism (Silberstein, 1999, chp. 2–3). Post-Zionism is thus not a homogenous identity discourse, it is rather an intellectual critique, which mainly emanates from academic circles, but also from social movements and minority groups. Post-Zionism is inspired by both local and regional everyday life issues and global integration in an attempt to override the national level (Ram, 2003:28p). Another reason as to why post-Zionism was developed is that Zionism in its original form is achieved, and therefore Israeli society needs to move on (Kelman, 1998).

...postzionism is a term applied to a current set of critical positions that problematize zionist discourse, and the historical narratives and social and cultural representations that it produced. [...] To critics and detractors, postzionism presents a challenge to the basic principles and values of zionism. To its advocates, the postzionist critique is a necessary prerequisite to Israel’s emergence as a fully democratic society. (Silberstein, 1999:2)

One central perspective is consequently the challenge for Israel to remain both a Jewish and a democratic state.5 It is considered morally questionable and practically impossible to maintain control over another people without granting equal rights. The only alternative is to create a truly democratic state for all its residents (Evron, 1995; Ram, 2000; Nimni, 2003; Silberstein, 2008; Strömbom, 2010). Civic versus ethnic nationalism is thus one of the central aspects in the post-Zionist debate. This is not only related to the Israel–Palestine conflict or the role of so-called Israeli Arabs,

5 For a summary of the ethnic democracy debate in Israel see Andersson, 2010. See also Dowty, 1999 and Smooha, 1997.
who are citizens of Israel, but has also recently been brought to the fore in connection with the situation of guest workers and their children.

Post-Zionism is often related to critique from the academia. New facts and interpretations of the events during the 1948 war constituted the starting point for a *historiographic* debate in Israel. Many Arab-Palestinian villages were leveled or completely reconstructed after the war, and the information about the origins of these places was not public knowledge until the appearance of the *new historians* in the 1990s (Morris, 1999; Pappé, 1999). These researchers started the historiographic debate by confronting traditional Zionist narratives and in particular the narratives regarding the territorial conquest of areas in the 1948 war (Strömbom, 2010:140). This debate is often regarded as one of the foundations of the umbrella concept of post-Zionism. It is important to note that not all authors within this debate see themselves as post-Zionists, though they are often connected to a challenge to the traditional view of the history of Israel and the future of the Jewish state. These researchers dared to recognize the “the Other”, thus transgressing several of the Zionist narratives.

Post-Zionism is thus a critical perspective and the territorial consequences of the suggestions are substantial. The principal objective is not a two-state solution, but rather the civic rights of all inhabitants. There are conflicting views regarding territory within the post-Zionist debate. The critique does not necessarily regard the right of Jews to a safe haven in Israel, but rather how groups after the creation of Israel continue a colonial enterprise in Eretz-Israel through the settlement movement (Newman, 2001).

During the last years, post-Zionism and actors perceived as post-Zionists have been under considerable pressure from a strong right-wing agenda in Israeli politics. Post-Zionism is seen as anti-Zionist and even anti-Israeli (Silberstein, 2008:5). Post-Zionists are regarded by new Zionists as “the other”, as decadent Tel Avivians, who are denying their ancestral bonds to the territory. They are by some even considered as self-hating Jews. One example is the finger pointing at potential post-Zionists within the academic world or the dismissal or discrimination of university lecturers who analyze Zionism from a critical perspective. Several examples have come to the public attention the last couple of years in what seem to be systematic attempts to remove these elements from higher education in Israel or at least question their loyalty to the state (Kashti, *Haaretz*, February 10, 2011). Israeli peace activist Uri Avnery illustrates the demand for loyalty to the state.
IN ISRAELI parlance, denying the “Jewish Character” of the state is tantamount to the worst of all political felonies: to claim that Israel is a “State of all its Citizens.” (Avnery, www.gush-shalom.org, June 18, 2011)

Post-Zionism thus constitutes a challenge to traditional Zionism and new Zionism, but has a marginal position in Israeli society as a whole. It is connected to the failure of the Oslo Accords and to a rejection of the state, in other words, rejection of the safe haven. The critique is nonetheless vocal and apparently important enough to be confronted by Israeli right-wing politicians and groups. The narrative struggle between post-Zionists and new Zionism is an illustration of the battle over identity hegemony in contemporary Israeli politics and the struggle for territorial legitimacy.

5.1.4 The image of "the other"
National identity discourses are often constructed in relation to other identities. We have established that the Israeli identity discourses are interrelated, particularly concerning the importance of territory as a refuge or safe haven. The Israeli claims on territory are to some extent a response to Palestinian claims and vice versa. We can compare Israel’s rhetoric with the Palestinian:

Palestine, the land of the three monotheistic faiths, is where the Palestinian Arab people was born, on which it grew, developed and excelled. Thus the Palestinian Arab people ensured for itself an everlasting union between itself, its land, and its history. (Palestinian Declaration of Independence, 1988)

According to Gerald Steinberg (2009), there is a narrative battle over how the Israel–Palestine conflict is communicated throughout Israeli society and the international community. This is a battle between Israelis and Palestinians, but it is also a battle between left- and right-wing oriented Israelis, and related to the image of Israel. Israeli and Palestinian organizations and social movements, communicating human rights issues, are sometimes backed by international aid, and according to Steinberg, this support of “left-wing” views constitutes an inappropriate interference in Israeli politics. This example shows that interpretation of who “the other” is can be rather intricate (Steinberg, Jerusalem Post, 2009).

The Israeli claims on territory are supported by an image of “the other” as a worse caretaker of territorial issues. In this context it is important for the researcher not to exaggerate myths and narratives in an anachronistic way. All quotes and reflections must be analyzed according to their historical contexts, such as the words of Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir who stated in 1969 that “There is no such thing as Palestinians” (see for in-
stance Garfinkle, 1991). Although Meir claimed that her statement referred to both Jewish and Arab Palestinians, it is used in the contemporary narrative battle regarding the entitlement to the territory.

There are a number of events in history that have been used in creating the image of “the other”. We will return to some of them in the next section such as the interpretations of the events in 1948, in which the Palestinian Nakbah (catastrophe) stands against the Israeli War of Independence. Another issue is the administration of East Jerusalem 1948–1967. The 1990s were dominated by the peace negotiations, and this process created an image of the Palestinians as not committed, as breaking promises, or as making unreasonable demands. This stereotype is particularly associated with the former PLO leader Yassir Arafat.

These stereotypes can be found in policy documents, in speeches or in everyday life vocabulary in Israel. They are also part of the socialization processes of Zionism within, for instance, the school system. Daniel Bar-Tal and Yona Teichman have studied the representations of Arabs in Israeli schools, but also in the wider society. The Arab is perceived as “…hating Jews, striving to destroy Israel and to annihilate its Jewish population.” (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005:376). Zionism has been strengthened by using negative stereotypes about “the Palestinian other”, but the reverse is also the case in the Palestinian education system and society. These negative representations have been particularly common during periods of extensive violence. Bar-Tal and Teichman also show how the education system can be used to promote peace, as in the years following the Oslo agreements (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005:375, 401p). The analysis of policy documents, research literature, and political speeches reveals how “the other” is portrayed in relation to Jerusalem.

5.2 Jerusalem in Israeli identity politics

In 2007, Israel celebrated the 40th anniversary of the reunification of Jerusalem; in 2000, Ariel Sharon made his famous walk on the Temple Mount/Haram Ash-Sharif; in 1998, Israel commemorated the 50th birthday of the state; and in 1995, Israeli authorities arranged a celebration of Jerusalem as 3000 years old. These are all examples of Israeli manifestations of identity politics in Jerusalem. In Israeli politics today, Jerusalem plays an increasingly important role, and interpretations of historical events and processes determine, to a large extent, political discussions regarding the city. These interpretations constitute the basis for individual identity, local and national policy-making, territorial claims, and accusations of wrongdoing, and serve as corroborations of a certain “truth”. This section focuses on how Israeli territoriality, i.e. Israeli territorial claims and attempts
to control the development of Jerusalem, are manifested and legitimized in political speeches and statements. There are many ways to approach Jerusalem as an academic topic. This section concentrates on studying how the Israeli claims on Jerusalem are connected a Zionist interpretation of history and supported by the construction of commemorative narratives.

5.2.1 Jerusalem in contemporary Israeli politics – Stating the claim

The generation that fought in the Independence War gave us a country with Jerusalem as the reborn capital of the Jewish state that arose from the ashes. Our generation united Jerusalem and is developing it with strength and vigor, and the next generation – your generation, children – will ensure its future as the one united, undivided and prosperous capital. (Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu, speech Jerusalem Day ceremony, June 1, 2011)

Any account of the identity politics of Jerusalem shows that the city is connected with many emotions, visions and beliefs. It is an empty signifier (Torfing, 1999) filled with meaning from various perspectives. Nonetheless, contemporary Israeli identity politics is dominated by a commonly accepted vision or a master commemorative narrative which is identifiable in political speeches, interviews, and official statements regarding Jerusalem.

New- and post-Zionist challenges towards traditional Zionism have dominated Israeli identity politics the last 20 years, and the growing influence of new Zionism became particularly apparent in the 2009 national elections, where the government took a turn to the right. Right-wing parties, such as A Jewish Home (former National Religious Party), have closed the door on practically any compromise regarding Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem. Despite the discursive antagonism, parties as different as National Union and Kadima, share a basic view of Jerusalem as the indivisible eternal capital of Israel, at least on paper. National Union states in the platform for the 2006 elections that “Jerusalem, the eternal capital, will be preserved in its entirety under Israeli sovereignty” (National Union/NRP, Joint Platform for the 2006 elections) and almost the same words are used by Kadima and shares the goal to; “...maintain the unity of Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty” (Kadima, Yes to Kadima, election platform 2006).

In its platform for the elections in 2009, the Likud party states that it will

... keep Jerusalem the unified capital under Israeli sovereignty. [...] The worst action that can be taken for peace is dividing Jerusalem. Such as step would create a permanent site of friction that is likely to ignite the entire region. (Likud Party Platform, Elections 2009)
Although local groups have criticized the Israeli government and national politicians for not turning words into action (Interview Arieh King, 2009), the vision of the eternal, indivisible capital is supported by many local politicians as well, such as Mayor Nir Barkat. In his biography on the municipality website, Jerusalem is referred to as “the eternal capital of the Jewish people” (Biography of Nir Barkat, www.jerusalem.muni.il), and he sees a division of the city as the worst solution.

Show me a working model of a split city that ever works. [...] They either stay dysfunctional or get reunited. There is no way, when you learn and understand the city, you understand that we can never be divided, not practically and not ideologically. [...] The world is looking for such a simple solution for such an important city that was never divided. (Nir Barkat on BBC, July 15, 2011)

These declarations appear at first glance to reveal a consensus. Looking more closely at political statements from individual politicians or parties such as Kadima, Labor, and Meretz, they express a less negative attitude towards territorial concessions. The left-wing party Meretz agrees that the city should not be divided physically, but supports a division into two capitals side by side (Meretz Party Platform, 2006). Former Meretz leader Yossi Beilin stated in 2007 that

Continued declarations of a “united Jerusalem” are just empty slogans in a de facto divided Jerusalem. It’s time to remove the mask and to act according to real Israeli interests: Namely, to reach a final status agreement that would allow the Palestinians to found a state alongside Israel with its capital in East Jerusalem. (Beilin, Ynet News, October 15, 2007)

On the other hand, Meretz have been criticized for rejoining the Barkat municipal coalition in 2011, accepting the East Jerusalem portfolio, and thus potentially giving legitimacy to discriminate Palestinians (Warschawski, Alternative Information Center website, June 30, 2011).

In any case, within the realm of Israeli national politics, it is very sensitive and controversial to talk about a division of Jerusalem. Even though Jewish residents of Jerusalem in general are not attached to, or may not even know of Palestinian neighborhoods such as Anata or Shuafat, the very thought of giving up any part of Jerusalem seems impossible, despite the fact that these areas were not historically part of Jerusalem. The mental map in this perspective is more powerful than the actual “facts on the ground”. Proponents of compromise on Jerusalem regard territorial or at least administrative concessions as a prerequisite for security and peace, so-called “land for peace”. The peace negotiations show that this notion is rather complicated to fulfil (Klein, 2003; Mayer & Mourad, 2008:12).
There are currently few incentives in Israeli politics for discussing a two-state solution with two capitals. The Likud platform implies, relinquishing Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem, would cause security problems. One argument is that it would strengthen the position of Hamas or other militant groups in Jerusalem. Former Mayor Uri Lupolianski combined the fear of a Hamas takeover with the demographic threat of the Palestinian birth rate in the following statement during the 40th anniversary of the Jerusalem reunification.

Jerusalem could, God forbid, end up not under Jewish sovereignty, but rather that of Hamas. […] Hamas knows that it is possible to capture Jerusalem through demography within 12 years. (Uri Lupolianski speech during the 40th anniversary of Jerusalem reunification cited in Jerusalem Post, May 13, 2007)

Dore Gold warns that a division of Jerusalem could lead further away from peace. Gold, who was also an advisor to Prime Minister Netanyahu during his first term, claims that Jerusalem is used by radical Islamists as “… a trigger for global Jihad.” (Gold, 2007:22). This holy Muslim struggle is not only directed against Israel but against the entire western world. “The struggle for Jerusalem today is being waged against a background of a larger clash between radical Islam and the West”. (Gold, 2007:30). This view is rather common among more right-wing debaters, and Gold summarizes this ideological stance when he concentrates on two questions: who will be the best guardian of the holy sites, and will a division of Jerusalem really create peace? The message is that it is very telling that Israel’s control over Jerusalem is acceptable to Christians all over the world, but not to Muslims. According to Gold, Jews have shown throughout history that they are better equipped to ensure religious freedom. The problem with allowing for Muslim sovereignty over the holy sites and allowing for some kind of self-determination in East Jerusalem is that there is not enough separation between Islam and the state/ruling authority (Gold, 2007). On the other hand, there are periods in history when Muslim leaders have also granted religious freedom in Jerusalem (Little, 2000:195) and Israel has also been criticized for not separating religion and state (Yiftachel, 2006:16p).

The current identity politics of Jerusalem can thus be summarized in the following vision or master commemorative narrative;

*Jerusalem is the indivisible, eternal capital of Israel*
This master narrative has been pronounced in speeches delivered by Israeli Prime Ministers and in other public statements since the beginning of the 1980s, as for example in a statement by Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin in connection with the peace negotiations in 1994. “Jerusalem must be united, under Israeli sovereignty and the capital of Israel. [...] and will remain so in the future as well.” (Statement Prime Minister Rabin, Channel 2, August 1, 1994). The master commemorative narrative is both a claim and a statement based on a number of stories regarding historical events. These narratives are firmly grounded in Zionist visions and are constantly being reproduced. This master narrative permeates all political issues and levels dealing with questions concerning Jerusalem. This is the foundation of laws and regulations as well as political action. Israel does not have a constitution but a number of Basic laws. The Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel from 1980 states that

1. Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel. 2. Jerusalem is the seat of the President of the State, the Knesset, the Government and the Supreme Court. (Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 1980)

The text of the law itself does not argue for its case but simply states “the fact”, and provides the basic legal framework for the administration of the city. The narrative thus constitutes the main expression of legal-political territoriality. Another important law reflecting the master narrative is the Jerusalem Day Law, 5758, from 1998, declaring a special day dedicated to celebrate the reunification of the city. The master narrative can be interpreted as the point of departure in the ongoing internal narrative battle between traditional, post- and new Zionists, and in the Israel–Palestine conflict. It is used as an argument against counter-narratives and external counter-discourses, and it is crucial for leading politicians to relate to this narrative whenever possible, especially when celebrating such identity-related and symbolic events as Jerusalem Day.

By reciting a story that reaches back into the past, master narratives of this kind provide legitimation for present institutions and practices. In this particular case the narrative draws authority not only from its constant recitation as official history but also from its association with the Bible... (Gunn, 2003:258)

The master commemorative narrative is a hegemonic political argument as well as a master narrative, and going beyond this statement means a serious breach of Zionist identity. On the other hand, this also means that the Jewish identity of Jerusalem is in danger of being static and...
...the more it becomes the narrative of the ‘eternal and undivided capital of Israel’ – that is, the eternal political possession – the more it risks emptying traditional Jewish ‘yearning’ of meaning. As it seeks to shore up Jewish identity it is at the same time subverting it. (Gunn, 2003:270)

The question that arises is what Jerusalem these politicians, parties, and legal frameworks relate to, is it the “heavenly” or the “earthly”? Is it the symbolic or the physical Jerusalem? In any case, Jerusalem has never been recognized internationally as the capital of Israel. The foreign embassies are still located in Tel Aviv. The new borders from 1967 have turned Jerusalem into a completely different city, which we will return to later on. They have enlarged the Israeli controlled territory (see figure 5:1), which is consistent with the Zionist vision, but they have also created administrative and security problems (Interview Miron Cohen, 2009). “We shouldn’t have expanded the borders of Jerusalem” says planner Moshe Cohen in retrospective (Interview Moshe Cohen, 2007).

![Figure 5:1. Territorial changes in Jerusalem during the 20th century Source: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, Jerusalem. www.passia.org](image)
In the following section, this master narrative will be deconstructed into separate commemorative narratives in relation with their historical periods. The five territorialities are intertwined in all these narratives and therefore the narratives are presented chronologically. The commemorative narratives have been identified in and drawn from literature, political speeches, policy documents, and political statements. First of all, when exploring the meaning of “eternal”, we find ourselves at the very beginning of Jerusalem history. These words have primordial connotations, leading back to the Jewish presence in ancient times, and of having created Jerusalem as a capital. The narrative furthermore refers to uninterrupted Jewish presence in Jerusalem and to the city as a safe haven. Many of the quotes from political speeches also connect to the process of yearning for Jerusalem in exile. This dissertation identifies a narrative portraying divided Jerusalem (1948–1967) as a disastrous period hampering development and characterized by neglect. The narrative based on reunification after thousands of years of yearning is particularly strong. To sum up, the commemorative narratives of Israel and the Jewish nation are commonly divided into three different historical periods: antiquity, the exile, and the return (Zerubavel, 1995:15; Gunn, 2003:259).

Later on in the chapter, we will discuss whether these narratives have political importance as political strategies to keep Jerusalem united and undivided are identified and analyzed.

5.2.2 Jerusalem 3000 – The war of archeology

Three thousand years of history look down upon us today, in the city from whose stones the ancient Jewish nation sprang, from whose clear mountain air three religions absorbed their spiritual essence and their strength. […] Three thousand years of Jerusalem are for us, now and forever, a message for tolerance between religions, of love between peoples, of understanding between the nations, of the penetrating awareness that there is no State of Israel without Jerusalem and no peace without Jerusalem united, the City of Peace. (Speech by Prime Minister Rabin at the Jerusalem 3000 celebrations, September 4, 1996)

In 1993, the State of Israel decided to make the year 1996 the Trimillenium of Jerusalem – The City of David, an event popularly called Jerusalem 3000. According to the decision, the purpose of the celebration was “To place Jerusalem at the focus of attention both in Israel and the world, and to strengthen its status and image as both the spiritual and national capital of Israel and the Jewish people.” (Decision of the Government of the State of Israel, 1993).
This celebration and the reactions to it put a finger on one of the narrative battles regarding the history of Jerusalem. Who can provide solid evidence of an ancestral bond going back to the very beginning of settling the area where we find Jerusalem today? History and archeology are crucial components in the Zionist project regarding Jerusalem and current territorial politics in Israel. Historical backgrounds are common in many books, but in this case it is highly complicated to define any kind of objective history. Historians and archeologists often relate their findings more or less closely to religious texts or use the texts as a way of structuring chapters or the entire research. There is a risk of the researcher being overly steered in a certain direction, especially when it comes to the early history of Jerusalem, concerning which there are few archeological findings (Thompson, 2003:1p; Sawah, 2003:116). Therefore descriptions of actual historical events and dates are combined with an analysis of how history is used in political vocabulary.

The narrative battle of ancestry is not necessarily a question of who was the first person in Jerusalem, since it is impossible to ascribe ethnicity to the 35,000 year-old human remains that have been found in the area, but rather a question of who built and constructed the first permanent town-like settlement. Who can present the most legitimate territorial claim? Archeologists have found remnants of a settlement in the Kidron valley in the Jerusalem area dating back 5,200 years. These findings cannot clearly tell us who these early settlers were or if there was anything resembling a town at that point. There are very few physical structures or documentation from this early period, except religious texts (Franken, 2000:25pp). In 1961, remains of a city wall were found in Ophel (near the Palestinian neighbourhood of Silwan and the city of David) dating back 3,800 years (1800 BCE), which has been interpreted as a sign of urban life. The settlement was probably populated by the Jebusites and most archeologists believe that the Jebusites had some connection with the Canaanites. The first mentioning of the name Jerusalem has been found on Egyptian vases dated to approximately 1900 BCE and contained the name Kushalimum, Urusalim or Urushamem. Archeologists and Historians believe that this is the first evidence of the existence of Jerusalem (Armstrong, 2005:6–7; Cline, 2004:17).

Immediately outside the current city walls we find “City of David”, run by the settler organization Elad, and which has become an increasingly important Israeli commemorative site, where the Jerusalem 3000 celebrations took place. This is the place where some of the first traces of a the city have been found, and the area has been in focus the last decade due to the plans of making it into a national park and the pending demolition
orders on a substantial amount of Palestinian houses in the vicinity. The efforts of the municipality to develop the area is connected to ancestry, tourism, territorial control, and thus a part of the identity politics of Jerusalem.

Claiming that Jerusalem is 3,000 years old is a strong commemorative narrative in Israeli political rhetoric and in Zionist identity discourse. According to Ariel Sharon, “Historic Jerusalem, the heart of the Jewish people for over 3,000 years, will always be one, united, the capital of the State of Israel forever and ever.” (Prime Minister Ariel Sharon speech Jerusalem Day, June 6, 2005). The figure 3000 is repeated in Israeli museums, tourist brochures, and political statements. The purpose of reproducing the narrative is to strengthen and legitimize the Israeli claims on Jerusalem. It is connected to the importance of settling in and developing the land, and to the political slogan of “a land without people”.

In the last 10–15 years, the origin of the city has created a narrative war in the Israel–Palestine conflict. It is clear that there was a settlement in Jerusalem about 5,000 years ago. The question is who the settlers really were, what the settlement looked like, and who their descendants are. It is more and more common among Palestinian researchers and politicians to relate to Jerusalem as a 5,000 year-old city, and they claim that at least some Palestinians could be the descendants of the Jebusites, which means that Palestinians can also present historical linkage with the very first traces of the city. There are also similarities between the current Palestinian and the ancient Canaanite culture (Khalidi, 2000:xi–xv; Nabil, 2003:1; Noufal, 2003:1). Since there are no clear historical and archeological facts, anyone could be the descendant of the early settlers of what is today Jerusalem.

Jerusalem has been the center of Jewish consciousness for over three thousand years, even before King David made it the capital of his kingdom in 1004 B.C.E. No other city has played such a predominant role in the history, culture and religion of a people as has Jerusalem for the Jews. (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999)

There are today two main stories on how Jerusalem became a capital 3,000 years ago. The traditional view has been that King David conquered Jerusalem militarily and declared Jerusalem the capital. This assumption has been challenged lately as it is speculated whether it is not more reasonable to assume that the Israelite, Judahite, Jebusite and the Canaanite societies merged at one point and that David ended up as the king (Franken, 2000:30pp; Armstrong, 2005:ch. 2). In any case, the origin of the Jewish claim over Jerusalem is not only connected to the narrative of who built
the very first settlement, but also who made Jerusalem into a capital and thus according to the commemorative narrative a proper city. From an archeological perspective there are few doubts that Jewish ancestors were established in Jerusalem 3,000 years ago and this date is the basis of the modern Israeli claims to Jerusalem (Mendenhall, 2000:42p; Armstrong, 2005:ch. 2–3). The 3,000 year-old connection with Jerusalem is considered in Israeli commemorative narrative to be a unique emotional attachment for the Jewish people, as Jerusalem has never been the capital of any other state except the Jewish states in the era of King David until 70 CE and the state of Israel after 1948.

...apart from the period when it was the capital of the Crusader Kingdom, only the Jews have made Jerusalem their political capital and most important holy city. (Meir Ben-Dov, 2002:xiv)

From a religious and cultural perspective this period in history has great effects on identity politics today, both secular and religious, because of the belief that King Salomon, David’s son, built the First temple (Mendenhall, 2000:50pp). The capital created by King David is a significant component in the contemporary Jerusalem identity discourse and particularly in the Israel–Palestine conflict. The Israeli argument is that Jerusalem was never a capital during any of the Arab periods, on the contrary. The main message from this commemorative narrative is that the first real settlement in Jerusalem was built by Jewish ancestors, and that no other people except Jews have made Jerusalem into their capital.

5.2.3 Next year in Jerusalem – Exile, yearning and struggle

The greatest hardships, exiles and difficulties in history could never dissuade us from pursuing the realization of the Jewish people’s dream of generations – the establishment of a state in the land of Israel, with Jerusalem as its capital. This was the wish of every Jew in exile, at every community and in every prayer: “next year in built-up Jerusalem.” (Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speech, Jerusalem Day, May 21, 2009)

One of the main narratives of Zionism is the forced exile from and the yearning for a return to Jerusalem and the homeland. For some groups of Jews, the exile, or Diaspora, has been connected to a sense of geographic guilt, particularly after the establishment of the Zionist movement. A good Jew was (and is) supposed to long for the ancient homeland, and eventually settle there and those who argued against the Zionist project were viewed as taking sides with the Other (Zerubavel, 1995). The Diaspora is in Zionism described as depressing, unfulfilling, and as blocking the potential of Jews. The view of the Diaspora and exile is one of the pillars of le-
gitimizing Zionism. Jerusalem is a central part in this narrative, although as we shall see, not the first priority of the first wave of immigrants.

There are a number of events relating to both expulsions and resistance that have become fundamental in the Zionist identity discourse. Jerusalem is in political speeches and statements often referred to as a city in constant war and as having been conquered by many armies throughout the history. There have been periods of relative calm and tolerance towards the Jewish population, but these are rarely mentioned in contemporary Israeli identity politics as they do not fit into the identity framework and commemorative narratives.

Throughout all the periods of foreign rule over Jerusalem – Roman (70 C.E. –324), Byzantine (324–614), Persian (614–640), Arab (640–1099), Crusader (1099–1291), Mamluk (1291–1516), and Ottoman Turk (1516–1918) – Jews were persecuted, massacred and subject to exile. In spite of this, the Jewish presence in Jerusalem remained constant and enduring. (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999)

The period of exile and ongoing battles over the city, lasted from around 600 BCE to around 13th century CE. We will here consider a few examples used in political rhetoric. The Babylonians conquered Jerusalem in 587 BCE and destroyed the city, including the temple. The legend says that the exiles returned after approximately fifty years and started to build the second temple (Mendenhall, 2000:69pp). The Babylonian period is a major narrative in Israeli identity discourse and tradition, alongside the flight from Egypt. The narrative even inspired popular music such as in the song “Rivers of Babylon” by Boney M in the 1970s. The lyrics were based on passages in Psalms. “By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down. There we wept when we remembered Zion”. (Dove, Brent; Mc Noughton, Trevor; Farian, Frank; Reyam, George, based on Psalms 137). The narrative of yearning can also be exemplified through the words of former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.

Jerusalem – Jewish at its birth, Jewish also during the days we were exiled from it, and today more than ever – Jewish, whole and united. (Jerusalem Day speech Ehud Olmert, May 25, 2006)

A narrative related to the struggle over the city is the fate of the Macca-bees, who rebelled against and ousted the Hellenistic regime in 164 BCE and reinstated Jewish religion and tradition in the Temple. This is celebrated in the Hanukkah tradition (Mendenhall, 2000:72) and has been remembered ever since in political speeches as well as in the Maccabiah games which is a Jewish version of the Olympics.
From the days of the Maccabees to our own times, the Jewish people has not been so strong in its homeland as it is now. (Address by Prime Minister Begin on Independence Day, Broadcast on Israel Television, 27 April 1982)

The Roman period, starting with the conquest in 63 BCE, where two-thirds of the Jerusalemites were Jews, is a period frequently referred to in modern identity politics, mainly related to Jewish revolts. To this context we can add the Bar Kokhba revolt in 132–136 BCE (see for instance Zerubavel, 1995), which briefly created a Jewish state, but was later crushed by a superior Roman army. The conquest by the crusaders in 1099 led to a massacre of its inhabitants ensued, Muslims, Jews and others alike. Jerusalem was soon retaken by Arab forces led by Salah al-din Yusuf b. Ayyub (Saladin) in 1187 (Hiyari, 2000:141pp). During a long period Jerusalem was a predominantly Muslim city. In the 16th century, a homogenous Jewish quarter was established in the old city and Jews started to pray at the Western wall (Cohen, 1984). The number of Jews increased, mainly as a result of the persecutions in Spain and elsewhere. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the growing decline of the Ottoman Empire led to a number of power struggles between and within the religious groups. In this period we can see the beginning of a division within the Jewish community between Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews. There were also severe conflicts within the Christian community and one of the worst incidents took place in 1808, when a part of the Holy Sepulcher was badly damaged in a fire. Accusations flew back and forth and there were violent clashes (Armstrong, 2005:342pp). For an overview of Jerusalem history, see appendix 2.

These periods of conquests and power struggles are popular references in Israeli political speeches and these legends of Jerusalem are constantly reproduced in the Israeli society. They feed directly into the commemorative narrative based on constant Jewish struggles for survival.

It will be ours forever, and will never again be in the hands of foreigners. (Ariel Sharon, Jerusalem Day speech, June 6, 2005)

The message of these commemorative narratives is that Jews have always fought for their survival in Jerusalem, and the city has been a uniting symbol in exile. Jews have thus always yearned for a return to the city.

5.2.4 Jerusalem in early Zionism – The triumphant return?

For 2,000 years we have been saying: We are in exile. We have not been in exile for 2,000 years – even this is not true. We continued to live here. (Benjamin Netanyahu speech, Jerusalem Day, May 11, 2010)
One of the most fundamental commemorative narratives is that Jerusalem has always been the focus of Jewish yearning and for Jewish immigration. Leaving any chronological space empty of Jewish presence would mean opening up for other claims. It is furthermore supported by a claimed uninterrupted Jewish presence in the city, and the somewhat disputed fact that Jews have been a majority for 150 years.

Jews have always chosen to settle in Jerusalem. Since 1840, the Jews have constituted the largest ethnic group in the city, and they have held an uninterrupted majority in Jerusalem since the 1860’s. (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999)

One fact that modern day politicians are reluctant to discuss is that Jerusalem has not always been the center of attention. The period of early Zionism and the first waves of immigration is an illustration of Jerusalem in and out of Zionist focus. The character of Jerusalem started to change around 1840, and according to Alexander Schöch, the city, until the First World War, “…reflected the rhythm of the interaction between Ottoman policies, European penetration and regional responses.” (Schöch, 2000:230). The most visible change that occurred in Jerusalem was the increasing Jewish immigration and growing local Arab nationalist aspirations, mainly motivated by the Zionist project (Wasserstein, 2001:66pp). This was a time when the Christian population was financially and emotionally backed by many European countries, particularly the United Kingdom. It was a period when all groups tried to find physical evidence of their connection to the city. Archeology became a new kind of soft crusade, but this time the Europeans, based on the Bible, supported the Jews rather than slaughtered them. Archeological work was performed with a shovel in one hand and the Bible in the other. Several archeologists and other hobby excavators played an important role in unearthing the secrets of Jerusalem. One even managed to bring a pickaxe into the Dome of the Rock and started to hammer away in the hopes of finding a hidden treasure (Armstrong, 2005:362).

Jerusalem was, as mentioned, not the first priority of the new Jewish immigrants in Ottoman Palestine as they chose to settle mainly in rural areas and along the coast. Therefore, the immigration did not result in an economic boost for Jerusalem during the 19th century. The Jewish population lived quite substantially off Jewish charity. Many of the new construction projects, such as schools or religious institutions, were financed from abroad (Schöch, 2000:235p). On the other hand, the very return to the ancient homeland was a triumph for many Jews. There were several reasons for not settling in Jerusalem: one was to create an economic founda-
tion for the community based on agriculture; another to maximize territorial control (Katz, 1995:281); a third to distance the Yishuv from the urban life in the Diaspora and instead focus on developing the new rural Jew; a fourth explanation is that the secular nature of the hegemonic labor Zionism led to less focus on Jerusalem; a fifth is the reluctance of Zionist leaders to start an international conflict over Jerusalem, which would jeopardize the Zionist project (Mayer, 2008:24p); and finally that Jerusalem was geographically remote as the new communities settled mainly along the coast (Friedland & Hecht, 2000:49).

By the beginning of the 20th century, the conditions for settling in Jerusalem had improved. There were more opportunities to build, there were better means of transportation, better sanitary conditions, and a growing religious attachment. The Jewish community had settled permanently in the territory and it was only natural that it would sooner or later turn its attention to Jerusalem. With the growing focus on Jerusalem, the tensions between the Jewish immigrants and the Palestinian Arabs increased, and Mayor Al-Khalidi warned Theodor Herzl, in a letter sent in 1899, about a growing aversion among the inhabitants towards Jewish immigration and Zionism as nationalist movement (Schölch, 2000:243). World War I led to the end of the 400 year Ottoman rule over Jerusalem, and the area was from 1922 administered by the British mandate. British administration had a profound effect on the Zionist project. British politicians had previously made a number of promises and issued declarations to maintain good relations with all actors in the region, which led to a number of contradictory statements that caused irreparable damage to the British status in the region.6 The Balfour declaration was a central part in legitimizing Zionism.

In Jerusalem, the British mandate and the new administration started to restore buildings and infrastructure, and even decided what kind of stone was to be used for buildings (which is still followed today by Israeli authorities). This process of modernization was welcomed by the Zionist movement, and the Jewish population grew with the establishment of new neighborhoods, both to the east and of the Old City. Commercial activities were developed, and one of the major geographical achievements of the Zionist movement was the establishment of Hebrew University on Mount Scopus. But despite these developments, Jerusalem was still in the periph-

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6 1915, the British High Commissioner of Egypt, McMahon, promised the Sharif of Mecca, Husain ibn Ali, Arab sovereignty in the Middle East and that the holy sites would be governed by a Muslim state. At the same time, the Sykes-Pikot agreement from 1916 and the Balfour declaration from November 1917 supported the aspirations to create a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine.
In order to put Jerusalem in focus, one strategy of religious Zionist leaders was to recall ancient stories about the territory of Jerusalem, such as regarding the Western Wall. Under the leadership of Rabbis such as Avraham Kook, religious Zionism became an important movement in Jerusalem. For them, the temple was the center of the world and the main role of Zionism was to recreate god’s kingdom, with Jerusalem as its center (Armstrong, 2005:379).

Jewish immigration to Jerusalem increased during the first half of the 20th century, mainly due to the increased persecutions in Europe. This increase was one of the reasons for clashes, such as in 1929 and 1936, between Jews, Arabs, and British soldiers. Jewish groups from both labor and more revisionist circles within the old and new Yishuv, prepared for armed resistance, but more moderate labor Zionists, including David Ben-Gurion, who came during the second Aliyah in the 1920s, held a low profile. The creation of the state was seen as an enormous achievement for both the old and new Yishuv, which is one reason why the Declaration of the establishment of the state of Israel did not direct the Jerusalem question. But as a result of the various suggestions for partitioning the mandate and the city, the leaders of the Yishuv, including Ben-Gurion, had started to realize the political importance of the city (Mayer, 2008:230p).

The message of the commemorative narratives presented in speeches and statements is that this period constituted the glorious return to Jerusalem as a safe haven for all Jews and a refuge from centuries of persecution. Another commemorative narrative is the uninterrupted presence of Jews in Jerusalem. The events during this period show that the modern commemorative narratives, depicting a triumphant return or an eternal presence, are simplified and do not give room for the tensions between different forms of Zionism. The narratives are tarnished by the fact that Jerusalem was not the priority of the old Yishuv or mentioned in the Declaration of the establishment of Israel. The period also illustrate how new Zionism uses history to accuse traditional Zionists of not giving priority to Jerusalem, as well as showing the discrepancy between actual historical events and the construction of contemporary national identity discourses.

**5.2.5 Jerusalem divided**

Jerusalem is and has always been an undivided city, except for this 19 year period. There is no justification for this short period to be viewed as a factor in determining the future of the city, and to negate 3,000 years of unity. (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999)
One of the central parts of the master commemorative narrative is Jerusalem as undivided. The period between 1948 and 1967 is the main fuel for the arguments against division. This was also a period where the Zionist leaders started to show a genuine interest in the Old City (Mayer, 2008:233). Let us first recall the events leading up to the division. The British authorities passed on the mandate of Palestine to the newly created United Nations in 1947. The organization drafted a partition plan that was accepted by the General Assembly (United Nations General Assembly resolution 181:II) which proposed dividing the Palestinian mandate into two states. The Palestinian Jews accepted the plan and the internationalization of Jerusalem (corpus separatum). The Palestinian Arabs, on the other hand, refused to agree to the partition or to Jerusalem as a corpus separatum. The Jewish leaders who had foreseen a military struggle for the land, launched Plan Dalet in April 1947, with the aim to ensure an open corridor between Jerusalem and the coastal plain (Hudson, 2000:257pp). There were Arab attacks on Jewish property in Jerusalem immediately after the partition plan was accepted, and Jewish military forces (later developed into the Israeli army), attacked Palestinian Arab villages near Jerusalem. Palestinians fled, were expelled and even executed (Armstrong, 2005:387; Pappé, 2006). The Jordanian Arab Legion captured the Old City and all Jewish residents of the Old City were driven out. In May 1948, the Jewish leaders, headed by David Ben-Gurion, gathered in Tel Aviv to declare the establishment of the state, and after the ensuing war (War of Independence or Nakbah) Israel had enlarged its territory considerably but east Jerusalem came under Jordanian administration. Jerusalem was now physically divided. Jordan’s subsequent annexation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem in 1948 was never recognized internationally. The book O Jerusalem by Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre depicts the emotions among the Jewish population when the state of Israel was created (Collins & Lapiere, 1972) but the establishment of the state of Israel also created a rift between first of all some religious Jews who opposed the creation of the state but also between the Ashkenazi leaders of the Zionist movement and the Sephardic Jews from the old Yishuv. There was a clash of cultures and languages, which Israel is still very much affected by.

The 19 years of Jordanian rule over the eastern part of Jerusalem has created a commemorative narrative about “the other” based on the inability of the Jordanian authorities to develop Jerusalem and to grant access to religious sites. If there is a narrative, there is always a counter-narrative. The 1948 war is called the War of Independence in Israel, but the Palestinians call it the Nakbah – the catastrophe. Israeli books about the 1948 war and its aftermath, such as Raphael Israeli’s Jerusalem Divided. The
Armistice Regime 1947–1967, present one narrative, while Jerusalem 1948, The Arab Neighborhoods and their Fate in the War, edited by Salim Tamari, deals with the same historical period in a totally different manner. Nonetheless, both of them agree that the armistice line in the middle of Jerusalem was not based on a natural division, and led to great problems for urban development (Tamari, 2002; Israeli, 2002).

In Israeli political rhetoric, be it speeches on Jerusalem day or statements on various government websites, Jerusalem has never been physically divided apart from these 19 years, although the city is divided into different neighborhoods and quarters based on ethnic and/or religious affiliation. During the 19 years of division, the Jordanians were criticized for not granting religious freedom and accusations were directed towards the Israelis of desecrating Muslim cemeteries. The city during this period is described as; “...a divided city. Not one Jew could pray near the Western Wall [...] Jerusalem was a sleepy border town, a city on the edge. [...] separated, bleak...” (Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu speech, Jerusalem Day, May 12, 2010).

The Israeli narrative states that few investments were made in the Jordanian area of the old mandate in general and in Jerusalem in particular. According to Michael Hudson, “It was widely believed that the Jordanian authorities feared that sooner or later Israel would strike again and so had its security incentive to give priority to the East Bank.” (Hudson, 2000:267). The counter-narrative of the Jordanians and the Palestinians is that a lot of effort was put into the tourism industry. They claim that the Haram ash-Sharif was renovated and a new city center was built to the east of the Old City. From only a handful of hotels in the late 1940s, around 70 hotels had sprung up in East Jerusalem by 1966 (Armstrong, 2005:391). The argument from the Israeli side that East Jerusalem was neglected during the Jordanian rule, can be discussed, even if it did not reach the scale of the development in West Jerusalem. The Israelis built several new neighborhoods and established the Knesset and other government buildings in West Jerusalem, west of the Old City center around Jaffa Street. Teddy Kollek, elected Mayor of West Jerusalem in 1965, resisted a move of the city hall, which is located near the armistice line, further to the west. We will return to the discussion regarding the city center in the next chapter. One of the most important things to remember is that neither the unilateral projects of Israel nor the Jordanian/Arab ones were accepted by the international community.

The result of the 1948 war and the period of division was a tense and artificial situation regionally, which eventually led to the 1967 war – the Six-Day War. By June 10, Israel controlled the Sinai Peninsula, the West
Bank, the Gaza strip, the Golan Heights and most importantly, all of Jerusalem. A new chapter in the history of the region began. The main message of the narrative on division is that Jerusalem has never been divided except for the 19 years between 1948 and 1967, and during this time “the other” neglected Jerusalem. Furthermore, “the other” cannot be trusted as religious freedom was not granted and as development was thwarted during this period. This narrative is used as a critique to post-Zionism, which is consequently accused of indirectly promoting religious discrimination and a general decline of Jerusalem.

5.2.6 Jerusalem reunited

For 19 years Jerusalem was divided, besieged, reclusive, and at the end of every path, and for double that time – 38 years – it has been united and open. (Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Jerusalem Day Speech, 2005)

Today, we celebrate 40 years since the reunification of the two parts of the city. However, these 40 years appear as a passing moment in the rich history of this magnificent city. So many have yearned for it, so many have longed for it and so many have sacrificed their lives for it. (Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert speech, Jerusalem reunification celebration, 2007)

In May 2007, Israel marked the “40th anniversary of the reunification of Jerusalem”, with speeches and celebrations in Jerusalem attended by leading national and local politicians and people from all over the country. Separate ceremonies were also held all over the world. The celebration was one of many expressions of the role of the 1967 war and its aftermath in commemorative narratives. The Israeli conquest of the Western Wall (the Kotel) is today portrayed as one the most significant set of events in the modern history of Israel and the Jewish people. Religious and secular Jews are united in their attachment to Jerusalem and the Western Wall, since it plays a major role not only in Judaism, but also in Jewish tradition and culture. After the conquest, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan delivered a famous speech, standing next to the Western Wall, and expressed his emotions about “uniting” the city.

This morning, the Israel Defence Forces liberated Jerusalem. We have united Jerusalem, the divided capital of Israel. We have returned to the holiest of our Holy Places, never to part from it again. (Speech Moshe Dayan, 6 June 1967)

The post-1948 period, when Jews were not allowed to approach the Western Wall and could only look at the holy site from a distance, created and strengthened the desire to “liberate” the Western Wall and other sites cher-
ished in Jewish tradition, at least according to the commemorative narrative about the 1967 events. On the other hand, there were no clear plans for the Old City and East Jerusalem by the time of the conquest (Mayer, 2008:237).

The 1967 war created new flows of Palestinian refugees mainly from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. For the first time in 19 years, Arab residents who had fled to East Jerusalem could visit their houses in Katamon, Baka’a and other areas in West Jerusalem, only to find them inhabited by Israelis. Jewish worshippers could visit the Western Wall, and other holy sites in the West Bank. A large project was immediately launched to rehabilitate and rebuild the Jewish quarter in the Old City (Ricca, 2007). The Knesset also passed the Protection of the Holy Places Law in June 1967, stating that

The holy places should be protected from desecration and any other violation and from anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of the different religions to the places sacred to them or their feeling with regard to those places. (Protection of Holy Places Law, 1967)

The Israeli authorities immediately had to tackle the question of the Temple Mount/Haram ash-Sharif. They formed, together with the Jordanian Ministry for Religious Endowment, a system whereby Jordan controls the top and Israel the bottom. Although there have been frequent clashes over this site, the cooperation could possibly serve as a model in a permanent agreement if the city is to be divided into two capitals. The dominating Israeli commemorative narrative, from a religious perspective, is that Israel is the best protector of religious freedom in Jerusalem, as evidenced by the experiences of the Jordanian governance of East Jerusalem. “…only a free and democratic Israel can truly safeguard the city for all the world’s faiths.” (Gold, 2007:30).

The narrative of reunification and particularly the view of Israel as the liberator is constantly being reproduced in Israeli political rhetoric.

What happened on the day of the great victory after what had happened here is that Jerusalem began to breathe again. It began to flourish, it began to spread its wings, be built up and developed. Jews returned to pray at the Western Wall, new neighbourhoods and factories were built. Millions of tourists rushed to the renewed holy city... (Prime Minister Netanyahu speech, Jerusalem Day, June 1, 2011)

Jerusalem, during this period, finally became a full partner in the labor Zionist project to establish something modern, to pioneer, and to create a Jewish future in the city. On June 28, 1967, the Israeli government issued an order to enlarge the municipality of Jerusalem to cover East Jerusalem
and beyond and declared that Israeli law would be implemented in this area. The area grew considerably (see figure 5:1) (Israeli Proclamation of Enlargement of the Municipal Area of Jerusalem, June 28, 1967). This and several other orders were amendments to already existing laws from 1948. The actual text did not contain the word annexation even though it was the final result (Dumper, 1997:38pp). Israeli authorities also dissolved the existing city council and made great changes in the municipal administration. The United Nations continued to regard Jerusalem as an occupied city, and in November 1967, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 242, written by the British UN ambassador and accepted by Egypt, Jordan, Israel, and later on Syria, but not by the Arab citizens of former Palestine – the Palestinians. The resolution urged Israel to withdraw from territories occupied during the 1967 war (Gelvin, 2005:176).

The de facto annexation of Jerusalem in 1967 and the legacy of the armistice line from 1948 (Green line), have profoundly affected the everyday life of and the political conflict concerning Jerusalem. These historical events have created commemorative narratives that are ubiquitous in the Israeli and Palestinian societies. In Israel these narratives have positive attributes, but for the Palestinians the narratives tell of the immorality of occupation. The main message of the commemorative narratives connected to the immediate post-67 period is that Israel reunited Jerusalem and imposed religious freedom, implying that Israel is the best caretaker of Jerusalem and particularly the holy sites. The reunification is described as returning the city to its natural state and form.

5.2.7 Constructing the capital during peace and conflict

History did not come to a halt in 1967, although an analysis of recent political statements and speeches, and the descriptions of the “reunification” of Jerusalem give the impression of an “end of history” and of having reached the ultimate goal – the Zionist ambition to create a homeland in Eretz-Israel. Analysis of the political speeches delivered, for instance, on Jerusalem Day, shows that fewer references are made to more modern history. One interpretation is that it is easier for a politician to relate to a common history before 1967, because of the ongoing processes of consolidating Israeli control over Jerusalem. Another reason is that different opinions about what Jerusalem should be became more apparent after 1967. A third explanation might be that the memories are too close in time and too personal. On the other hand, commemorative narratives based on contemporary or modern history are continuously being produced, and the common core they share is their mainly being based on the image of “the other”, both the internal, but also the external other. When internal differ-
ences start to divide the community, it may be easier to unite against a common enemy.

After the de facto annexation in 1967, the united Jerusalem was unilaterally declared the capital of Israel. The Palestinian inhabitants were invited to apply for Israeli citizenship, but the majority did not accept the offer. They were also offered to participate in the local municipal elections but have collectively refused to do so in order not to legitimize the occupation. Israeli authorities started massive building projects in East Jerusalem, which we will come back to in the next chapter, and they also put a lot of effort into continuing to create a capital with government buildings, museums, and public places also reaching into East Jerusalem. Although constructing the basic foundation of the capital, the attitude of traditional Zionists towards Jerusalem, seemed to have remained quite indifferent (Mayer, 2008:238p). When the Likud party won the election in 1977, the settlement project in Jerusalem was enlarged, which created disputes and violent clashes between Israelis and Palestinians. The occupation triggered a Palestinian Intifada (literally “shaking off”) in 1987, which affected the city by violent encounters and had severe economic consequences, but it also created a stronger sentiment among the Palestinian population to be part of a national movement (Friedland & Hecht, 2000:330pp).

The continued violence led to groundbreaking peace negotiations in the 1990s, but the negotiations in Oslo, leading to the Declaration of principles in 1993, resolved to leave the issues of Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, and the settlements, to the final negotiations, which did not take place according to schedule (Aggestam, 1999:227). Meanwhile, in mid 1990s, there were a number of terrorist acts in central Jerusalem swaying the political winds from the left to the right. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was murdered in 1995 by a right-wing extremist. Nonetheless, peace negotiations were resumed, mainly at Camp David in 2000 and in Taba 2001. Far-reaching compromises were made on the control over Jerusalem, and the Israeli offerings are often referred to as “painful concessions”. The rejection of the proposals by Yassir Arafat and the Palestinians is regarded in Israel as incomprehensible, as slapping an outstretched hand, and as missing an historic opportunity (Zittrain Eisenberg & Caplan, 2010:236pp). This rejection, together with other Palestinian refusals over the years, such as the unwillingness to accept the partition plan, and the boycott of the Israeli political and administrative systems in Jerusalem, laid ground for a commemorative narrative about the Palestinians as always missing the opportunity for peace, for ignoring Israeli peace efforts, and for always choosing violence. “Have we not tried every possible way, even the
most painful, to run that sword into a plowshare?” (President Moshe Katsav speech, Jerusalem Day May 19, 2004).

The second Intifada, which erupted in 2000, is in this commemorative narrative portrayed as Palestinian violence in response to the Israeli offers of territorial concessions. Yassir Arafat was blamed for turning his back on negotiations and initiating the Intifada, which hit the streets of Jerusalem in 2000–2002, in forms of car and suicide bombs. This is a powerful commemorative narrative, strengthening the image of the Palestinians as a people that cannot be trusted, thus giving another motive for arguing against division of the city. There were other reasons for the eruption of the Intifada. The famous walk by upcoming Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, may certainly have jump-started the uprising, but there were also other more pressing humanitarian reasons for the second Intifada (Gelvin, 2005:94). The narrative is still vibrant today as the peace negotiations have come to more or less a standstill, and related to the Arab spring of 2011, the Palestinian choices are referred to in the following remarks:

Will this mark yet another missed historical opportunity, one of many that the Palestinians made sure to miss through dozens of years of conflict? Yet in every similar junction in the past, the Peel Commission (1937,) the Partition Plan (1947) or the Oslo Accords (1993-1995,) it wasn’t logic that guided the actions of the Palestinian leaderships and people who followed them, but rather, unrestrained national zeal. This outbreak of emotion gave rise to terms like Nakba (disaster) and Intifada (uprising.) The target has always been Israel, Zionism and the Jews. (Elad, Ynet News, April 5, 2011)

The message of one of the post-1967 commemorative narratives is that Israel built a completely new and modern capital city, and lifted it from the periphery to the center. Another narrative focuses on “the Palestinian other” as irresponsible and for rejecting the painful concessions made by Israel, such as offering citizenship, special identification cards for Palestinian Jerusalemites, local political influence, and promises of territorial autonomy. The commemorative narrative regarding the peace process has resulted in a general distrust in the Labor party from a security perspective. It has strengthened the new Zionist agenda of security and defense. Groups acting under the umbrella of post-Zionism and promoting territorial compromises are criticized and questioned.

In conclusion, the identity debate regarding Jerusalem often circles around these commemorative narratives. Are they simply narrative cosmetics in a few non-important political speeches? Are they political slogans, coming and going, or do they matter in the long run? The answer is that there is a vivid interplay between political strategies and these narratives.

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They constantly enforce each other and as time goes by, new commemorative narratives are created and reproduced. We will now turn to a discussion on how these narratives are connected to city policy and specific strategies of territorality.

5.3 From narratives to city policy and strategies of territorality

One major criticism from local politicians and other actors from across the political spectrum, is that leading Israeli politicians talk about the importance of Jerusalem in speeches, but as soon as the cameras are switched off, their interest in practical issues, that cost a lot of money, has generally been slim (Interview Peggy Cidor, 2009; Interview Arieh King, 2009). These critical voices claim that Jerusalem has been neglected, and along with the growing neglect from Knesset politicians, the government’s financial support in the municipality’s budget has decreased from comprising 70% of the municipal budget in the 1970s to 26% in 1986. Teddy Kollek, who was elected mayor of West Jerusalem in 1965, immediately complained about the lack of interest in the city, and there were speculations as to whether he established the Jerusalem Foundation, which raises funds from elsewhere, as a response (Dumper, 1997:47). The criticism has been directed towards Labor, Likud and Kadima, as representatives of traditional Zionism, often labelled “the establishment”.

Furthermore, there has always been a minister for Jerusalem affairs, but recent governments have not appointed such as minister, which is a symbolic sign to the critics. The official rhetoric puts Jerusalem first, but in the budget and on the general political agenda, Jerusalem is not given priority, despite its indicated importance. There have been no clear, outspoken visions at the highest political level, and the setting of political goals is delegated to lower levels in the decision-making hierarchy. The problem emanating from the lack of political visions on the national level is that the city risks stagnating, culturally, economically, socially, and politically (Interview Israel Kimhi, 2007 and 2009). Accusations have mainly been directed towards former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Kadima, and the entire Labor party era for neglecting Jerusalem in order to make territorial concessions in the peace negotiations with the Palestinians. The accusations stem mainly from right-wing activists claiming that “the establishment” is maintaining status quo as too many changes on the ground would threaten the possibility to make peace (Interview Arieh King, 2009).

The decision-making hierarchy regarding Jerusalem is based on a top-bottom system. Municipal politicians have been more or less forced to take on a reactive role rather than proactive. The inability of the national level to issue open and straightforward policies, has led to a situation where it
has been difficult to pursue an effective and systematic city policy. This is also due to differences in opinion, weak decision-making structures, ad hoc implementation of political projects, and the unresolved conflict over Jerusalem. This deficiency has, for instance, led to run-down neighborhoods in central Jerusalem that are in great need of revitalization, and a lack of systematic renovation of sewage systems and infrastructure. The conclusion drawn from the interviews is that the master commemorative narrative, as expressed in speeches and laws, is the closest Israeli politicians have ever come to making decisions regarding actual day-to-day problems in Jerusalem. National politicians have issued various visions, but they have not been backed by proper funds. The Prime Minister’s speech on Jerusalem Day normally turns back the clock, but on Jerusalem Day 2010, Prime Minister Netanyahu also spoke about the need to strengthen contemporary Jerusalem economically as well as the Jewish heritage in Jerusalem (Jerusalem Day speech at Mercaz Harav Yeshiva, May 12, 2010), and as mentioned earlier, the government has, together with the municipality, decided to give Jerusalem additional financial support.

The role of Jerusalem municipal politics is normally described as less influential and dependent upon the budget and initiatives of the national government (Dumper, 1997). On the other hand, local Jerusalem politics have often had a special character. Teddy Kollek, the Mayor of Jerusalem from 1965 to 1993, is often described as a legend, due to his long career. He continued to complain throughout his mandate about the lack of funds and interest in Jerusalem, showed by his fellow companions in the Labor party and in the following Likud-run governments. Due to complaints from the Palestinian population regarding discrimination, municipal civil servants took a closer look at the municipal budget and concluded in late 1980s that the Palestinians received from 2 to 12% out the municipal budget, depending on the issue. Based on these numbers, Kollek made a series of attempts to receive funds for developing East Jerusalem, but was frustrated at the unwillingness of national politicians to engage in Jerusalem (Cheshin, Hutman & Melamed, 1999:20pp). So far, it looks as if the commemorative narratives were and are pure cosmetics. The period of Ehud Olmert as Mayor of Jerusalem (1993–2003) is not seen as very transformative, and although being the first ultra-orthodox mayor, Uri Lupolianski (2003–2008) was criticized for prioritizing his constituency and not Jerusalem as a whole (Interview Shlomo Hasson, 2007). Today, debaters and analysts see a new kind of initiative and creativity coming from the municipality when it comes to forging political alliances, presenting visions, and a concrete city policy. Regardless of whether these policies are new or not, they are presented in a much more open and transparent way.
5.3.1 New Mayor, new city policy

In another 15 years there will not be a secular mayor in any city in Israel, [except for] perhaps in some far-flung village. (Statement by Mayoral candidate Meir Porush November 1, 2009 in Shragai & Ettinger, Ha’aretz, November 3)

On the evening of November 12, 2008, it was clear that the new Mayor of Jerusalem was the secular businessman Nir Barkat from the party Jerusalem Will Succeed. He gained 50% of the votes while his main competitor Meir Porush from United Torah Judaism gathered 42%. The results of the elections were surprising for some urban governance analysts who saw a growing religious influence over local politics as well as over the entire state of Israel (Interview Shlomo Hasson, 2007). The political situation in Jerusalem displays the secular-religious divide and the victory of the secular forces in Jerusalem is an interesting break and is leading Jerusalem in a partly new direction. It is interesting to note that Likud, Kadima, and Labor have a limited representation in the city council and that Meretz is the leading social democratic/left-wing alternative. Even if Barkat won the local election, he still has to deal with Jerusalem as a predominantly religious city. If we look at the results in the latest national election by city, (see appendix) it is noticeable that the biggest party is United Torah Judaism followed by the religious Sephardi party Shas. It is easy to be skeptical of Barkat’s real ability to make a change since he is not Haredi (ultra-orthodox). It is easier for someone from within that community to make painful reforms. On the other hand, the strategy of the administration was from the beginning to invite every council member into the coalition governing the city. All but one member, Meir Turgeman, accepted the offer.

The change of administration in the municipality has led to a more open city policy. It is not necessarily disconnected from national goals for Jerusalem, but the coalition is portrayed in the interviews as acting more independently than previous administrations. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s political agenda seems to fit well with businessman Barkat’s visions.

Jerusalem is being renewed. Mr. Mayor, I must tell you that I am deeply impressed by the amount of development and construction around town and into town. We are building a rail line, drilling into the mountain side, [...] and the hi-tech center, and the biotech center, and the arts center and the new movie facility, courts, the new National Library that is being built near the Knesset. (Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speech, Jerusalem Day, June 1, 2011)

Jerusalem is facing a number of challenges. The overarching problem addressed in the empirical material is that Jerusalem is considered a weak
capital in many respects. The image of the city is one of a poor, peripheral religious symbol detached from real life. This is one reason why young, well-educated people are rapidly leaving Jerusalem, though this is also due to the lack of employment. The negative migration trend is worrying many Israeli policy-makers for economic but also national reasons.

The new Mayor therefore launched a program, and one central issue was to deal with is the overall management of the municipality of Jerusalem. The ambition of the Barkat administration is to make Jerusalem into a proper capital, together with local and national actors. The goal is to make Jerusalem a political, economic, cultural, religious, demographic, educational, and picturesque capital. Planning and construction in general, and specific projects, will therefore be a prioritized political issue, and the next chapter will explore the planning and construction issues further. Barkat wants to develop the local neighborhood councils and open up the decision-making processes to the public. Transparency is a key word, and the municipal spending should be firmly controlled. Besides the focus on a certain target population, Barkat and his coalition want to highlight reforms within education. Environmental issues have priority, and a deputy mayor (Naomi Tsur) has been appointed to deal specifically with this issue. In the Barkat election platform special emphasis was put on the development of East Jerusalem (Barkat Plan 2008) and on the eve of his victory, Nir Barkat assured everyone that he will be the mayor “for all Jerusalemites”.

Using Clark’s model, presented in chapter 3, this means that the Jerusalem municipality is more than just a local administration, as it has the ability or take responsibility for initiating new issues and plans. Following the model of Hesse and Sharpe, a conclusion is that the local government in Jerusalem, which has many administrative tasks, such as collecting a municipal tax, managing municipal services, garbage collection, beautification, and handling building permits, can be connected to both type 1 and type 3. According to the model, the local government in Jerusalem has a high level of autonomy, but as we shall see, state authorities have the final word in the case of planning. We will now turn to four central city policies presented by the Barkat administration and supported by the current national government.

5.3.2 Strengthening ancestry and heritage

One of the main policies during the last decade has been to promote and strengthen the Jewish heritage and ancestry in Jerusalem. One of the most important projects is the renewal of the Old City, which is also one of the most controversial and sensitive (Interview Reuven Pinski, 2009). One way
has been to focus on establishing the physical bond with the city through archeology. Important sites are the City of David which is described in the following way on the Jerusalem municipality website “Here, while exploring the recently excavated fortresses and passageways, visitors relive King David’s conquest of the Jebusite city as described in the 2nd Book of Samuel.” (http://www.jerusalem.muni.il, Tourism). The policy of the municipality is to strengthen the Jewish character of this site and the neighborhood Silwan in which it resides. Another example is the excavations near the Temple Mount (the Ophel). These sites are strategic in connecting city policy to the 3,000 year old legacy.

The ancestral bond is also developed by a city policy focusing on urban renewal. This work is mainly led by the Jerusalem Development Authority (JDA) and is closely connected with economic development, culture, and tourism. This project is focusing currently on the area around Jaffa Street. The municipal administration will also work for the creation and maintenance of open spaces and parks, strengthening the ancestral landscape. Promenades, such as those overlooking the Old City, are particularly prioritized. With the appointment of a “Green” deputy mayor, ancestry and heritage is firmly rooted in the nature and landscapes surrounding Jerusalem.

5.3.3 Bringing the right people in

One of the central goals set up by the Israeli government, the Mayor of Jerusalem, and his broad coalition is to reverse the negative migration trend. According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem, which is the largest city in Israel, had a negative migration trend rate of 9.3 (7,100 people left the city) the year 2009 (Statistical abstract of Israel 2010, www.cbs.gov.il). In his election platform, Barkat presented a number of ideas for how to reverse this trend, such as attracting young, well-educated people by offering affordable housing, supporting local entrepreneurs, providing the best education, and beautifying the city (Barkat Plan 2008). The reluctance to live in Jerusalem is based on the image of the city as peripheral among many Israelis, and on its being too connected to religion and the political conflict with the Palestinians.

The demographic balance in Jerusalem is one of the most discussed issues in contemporary local and national politics. For quite some time, public officials have worked according to the 70-30 ratio of Jews and Palestinians. Demographic policies are closely related to maintaining Israeli control and sovereignty over Jerusalem. Numerous studies have been performed and since few sources give the same numbers of residents, they could easily be used as tools to promote a certain narrative. According to
Israeli sources, Jerusalem has had a Jewish majority since at least the 1860s, but Palestinian sources provide other figures indicating that those claims are exaggerated (Hulme, 2006:37). As we have seen, it has been of great significance for Israeli political argumentation to establish an uninterrupted presence in Jerusalem and this has been used in connection with the Israeli narrative that many of the Arab inhabitants of Jerusalem settled in the city during the second Ottoman period and not before. This is an example of trying to find a positive self-presentation and a negative other-representation.

5.3.4 The potential flagship of economic development

In order to change the trends in Jerusalem and turn it into a thriving city, worthy of its title as the Capital of Israel and the Jewish People, the city needs accelerated economic growth and the reinforcement of business activity. (Barkat Plan 2008)

A capital city has a special place in the national consciousness, and the image of Jerusalem as poor and worn-down is not an ideal foundation for economic growth and attractiveness. The municipal leadership of Jerusalem focuses to a great extent on the economic development of the city and the underdeveloped tourism industry. The plan is to go from 2 million tourists a year to 10 million in 10 years. In order to accomplish this goal, there is a need for more hotels, a better transport system, a modern shopping district, etc. This ambition is shared with the Prime Minister, as one of his cherished areas of interest is economic development.

Building a new capital requires a large work force in the construction industry, both in the public and the private sector, and industrial areas. Jerusalem lacks these kinds of areas, although two major industrial zones were created after 1967, Atarot in the north and Talpiot in the south. One challenge in developing the industry is the negative migration trend, with well-educated people tending to leave the city. Even though there are far-reaching investments in Jerusalem today, it is still a poor city. There is a clear difference between the cities in this statistical material and Jerusalem stands out. The poverty level, for instance, among families has increased from 18.5% in 1995 to 35.8% in 2009.
Table 5.1. Level of poverty in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, 2009 (%) Source: Adapted from Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies. Statistical Yearbook 2011. www.jiis.org

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Families</th>
<th>Individuals</th>
<th>Children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>60.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(including East Jerusalem)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel Aviv</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Total</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition the city has some disadvantages that affect the economic situation. First, the geographic location and topography are not ideal for building and construction, be it a question of residential, commercial, or industrial areas. Jerusalem’s distance from harbors and its lack of natural resources have restricted the possibilities to develop a viable industry. On top of all that, there is very little space to develop (Dumper, 1997:217). Second, the ongoing conflict has had a serious effect on both West and East Jerusalem economies. Third, the intensive periods of Jewish immigration have contributed to an increasingly severe economic situation in Israel in general – a situation that has created social divides (Alterman, 2002; Naqib, 2003). Fourth, according to several studies, poverty is rising among the new immigrants, the Palestinian population, and the ultra-orthodox Jews. Since Jerusalem has a significant number of Palestinians and ultra-orthodox Jews with large families, this naturally has consequences for these citizens and for the municipal tax income and hence the budget (Lewin & Stier, 2002). The growing divides in Jerusalem is problematic from these points of view, but are also an obstacle to any attempts to create a common economic base or economic solidarity – an idea that was very much part of the vision of the creators of Israel. With increasing ties to the global economy this idea is problematic to strive towards.

### 5.3.5 City policy and “the other”

One of the prioritized policy areas for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is economic development and his vision is to achieve economic peace. Netanyahu has already set up a special office to deal with the economic situation of the territories, i.e. the West Bank. “We strive to assist with the accelerated development of the Palestinian economy and in developing its economic ties with Israel”. (Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speech at the Knesset swearing in ceremony, March 31, 2009). The mayor also calls for an increased focus on investments in East Jerusalem, such as renovating...
the sewage system, enforcing laws and improving the standard of living of the inhabitants. No more “Wild East” (Barkat Plan 2008). The 2011 budget for Jerusalem is presented as allocating a record sum to the development of East Jerusalem.

The gaps in eastern Jerusalem are the result of decades of neglect of the residents of the city and its infrastructure by the Government of Israel and the Municipality of Jerusalem. As someone who believes in the unity of Jerusalem, it is my duty to invest in eastern Jerusalem and in the last two years I have made it a priority to close many of the gaps. We will not accept a situation where residents of Jerusalem do not have classrooms, roads, or basic infrastructure. The 2011 Municipal budget addresses many of the challenges in eastern Jerusalem and will both raise the quality of life of the residents and will continue to reduce gaps. (Nir Barkat on 2011 budget, Jerusalem municipality website)

One way to interpret the focus on economic development is to connect economy with the narrative regarding the alleged wish of the Palestinian Jerusalemites to remain under Israeli jurisdiction. According to the narrative, the Palestinian Authority cannot provide for them as well as Israel can and when the Palestinians in Jerusalem are satisfied materially and economically, they will no longer demand their own state. The effort to make East Jerusalem a better place to live in economically and infrastructurally is supported today by right-wing Israelis and particularly those who live in the smaller Jewish neighborhoods or settlements in East Jerusalem. The first priority has for a number of years been to “make them leave,” mainly by buying property, but if that cannot be done, why not improve their economic situation to such an extent that there are no economic reasons for them to strive for self-determination (Interview Arieh King, 2009). Economic prosperity is certainly an important part of the everyday lives of Palestinians in Jerusalem, but to go so far as to see it as a reason for giving up self-determination rather overestimates the importance of economy and underestimates the question of identity.

This is an image of “the other” as an object or some kind of marionette that in a rational society should act in a certain way. It shows a lack of understanding for the dynamics of the Palestinian society and the internal Palestinian political relations. Today, it is vital for each side to maintain arguments and stories about the evilness of the other, whether or not these stories are actually true.

From a traditional and new Zionist perspective, the focus is solely on the Jewish connection to the homeland. The argument in new Zionism is that there are other Arab countries to where the Palestinians in Jerusalem can return. The Jews only have one place. Post-Zionism is a challenge towards...
traditional and new Zionism in the understanding and recognition of “the other”. Post-Zionism displays a belief in the possibilities of co-existence.

5.3.6 From commemorations to strategies of territoriality
The deconstruction of the master commemorative narrative reveals a number of commemorative narratives. These constitute the basis for city policies and strategies of territoriality. If Israeli authorities reach these goals, they will control the physical base of Jerusalem. It is important to remember that the figure below is not a figure of causality. There are constant interactions between narratives, city policy, and strategies of territoriality. This scheme is an attempt to visualize the conclusions of this chapter and how they connect with the next.
### Master commemorative narrative

| Jerusalem as the eternal and indivisible capital of Israel and the Jewish people |

### Territorialities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal-political territoriality</th>
<th>Historical and religious territoriality</th>
<th>Ethnic territoriality</th>
<th>Economic territoriality</th>
<th>Exclusive territoriality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Commemorative narratives

| Jerusalem as the 3,000 year-old capital of Israel and the Jewish people | Jerusalem as the religious capital of the Jewish people. No other religion has the same bond to the city. | Jerusalem as a safe haven for Jews and a refuge from centuries of persecutions | Jerusalem as neglected by other “landlords” and requires Israel to build up the city | Jerusalem as a contested territory where “the other” chooses violence instead of peace |

### City policy

| Strengthening the political capital by government buildings, monuments, and places for public gatherings | Focusing on urban renewal, historic landscape, common heritage | Bringing Jews to Jerusalem, with the right socio-economic background | Strengthening economic growth through public and private initiatives | Controlling “the other” through housing projects and economic development |

### Strategies of territoriality

| Constructing the legal-political capital | Constructing the ancestral and spiritual capital | Constructing the demographically balanced capital | Constructing the economic capital | Constructing the exclusive capital |

*Figure 5.2. Interplay commemorations, city policy, and strategies of territoriality*
5.4 Conclusion

Many of the commemorative narratives presented in this chapter are used as points of reference in political speeches and statements. They are a part of everyday life stories and of socialization processes in the Israeli society. The commemorations are based on particular events in history and often related to counter-narratives, both from within and without, about the same historical events. The question is: Do they really matter or are they just political cosmetics? The narratives do matter as they shape the argumentation in the struggle over the control of Jerusalem. The commemorative narratives are used to legitimize and establish the claim to Jerusalem based on historical “facts”. They are the foundation for constructing city policy and strategies of territoriality. At the same time they are constantly developing, depending on the political context. Despite the existence of political goals inspired by the narrative foundation, Israeli authorities on the national level and the government have been accused of not putting action behind the words. Jerusalem has in many aspects been on hold for the last 20 years. There are actors who believe that this is done because of the willingness of certain political parties to give up on parts of Jerusalem, particularly the secular labor Zionist veterans, who have never focused on the city. Others claim that it is due to lack of state land.

Through a more outspoken city policy developed by the municipality, the link between narrative, policy and practice is clearer today. Some politicians and social movements are also more candid in their communication about strategies to keep Jerusalem united under Israeli sovereignty. The city policy might not have changed considerable since 1967 but it comes today in another form. The current city policy focuses mainly on making the whole of Jerusalem the capital city of Israel; preserving heritage, particularly the historic landscape, and creating ancestry; developing the local economy; focusing on turning the negative out-migration; and making Jerusalem a city for all its inhabitants.

The next chapter will concentrate on elaborating on the connection between identity politics, city policy, and strategies of territoriality, by analyzing the interplay with the policy area of planning. This will be performed by analyzing policy documents, plans, visions, political statements, interviews, and conclusions of secondary sources.
6. Strategies of territoriality in the city planning of Jerusalem

We will continue to build in all parts of Jerusalem. The promise of a future Jerusalem with a Jewish majority is a strategic mission for all of us. (Speech Nir Barkat, Jerusalem Day at Merkaz Harav Yeshiva, May 11, 2010)

Ever since 1967, the planning of Jerusalem has been strongly affected by the master commemorative narrative to keep the capital city united under Israeli sovereignty. Constructing the state of Israel is a gigantic identity project, and the creation of a homeland for all Jews has affected every policy area. Land-use planning is no exception (Faludi, 1997). Planning policy goals have clearly been steered in that direction (Bollens, 2000; Yiftachel & Yacobi, 2002; Fenster, 2004; Nitzan-Shiftan, 2005;), whether connected to the creation of new neighborhoods or the construction of government compounds all over the city. However, planning policies related to traditional Zionism and the collective national planning doctrine, are today challenged by ideas stemming from competing identity discourses, new planning trends, and the appearance of new actors (Shachar, 1998; Alfasi, 2003). Urban planner Arie Shachar claimed in 1998 that “While land was once considered a precious national asset, it is now regarded as real estate” (Shachar, 1998:215). Are the policy goals and outcomes a result of Zionist identity discourses, or are they connected to what Shachar calls a new planning doctrine, based on the interest of the individual as well as global and local trends?

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the interplay between Israeli identity politics, city planning policy, and strategies of territoriality for Jerusalem by focusing on capital-building through legal-political, historical and religious, ethnic, economic, and exclusive territoriality. This will be done by analyzing policy documents, reports, statements, and interviews. This dissertation draws on earlier research on both statutory and non-statutory planning documents concerning Jerusalem, mainly focusing on older plans (Efrat & Noble, 1988; Nitzan-Shiftan, 2005; Hershkowitz, 2010). This chapter adds to these studies an analysis of three more contemporary plans, and particularly the Local Outline Scheme.

6.1 Early Zionist planning and “the oriental other”

This section undertakes the task of analyzing early Zionist planning in the new Jewish communities in Palestine. Planning practice, in the latter part
of the 19th century, was strongly connected with constructing the physical identity of a new nation. The planning ideas and ideals of the immigrants were influenced by Anglo-Saxon and European planning models, as many of the Jewish planners immigrating during this period had such a background. At the same time, the construction of the new Jewish communities, neighborhoods and cities, particularly the areas inhabited by Jewish immigrants from other countries in the Middle East, were to some extent influenced by the atmosphere and design of the Arab Palestinian villages and buildings (Yacobi, 2008). The Ottoman authorities did not impose a central planning doctrine in a modern sense, and the building and construction laws were mainly based on religious and cultural concerns, but as the Jewish immigration increased, the Ottoman Empire imposed restrictions on land purchase (Gouldman, 1996:3p).

From this period until the establishment of the state of Israel, the Jewish community was influenced by all kinds of planning trends, from Ebenezer Howard’s garden city, with its focus on cooperation and fellowship surrounded by a green belt, to Le Corbusier’s modernist tall buildings. Walking through Tel Aviv, you can see traces of both these planning ideals, and you also run into buildings inspired by the German Bauhaus school (Cohen, 2003). The idea of common ownership worked well together with the growing kibbutz movement, which was and is based on cooperation, as well as with the overall ambition of the immigrants to build a new Jewish home. The vision of the green belt, particularly in the form of agriculture, was compatible with labor Zionism adopted by the early Jewish immigrants with a vision of “making the desert bloom”. To cultivate the land was almost a sacred virtue (George, 1979). These aspects of Zionism could also be connected to the modernist project to move away from the old, in this case the Diaspora, and towards building something new and unique. It includes the creation of the “new” Jew, separated from the “old Jew” in the Diaspora. The Hebrew or the “Sabra” Jew, was born or at least reborn in the homeland and later on the state, and built the new community on visions of a Hebrew Israel. The modernist period in “western” planning went hand in hand with the spirit of pioneering that characterized Zionism and the construction of the state of Israel at that time, and with the wish of the people to start anew after many centuries of persecution. It is also connected to the modernist aspects of theories on nationalism. One might think that the modernist approach would be problematic in a region containing so many holy places and historical buildings. In this light, the modernist hallmark of demolishing or at least renewing the old seems highly

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7 Commonly referred to as the Mizrahi or "Oriental Jews".
inappropriate. Nonetheless, Israeli planning has ever since 1948 been influenced by the modernist perspective (Yacobi, 2008).

In the formative years of the new state, Israeli planners had a particular image of what good planning was, and the greatest challenge, they fared, was the rapid and large-scale immigration. The Arab Palestinian villages located in what came to be Israel were regarded as problematic from a political as well as a planning point of view. They represented an oriental planning style which was considered as primitive and unsophisticated. The dominating opinion of professional planners and architects was that ...

...vast sections of the urban built landscape in Israel are, professionally and legally, “sub-standard”, therefore violating the spatial order of purifying modernism. (Yacobi, 2008:96)

Many of the new immigrants, mainly Mizrahi Jews, settled in the abandoned Arab Palestinian villages and houses, and a substantial part of this group came to live under harsh circumstances during their first years in Israel, something that the planners found very challenging as the end result was that the Oriental Jews replaced the Arab Palestinians and the area remained “poor and underdeveloped”. The solution was the “...modernization project that provided justification for the rejection of Oriental past and present.” (Yacobi, 2008:96). Orientalism thus plays a role in the Israeli image of the Palestinian other and within Israeli society. The Palestinians and some Israeli groups are sometimes referred to as backwards and uncivilized. On the other hand, this is how ordinary Israelis risk being labeled in an international context, coming from the Middle East.

6.1.2 Transforming Oriental Jerusalem

For a long time Jerusalem was a rather small peripheral city, and the neighborhoods outside the Old City walls, only first started to grow during the 19th century. These communities were based on inhabitants with a similar background and culture, such as the German colony, the Greek colony, and so on. Many of the Jewish immigrants that came to Jerusalem were Hasidic Jews who formed their own communities, often inspired by the shtetl – the small Jewish towns in Eastern Europe. The Arab Palestinian population lived and settled in their own communities both in east and west Jerusalem (Efrat & Noble, 1988:390p). The planning of Jerusalem was formally under the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire until 1914, but the city council, which was established in 1863, was responsible for the planning and construction of the city.

One of the central aspects of the early Zionist narrative was the image of the old Jewish homeland as empty or at least underdeveloped. The mod-
ernist approach to planning was also prevalent in Jerusalem, which meant that everything connected to the old Ottoman planning or the Arab Palestinian village-like style was not considered good planning. The policy documents and interviews relating to this period of history demonstrate that there is a positive Jewish self-image and a negative image of “the other”, according to the theories presented by Van Dijk (1998). Who “the other” is shifts depending on the historical period. It can be the internal or external other. The National plan 31 from 1991 describes the aftermath of the Ottoman rule of Jerusalem in the following terms:

The awakening of Jerusalem from the long degeneration began in the middle of the 19th century. The physical development [...] was performed by the flow of European capital and Jewish population from the Diaspora. (National Plan 31, H/0:1)

The British mandate introduced a more regulated planning process, and despite the fact that the mandate was not well liked to say the least, either by the Jewish or the Arab Palestinian population, the planning standards of the British authorities are not questioned in any of the policy documents analyzed in this chapter. The Sharon plan (1951) even displays an understanding of the difficult circumstances they faced, an understanding that is not shown towards either the Ottoman authority or the Jordanian authorities during the years of physical division. With reference to post-colonial aspects, British planners were also critical of the Ottoman non-planning and that there was very little material in the form of maps and surveys that could be used by British planners for the physical development of Jerusalem (Kendall, 1948). This criticism is understandable if a planner is firmly rooted in Western planning standard, but the question is whether there were planning standards in place, although not recognized from a western perspective.

The planning of the British mandate was based on modernism, rationality, and a top-down decision-making system. The central mandate authority was responsibility for planning, and the municipal council had to seek permission from these authorities for construction or housing projects in Jerusalem (Dumper, 1997:25). The first city plan made from a western planning perspective was constructed by William McLean in 1918, and its main policy goals were to limit the height of buildings, not to build directly adjacent to the Old City, to prohibit industrial areas, to design the public buildings in a certain fashion, and to expand Jerusalem to the north, south, and west. The Geddes plan from 1919, suggested that Jerusalem should grow to the northeast towards Mount Scopus instead, and that the Old City should be regarded as a separate planning unit. The Geddes-Ashbee
plan from 1922 and the Holliday plan from 1930 made a few additional changes, mainly towards rational decision-making (Efrat & Noble, 1988:393p). These plans all show a clear movement away from the Ottoman policies towards a modernist and rational thinking. In 1944, British planner Henry Kendall presented the first comprehensive outline scheme for Jerusalem and he focused on bringing all parts of Jerusalem together, envisioning a future capital city. Kendall planned for light-industrial areas and defined the skyline limit. The roads and the neighborhood system were established, as well as green areas (Kendall, 1948). Notably, the 1944 plan is the most recent outline scheme to have been approved for the whole of Jerusalem, which is one reason why the British planning principles still hover over the planners today.

The reason for mentioning these historic plans is that the British legacy remains considerable regarding both the physical development of the city and the contents of the planning law. Few statutory plans for Jerusalem have been approved since then, and the policies still influence actual building and construction projects. The main legacy of British planning has been a policy of not building in the valleys, maintaining a top-down approach which leaves the government in charge of decision-making, not building high, particularly close to the Old City, and using certain materials for new buildings such as natural stone introduced in 1918 by the first British military governor Ronald Storrs.

The British and the following Israeli planning policies are contradictory when it comes to the Arab planning style. Both seem to shy away from the old-fashioned way of planning, but the oriental style of buildings and landscapes has been an inspiration for contemporary planning goals. For example, when browsing through real estate ads in Israeli newspapers, one finds that one of the selling arguments for a house in Jerusalem is that it is built in Arab-style. These images of the “Arab-oriental” Jerusalem are not connected to a Palestinian heritage but rather an ideal image of the historic landscape and the origin of the city. This can also be related to the narrative battle over the origin of the falafel or the water pipe. Serious or not, a popular Israeli postcard states that the Falafel is Israeli. These are some example of the contradictions in the Jerusalem identity politics and the Israel–Palestine conflict. To sum up, the early planning of the city was related to Zionist commemorative narratives and slogans such as developing the empty land, denying “the other”, seeing the territory as a refuge and safe haven, and emphasizing heritage.
6.2 Legal-political territoriality – Planning the political capital

Only twice has Jerusalem served as a national capital – the capital of the Biblical kingdoms of Israel and Judea before the Roman destruction in 70 C.E., and the capital of the modern state of Israel since the rebirth of the Jewish state in 1948. ...no other nation or state which gained political control over the area had ever made Jerusalem a capital city. (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999)

The city policy goals presented in this study can be directly connected to constructing a modern, but also a national capital. The first of these strategies is the creation of the political capital in the sense of constructing government buildings, setting up laws, creating public places, establishing cultural institutions, such as museums, and thereby setting the main framework in which the capital should be constructed. The legal framework is relates to the master commemorative narrative as expressed in the Basic law from 1980, the Holy Places Law from 1967, and numerous other laws reproducing Israeli claims to sovereignty over Jerusalem. This process began in the wake of the establishment of Israel. This section will ascertain the role of planning in the legal-political construction of Jerusalem. For a detailed account of the planning decision-making hierarchy and planning actors see figure 7:1.

6.2.1 Where is Jerusalem? – Locating the capital

The 1948 war left Jerusalem divided into two parts and one of the first tasks in the first years of building the state was to transform Jerusalem (the western part) from a peripheral holy city into a capital city. Planning was an important political tool in that mission. An initial question was where to place the city center with all the government institutions. These institutions are a crucial part of identifying the capital. This process is often referred to as building the “new” Jerusalem (Kutcher, 1973). In everyday life references “new Jerusalem” is often related to West Jerusalem in general. After the establishment of the state, a number of plans were initiated. The Rau plan from 1949 was the first Israeli non-statutory comprehensive plan for Jerusalem, and the major policy goal of the plan was to establish a new city center including the government complex, and to create neighborhoods around it in a horse-shoe shape (Sharon, 1951). The local plan was complemented by national plans for physical development such as the Sharon plan in 1951, which focused on continuing the development of West Jerusalem into a capital city including the construction of government buildings. This also entailed eliminating slums, developing the economy, and
creating an enjoyable city with green belts (Sharon plan, 1951:23, English version).

In contrast to the construction on the east side, which was very slow, the development of the western part was extensive and a master plan for West Jerusalem was approved in 1959 (Plan 62). The overall policy goal of the plan was to continue to strengthen Jerusalem as an Israeli capital, to focus on constructing the city center, and to build Jewish neighborhoods in West Jerusalem. The plan was based on Kendall’s modernist ideas about demolishing and renovating, focusing on parts of the “old city center” around Jaffa and Ben Yehuda streets. This process clearly highlights how the geographic priorities of planning change over time. The years following the establishment of the state were connected with the Zionist narrative of building and constructing a new homeland, which was based in part on modernism. The next section shows the current focus on preserving the heritage. The ideas of demolishing the old were not fully implemented, as processes for creating commemorative sites, such as the Old City, were simultaneously also in place. The prioritizing of the new center with the government compound led to neglect of buildings in the old city center around Jaffa Street as well as confusing the mental map of where the city center actually was. In a geopolitical perspective, the fact that the previous city center, close to the Old City, was more or less neglected gives the impression that Israel was ready to “settle for” controlling the land further to the west. This is yet another example of change of priorities over the years as the old city center is in focus today.

The municipal administration, on the other hand, was located much nearer the seam line and the Old City. These buildings were erected by the British mandate in 1930 and renovated in 1993. The central location of the city hall has been used as an illustration to accuse national politicians of giving up the “old” Jerusalem in favor of the “new” city and thus losing the battle over the whole city. One of the key planning goals of the current local administration is to redefine the city center and to strengthen mainly the area around Jaffa Street. The policy goal is presented as a call to

...take every possible measure and define the means of implementation that guarantee the restoration of the city center’s status as a highly diverse center with a wide range of activities – employment, cultural, entertainment, commercial, higher education, hotels and dwellings. The key instrument ought to consist of a policy that favors the development of the city center over secondary centers that grew at its expense. (Local Outline Scheme 2006, Chapter 5:10)
Anyone who has been to Jerusalem in the last couple of years has experienced the construction projects in this part of the city including the light rail system, new residential buildings, urban renewal, and new restaurants. There are also plans to strengthen the Eastern CBD (Central Business District) around Saladin Street (Jerusalem Development Authority, 2008; Interview Lior Bar-Dor, 2009). This conflict over the location of the city center relates to the view of Jerusalem as a mainstream capital, and to the desire of planners and politicians after the 1948 war to start afresh on more or less vacant land, regardless of the historical and symbolic importance. This is also part of a challenge based on local culture and local economic development versus the accusations of neglect or lack of knowledge on part of the national politicians. These trends go hand in hand with the new Zionist aspirations to focus more on heritage and ancestry and on controlling the entire territory of Jerusalem, but they can also be connected to post-Zionist ideas to put effort into developing the old city centers in both West and East Jerusalem in order to revive the entire city for all its inhabitants. To sum up, although Jerusalem was important as a capital during this period, it was not clearly defined either in physical and boundary-related terms or psychological ones.

6.2.2 Planning the reunited capital

Until 1967, the planning of Jerusalem was guided by a number of laws and plans from the British mandate, and many of these were changed or amended after the Israeli annexation, which left the city enlarged by 70,000 dunums (70 square kilometers) including Arab Palestinian villages in the east which had never been part of any Jerusalem municipality (see Figure 5:1). Many of the planners were skeptical towards enlarging the city and argue in hindsight that the enlargement created great planning problems and that it was based on political concerns rather than the advice and expertise of planners (Interview Israel Kimhi, 2007; Interview Meron Benvenisti, 2007).

The war of 1967 and the following de facto annexation made it necessary to construct the 1968 master plan for the entire city with its new borders (Efrat & Noble, 1988:397; The Master Plan 1968. Interim Report, 1969). The plan was never approved at all necessary levels, but it was used as a point of reference for the Israeli authorities in charge of planning Jerusalem. The strategic time-scale of the plan was 40 years, and the main policy goals of the 1968 plan were to improve the living conditions of the inhabitants, such as by creating housing and reducing poverty; to improve the aesthetic values of the city, to maintain Jerusalem’s character of a holy city; and to create functional city services (Master plan 1968, Interim Re-
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The policy principles in the plan reflect the Israeli state-building efforts, but also the socialist political focus on welfare.

The master plan of 1968 reflects the narrative clearly expressed in the statement on Jerusalem by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, namely that Israel is the best guardian and caretaker of Jerusalem. The master plan states that the Jordanian plans during the period of 1948 to 1967 are not valid in Israel and that they would be problematic to use as they suggest building in areas that should be left open (The Master Plan 1968, Interim report: 8p). The criticism directed towards the Jordanian authorities for neglecting East Jerusalem planning, is connected to issues such as providing access to holy places, economic development, and planning standards (Plan 31:1; Israeli, 2002:116; Benvenisti, 1996:189). It is also connected to the opinion, based on historical experiences, that the Palestinians of East Jerusalem are better off under Israeli than under Arab rule (Interview Shalom Goldstein, 2007; Interview Yigal Carmon, 2007). The problem with this narrative is that it is difficult to measure the effects of Israeli patronship and the desires of the Palestinian residents under the current geopolitical circumstances.

Although the planning of Jerusalem is guided by the Planning and Building Law of 1965, a number of military orders regulating land ownership were issued or amended after 1967, and the land registration process itself was frozen for East Jerusalem. Examples of important laws or orders are the Land Acquisition Order of 1943 and the Absentee Property Law of 1950, which states that property can be expropriated if the owner has been absent for a certain period of time even if its known who the actual owner is. As the Israeli government chose to build extensively in East Jerusalem after 1967, the expropriation and purchase of land was a necessity for the growth of Jewish settlements there. Planning in Jerusalem is furthermore guided by regulations such as The Antiquities Law of 1978, the Israel Lands law of 1960, environmental regulations, specific amendments to the Town planning law, and statutory plans. These laws are all part of a legal-political territoriality consolidating the control over the territory by judicial means.

Few plans were approved in the 1970s and 1980s, nonetheless Israeli authorities, mainly the Ministry of Housing, built extensively in the eastern part of Jerusalem, which had a profound effect on the physical structure of the city. This period is mentioned by most planners interviewed in this dissertation as having the greatest impact on what modern day Jerusalem. This will be analyzed below in the section on demography, but it affects the status of Jerusalem as a political capital as well. After 1967, Jerusalem became a much larger unit, which created a need for new infrastructure but
also changed the image of Jerusalem into that of a large metropolitan capital. The metropolitan aspect of Jerusalem is foremost in Plan 31 from 1991, which does not specifically discuss Jerusalem as a capital. Although the intention of the plan seems to have been to avoid the geopolitical implications of the role of Jerusalem, it still relates to national aspects.

Taking care of the problems of Jerusalem and its uniqueness requires reference to a number of subjects such as the direction of the political process, solution of the problem of the central city, the territorial solution for Judea and Samaria, since united Jerusalem is a mixed town, and the ethnical and cultural pluralism that exists both in the Jewish population and the Arabic population. Since the mandate of National Outline Plan 31 is that planning for the absorption of immigration – in the short term, it is suggested that the planning team will not deal at all with these ‘loaded’ questions. [...] It is also worth thinking about the correct way of integrating Jerusalem at its region economically and sociality into the ‘national core’... (Plan 31:6)

This unwillingness to address national identity issues is one of the pieces of the puzzle in the criticism directed towards national authorities for not dealing with the political problems of city. On the other hand, the plan showed a break away from the collective planning doctrine concerning new economic issues and its focus on metropolitan aspects (Hershkowitz, 2010:269p). Plan number 35 (TAMA 35) from 2005, on the other hand, specifically deals with strengthening Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. It presents seven policy goals:

1. Jerusalem is the capital city and sufficient funds should be allocated for that purpose;
2. public institutions should be moved to and located in Jerusalem,
3. the historic and scenic sites should be preserved in order for Jerusalem to be a cultural center for the entire world;
4. a new government compound should be set up;
5. institutions for cooperation with the Palestinians should be established;
6. Jerusalem should be the primary location for public gatherings; and;
7. land should be allocated for the transfer of all embassies to Jerusalem (Plan 35, chapter 7.5:150).

These goals show that the role of Jerusalem as a Jewish capital is highlighted in national policy documents on planning. Planning is often defined as a profession where the common good is highlighted versus short-term economic profits (Campbell & Fainstein, 2003:7pp). If the common good is only pertaining to the Jewish population, then the plan serves that purpose, but if is meant to target Jerusalem in its entirety and all its inhabi-
tants, then the plan is partisan. With its 17 chapters, the Local Outline Scheme is a great deal more detailed, from a planning point of view, compared to the national plans. The task assigned to the planning team led by Moshe Cohen contained 16 specific objectives and the team came up with 11 planning goals. Two of these refer specifically to Jerusalem as a capital city. These are as follows:

- Strengthening the basis and continuing development of the city as the capital of the State of Israel, center for the Jewish people and sacred to all religions.
- Strengthening the role of Jerusalem as capital city and world city, promoting public buildings, national and international institutions and sites. (Local outline scheme 2006, 17:2)

At least three of the other goals could be related to the special character of the city. Why were there more specific policies for capital-building in Plan 35 and the Local Outline Scheme than in Plan 31? One explanation is that there is more political interest in Jerusalem today because of the growing popularity and success of right-wing parties during this particular period, as opposed to the early 1990s when the peace process was initiated. It may also be due to the composition of the planning team and the specific target areas of the plan, not on national political priorities. It is often a combination of both. What then is the role of these plans, and more specifically, how do planners work with the policy goals? According to former city engineer Osnat Post, Head of District planning office Dalit Zilber, and several other planners, Plan 35 contains guidelines, not strict rules. The plan is mainly used for guiding the development of rural areas, for planning the location of main highways, for setting guidelines for construction density, and for preservation of nature and historic sites. Some planners use it as a reference and others do not. Overall it has limited influence (Interview Dalit Zilber, 2009; Interview Osnat Post, 2009; Interview Uri Barshishat, 2009; Interview Ruth Schwartz 2009; Interview Hagit Zehavi, 2009). Instead they point to the district plan and the local outline scheme as the documents regulating the development of Jerusalem. The district plan has not been included in the material for this dissertation due to time constraints and the fact that it was recently released.

This section shows that planning is an important instrument in the construction of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. This pertains to both the local and national level, although the methods of reaching the goal of controlling Jerusalem have been slightly different. Post-Zionists have questioned the legal frameworks imposed on the Palestinian population. New Zionists have questioned the motivation of authorities to implement them.
6.3 Historical and religious territoriality – Planning the ancestral
and spiritual capital

Jerusalem is the heart of the Jewish Nation and serves as a cultural-spiritual
focus of its entire Diaspora and Israeli residents. (Plan 35, chapter 7.5:150)

In the planning policy goals for Jerusalem, preserving the heritage and
highlighting the ancestral bonds with Jerusalem is a central part of any
plan consulted. This section will focus on the role of history and the con-
struction of the common ancestry and heritage in the planning of Jerusa-
lem. Of the numerous issues, three perspectives will be highlighted, revi-
talization, preservation, planning the picturesque city, and the territorial
role of religion.

6.3.1 Planning the historic landscape – Constructing ancestry and heritage

The policy of preserving buildings and the specific landscape of Jerusalem
has been a major policy goal for at least the last 20 years (Interview Dalit
Zilber, 2009). It is connected with archeology, open spaces, and urban
building codes. It is also related to the mental image of Jerusalem within
Zionism as a refuge and the place for which generations of Jews have
yearned. It is common to see reproductions of old images of Jerusalem in a
pastoral and quiet setting. This image is not easily reconciled with the bus-
tling modern reality with traffic noise and disturbing modern construction
sites. This preservation trend aims to strengthen the Jewish heritage and
ancestral claims, and it is also an important strategy for supporting the
tourism industry.

In order to achieve the goal of being a historical, cultural, and spiritual
center, the policy documents presents of number of measures. Plan 35 fo-
cuses on preserving religious sites mainly in the Old City, developing the
sense of ancestry and heritage among the Diaspora, commemorating the
Holocaust, and creating cultural meeting places (Plan 35, chapter 7.5:151).
One of the policy goals is to make the preservation of “...Jerusalem’s built
heritage...” a permanent part of the state and city budgets (Plan 35,
7.5:12). The Local Outline Scheme deals with preservation in several chap-
ters. Moshe Cohen states that the scheme itself is based on the preservation
of specific open spaces (Interview Moshe Cohen, 2007) and one of the
goals presented in the plan is the “Preservation of the urban qualities and
special character of Jerusalem” (Local Outline Scheme, 2006, Chapter
17:2). Preservation is also measured by what is regarded as antiquity.
Buildings constructed before the year 1700 C.E are considered antiquities
(The Antiquities law of 1978).
Another important plan in this respect is the TAMA 29 – the national outline plan for commemorative sites of 1995 and its legal counterpart the National Parks, Nature Reserves and National sites law of 1998. The Minister of the Interior decides what can become commemorative sites. A national site is

...a structure or group of structures or part of them including their immediate vicinity which are of historic national importance in the development of settlement in the country... (National Parks, Nature Reserves and National sites and Memorial sites law, 1998)

A national memorial site is a site for

...commemorating Israel’s military campaigns having special significance in the history of the nation or the State... (National Parks, Nature Reserves and National sites and Memorial sites law, 1998)

The question is what is regarded as national and memorial sites. This issue is quite frequently related to the image of “the other”. Latrun, for example, is described as a memorial site for fallen Israeli Soldiers, and the grave site on Mt Herzl is a national memorial site. The village of Lifta, for instance, is used in the Local outline scheme as an example of “unique historical-architectural qualities” and of “preservation of the distant past […] including the picturesque rural patterns at the margins of the inner city” (Local Outline Scheme, 2006, Chapter 10: figure 14). This is related to an ancient pastoral picture of Jerusalem, but at the same time the village itself is a monument of the Nakbah, as it is an emptied Arab-Palestinian village. If preserved, what will it be preserved as? This is one of many illustrations of the contradictions of contemporary Jerusalem and sites such as Lifta, have become important narrative battleground as well as physical. Masada, on the other hand, is under this definition a national memorial site and also a world heritage site. It is more connected to the internal commemoration process than the image of the contemporary other.

Israeli authorities have been accused of using open spaces and parks in the Local outline scheme in order to limit the natural growth of the Palestinian communities. Lands that could have been used to meet the future housing needs of the Palestinian population have been zoned as parks or open spaces in the Local Outline Scheme (Interview Efrat Bar-Cohen, 2007).

In any case, the national memorial sites play a crucial role in establishing a common core regardless of whether or not the narratives behind them are “true”. These sites are symbols of freedom, suffering, heroism, and so on, and the public use of these sites is part of the socialization process. It is no coincidence that the Jerusalem Day speech is held every year on Ammuni-
tion Hill\textsuperscript{8} which is a national memorial site and an important landmark in the Jewish military history of Jerusalem.

These aspects are related to many of the settlement projects that will be described below in the section on economy. The descriptions of those housing projects often include the pastoral image of Jerusalem and a historic landscape void of “the territorial other”.

There are other planning goals that do not clearly fall within the identity discourses at a first glance. One of these is the focus on the environment. In Plan 31, the environmental priority was to stimulate the relationship between metropolitan areas and open spaces. This goal is further developed in Plan 35, and the goals for Jerusalem were, the creation of a green corridor in the western part of the city, preserving the valleys, creating green infrastructure all over the city, maintaining and developing open lands, establishing municipal codes for environmental issues, and

Establishing the term, ‘Urban Nature’ as an instrument of fostering and integrating [...] the green scenery and the desert scenery; and as an integral part of the urban scenery: from the big parks to the most intimate public space, built-up alley and the yard. (Plan 35, chapter 7.5:15)

Environmental planning policy is a prioritized area for the municipality, as illustrated by the 2008 division of the local planning council into two separate parts: a more building- and construction-related council, and an environmental planning council. The municipality focuses on sustainable transportation, water and sewage, waste management, open spaces, industry, and green spaces (Local Outline Scheme, 2006: chapter 15). These goals are much more hands-on than the national planning goals. The question is whether this policy area is excluded from Zionist planning. I would say that it is not. All these aspects can be related to identity. The open space policy relates to the idea of the picturesque Jerusalem and the historical landscape. Transportation relates to the light rail system,\textsuperscript{9} criticized for serving Jews only. The focus on green spaces has not been implemented to any significant extent in the Palestinian areas (Interview Rima Awad,

\textsuperscript{8} Ammunition Hill was the site of an historic battle in June 1967. The location was particularly important from an Israeli perspective to secure the link between West Jerusalem and Mount Scopus, which had been a Jewish enclave surrounded by Jordanian controlled areas during 1948–1967.

\textsuperscript{9} The light rail system was initiated during the 1990s and the construction of the first line began in 2002. The purpose is to lessen pollution in the city center and facilitate for urban transportation. The railway has been criticized for being too little, too late, and for causing more problems than it solves (Interview Amos Unger, 2007).
2007) strengthening the opinion that the municipal services are guided by the needs of the Israeli inhabitants.

Furthermore, the organization Green Zionist Alliance, claims that there is a “…special responsibility of the Jewish people to preserve the ecology of Israel.” (Green Zionist Alliance website, http://www.greenzionism.org). Green issues are connected with the divine mission to take good care of the territory and the land. These aspects introduce the term Green Zionism which is applicable when approaching the role of environmental issues in Israeli identity politics. We will return to the concept in the analysis of the “Safdie plan” process.

6.3.2 Planning the picturesque city – Old City and the Holy Basin

The most common preservation site is the Old City and the so called Holy Basin surrounding it, also called visual basin. Special planning interest has been devoted to preservation, archeology, and the Old City area over the years. It is a place of impressions with its scents, views, and noices. When entering the Old City, you literally walk through history. A concrete expression of the policy goal is to create a picturesque city with the establishment of viewpoints and vista locations, often with promenades, overlooking the Old City (Local Outline Scheme, 2006, chapter 2:34). The 1944 Kendall plan largely focused on the esthetic values of the Old City and of the views overlooking the walls. The restrictions on the height of buildings in the vicinity of the Old City set forth in the plan (Kendall, 1948), are still in place today. The British authorities mainly focused on Jerusalem as a holy city. Two of the three basic principles of the Sharon plan were connected to the special history of the city, namely “…preserving the historic values”, and “…preserving historic sites” (Sharon, 1951). The plan does not reveal what the historic values are. After the 1967 war, the Israeli government decided to develop an Old City plan which focused on bringing basic infrastructure to the Old City but also on developing and rehabilitating the Jewish quarter (Sharon, 1973). This was a massive project aiming to recreate a Jewish neighborhood in the heart of the historic Jerusalem. This was not done without conflict. One of the first measures of the Israeli government after the conquest of the Western Wall was to raze the existing buildings in front of the wall (the Magharib quarter) to the ground. The Palestinian inhabitants were moved to other locations outside the city center (Dumper, 1997:78p). The 1968 master plan reiterated the importance of keeping the space around the Old City low and open in order to maintain the picturesque image of the city (The Master Plan 1968, Interim report). The focus on the Old City and its environs concerns not only historic sites but also the great potential for tourism.
Preservation of commemorative sites is not only in the interest of Israel and the Palestinian population, but is also an international interest, as the city is a world heritage site. In 1982, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) decided to put Jerusalem on the world heritage in danger list, after it was nominated by Jordan. Israel joined the organization in 1949, but has repeatedly been criticized for not preserving historic sites in Jerusalem in accordance with the agreements and international archeological standards. The Israeli response is that the decision to put the city on the world heritage site in danger list is purely a political decision and not based on archeological concerns (Interview Michael Turner, 2009), and second, that working to preserve such a complex city requires a lot of resources and archeological diplomacy, and that takes time (Interview Jon Seligman, 2009; Interview Michael Turner, 2009). In any case, Israeli preservation of the Old City has focused on “…the architectural character of the Old City and strengthening its status as a world heritage site.” (Local Outline Scheme, 2006, Chapter 11:2).

Today a large-scale project has been launched to renovate, revitalize, and develop the Old City and the Holy Basin. This project is run by the Jerusalem Development Authority (JDA) and was initiated by the government. This project aims to develop these sites for tourism as well as hinder the spread of so-called illegal structures of the Palestinians in the visual basin. The project tries to work “below” national politics and thus challenges towards the status quo and hegemonic ideas on both the Israeli and the Palestinian sides. Reuven Pinski describes the project as a

…micro-cosmos on how we can really bring about a solution here. Don’t talk about peace, just do the job. The prime ministers, the politicians, they all talk about peace. [...] …whatever we are planning now is right for the Old City regardless of who is the municipality or who is the state. (Interview Reuven Pinski, 2009)

This project is highly sensitive, as it involves two very specific challenges. First of all, it challenges the collective decision of the Palestinians not to get involved in the Israeli system in any way. This project can build bridges between the communities when it comes to everyday life issues but on the other hand it is a lot trickier when dealing with the holy sites in the Old City, which is the second challenge.

6.3.3 Planning and religious territoriality – Controlling holy sites

Jerusalem is important for the three monotheistic religions Judaism, Christianity, and Islam and all three religions can find support in their respective
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holy books for their claims to Jerusalem. The most known narrative from a Jewish perspective is summarized by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

‘Jerusalem’, or ‘Zion’, is mentioned over 800 times in the Jewish Bible. [...] Jerusalem has always remained foremost in the thoughts of the Jewish people as they turned to Zion three times a day in prayer. (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999)

The mere fact that Jerusalem is mentioned many more times in the Jewish bible than in any other holy book is for some actors evidence enough of the unique Jewish claim to Jerusalem. The control of the holy sites is one of the most difficult issues to solve in any future agreement, and as it involves land use it is an issue that planners become entangled in whether they want to or not. Like many other components of the Israeli Jerusalem identity construction, this issue is closely linked to ideology. The most complicated question concerns the Temple Mount/Haram ash-Sharif.

In recent years there have been a number of clashes over this site, one of the most serious of which was connected to the opening of the Western Wall tunnel. The Israel Antiquities Authority has conducted a number of archeological excavations in the vicinity of the Western Wall since the Six-Day War, and some of these diggings triggered violent clashes in the 1990s and 2000s. In 1996, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu issued an order to open a new entrance for the Western Wall tunnel or the Hasmonean tunnel in connection with Via Dolorosa. The tunnel and the new entrance were highly controversial, since there were accusations that the tunnel undermined houses in the Muslim quarter and that Israel was trying to enter into the Haram ash-Sharif/Temple mount from beneath. Violent clashes broke out and 17 Palestinians and 3 Israeli soldiers were killed.

Commemorative narratives, based on history, religion, and archeology, interact with the implementation of plans and planning strategies. In the winter of 2004, the Mughrabi gate, leading to the top of the Temple Mount/Haram ash-Sharif, was destabilized by the weather and had to be repaired. The construction of a new bridge was very complicated, as the whole area had to be excavated and important remains were found. In July 2007, the Awqaf (Muslim religious authority) received permission to repair the electric wiring on the Mount/Haram and there was a huge outcry in the Jewish religious community. There were complaints that, first of all, the Muslim community was allowed to dig without proper archeological supervision, and second, that the debris from the diggings was never examined according to archeological standards. Leading archeologists called for a halt to the renovations, and Gabriel Barkai said to Jerusalem Post: “The Israeli Government is lending a hand to the destruction of one of the most
important archaeological sites in the world.” (Barkai in Lefkovitz, Jerusalem Post, August 31, 2007).

A recent controversy regarding holy sites is the project to build the Museum of tolerance partly on or adjacent to the old Muslim Mamilla cemetery. The project is being run by the Simon Wiesenthal center, and there has been an ongoing legal battle over the location of the museum. In October 2008, the Israeli Supreme Court gave the Wiesenthal center the right to build, and Rabbi Marvin Hier, who is the founder and dean of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, made the following statement on the website of the project in connection with the ruling:

Jerusalem is 3,000 years old and every stone and parcel of land has a history that is revered by people of many faiths. We are deeply committed to do everything in our power to respect that sacred past, but at the same time, we must allow Jerusalem to have a future and we are honored to be given an opportunity to be a part of that future. (Museum of Tolerance, newsrelease, October 29, 2008)

A third example of the importance of common ancestry in the implementation of preservation policies is the inclusion of historic sites into land-use planning strategies. The development has concentrated on including important historical monuments, areas, and buildings into land-use planning. Buildings such as the “King David tower” or sites such as the “City of David” are important to the national scenery of Jerusalem. The “King David Tower” is actually a minaret, but stands in the middle of the Citadel which is used as a museum for the Jewish history of Jerusalem. The image of the tower is used in a number of Israeli tourist brochures as a symbol, although archeological findings reveal that this site probably had nothing to do with King David.

This leads to our final example of the connection between holy sites, city policy, and planning. This is the site where some of the first traces of a city with fortifications were found. The site has become a part of a conflict between the city administration of Jerusalem and the Palestinian inhabitants of the village/neighborhood of Silwan. In June 2010, the Jerusalem municipality reiterated a previous decision regarding the demolition of 22 Palestinian houses in the neighbourhood Al-Bustan in Silwan,
where the families lack proper building permits. The intention of the Israeli authorities is to create a park, the King’s Garden (Medzini, Ynet News, June 21, 2010). Many of the houses slated for demolition were built before 1967 and therefore lawyers have questioned the legitimacy of the municipality decision to issue these demolition orders. It is also seen as part of a larger project to take control over the Old City and its environs (Interview Daniel Seidemann, 2007, Interview Amos Gil, 2007). The municipal decision led to serious criticism from United States Secretary of State Hilary Clinton who described it as a breach of international agreements, particularly the Road Map for Peace (Ravid, Ha’aretz, March 4, 2009). Mayor Nir Barkat responded that it is a question of illegally built houses and that the administration of Jerusalem has a responsibility to make sure that all inhabitants of Jerusalem abide by the legal arrangements of building and construction. “I totally reject the notion that we are kicking people out of their homes, that is not the case. […] If you build illegal houses you pay the consequence. […] I expect people to obey the law.” (Barkat in Ha’aretz, March 5, 2009). The illegal building activities have left a substantial mark on the physical appearance of Jerusalem. Justus Reid Weiner shows in a study that building illegally is a part of the conflict and an organized way to override municipal authority (Weiner, 2003a). It is a discursive practice connected to a counter-discourse and part of the discursive struggle over Jerusalem. These examples are used to illustrate how places change meaning over time, both as a result of intentions and through an intricate process of identification.

The planning priorities regarding ancestry, heritage, and the historical and religious landscape show how text, in the form of planning policy documents, is transformed into discursive policy. Few disagree with the broader goal of beautifying Jerusalem, but the conflicts arise over the methods used to reach that goal. Who decides what is beautiful and what should be demolished? Who are the target groups for the promenades? The current focus strengthens the traditional and new Zionist perspective on what Jerusalem is and should be. The secular Jewish group and the Palestinians fall outside some of these projects. Everyone agrees that Jerusalem needs a facelift, but that this should be performed on all the faces of Jerusalem. Instead, different social practices have emerged such as building illegally or, as we shall come back to later in this chapter, to reduce the burden of planning procedures for the Palestinians. On the other hand these are practices that fall within other discourses, thus constituting discursive practices as well.
6.4 Ethnic territoriality – Planning for the demographically balanced capital

This section concentrates on discussing the demographic development of Jerusalem in connection with planning, and more specifically, the policy goal of demographic balance.

6.4.1 Planning and the demography of the “new” Jerusalem

New Jewish neighborhoods or settlements were built by the Ministry of Housing in East Jerusalem after 1967. One reason for this construction was to absorb the large number of Jewish immigrants arriving in Israel from all over the world. The building of new housing units to meet the demand was not only being done in Jerusalem but all over Israel. The situation has been described as a crisis (Alterman, 2002). The Jews who settled in these neighborhoods in East Jerusalem were everything from ultra-orthodox to university professors. The state of Israel was accused of deliberately placing so called “facts on the ground” in East Jerusalem, thus hindering the natural growth of the Palestinian population. According to former advisors to the Jerusalem Mayors Teddy Kollek and Ehud Olmert,

The building of new Jewish neighborhoods in east Jerusalem was aimed at more than ensuring Israeli demographic superiority in the city. Israel also hoped that the new neighborhoods would serve as a physical barrier cutting Jerusalem off from the West Bank (Cheshin, Hutman, & Melamed, 1999:62).

New neighborhoods were constructed all over Jerusalem creating a completely different map. The physical boundaries of the city were in the process of being erased, but the mental or psychological boundaries remained. The development of Jewish-Israeli housing projects in East Jerusalem is connected to the development of the Israeli claims to the city. This is the single policy outcome that planners and architects interviewed in this dissertation mention as having had the greatest influence on the physical development of the city. Some of the neighborhoods in the eastern part were psychologically connected to Jewish villages in the old Yishuv, such as Neve Ya'acov. Land was expropriated from Palestinian villages as well as purchased. There is a dispute about whether some of the land in question actually belonged to Palestinian villages in the first place. British mandate planners created large planning zones for some villages that did not previously exist. It is therefore difficult to know what land actually is the property of Palestinian villages and families (Interview Israel Kimhi, 2007). On the other hand this reasoning is connected to a “western” view of what a
property is and what land use is. In a sense it amounts to simplifying the role of the cultural landscape.

![Identity Politics and City Planning](Image)

The population of Jerusalem grew from 266,300 inhabitants in 1967 to 545,000 in 1991. Almost 75% were Jews and the majority settled in the new neighborhoods in the de facto annexed area. The Palestinian population also increased radically during this period (Dumper, 1997:53). Because the Israeli-Jewish population growth began to decline in the 1990s and the Palestinian growth rate has remained high, Israeli demography researchers project that the Palestinians will be majority in the city in 2035 with the current borders (Kimhi, Choshen & Assaf-Shapira, 2006:8). The

Figure 6:1. Israeli settlements and Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, 2000. Source: PASSIA, http://www.passia.org

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The latest statistics show that the Jewish population growth in Jerusalem was 1.3% for the year 2007 and 3.2% for the Palestinians (Choshen, Korach, & Kaufman, 2010). In 2009, Jerusalem was inhabited by 766,700 people including the Palestinian residents. Jerusalem comprises, according to the Israeli Bureau of Statistics, the pre-1967 western part and the eastern part that was annexed in 1967. About 34% of the total population of Jerusalem is Palestinian and they reside mainly in the Eastern, Northern, and Southern parts of the city. The Jewish ultra-orthodox group constitutes around a third of the Jerusalem population and is growing (Population database 2009, Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, http://www.cbs.gov.il). The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, on the other hand calls the annexed area J1, but an area outside these boundaries is part of the Jerusalem Governorate and is called J2. In 2005, there were approximately 250,000 Palestinians within the Israeli Jerusalem borders and an additional 150,000 Palestinians in the governorate outside the Israeli municipal borders (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Census and population database, http://www.pcbs.gov.ps). The construction of the settlements in East Jerusalem is an illustration of the conflict between not only Israelis and Palestinians but also between the policies of the state of Israel and the policies of the municipality. Most land in Israel is state owned and the municipality has little influence on the development of land policies in Jerusalem (Interview Meron Benvenisti, 2007; Interview Israel Kimhi, 2007).

Today there are few areas in Jerusalem to develop. Planners therefore have looked west towards Tel Aviv, or continue to build on annexed territory towards the east. Some even go as far as to say that the development of Jerusalem is now in the hands of private property owners and large construction companies (Interview Israel Kimhi, 2007). According to Israel Kimhi, Israel has won the geopolitical race to control the territory in a wider sense through the building of the barrier, the settlements, and the ring roads, but the Palestinians have won the demographic war (Interview Israel Kimhi, 2007). The construction of residential units continues, but available state lands are scarce. The only larger projects conducted by the Ministry of Housing is the development of Har Homa and continued building in adjacent Gilo in the south-east part of the city (Interview Chaim Fialkoff, 2007). There are also private residential projects all over the city, but the quantities are much less than the demand.

One way to solve this problem was presented by the Rabin government that introduced the concept of “Greater Jerusalem” in 1993. The Israeli government suggested a transformation of Jerusalem into an attractive metropolitan area. This concept is used in Israeli politics, rhetoric, and planning, but not by the Bureau of Statistics, and the area includes the
settlements Ma’ale Adumim and the Gush Etzion bloc, as well as municipalities to the West. For demographic reasons, some see an inclusion of these settlements in the Jerusalem municipality as the only solution to the demographic problem (Shragai, 2008:8). The discussion of greater Jerusalem and the meaning of the green line are closely connected to discussions on the Israeli legitimacy to control Jerusalem (Rosen & Shlay, 2010:360).

Figure 6.2. Greater Jerusalem. Source: Ir Amim, http://www.ir-amim.org.il
6.4.2 Demographic balance as a planning policy goal

One of the 16 policy goals handed to the project manager of the Local Outline Scheme 2000 was to plan for a demographic balance of 70% Jews and 30% Arabs in Jerusalem. This goal was in line with the government guidelines regarding the demographic balance, so it was not a new discussion. The novelty was that it was included in a plan handed out to the public, though we should keep in mind that the final version has yet to be approved. The project manager Moshe Cohen says that it was impossible to work in any serious fashion with such a goal. Putting the goal in the text is one thing, but planning for a purely geopolitical goal is not a planner’s job (Interview Moshe Cohen, 2007).

On the other hand there are attempts to achieve that result. The unofficial goal of the planning authorities and the official goal of the municipality is to attract or keep the well-educated middle-class in Jerusalem. Plan 35 mentions the need for “… increasing the young, productive and enterprising population’s part. Strengthening and improving the city’s image will improve the resident population’s status, and increase the city’s appeal to strong populations.” (Plan 35, chapter 7.5:8). But how should this be done? As mentioned, one idea was to build towards the West, to which we will return in chapter 8. In the Local Outline Scheme from 2006, the policy goal was reiterated and was to be achieved by:

1. densifying the Jewish neighborhood in the Old City,
2. building new Jewish neighborhoods,
3. building affordable housing,
4. creating employment, and
5. making Jerusalem a unique and attractive city

(Local Outline Scheme, 2006, chapter 7:7pp).

These policies, which also encompass the Palestinian population, risk creating an even more polarized city, though the scheme does also suggest establishing meeting places. On the other hand the role of segregation is approached from a different angle than we normally see. In many other contexts all over the world, segregation is regarded as problematic and even dangerous for society, but the author of this particular part of the scheme puts it quite differently.

In a multicultural city such as Jerusalem, spatial segregation of the various population groups in the city is a real advantage. Every group has its own cultural space and can live its lifestyle. The segregation limits the potential sources of conflict between and among the various populations. It is appropriate, therefore, to direct a planning policy that encourages the continuation of spatial segregation with a substantial amount of tolerance and consideration. (Local Outline Scheme 2000, 1:33)
In a city like Jerusalem, where there are incidents of ethnic violence, this might be interpreted as a natural way to see things. But in the light of calls for coexistence and the importance of meeting “the other” as a way of breaking down stereotypes, this sends a very negative message.

A recent demographic trend and a social practice that has alarmed Jewish citizens, activists, and politicians, is the growing number of Palestinians and Israeli Arabs who buy or rent apartments in Jewish neighborhoods or settlements in East Jerusalem such as French Hill and Pisgat Ze’ev (Shragai, 2008:9). This is an interesting trend, as it is related to processes occurring in any city around the world. Neighborhoods sometimes change character over the years. One reason for this development is that many Israeli Arab students at Hebrew University are looking for affordable housing, and another is the wave of Palestinians moving from the other side of the wall. From a post-Zionist perspective, this development is welcomed, but new Zionists vehemently object this development. In an interview for an article in the Jerusalem Post, Arieh King said that “this migration is a disaster” and describing the campaign against this process King stated that “There are some who say that this is pure racism, but as a Jew I am happy to be racist… I too want to preserve my identity”. (King in Green, Jerusalem Post, March 27, 2008).

In any case, the Israeli construction of Jewish settlements or neighborhoods in East Jerusalem continues, one recent example being the development in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in central East Jerusalem. This became an internationally known area when the elderly Al-Kurd couple were evicted from their home in 2008 and Israeli settlers moved in. Several other families were also evicted from houses where settler groups now reside. These actions were based on Israeli court decisions claiming that the properties were owned by Jewish families. These evictions, and other residential projects in the area, created a conflict between the Obama administration and the Israeli government supported by the Jerusalem municipality. This is being used in the Israeli political rhetoric as an attempt to stop Israel from developing and building its capital. According to Prime Minister Netanyahu,

...recognition of the Jewish people's right to [...] build in its capital is not an obstacle to peace – it is the key to peace and we wish for peace. (Netanyahu, Jerusalem Day speech, May 12, 2010)

According to Oren Yiftachel there is an ongoing process of Israeli authorities to judaize Jerusalem (Yiftachel, 2006), but this is denied by Mayor Nir Barkat and claims on the contrary that forces, such as the United Nations, through their condemnation of the continuing construction of Israeli set-
tlements in East Jerusalem, are trying to stop Jews from building in the city, thus promoting a racist policy (Barkat in Selig, *Jerusalem Post*, August 2, 2010). The policy of demographic balance is a central point of division between post-Zionism on the one hand and new Zionism and traditional Zionism on the other, as well as between the international community and Israel. From a new Zionist perspective demographic balance is connected to survival, both literally and culturally. This perspective is often enhanced by stereotyping “the other” and particularly the “Muslim other”. For a post-Zionist, the discussion regarding demographic balance is an image of the democratic problem of the state of Israel and part of a xenophobic culture.

**6.5 Economic territoriality – Planning the capital of gold**

On August 3, 2009, the Knesset voted yes to a law reforming the Israel Land Administration (ILA) and the land laws. The main changes concern the possibility to sell state administered land to private interests. Until that point, the state of Israel, through the ILA, has administered 93% of the land, or more specifically, the land could only be leased. Prime Minister Netanyahu has put planning issues high on the agenda, and the Prime Minister’s office (PMO) initiated an investigation into the possibility of reforming the planning structures, mainly the role of the planning committees to give more authority to the local level. These amendments might not seem very significant from an international perspective, but in the case of Israel it is a major revolution, as land is so intimately connected with collective identity, different forms of Zionism, and constructing a Jewish state. The planned land reforms have been criticized by both left-wing and right-wing politicians and groups. From a new Zionist perspective, the state must hold on to the land. The land is *the* core component of the Jewish national identity and shouldn’t be given up to “simple” economic interests. Therefore the decision of the right-wing representatives to vote for the reform caused great tensions within the new Zionist camp, but also within the broken up Labor Party. Both were blamed for giving up their ideological base (Merranda, *Ynet News*, August 3, 2009). Opposition leader Tzipi Livni called the reform irresponsible and only serving Netanyahu’s personal interest regarding privatization (Livni in *Ynet News*, July 29, 2009). Giving up the state ownership of land in a region where territory is highly disputed also increases the risk of adding fuel to the Israel–Palestine conflict, according to post-Zionists. The main idea behind the planning system reform has also been criticized by the environmental movement for putting too much power in the hands of economic interests, which could lead to harsh ex-
exploitation of the land and to decisions based only on economic benefits or ideology.

In any case, most Israeli politicians agree that Jerusalem – as a Jewish center – cannot remain poor and peripheral. This image of poverty is too close to the image of the Diaspora Jew and the Shtetl. According to Anthony D. Smith (1991), one of the central components of an identity project, particularly when the project has national implications, is the creation of an economic community, and in this dissertation more specifically, economic space. Economic development in Jerusalem is closely linked to the other areas presented such as ethnic territoriality. Although acknowledging this strong connection, the separation between the two is made for analytical reasons and the fact that politicians and planners often relate to them as two separate policy areas. This section explores the discussions on territory as a resource, planning for the tourist industry, and the influence of the private sector in particular.

6.5.1 Land as national resource or as real estate?

The globalization of Israel’s economy has reduced the capacity of public policy to influence the location of economic activity. (Shachar, 1998:209)

The growing demand for land in Israel, for both commercial and residential purposes, has brought about a shift in the planning paradigm and planning policies from regarding land as a national asset to regarding it as real estate (Shachar, 1998). As land is a scarce resource, this has inevitably led to a greater focus on densification and a re-appraisal of every single property. The problem with this change of view, which both planning researchers and planners describe, is partly connected to two challenges identified in Plan 31, that Jerusalem has a shortage of land both for residential and for industrial purposes (Plan 31, H/O:3). In Jerusalem, less and less land is available for large-scale investments by the government or the municipality, such as the Jewish neighborhoods or settlements in East Jerusalem built in the 1970s and 1980s. A number of planners, mainly those working in private firms or as consultants, argue that the government has lost some of its influence over the physical development of Jerusalem to private entrepreneurs or to other private interests, such as Palestinian families in East Jerusalem who own their own properties (Interview Moshe Cohen, 2007; Interview Shlomo Hasson, 2007; Interview Israel Kimhi, 2009).

As we will come back to in more detail in chapter 7, the district commission has the final word in most planning projects. The growing focus on economic growth and development has led to a new policy to push large-
scale projects through the system faster. These decisions may end up on the National Planning Board’s table thus being removed from the checks and balances system of the district commission, which could be problematic from a democratic point of view. The current head of the District Planning Commission, Dalit Zilber, does not see this as a serious problem, as these large-scale projects are for the public good and the slow planning process has been an impediment for development for so long. There is a quite simply a need for a fast lane (Interview Dalit Zilber, 2009). Israel Kimhi suggests that the new outline scheme is a way for both the government of Israel and politicians to sidestep the district commission and try to take control over the physical and economic development of Jerusalem (Interview Israel Kimhi, 2007). The problems in the planning hierarchy will be further analyzed in the next chapter.

As some planners and architects criticize the authorities for giving too much influence over the physical development of Jerusalem to private entrepreneurs such as construction companies, others claim that the growing influence stemming from private investments is good for the development of the city. As there is very little land left to develop, private investors, private property owners, or land leasers have the possibility to develop new ideas and provide fresh input into the physical development of Jerusalem. A representative of the JDA claims that

...giving the private sector the planning itself you can have more diversity, more new points of view. I think it is going on very well in Israel as a whole and Jerusalem. I don’t see a problem with this. (Interview Lior Bar Dor, 2009)

The scarcity of land and the lack of comprehensive plans and strategies on the part of the authorities have led to a number of controversial issues. We have already addressed the first one, that the government or municipality cannot launch the necessary large-scale housing or industrial projects due to the lack of access to land. The second challenge is that private construction companies are pursuing projects in order to make money, not necessarily for the public good. The third issue, connected to the identity discourse of maintaining a demographic balance, is that scattered projects, mainly in the form of luxurious apartments, will not attract the well-educated Israeli middle-class, which is the unofficial target group of current district planning.

6.5.2 Constructing “Jerusalem of Gold” or a ghost town?

In 2007, students from the Hebrew University launched a campaign mainly directed towards U.S. citizens buying properties in Jerusalem. The students
claimed that these purchases are causing prices to go through the roof and that housing within a reasonable commuting distance is becoming too expensive for ordinary Israelis. Furthermore this is turning neighborhoods into ghost towns and causing problems for nearby commercial interests. Anyone who looks for a house or an apartment in Jerusalem knows that the housing price is very high, even in the Palestinian neighborhoods, due to the slow pace in the construction of dwelling units and the scarcity of land. The rejection of more large-scale plans such as the Safdie plan, and the number of smaller projects marketed towards a limited and specific clientele, have increased the focus on a shortage of affordable housing. The neo-liberal agenda of mainstream Likud is not very compatible with a policy of affordable housing.

As we can assume that the current right-wing government or the municipality are less interested in public housing projects for ideological reasons, the field is left open to real estate developers and private construction companies. According to municipal planner Charles Kuhn, the only current construction projects in central Jerusalem are the building of luxury apartments or housing for certain Jewish target groups. The construction company Africa Israel Investments, for instance, is involved in two projects in the centre of Jerusalem, one on Harav Kook Street and one on Hanevi'im Street, and the latter is marketed with the following words:

Take a journey to the center of the world. [...] Walk in the glorious footsteps of Jewish history [...]. Hanevi'im court has been designed to synthesize our glorious past and our promising future in every brick and stone. (The Hanevi'im project. www.hcourt.co.il)

Another apartment project, Jerusalem of Gold is promoted on its website with many references to Jewish culture and history. “Some people dream every Passover of ‘next year in rebuilt Jerusalem’. Jerusalem of Gold makes these dreams real.” (The Jerusalem of Gold project, http://jerusalem-of-gold.com). The very name of the project relates to Jewish history and to the famous song Yerushalayim shel zahav. A third example is the Mamilla project developed by the Alrov Group and containing an outdoor shopping mall (opened in May 2007), a hotel, and luxury apartments. The tagline of the project, particularly articulated during the opening ceremony of the shopping mall, is to link old Jerusalem with new Jerusalem (The Mamilla project, http://www.alrov.co.il).

These are three examples of apartment projects started in recent years in central Jerusalem, and are not small-scale, even though they are very small compared to the government-launched projects during the 1970s and 1980s. On the other hand, these luxury housing projects came to a halt in
connection with the current international economic crisis (Interview Osnat Post, 2009). Even though it is clear that the companies are building these apartments to make money, it is also obvious that they are marketed towards rich Jews in the Diaspora and profit from the dream or the sense of duty to invest in Jerusalem, which is part of the Diaspora culture. For some Jews, being in the Diaspora causes a feeling of guilt that they are not helping to “rebuild Jerusalem” or “rebuild the walls” according to the Bible. One example of this narrative is that the exile was and is depicted by leading Zionists as if the Jews were still subjects under a foreign entity (Zerubavel, 1995:17pp). The image of a common ancestry, a common link to the land, and a common national identity in general could therefore be a very efficient marketing tool. You are buying yourself a part of the myth. This is another example of how commemorative narratives are reflected in the construction of Jerusalem and the discursive practice.

There is a risk that these neighborhoods or buildings will remain empty most part of the year and create a ghost town feeling. David’s City next to the Old City wall near Jaffa Gate is one example of such a neighbourhood, and if these constructions dominate the physical development of downtown Jerusalem there is a risk of creating dead space. These neighborhoods or apartment complexes are also controversial in the sense that they are part of the gated community trend and have benefited from the current policy of densification. There is also a risk that Jerusalem will remain a peripheral city which blooms only one or two months a year.

There are also housing projects for religious Jews in East Jerusalem and these are more controversial projects. The construction companies and investors have been accused of serving a political agenda of establishing Jewish enclaves in the eastern part of the city. They have also been criticized for not informing the potential buyers of the meaning of the actual location of the projects. For instance the Nof Zion neighborhood is marketed as a private neighborhood and a continuation of the promenades overlooking the Old City near East Talpiot (Armon Hanatziv). The marketing text draws inspiration from the history of Jerusalem and the site is described as a “…scenery that has witnessed battles, growth, empires and prosperity.” (The Nof Zion project, http://www.nofzion.co.il). This relates back to the policies of planning for heritage, ancestry, and a common cultural landscape. A Palestinian on the other hand would say that the project is built on land belonging to the village of Jabal Mukaber, but in the main promotion picture on the website, the Palestinian neighborhoods completely surrounding Nof Zion today are not portrayed. Another controversial project in the area, the Bemuna project, was approved in 2000 and construction started in 2009. It also claims to be a continuation of the
promenades and East Talpiot (The Bemuna project at Armon Hanatziv, http://www.bemuna.co.il). Both these projects are using images of Jerusalem as the dream that can come true, and even though these projects are not necessarily a way to create a common economic base, they certainly use the vision of Jewish national identity linked to a certain territory. The Bemuna project has been publicly criticized for interrupting the development and natural growth of the village Jabal Mukaber. Israeli Lawyer Daniel Seidemann wrote a letter to the Mayor asking whether the municipality would promote similar plans for the Palestinians – to build new apartments for Palestinians in Jewish neighborhoods, thus drawing attention to what he saw as hypocrisy among both planners and politicians (Seidemann in Eldar, Ha’aretz, April 27, 2009).

Some of these projects are related to a new Zionist agenda, combining nationalist ambitions with religious fervor. Israel Land Fund is one actor involved in promoting the purchase and development of real estate in Israel. The opinions aired on their website have a new Zionist tone such as: “Possess the land of the forefathers and reap the spiritual benefits”. (Israel Land Fund website, http://www.israelandfund.com). The website also displays a number of properties in Jerusalem that are promoted as an investment and some of them are labeled ideology property.

6.5.3 Planning for 10 million tourists – Selling the narrative

In order to change the trends in Jerusalem and turn it into a thriving city, worthy of its title as the Capital of Israel and the Jewish People, the city needs accelerated economic growth and the reinforcement of business activity. (Barkat Plan, 2008)

The leadership in city hall focuses to a great extent on the economic development of the city, and according to Nir Barkat, the tourism potential is largely underdeveloped. The plan from city hall is therefore to go from 2 million tourists a year to 10 million in 10 years. In its section on economy, National Plan 35 focuses on tourism, as well as on making Jerusalem an attractive place for conventions, business gatherings, cultural activities, and the like. “Developing Jerusalem’s tourism industry would project on fostering the city’s assets, maintaining the city inside and out, and contribute to revitalizing the urban fabric and serve as a catalyst for its renovation”. (Plan 35, chapter 7.5:5).

The purpose is not only making Jerusalem a world class tourist site, but also to make the city an attractive place for dwelling, for tourism, for conventions, for industrial investments, for education, etc. All these things combined will ensure that Jerusalem will prosper and above all that Jerusa-
lem becomes a real capital. The question here is what role planning plays in facilitating this policy goal. The current planning focus on the Old City and the Holy Basin goes hand in hand with the development of the tourism sector. It is not only important to preserve and rehabilitate these areas, but also possible to capitalize on tourism focused on ancestry and heritage. “Many cities in Israel and around the world gradually discover the renewed power of preservation, the economical value of respecting the past and legacy.” (Plan 35, chapter 7.5:11).

Plan 35 and the Local Outline Scheme 2000 have influenced each other and basically promoted the same measures and goals regarding tourism.

The brand name “Jerusalem” [...] carefully cultivated could make possible the strengthening of the city’s economy and its position in the world. (Local Outline Scheme 2000, chapter 13:2–3)

The Local Outline Scheme emphasizes the potential of Jerusalem as a tourist site from five different perspectives:

- religious tourism,
- an attractive place for conventions,
- employment opportunities,
- international contacts, and
- tourism as an economic boost for the brand Jerusalem.

The measures adopted to make Jerusalem into a world tourist destination are to allocate land for tourism, to strengthen the city center which includes constructing a mass transportation system, to give priority to outdoor markets and public spaces, to renovate the Old City, and to establish cultural institutions. Notably, all these measures are based on “…its status and continued development as the capital of the State of Israel, as a center for the Jewish people…” (Local Outline Scheme 2000, chapter 13:3).

Some of these measures are clearly visible such as the traffic jams due to the construction of the new light rail and the opening of new shopping centers. Some planners argue that the city has become livelier because of the focus on tourism, that Jerusalem has become more attractive, and that it is definitely not a dead city. “It is full of people. Go Thursday night out in the evening, you can’t believe it’s the city center. [...] But it is not Tel Aviv. It doesn’t have that kind of continuity, urban continuity.” (Interview Miron Cohen, 2009). Others describe the city in more negative terms, for instance, as a fragmented city (Interview Chaim Fialkoff, 2007) or a city that is not normal (Interview Moshe Cohen, 2007).

Tourism has always been an important policy area but the strategies have not been clear and coherent before. Plan 31 mentions tourism as a
vital sector, but mainly for creating employment opportunities. The newer plans contain more detailed planning strategies for how to create this new attractive capital city. These strategies are not necessarily disputed in the Israeli society. Everyone wants economic development and a more attractive city, but while the plans are detailed when it comes to Jewish West Jerusalem and the Old City, they are a great deal vaguer concerning the role of tourism for the development of the Palestinian areas of Jerusalem.

The goal of creating an economic capital does not automatically constitute the base for a conflict between Israeli identity discourses. The will to build, create and develop the homeland could be related to one of the basic Zionist narratives of building Jerusalem. We have seen that neo-liberal views on privatization sometimes run counter to new Zionist perspectives, but if privatization of state land means that the “right” kind of Jews buys properties, then a focus on economic growth can go hand in hand with national-religious aspects. The view of the role of the Palestinians in the economic development illustrates one important difference between post-Zionism, traditional Zionism and new Zionism. The development of the Jerusalem tourist industry can also be interpreted as a way of marketing the Jewish Jerusalem and the tourists are seen as ambassadors. Tourism thus strengthens the legitimacy of the Israeli claims on Jerusalem. Tourism in the Palestinian neighborhoods of Jerusalem is scarce and the Palestinians or their history is not mentioned specifically in any official tourist brochures.

6.6 Exclusive territoriality – Planning and the image of “the other”

Caring for the Arab population, which is in a bad shape regarding housing and services, is one of the Development Policy’s criterions. (Plan 35, chapter 7.5:7)

Politicians and planners have been accused of using planning laws and the decision-making process in such a way that some citizens are excluded or discriminated against. Studies on planning in Israel show that social or ethnic background are significant factors for participating and having influence in the planning policy process (Fenster, 2004; Lazin, 1994; Yiftachel, 2006). Scott Bollens claims that the geopolitical situation in Jerusalem has worsened due to the urban policy conducted and that there are clear signs of partiality among city planners. Bollens finds that no serious attempts have been made to get to the bottom of the problem (Bollens, 2000). This section will analyze the image of “the other” from two per-
spectives, the Palestinian boycott of Israeli political and administrative system, and discrimination.

6.6.1 The Palestinian Catch 22 of participation and power

The Arab residents of Jerusalem ought to question whether this decades-long boycott, imposed by the Palestinian leadership, has in fact served their interests. (Weiner, 2003b)

The Palestinian Jerusalemites decided in 1967 to boycott the Israeli-made local political system, whether concerning the local elections, the administrative system regulating land issues, or the like. The Minhalot system (neighborhood councils) is also looked upon with suspicion and with the possible exception of the A-tur neighborhood council, the system has not been a success in east Jerusalem (Interview Anonymous Palestinian property owner, 2007; Interview Rassem Khamaisi, 2007). Neither the municipality nor the state of Israel is regarded as a legitimate authority over Jerusalem or the Palestinian areas, as these areas were conquered in war and not negotiated over. On the other hand, sometimes it is necessary to participate in the Israeli system in order to survive. The Palestinians in East Jerusalem are covered by the Israeli health and welfare systems, and Shalom Goldstein, a former advisor to Ehud Olmert, claims that the Palestinians of East Jerusalem would rather be citizens of Israel than citizens of a future state of Palestine (Interview Shalom Goldstein, 2007). From a Palestinian perspective this claim may very well be true from a survival point of view, but not necessarily from a national or emotional point of view. The fact that the Palestinians in East Jerusalem have been cut off from the West Bank by the Israeli security barrier/wall and feel abandoned by both the international community and the Palestinian authority has created a special kind of Palestinian East Jerusalem mentality. The rest of the Palestinian population regards the east Jerusalemites as privileged, while the east Jerusalemites regard themselves as living in a vacuum (Interview Ibrahim Dakkak, 2007; Interview Ghassan Khatib, 2007; Interview Azzam Abu Su’ud, 2007).

Palestinian participation in local elections or any cooperation with the Israeli authorities is among the most sensitive issues for Palestinians in East Jerusalem. Palestinians who have tried to run for City Council are considered as collaborators or at least a very suspicious character by other fellow nationals. Representatives of the Palestinian civil society in Jerusalem, have long emphasized that cooperation with the Israeli authorities will undermine the potential for a future Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem (Interview Mahdi Abdul Hadi, 2007). Others claim that the Palestinians in East
Jerusalem are stuck in a catch 22; boycotting the Israeli municipal elections has left them with no representation, but open participation would legitimize the Israeli occupation. Their solution is nonetheless to cooperate with Israeli authorities in order to receive service regarding for instance planning and building. Rassem Khamaisi calls this “a strategy of coping” (Interview Rassem Khamaisi, 2007). It must be possible to “participate” in the Israeli system for reasons of survival but still resist the occupation (Interview Rami Nasrallah, 2007; Interview Rassem Khamaisi, 2007). The low-key participation of Palestinians in different projects was put on hold completely after the Israeli military operation in Gaza 2008 (Interview Michael Turner, 2009) and the situation is still sensitive.

Looking at the Palestinian response to Israeli planning policies, the most common reaction has been to fight expropriation orders in Israeli courts, but with limited success. The cases concerning the route of the security barrier are the most known internationally and groups of Palestinian individuals have managed, through the court system, to change the route of the wall in the Jerusalem area. A Palestinian lawyer in Jerusalem says that the problem is that these court cases and decisions never reach the heart of the problem, and a case won in the first trial may easily be lost higher up in the court system (Interview with anonymous Palestinian lawyer, 2007). It is thus not completely clear where the line is drawn regarding Palestinian East Jerusalemite participation in the Israeli system. The opinion of most of the Israeli respondents in this study is that the Palestinians should participate in the local elections, and run for a position on the City Council. There is a lack of understanding as to why the Palestinians make the decision not to.

6.6.2 Planning and discrimination

In 1967, the Palestinians who lived in East Jerusalem on the day of the Israeli victory were offered Israeli citizenship, though most declined. Instead they received a blue ID card which was equivalent of a residence permit but only if they could prove that Jerusalem was their “center of life”. Israeli authorities have been accused of discriminating against the Palestinian population ever since. Municipal services were extended to the annexed area as was the welfare system (Hudson, 2000:274), but former Deputy Mayor Meron Benvenisti describes how Teddy Kollek was adamant about not having any kind of Arab Palestinian city council and how he, despite his reputation for being liberal and tolerant, was responsible for neglecting east Jerusalem regarding sewage systems, electricity, and other infrastructural necessities (Benvenisti, 1996:108, 125pp; Interview Meron Benvenisti, 2007). This neglect is brought up by a number of right-wing
activists to criticize particularly the Labor Party on both a national and local level of keeping East Jerusalem underdeveloped in order to facilitate the return of this area to the Palestinians. Nobody would miss areas this poorly managed (Interview Arieh King, 2009).

The Oslo agreements paved way for and created the Palestinian Authority, but the agreements also stated that the Palestinians were not allowed to organize political activities in East Jerusalem. This is part of the Catch 22 for the Palestinians in East Jerusalem, as the only legitimate political voice is through the Israeli municipal city council. Any activity in East Jerusalem that could be connected to the Palestinian Authority is shut down and evacuated by the Israeli policy. An example was police operation against the celebration of Jerusalem as the Arab cultural capital 2009 (see for instance Lefkovitz, Jerusalem Post, March 22, 2009).

One political activity, in which the Palestinians in East Jerusalem have been allowed to participate, is voting in the Palestinian national elections. The Palestinian electoral system is unique in many ways since Palestine is not an independent or recognized state. But Palestinian Jerusalemites are living in a political vacuum. They are closed off from Ramallah, Jericho, and Bethlehem by checkpoints and the Security Barrier/Wall, and they feel neglected by the leadership in Ramallah and oppressed by the Israeli authorities (Interview Samia Khoury, 2007; Interview Ibrahim Dakkak, 2007). On the other hand, in terms of poverty they are better off than their countrymen and women in the West Bank and Gaza.

We have mentioned that there is a widespread custom to build illegally in Jerusalem, not only among the Palestinians, but according to former head of the district planning office Guy Kav Venaki, the Palestinian or Arab village-like building style is problematic from a rational planning approach as it consists of curved narrow streets and irregular building patterns. The villages or separate houses are in many cases not connected to the larger roads and highways in a proper way. These planning problems are associated with illegal construction and it is an administrative and legal problem as well a political dilemma. “There is a major, major problem of the planning and building law and many times [...] first you build and then you plan. Some of the illegal building interferes with good planning,” (Interview Guy Kav Venaki, 2007). On the other hand, Rami Nasrallah points to the fact that the Israeli policy to revoke permanent residency of former Palestinian Jerusalemites introduced in 1995, created an influx of Palestinians and an increase in illegal constructions (Interview Rami Nasrallah, 2007). Meir Margalit, an active member of the Israeli Committee Against Housing Demolition (ICAHD) and a city council member, claims that the house demolitions performed by the municipality...
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is done for national motives, and that the municipality is hiding behind figure and statistics (Margalit, 2006, Interview Meir Margalit, 2007). The point here is that these house demolitions serve to ignite the conflict again and again. In 2009, the municipality and the Mayor presented a new policy for East Jerusalem containing suggestions on how to deal with illegal constructions, recommendations for building height, etc. One of the ideas is to reverse the label of illegality in some cases, particularly in areas that are not very controversial. According to a statement by Israeli organizations Ir Amim and BIMKOM, the new policy is empty, because the preconditions for the Palestinians have not been changed (BIMKOM/Ir Amim, 2010).

The land registration system is another quagmire related to planning, because of the freeze of registrations in 1967. If land has been sold without proper land registration it is almost impossible to claim the land. On top of that, even land registration is a sensitive issue for Palestinians and is regarded as collaboration with Israeli authorities. People have been exposed to violence and even death because of their cooperation with authorities on this level. Therefore some residents never even try to register their land despite having the right paperwork (Interview with anonymous property owner Jerusalem, September 2007). During the past couple of years, the District Commission has tried to work more closely with the Palestinian population within the municipal boundaries in order to create zoning plans – a requirement for starting any construction. In that way, the Palestinians may bypass the municipal level, that some regard as more political than the District level (Interview Binat Schwarz, 2007).

The collective decision of the Palestinian Jerusalemites not to participate in the Israeli political and administrative system has been questioned by Israeli politicians, but also by many of the planners in this study. There is a clear lack of understanding about the Palestinian society. From a new Zionist perspective Palestinians are unwanted in Jerusalem. They simply do not fit into the frame that has been imagined and neither do post-Zionists who work for strengthening the rights of the Palestinians. The Palestinian way of building and constructing is perceived as backwards and even those who support the Palestinian quest for planning and building rights, do sometimes act as having the only answer to a planning problem. Palestinians are also described as not taking enough care of East Jerusalem. These images have an effect on the self-image of Palestinians and are also an important part of the resistance towards Israeli authorities. One example is brought up by Samia Khoury, who is a veteran within the Palestinian East Jerusalem civil society. When she asked a young man why he was throwing garbage on the street and in this way violating the land of his ancestors, he answered, “Let the municipality clean it up”. According to her, there is a
need to focus on the generation that has never seen anything but occupation and instill in them a sense of pride in the land (Interview Samia Khoury, 2007).

6.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, planning policy documents and interviews have been analyzed in order to identify the interplay between Zionist discourses and narratives, and contemporary planning. The chapter is structured according to five strategies of territoriality. These strategies play an important role in reaching the overall political goal to maintain Jerusalem as the eternal and united capital of Israel and the Jewish people, and they are thus firmly rooted in traditional Zionism and its narratives. The main planning policy goals in Jerusalem have throughout history mainly been decided by actors at the state level and not by the municipality. The residential projects in Jerusalem after 1967 were initiated by the Ministry of Housing, and the security barrier is a national decision based on military considerations. These are large-scale projects that have changed the physical and mental map of Jerusalem significantly. The municipality and planners in general had a limited influence on these initial goals. Today, the municipality is part of the agenda-setting process and is often the initiator of new ideas.

Planning the political capital is a strategic measure to strengthen the united Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty. It relates to Jewish history and the exclusive connection to Jerusalem as a capital. The process highlights the narrative of being the best guardian of the city; i.e Jerusalem can only become a prospering capital city under Israeli sovereignty. Claiming territory for government buildings, residential areas, infrastructure, and so on, is part of creating the political capital, staking the claim, and creating “facts on the ground”. But constructing a capital is not only based on establishing institutions, government buildings, and laws. It is more than just public space or where foreign states place their embassies. According to theories of capital cities, these cities often contain the main cultural institutions and symbols of a nation, and attract businesses as well as well-educated people. Many components join together to make a capital. One conclusion is that planners can propose allocating land to government buildings and institutions. Architects and planners can present ideas on urban design specifically directed towards facilitating public gatherings and restoring or establishing commemorative sites. These commemorative sites also serve as places for public gatherings and are major tourist attractions. The problems arise when two nations claim the same site as part of their respective collective memories.
In recent years, preservation, rehabilitation, and revitalization have been prominent planning policy goals, in a strategy to attract more tourists and for strengthening the Jewish ancestry and heritage in Jerusalem. This heritage is firmly based in the traditional Zionist identity discourse of recreating and reconstructing the homeland. Criticism has been directed towards Israeli authorities for ignoring the preservation of the Palestinian built heritage and for creating the picturesque Jerusalem at Palestinian expense. This is connected to the development of Green Zionism and the focus on the spiritual aspects of the nature of the homeland. The focus on heritage and religion is a major component of new Zionism, but the preservation projects can also relate to the wider society, be for the common good, and help create a city that is economically viable and enjoyable for all its inhabitants. The goal of preserving, renewing, and rehabilitating amounts to a break with modernist planning doctrines, and is even reminiscent of certain features of new urbanism concerning returning to an historic ideal.

Demography is a central aspect of maintaining Jerusalem as the united, eternal capital of Israel. Not being the majority in the city is more or less equated with extinction. It is connected to recreating the ancestral bond, to the image of Jerusalem as a refuge, to establish who is best equipped to develop the city, and to the constant struggle for the right to develop the homeland and even simply to exist. Having demographic balance as a policy goal is a victory for both traditional and new Zionism. It is intimately connected to the territoriality aspects of control and legitimacy. It is related to creating new facts on the ground, making it very difficult to even discuss a division of the city into two capitals. It is very far from a post-Zionist perspective of living together in tolerance. This policy intentionally leads to segregation, and even though the separation of rival groups could be reasonable in the short run, it is devastating for the image of the open, vibrant, and modern city.

The economic development of Jerusalem is considered crucial in order to keep Jerusalem united under Israeli sovereignty. It would change the image of the city into one of being an attractive place for the right socio-economic groups. The creation of new residential buildings relates to the glorious past and ancestry. These constructions are also part of the labor Zionist narrative of developing the homeland. The collective perspective of traditional Zionism has been more or less replaced by a focus on the individual which is visible within new Zionism. From this perspective, the Jewish nation should strive towards the same goal, but those Jews who choose a different path are singled out as traitors to the cause or even self-hating Jews. The idea of the collective, of the community, is only interesting when everyone is pursuing the same goal. When it comes to construction, the
national government seems to have lost a great deal of the initiative compare to private entrepreneurs and property owners, but the question is whether the content of the planning have changed. The building of settlements near or in Palestinian neighborhoods is not a new process. The new development is what we have seen in the last couple of years – a growing interest in the economic development of the Palestinians and their neighborhoods. There is a post-Zionist take on this process, as it could lead to a better situation in general for the Palestinian inhabitants, but economic development could also go hand in hand with national interests. The question is why economic issues are highlighted in the development of Jerusalem. One interpretation is that it is part of a process of making Jerusalem more Jewish and also spreading this image to a growing number of visitors. If you create jobs and give priority to education, it has positive effects on migration trends. Economic development and demography are thus two intertwined areas.

The Israeli view of “the other” focuses on immorality of illegal buildings because building illegally is breaking the law. The problem is that these laws are constructed in the atmosphere of Zionist planning, and the legitimacy of Israeli authorities is low. Even if approved, the Palestinian constructions are part of a village-like construction style that deviates from good planning. This is related to both a colonial attitude and sometimes even a chauvinistic approach. Another image of “the other” concerns the Palestinians’ reluctance to participate in local elections. Some of the planners and architects argue that Palestinians cannot really expect to be prioritized if they do not engage themselves in the local politics. There is little understanding for the Palestinian view of participation as collaboration with the occupiers. There seems to be an Israeli political consensus that prioritizing the development of the entire city strengthens the ability to control the city, and thus serves the primary political goal of maintaining Jerusalem as the united capital under Israeli sovereignty. This is something that traditional and new Zionists can agree on. Post-Zionism, on the other hand, does not give priority to Israeli control unilaterally.

As demonstrated in this chapter, identity politics and the planning of Jerusalem are intertwined, even though there are different views of what Jerusalem should be in the future and what planning policies should be prioritized to get there. The next chapter focuses on how planners relate to the identity politics of Jerusalem and how they shape their self-image in relation to the strong opinions to which they are exposed daily.
7. Structure and agency in the Jerusalem planning system – planners as identity agents?

Don’t believe them when they blame the system. (Anonymous employee at an Israeli NGO)

City planning and identity politics is undoubtedly interconnected in the case of Jerusalem. The hegemonic Zionist identity discourse and narrative battles have contributed to the city’s image, as well as its social, political, and economic development. The purpose of this dissertation is not to show how much but in what way. This chapter is based primarily on interviews with 20 current or former public planners, and a majority of the respondents agree that planning is based on the hegemonic traditional Zionist ideology as well as being influenced to various degrees by other contemporary identity discourses. They are also aware of the huge impact of planning on the territorial preconditions for coexistence and any future development in the city. These points of departure are in line with earlier research. According to Scott Bollens, “Israeli planners were almost all aware of the partisan nature of their planning practice. Nor was there self-denial about the ultimate effects of planning actions on the city landscape.” (Bollens, 2000:106). The planning practice has also been referred to as “Zionist planning” (Nitzan-Shiftan, 2005:235).

The main focus if this chapter is to clarify and analyze how planners relate to this interplay between identity politics and the planning of Jerusalem. The planners describe and relate to the ideational impact in two ways:

1. The planning decision-making system is blamed for the impact of identity politics because of its inefficiency and hierarchy.
2. The planner tries to be professional under the circumstances. The role of the planner will be analyzed using the model presented in chapter 3 and the concept of rational constructivism. The role of agency within planning is intimately connected to the varieties of territoriality – the identity-based control over the territory.

7.1 The Jerusalem planning system – An overview

One of the main challenges for this study, as well as for research in general, is to establish a well-defined research focus but without narrowing it down so far, that the connection with the surrounding context is lost. In framing the policy area of planning we draw upon Fainstein and Campbell (2003:2) as presented in chapter 3. First of all, planning Jerusalem has implications for many issues such as land use, economic development, environmental concerns, infrastructure, housing, and the like. The spill-over effect of this
policy area on other political issues is evident. Second, planning Jerusalem is not confined to public planners, as there are also a number of private planning consultants, private construction companies, and planning expertise within academia, all with a potential influence on planning. The role of identity politics in planning has also affected the relations between local and national actors and between local-national and international interests. The material used in this chapter is primarily confined to current and previous public planners. When asked to describe contemporary planning challenges, a majority of the planners mention the consequences of Jerusalem as a poor peripheral city, the outdated construction of the decision-making structure, and the complicated initiation and agenda-setting process that includes a vast number of actors.

7.1.1 The top-down decision-making structure
In many countries urban or city planning is the administrative and political duty of planners and politicians in a certain municipality. Occasionally, and under special circumstances, municipal planning draws the attention of civil society, government authorities, and international actors, and this is very much the case of Jerusalem. Therefore, not all policies on Jerusalem can be regarded as urban planning, but must rather be seen as city policy, particularly capital city policy. In any case, there is constant interaction between structure and agency in the setting of policies, in the implementation process, and in practice, although it is easier to describe these areas separately.

In accordance with the Israeli Planning and Building law from 1965, the land-use planning process in Jerusalem is constructed around three levels of decision-making: the Local Planning and Building Commission connected to the City Council, the District Planning Commission at the Ministry of the Interior and the National Planning Board, also associated with the Ministry of Interior but physically located in another part of Jerusalem. The National Board is involved in decisions regarding planning in Jerusalem if they concern an alteration of existing national plans, district plans or other planning issues with a wider interest. The majority of the members of the District Commission are professional planners, but the commission also includes representatives of various ministries. The District Planning Commission makes a majority of the decisions regarding the planning of Jerusalem, with the exception of issuing permits for some construction projects and handling breaches of the planning laws, which mainly fall within the jurisdiction of the municipality. The Local Planning and Building Commission, made up mainly of City Council members, was in 2008 divided into two parts; one with a focus on environmental planning, and the other with
a focus on more “traditional” planning issues. The role of each level is described further in the Planning and Building law, 5725 (1965).

This top-down planning structure was inherited from the British mandate and has had a profound effect on the Israeli planning system. Many of the central principles of British planning are used even today, above all its focus on the professional knowledge and rationality of the planner, and centralization of the planning administration. The British mandate authority established a new system of planning regulations with permits and planning principles (Gouldman, 1996:4). There is an ongoing discussion about reforming the planning system and giving more power to the local commissions and the municipalities. These reforms would lead to declining national control over planning issues in Jerusalem and a possible weakening of the national agenda. Local identity could supersede national identity. On the other hand, local identity could also go hand-in-hand with national identity.

The calls for institutional reform are also connected to the fact that the planning of Jerusalem is affected by a number of laws passed immediately after the de facto Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967. Military orders were issued or amended regulating land ownership, and the land registration process itself for East Jerusalem was frozen. These laws are seen as a bit old fashioned. Examples of laws or orders that were amended are the Land Acquisition Order from 1943 and the Absentee Property Law from 1950, which state that property can be expropriated if the owner has been absent for a certain period of time even if the identity of the actual owner is known. Planning in Jerusalem is furthermore guided by regulations such as the 1978 Antiquities Law with its amendments, the 1960 Israel Lands Law, and the updated version of the Israeli Land Administration Law from 2009, as well as environmental regulations, specific town-planning law amendments, and statutory plans.

The top-down Israeli decision-making system concerning the capital city is by no means unique in a comparative perspective. In the Latvian reconstruction of national identity, municipal and regional planners have influence over both agenda-setting and implementation of planning policies in the capital Riga, but the law states that planning authorities on the national level have the final authority (Spatial Planning Law, Latvia, 1998).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plans and schemes</th>
<th>Prepared by:</th>
<th>Objections filed with:</th>
<th>Plan/Scheme approved by:</th>
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<tr>
<td>National plans</td>
<td>Appointment by Minister of the Interior</td>
<td>National Planning Board</td>
<td>Government</td>
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<td>Local Outline Schemes</td>
<td>Local Planning Commissions Jerusalem Municipality</td>
<td>Local Planning Commissions Jerusalem Municipality</td>
<td>District Planning Commission Ministry of the Interior</td>
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<td>Detailed plans</td>
<td>Local Planning Commissions Jerusalem Municipality</td>
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<td>City Engineer, Jerusalem Municipality</td>
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Figure 7:1. Planning decision-making scheme, Jerusalem.

7.1.2 Key planning actors
Together with the already mentioned commissions and boards, there are at least 12 major institutions or groups of actors with influence over planning policies. The Ministry of Housing and Construction was a major player after the 1967 war, when it was responsible for building new neighborhoods and settlements on state-owned land in Jerusalem. Today, most of the state land is leased and there are few opportunities for the Ministry to initiate large projects (Interview Chaim Fialkoff, 2007). The Israel Land Administration (Land Authority Council after the new Land administration law from 2009) was established in 1960 and administers the state-
owned lands, which comprise 93% of all land (but is decreasing according to the amendments in the law). The basic purpose of the new law from 2009 is to allow for the sale of state land as mentioned in chapter 6. The ILA cooperates closely with the Jewish National Fund, established in 1901 mainly for the purpose of purchasing land during the Ottoman period, but today the JNF is working with all kinds of issues to benefit Israel, with somewhat of an emphasis on environmental issues. A majority of the respondents do not describe the ILA as a strong planning actor today, but say it was a major initiator in the 1970s and 1980s.

One of the most influential planning actors is the Jerusalem Development Authority (JDA), which operates under the direct authority of the government. It cooperates with the municipality, but its policy goals and directives come from the government. Today the JDA is working intensively with city center renewal in both West and East Jerusalem and with infrastructural projects in the Old City (Interview Lior Bar Dor, 2009; Interview Reuven Pinski, 2009). The JDA and the ILA together were the main initiators of the “Safdie plan”, and the rejection of which, as we shall further explore in chapter 8, was a major blow to these institutions. Social movements such as Ir Amim, BIMKOM and Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) are working intensively with planning issues, with a primary focus on the situation of the Palestinian residents in Jerusalem. These organizations are often connected to a post-Zionist agenda though they do not necessarily label themselves post-Zionists. There are also organizations related to the national-religious movement and the new Zionist identity discourse such as Israel Land Fund which is involved with purchasing land in Israel in order to fulfil Jewish national-religious aspirations.

In addition, some of the key municipal, district, and national planners exert considerable influence over planning policies. Key roles are the City Engineer, the Head of the District Commission, the leadership of the national planning association, and the heads of other planning institutions.

Private planning firms are doing most of the actual planning, since outsourcing is the major modus operandi of the Israeli planning system. The consequences of this method are that planning can be shielded away from public scrutiny and decided and controlled in accordance with self-interest. On the other hand, if public planning is intimately connected with identity politics as stated in research (Bollens, 2000; Nitzan-Shiftan, 2005), then the private sphere could counterbalance that connection. If we turn to public planners, they have mainly an advisory and supervisory role, as will be further analyzed below. There are no clear barriers between practicing planners and planners pursuing an academic career. Many of the latter
have been responsible for designing statutory plans for instance. Politicians on both local and national level with a specific interest in planning issues can affect planning processes. Private construction companies as well as private property owners have been ascribed an important role in the development of Jerusalem, as there is little public land to develop in the city.

The citizens of Jerusalem have the legal right to object to a plan, but they have traditionally not been formally invited to work with the planners in the early stages. This changed somewhat in the early process of preparing the Local Outline Scheme 2000 (Interview Moshe Cohen, 2007), and the Barkat administration in City Hall has called for more public participation in every area of municipal responsibility. Many of the actors mentioned here are part of an informal power structure and affect the physical development of Jerusalem considerably, particularly the private property owners and developers. On top of this, we need to remember that the territory of Jerusalem is disputed and that Israeli planning practice is considered a part of the Israeli geopolitics.

![Diagram of key planning actors](image-url)

*Figure 7:2. Key planning actors*
7.2 The top-down decision-making process as an ideational tool

According to John L. Campbell (2002), one way to study the relation between ideas and policy is by focusing on the decision-making system. In this system ideas and interests meet and he suggests that it is better to concentrate on the interplay between these ideas and interests, rather than the one over the other (Campbell, 2002:34). The decision-making system for planning is referred to as complicated, weak, and bureaucratic. The system has created protracted planning processes leading to situations where initiatives, related to one identity discourse, have been rejected after many years of planning in favor of initiatives based on other identity discourses. The “Safdie plan” is an example of such a protracted planning process. The complicated, hierarchical decision-making path has been challenging for the inhabitants of Jerusalem, and most visibly for the Palestinians, seeking building permits. The system has a built-in national supremacy, but many actors are involved in planning and there is no clear hierarchy regarding who can launch initiatives. This has left the field open to alliances of actors and strong individuals in key positions with a clear political agenda. Relating to the community power debate, there are signs on both a planning elite and a pluralism of actors involved in the actual agenda-setting.

The top-down planning system and the planning ideals introduced by the British mandate have consequently had a profound effect on the planning and construction of Jerusalem. When the state of Israel was created, new institutional and legal frameworks for the entire state had to be established. The result was that many of the ideas in British policy-making were incorporated into the Israeli institutions. One reason was that there was not enough time to create something from scratch, and it would have been difficult to reach a consensus among the different Jewish groups living within the mandate area.

The institutional endowment bequeathed by the Israeli founding elite was not designed for an accountable and effective government. Provisional governing institutions and arrangements were adopted in haste, as a temporary expedient reflecting the pre-state institutional order as well as the lowest common denominator of consensus, in order to meet the pressing exigencies of national security, massive immigration and state-building. (Nachmias & Sened, 2002:5)

One reason for setting up this institutional structure of decision-making was to create a system of checks and balances whereby projects and initiatives that were too political would be stopped or sent back for revision. The system was basically adopted in order to prevent strong identity discourses from penetrating into plans and projects. This could be particularly
useful in a sensitive environment such as Jerusalem. The top-down planning system also suited the authorities for another reason. It was important to keep the construction and the control of the land under the auspices of the government and connected to labor Zionist ideas, because the territory was a collective resource and not meant for individual profit. Power over the making of planning policy in Jerusalem also means power over territorial alterations. If too much influence is given to local politicians regarding “facts on the ground”, they might make physical alterations not in line with government policies. One example is the accusation against former ultra-orthodox Mayor Uri Lupolianski of only addressing planning issues related to his own constituency (Interview Shlomo Hasson, 2007). Mayor Nir Barkat has been accused of being too connected to or dependent upon Jerusalem-based right-wing settler movement (see for instance Nashoni, Ynet News, October 27, 2008). The respondents in this study argue that the top-down system has caused a stand-still in public planning which has opened up for initiatives by private property owners. The planners claim that the decision-making frames are tying their hands in at least two ways: first, the decision-making hierarchy is causing conflicts between the national and local level regarding the supremacy of the policy area; and second the lengthy time-frames for a planning process make it difficult to develop Jerusalem.

7.2.1 The clash between local politics and national planning
Theories on city-state relations relate, among many issues, to challenges in the bureaucratic set-up of different sectors in society. Different models are presented on how to ascertain the role of the local versus the national level (Clark, 1984; Hesse & Sharpe, 1991; Svara, 2006). The city-state relations have repercussion for whose interest is prioritized and what ideas are hegemonic. The most “powerful” position in the formal decision-making process is held by the District Planning Commission. For a long time the top-down planning process has created conflicts between, on the one hand national politicians and planners and, on the other hand local politicians and planners who see themselves as overruled by the district planners. Municipal planner Moshe Cohen describes the situation as “a clash” and as often leading to conflicts (Interview Moshe Cohen, 2007). Former district planner Binat Schwarz does not agree that the conflicts arise because of the planning hierarchy itself. It rather depends on the personal chemistry or the (dis)agreement between two planners. The problem is that the conflict often ends up in the district commission, thus halting the process (Interview Binat Schwarz, 2007).
There is an assumption among planners that the Local Planning and Building Commission is and has been too involved in the identity politics of Jerusalem, which leads to a situation where their submissions to the District Commission are in some cases being extra closely scrutinized. The image of the District Commission is the opposite; i.e. it is regarded as the protector of professional planning, thus leaving politics at the door. This is a strong narrative, and a majority of the planners in this study largely agree that the District Commission is more professional, although there are a few critical voices.

Originally the law has established the two committees, the local and the district, when it was assumed that the local was political the district is so professional. Unfortunately during the years the district committee and all the people involved are more political than the others and they are not that professional and politics are playing there, and the same problems that we had in the local committee we have in the district committee… (Interview Amos Unger, 2009)

Unger and other planners also claim that the political parties and politicians are not that involved in planning issues and that their engagement is mainly based on personal interests. Whenever an issue is being discussed in the media or elsewhere in society, particularly if the issue challenges the identity of different groups or the larger geo-political conflict, politicians become engaged and try to earn political gains (Interview Amos Unger, 2009).

From an identity politics perspective, the formal planning roles are described as crucial as they entitle professional planners on the District Planning Commission to override issues that are potentially biased. Although many of the respondents claim that the District Commission is a tool of the government, citing the fact that since some of the members are representatives of the ministries, the professional planner on the district level does have a certain amount of personal authority. On the other hand, they are still employed by the Ministry of the Interior and acting against the ideational foundation of the employer (the state), hegemonic traditional Zionism, may lead to consequences.

7.2.2 Time-frames as a control mechanism
The complicated bureaucratic planning process has brought Jerusalem’s development more or less to a halt, at least according to some of the planners.

The problem isn’t the fact that it is hierarchical, you have that in many other countries. The problem is that it takes so long, the actual processing
between the initial planning application to the time when the plan is actually approved. (Interview Charles Kuhn, 2009)

This is partly a consequence of the differences in opinions and approach among different levels of planning and planning actors. The protracted time-frames of certain planning processes, particularly demonstrated by the Local Outline Scheme 2000 process, illustrate the gap between the intentions and the planning practice. The situation has led to formal and informal planning arenas (Interview Amiram Gonen, 2007). Formal planning may have been slow moving, but there is still an informal social practice, for instance in the case of private property owners building illegally. There is also a growing number of initiatives from the municipality, mainly smaller constructions. Nonetheless, this has consequences for the state-based planning and identity politics, and the ability of the hegemonic traditional Zionism to maintain its dominance.

Furthermore the bureaucracy of the planning system works as a gatekeeper to check Palestinian natural growth, according to Meir Margalit. This deadlock in the planning process is seen as a way for the state to maintain its control over the development of Jerusalem (Interview Meir Margalit, 2007). The protracted processes have led to building illegally in the Palestinian neighborhoods. The municipality is accused of using the planning law and its regulations as a tool to implement identity politics, and there are claims that the time-frame confronting Palestinians causes, severely interrupts the everyday life. Due to the difficulty of getting a permit, the burdensome fees, and plain defiance against Israel, many Palestinians decide to build illegally, which in some cases leads to demolitions being performed by the municipality as exemplified in the previous chapter (Margalit, 2006). On the Israeli side these fees and procedures are taken care of by construction companies in the early phases of a housing project. However there are those who claim that the municipality has given the Palestinians in East Jerusalem the same opportunities as the Israeli Jerusalemites when it comes to building permits and fees. The illegal building in East Jerusalem is considered part of world-wide construction anarchy with residents choosing to disregard laws and regulation. Following this line of argumentation, it is not a question of discrimination or an identity-based strategy within the ongoing conflict (Weiner, 2003a).

There are planners who reluctantly accept the longer time-frames created by the system because of the overall good intentions. For instance private planning consultant Miron Cohen states,

I like the system although it is making me miserable. [...] it is checks and balance [...] but it makes a lot of the planning that we do limited [...] So
when we do planning we do everything that we can to keep everything under the jurisdiction of the local committee and that goes quite fast. (Interview Miron Cohen, 2009)

This discussion on time-frames relates to the theoretical perspectives on policy change (Hysing, 2010; Ostrom, 2007; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). The longer policy processes or administrative decisions linger, the more likely it is that new issues enter the agenda and that actors with interests push the development in a certain direction. This is very much the case in several of the examples used in this dissertation, such as the changing meaning of places, the long periods between statutory plans, the fast shifts in the Israel–Palestine conflict, and above all violent events.

7.2.3 Ad hoc planning initiation

Another key to the impact of identity politics on the policy area of planning is the agenda-setting process or the power of initiative. To a direct question a majority of the respondents in this study claim that the dominating actor within the land-use planning policy area is the government and above all the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior (see for instance interview with Moshe Cohen, 2007). The District Planning Commission and the Jerusalem Development Authority are described as the operational tools of the government in various respects. On the other hand, none of the planning actors interviewed can provide an account of how planning projects are initiated and lobbied for other than on a case-to-case basis. “I would say that if you get a clear picture, tell me about it”. (Interview Dan Stav, 2009). All actors described earlier basically have the right to initiate a plan and bring it to the District Commission.

There are planning actors who do not agree with the claim that the government controls the planning policy area. Shlomo Hasson argues that the Jewish religious community, and above all the ultra-orthodox groups, has a disproportionate amount of influence over the development of Jerusalem, both on the municipal and government level (Hasson, 2002; Interview Shlomo Hasson, 2007).

Most of the respondents emphasize that planning ideas could be put forward by any of the planning institutions or, even by individual planners, albeit those with a large network of contacts. The field is thus left open for ideological impact. Based on accounts of some of the larger projects since the beginning of the 1990s, most initiatives do not come from the public administration such as the District Planning Office, its Commission, or municipal planners. The ILA and the Ministry of Housing and Construction no longer have a powerful initiatory role; their role is more administrative. So, who are initiating projects and presenting ideas for the devel-
opment of Jerusalem? Who decides on what constitutes a problem, using the vocabulary of Bacchi (2001)? Some of the initiatives have come from the JDA and the authority cooperates in its projects with municipal planners. Many construction projects, mainly smaller ones, are initiated by private planners or construction companies. Local politicians also present quite a number of ideas, as does the city engineer. The main conclusion from the interviews is that larger projects with a fair chance of going through the system are initiated by informal planning networks which are created between planners with the ability to promote certain projects. It facilitates the process if these planners have key positions such as the city engineer, Head of the District Commission, or influential positions at the JDA. These networks are largely based on a mobile planning work-force, in which people change jobs quite often. In the end, it comes down to the personal skills of a planning actor to promote a plan. This is what I would call an ad hoc project initiation and management.

7.2.4 Institutional reform – Power to the…?

In recent years, proponents of institutional reform have suggested that more authority should be delegated to the local level. Municipalities such as Tel Aviv are already implementing such ideas. The statutory plans are already old by the time they get to the district planners, such as in the case of Local Outline Scheme 2000. Reducing the waiting period or a decision from the District Planning Commissions is seen as important in order to increase efficiency. A more influential local commission would also be better suited to deal with local issues on the basis of a unique knowledge of local demands. There is no clear-cut answer among the planners regarding institutional reform. Some argue that the local commission would take its role more seriously and professionally if it was responsible for making more final decisions.

The only way to change is to give the local community the force to take decisions and it will be good decisions because they will be responsible for the decision, it is to decentralize. (Interview Binat Schwartz, 2007)

Some of the planners argue that the municipalities are best equipped to deal with issues that arise in their own municipality. The government has done little concrete for the development of Jerusalem (Interview Israel Kimhi, 2007). Dan Stav from the ILA argues that,

…planning should be done by the municipalities, not only in Jerusalem, everywhere, [...] because they know how to combine, how to make the best consideration of the real situation of the inhabitants, of the people of Jerusalem, of what Jerusalem needs. (Interview Dan Stav, 2009)
Although most support the delegation of power, other respondents in this study are reluctant to support such a reform. Naomi Tsur said in 2007 that,

It should be, but I can’t allow the municipality to have that right at the moment because it would make all the wrong decisions. But if there was a real stake-holder process where the public was listened to, I could reconstruct the system… (Naomi Tsur, 2007)

The issue of power over the decision-making in planning raises a few questions regarding identity politics. In whose interest is it to reform the planning system and the planning laws? What would be the impact of identity politics on planning if the decision-making system was modified? In answer to the latter question, the state would lose some of its control over planning – a control that politicians say they do not have, as the District Commission is professional and not political. If more of the decision-making were to end up on the table of the local planning commission, issues more related to the everyday life of the inhabitants could be prioritized. On the other hand, this would empower other actors such as the ultra-orthodox community or even the Palestinians if they should decide to get involved in the local elections. In any case the reforms could challenge the traditional Zionist hegemony. Currently, the local planning commissions in Jerusalem may put forward more identity-based projects, but the decisions are still made at the Ministry of the Interior, the home of the District Commission. As everyone seems to agree that planning is highly affected by Israeli identity discourses, this falls heavily on the institution on top of the decision-making ladder. Why assume that the municipality has a certain political agenda but a national ministry does not? Several studies have shown how traditional Zionism has penetrated every public institution, but so has post-Zionism and new Zionism. The current Israeli government is moving Israel further to the right on the political scale, and the claim is that the municipality is following. Is the planning policy by the municipality and the current Netanyahu government run by ideas based on new Zionism or a neo-liberal economic agenda? There is no doubt that both ideational bases interplays with planning. The question is if we are now witnessing the glory days of neo-liberal nationalism.

### 7.3 The planner as identity agent?

I couldn’t care less if it was local or district or whatever. At the end it depends on the people. (Amos Unger, 2009)
Connected to the profession, a planner has to relate to a number of issues such as planning regulations, the particular assignment given by the employer (Campbell & Fainsten, 2003), planning for the public good or for one group only (Yiftachel, 1998), or constant negotiations over priorities (Forester, 1993). In the delicate political context of Jerusalem, where planning policies are established in an environment of ongoing geopolitical struggle, the natural assumption is that planners are affected in one way or the other. Relating back to James Svara’s standard model for the relationship between politicians and public officials, several aspects could be used in order to analyze the role of the planner. Looking at the municipal level, planners have become responsive and reactive bureaucrats (Interview Charles Kuhn, 2009) in an environment of political norms instead of being initiators and experts. District planners have a more autonomous role, with more influence and leverage. Planners within the private and research sectors and planning research describe their roles as more flexible vis-à-vis the ideational context.

Working with an object of such interest as Jerusalem leads to some sort of coping strategy. Scott Bollens uses the word coping mechanism, and the main conclusion of his interview study is that planners cling to being professional (Bollens, 2000:106). This is supported by the respondents in this study. This is not unusual in an international comparative perspective and the dissertation therefore attempts to further elaborate on the role of the planner, as professionalism is divided into different categories: the mobilizer, the expert, the bureaucrat, and the advocate. Regardless of whether the roles are consciously and unciously chosen, the planners regard themselves as professional. These categories are used to analyze the role of planners in the Jerusalem context, which is highly characterized by identity discourses.

Jerusalem planning actors involved in various stages of planning activity have been accused of deviating from the professional path and falling into a discriminatory form of Zionist planning where only a modest planning effort is awarded to “the other”, mainly the Palestinians. Due to the political context, the planners implement coping strategies which can be seen as a form of rational constructivism or as a boundedly rational behavior (Scharpf, 1997). They are aware of the impact of the identity discourses and try to make rational decisions based on their own interpretation of the context.

7.3.1 The challenges of planning Jerusalem

The geopolitical situation affects professional planners whether they want to or not. There is a risk of their becoming executors of controversial deci-
sions with geopolitical repercussions and of their being blamed for these decisions. A majority of all the planners have stated that it is difficult and challenging to work with Jerusalem as an object. According to Dan Stav, “The first case is a challenge, the second case is also interesting, but then from challenge to challenge, it is sometimes exhausting”. (Interview Dan Stav, 2009). Yael Eliashar from the Society for Protection of Nature in Israel (SPNI) revealed that their coping strategy is to work together in teams as a principle. In that way the work of the SPNI is not connected only to one person, because then it would be very fragile and open for critique (Interview Yael Eliashar, 2009).

These planning actors do not see themselves as a part of the identity politics but as reacting to it. The coping strategies and the planner’s relationships to an identity discourse can be viewed in terms of what Fritz M. Scharpf calls “intentional action”, which is boundedly rational and socially constructed. In his opinion the actor has subjectively defined the context or the reality and makes a decision based on this perception. The perceived reality determines in what way the actor should behave under the circumstances (Scharpf, 1997:19). In the case of Jerusalem, the geopolitical conflict could be a rather hard fact to relate to, but parts of it can also be subjectively defined. Traditional Zionism, or contemporary identity politics in general, could be interpreted by planners in different ways depending on their background, and social and political network.

In some cases, the reaction of the planners and urban designers to the strong ideational pressure has been not to plan at all, so-called non-planning. When a situation is so exceedingly sensitive some actors choose non-provocation as a coping strategy. One example was brought up by architect Ofer Manor when he described the problem of placing artwork in East Jerusalem. Placing anything in the Palestinian-dominated areas requires a great deal of communication and knowledge, otherwise it just will not work. “I couldn’t just put them there. […] We are discussing this project with local architects and local leaders in East Jerusalem. Getting them exposed to the project and getting their agreement”. (Interview with Ofer Manor, 2007). This is an example of why non-planning is a relevant analytical concept in the case of Jerusalem. One interpretation is that the sensitivity of the situation makes it difficult to plan. On the other hand non-planning is contradictory to the planner’s professional knowledge of good planning. Others go so far as to say that the non-provocative coping strategy is just an excuse and that there is a situation of blatant discrimination in East Jerusalem. “A combination of bureaucracy and financial constraints has created a situation in which a network of employees implements a discriminatory policy, detached from any emotional engagement”.

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These employees downplay the role of ideology in their decisions and instead emphasize the bureaucratic system (Margalit, 2006). But if the system is saturated by ideology these two cannot be separated. This further supports the theoretical assumption that an actor with the intention of being rational can be very aware of ideational structures.

Another challenge is that Jerusalem planners are described as moving around from job to job quite frequently. The constant shift in the workforce is described as a main feature of the Israeli planning community, but it takes on an extra dimension in Jerusalem because of the political pressure (Interview Binat Schwartz, 2007; Interview Dan Stav, 2009). In a small professional community this has repercussions, and the position of a Jerusalem planner is dual. It is challenging and interesting at the same time. The rotation of planners makes it both easier and harder to work in an efficient way. It improves networking abilities (“everyone knows everyone”), but every new planner in a strategic position has her or his ideas. “…every two or three years comes a new city engineer that makes a new plan. …one city engineer and one district planner […] they say ok let’s go and then one is replaced and then [the new one] says no… […] It is a mess”. (Interview Uri Barshishat, 2009). This situation is open for influences from all kinds of ideational perspectives and could theoretically diminish the impact of a hegemonic discourse. On the other hand, if the planning policy area is based on traditional Zionism, the process of changing this base is most likely lengthy.

These are examples of challenges facing Jerusalem planners. On the other hand, some planners describe working with Jerusalem as fantastic. The diversity of the people that you have to deal with as a planner is described as amazing and interesting. But this process of dealing with many different actors is also regarded as problematic because you lose some efficiency and the planning process tends to be protracted (Interview Amos Unger, 2009).

### 7.3.2 The planner as a mobilizer

A planner can act as a mobilizer or entrepreneur, which means that the planner has to find a network of actors to support a certain project and provide the necessary funds. The planner thus acts more or less like a politician and could jeopardize his or her position the plan clashes with the dominating political goals (Alexander, 1992:107p). In the case of Jerusalem, the proposal of plans and the management of projects depend to a large degree on the actual person and not necessarily on his or her position, at least according to several of the respondents. It is related to personal skills, professional reputation, and being connected to the right people.
This is proposed as one explanation of why certain projects tend to be more characterized by identity politics in Jerusalem but it is also seen as something inherently necessary because of the challenges of working with the planning of Jerusalem.

If you have a good person, if you have a brave person, if you have a professional one and efficient one. Whatever it will be, this will be the strong part and unfortunately we don’t have enough people that are willing to take the risks. (Amos Unger, 2009)

The skill of the promoter of a plan is important because of the bureaucratic quagmire of the planning system. “First of all, every plan should have a dad. Someone who pushes it, because in the bureaucracy of Israel…” (Interview Binat Schwartz, 2007). Pushing a plan through the system takes a very long time. We can take the Local Outline Scheme 2000 as an example. It was initiated in the 1990s, elaborated on, and finally approved by the Local Planning Commission in April 2007.

The conclusion to be drawn from the interviews is that when a project is strongly and persistently promoted by the planner as a mobilizer and entrepreneur with the right network, the project is often pushed through the system, although undergoing alterations on the way. Many of the respondents exemplify this by talking about the Kalatrava Bridge, which was an important issue for former city engineer Uri Shetrit. “If he had not been here, there would not have been a Kalatrava bridge, for better or for worse”. (Interview Amos Unger, 2009).

What does it mean in terms of identity politics when a planner is a mobilizer and entrepreneur? In a representative democracy, the politician is expected to represent the people, and acting against the will of the people will result in the person not being re-elected. If a planner is mobilizing support mainly from the business world and/or colleagues, important decisions may end up far from the citizens. A common opinion is that public officials should act for the common good (Yiftachel, 1998), but if the planner takes on a politician’s role, there is a risk of the planner becoming deeply involved in shaping the identity politics. Although this risk is real, the planner as mobilizer does not necessarily deviate from the role of the professional. In his or her opinion, professionalism means getting things done instead of suffering in a situation of deadlock and bureaucratic problems.

7.3.3 The planner as a bureaucrat
The former Head of the District Planning office, Guy Kav Venaki, argues that although he is aware of the political atmosphere in which the Com-
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mission makes its decisions, as a professional planner, he has to make the best of the situation. Even if the future political status of Jerusalem might be something completely different than today, professional planners must try to do their best under the circumstances. Kav Venaki expresses the majority opinion in my material. The respondents feel that they have a purely professional agenda and act as administrators, bureaucrats, and mediators. Scott Bollens calls this process “a psychological separation of an administrative “me” from a political “them”.” (Bollens, 2000:109). This is a defense mechanism and a clear strategy to avoid accepting responsibility for decisions made by politicians.

This role is connected to serving politicians and the citizens and acting in reaction to government or municipal policies and regulations (Interview Charles Kuhn, 2009). The planner is expected to be neutral and apolitical (Alexander, 1992:107p). That this role is embraced by many planners, has led to their being criticized for not taking responsibility for plans they have developed or policies they have implemented. This coping strategy may become something to hide behind and it is difficult to measure any kind of intention. It is difficult to determine whether the planner is actually reproducing an identity discourse intentionally or if the intentions are otherwise. These planners see themselves as professionals, but professionalism means more than being just an administrator, a bureaucrat or a “response-unit”.

For Binat Schwartz, it was important as a district planner to try to influence the agenda according to her own personal beliefs based on professional planning.

> You can love the city and hate it from time to time... I took my political vision [...] and I tried to give it professional clothes and I think I did it because I believe when someone is sitting in so strong position he has to act according to his belief as long as it is professional... (Interview Binat Schwartz, 2007)

In Schwartz’s view she had a responsibility to act according to her own vision of what is good planning. Every planner is thus unique as well as each planning projects. We all act according to our background, education, social network, and experience in an intentional or unintentional fashion. Planning is in this example connected with a moral stance of taking responsibility, but for the planners embracing this perspective, it is part of being professional. The consequences of this stance are that these planners risk accusations of being identity agents, pushing for a certain identity discourse, it may enhance the checks and balances system in Israeli planning, but also that normative planning always clashes with other world-views and identity discourses. Who is right and who is wrong?
The role of the planner as a bureaucrat is often difficult to maintain as the politicians also depend on the planner as an expert. Therefore, the role tends to be stretched a bit in reality. For instance, the role can transform into acting as a mediator. There are few studies relating explicitly to the role of the planner in the Jerusalem context, but there are articles and books about Israeli planners in general. Some of them relate to the intricate problems of building and construction in Jerusalem. David Best summarizes this challenge by asserting that some planners become mediators in order to solve complicated issues.

When you’re at an age, [...] where you’ve had enough experience, but [...] you’ve still got the enthusiasm to fight, somehow you manage. It is a fight [...] where you’re moving very often from one side to another... (Best, 2001:67)

A majority of the public planners interviewed in this dissertation express a self-image as a professional administrator. Few question that the policy area is driven by political goals and states that a planner just has to make the best of it. On the other hand, there are planners who argue that they have a responsibility to interfere if the political goals are contrary to good planning, for instance planning policies that go against the common good or are discriminatory in nature.

**7.3.4 The planner as an expert**

The public planner is expected to be impartial and to follow the regulations. On the other hand, he or she is also looked upon as an expert giving advice to politicians on specific issues. In the case of Jerusalem, this is also related to the role of private planning consultants and planning researchers. The planner as an advisor has a significant impact on planning policy and specific projects, particularly if one has long experience and is considered an authority in the field. This also gives the politician a chance to hide behind the advice of experts if criticized for setting up policies with a clear bias towards his or her constituency. On the other hand, experts could also hide behind their roles, by referring to figures and statistics, and yet still have a political agenda.

The conclusion drawn from the interviews is that the roles of public planning officials can be developed from that of being administrators to experts in a certain field. This is seen as a natural process of gaining experience, but it is not automatically connected with initiating projects and mobilizing support. According to a majority of the respondents, public authorities often outsource new planning projects, and private planning consultants and some planning researchers are frequently brought in to
develop these projects or to give advice on planning issues. At the municipal level, some see it as a problem that other actors, both public and private, initiate projects. “I think we have to do it and we know better how to do it [...] because here is all the knowledge about Jerusalem”. (Interview Osnat Post, 2009). Others see it as an extra resource:

...the statutory status is left with the public sector and by giving the private sector the planning itself you can have more diversity, more new points of view. (Interview Lior Bar Dor, 2009)

The district planners concede that they do not have the resources to do the actual planning themselves like they used to do, and that the planning is performed by private planning firms (Interview Dalit Zilber, 2009).

The municipal and district planners are responsible for the statutory planning, but a majority of the respondents argue that these statutory documents have limited importance for the actual “facts on the ground”. The management of projects is delegated to private experts, or in some cases researchers, which means that the public checks and balances system is more or less bypassed. One the other hand, private initiatives do not have to be related to identity discourses. The influence of the private sector is nonetheless used for supporting a coping strategy or an argument among some public planners: that their impact on planning goals and the concrete development of the city is limited.

7.3.5 The planner as an advocate

There are Jerusalem planners who see their role as something more than that of being a mobilizer, a bureaucrat, or an expert. They base their decisions on the fact that there are groups in Jerusalem who are not seen the the right target group of planning policies. Poor and run-down ultra-orthodox neighborhoods are often used as examples. Another illustration is that half of Jerusalem is under Israeli occupation and that public planning in those areas is regarded as a geopolitical enterprise and not as something performed in the best interests of the Palestinians. Aware of their competence and experience within the field of Israeli planning, some planners choose a different coping strategy in response to the identity politics of Jerusalem – advocacy planning, as presented in chapter 3 through Daviddoff, (2003). They plan for those who lack the requisite resources, in a broad sense, to influence planning policies, mainly the Palestinian population. In the Israeli context, recent planning practice theories such as communicative, deliberative, and democratic planning have not gained much ground as the process is still centralized and based on the modernist ideas of what is good planning. The planning system does not formally incorpo-
rate knowledge from alternative sources such as national minorities or other specific groups. This does not rule out that individual planners could try their best to use a non-traditional approach to planning, despite the system not being built for it (Fenster, 2004:35).

There are specific planning organizations that work with advocacy planning, which means that planners and architects, often on a purely voluntary basis, work with various groups and communities in order to produce alternative plans. These organizations have criticized the planning system for discriminating minority groups, and district and municipal planners for not including these groups in the planning process (Interview Efrat Bar-Cohen, 2007; Interview Amos Gil, 2007). Israeli organizations such as BIMKOM and Ir Amim join with Palestinian planners acting as advocacy planners. According to Palestinian planner Rassem Khamaisi, planning Palestinian neighborhoods together with Israeli planners and then bringing the plans before the District Commission is the most efficient way to create a better situation for each family and the entire neighborhood (Interview Rassem Khamaisi, 2007). This could be facilitated by creating new types of community centers, set up by the Palestinians and not the Israeli municipality, as is the case today, with the responsibility to help the citizens with their contacts with the Israeli authorities (Interview Rami Nasrallah, 2007). The problem is primarily that cooperating with any Israeli counterpart and submitting applications to the Israeli planning authorities is as mentioned in the previous chapter controversial for the Palestinian population due to the overall call to boycott the Israeli system.

Another potential problem facing advocacy planners is that they can be regarded as patronizing the Palestinians (Interview Haim Yacobi, 2009) based on the perception that Israeli planning is modern and up-to-date, compared to the Palestinian village-like building tradition. The challenge for an advocacy planner is that his or her planning effort, based on cultural considerations, risks strengthening problems within a particular group because of the lack of knowledge about that particular culture. This concerns everything from being a woman planner in a patriarchal context to knowledge about family constructions.

Nonetheless BIMKOM, for instance, has prepared plans for Palestinian neighborhoods and has presented them to the District Commission. Many of the respondents in this study emphasize that the organization is important when presenting alternative planning perspectives, but that the point of departure is sometimes too political. This is regarded as problematic from a planning point of view, as their plans tend to be less professional and are not solely based on good planning standards (Interview Osnat Post, 2009; Dalit Zilber, 2009).
Choosing the advocacy planner’s role is a coping strategy in a contested environment. First of all it is connected to pride in what you do for a living and to a self-perception of being a good and decent person. Second, it is part of being a professional planner – to plan for all inhabitants.

...planning in Jerusalem is not living in an ideal world [...] planning has many problems here but still we try to do a professional job and try to make the best out of things, also in eastern Jerusalem. (Interview Guy Kav Venaki, 2007)

From a social constructivist perspective, the actions and decisions of an actor are based on ideas and discourses that are constantly reconstructed. The important issue in a place like Jerusalem is to be aware of the ideational and discursive structures. One could agree with the conclusions of Scott Bollens that some planners tend to psychologically distance themselves from identity politics and act solely as bureaucrats, but add that other planners choose to see an alternative role in a challenging situation.

As pointed out by E.R. Alexander, the planner has a multitude of roles depending on the situation, the planning position, and the overall context. The planner can be anything from an advisor in the background to an ardent advocate of a certain issue (Alexander, 1992:111). Planning is also an identification process (related to Brubaker, 2004) and what is particularly important to remember is that planning is a political action, and not only an administrative duty. As stated by Lawrence Vale, while planners cannot take responsibility for all the ideas and discourses influencing the policy area of planning; “They can, however accept their complicity with the regimes that commission them and try to act responsibly.” (Vale, 2008:337). This is part of the important societal task of working as a planner today. The planning context of Jerusalem is related to both ethnic and cultural divisions. According to William Neill, these kinds of settings call for a higher level of tolerance. “Planning with an ethic of cultural inclusion means acknowledging that it is acceptable to be different. It means planning for difference”. (Neill, 2004:219). If tolerance of the different is not prioritized then the planning authorities have to face the risk of being accused of discrimination.

7.4 Conclusion

In the traditional Zionist identity discourse, the state is perceived as the main actor in constructing Israeli-Jewish collective identity. The British top-down planning system suited the traditional Zionist discourse as the state remained the most important actor in the planning system. On the other hand, as illustrated in figure 7:2, there are a multitude of actors in-
involved in different parts of planning Jerusalem. Planning has been a major tool in the traditional Zionist identity project, though there are signs of a growing influence of the new Zionist agenda. Planners are faced with growing pressure from nationalist groups. Planning initiatives connected to post-Zionist opinions have had less impact on the overall development of Jerusalem, although many planners appreciate the work of groups such as BIMKOM. The ideas about reforming the planning institutions are challenging the state’s decision-making hegemony over the planning agenda. They may also reduce the ability of the government to impose its opinion about what Jerusalem should be in the future. Today, the autonomy of the city of Jerusalem is weak, and using the criteria set up by Gordon Clark referred to in chapter 3, it is a case of local administration. If local authorities in Jerusalem take over some of the decision-making responsibilities, there may be a clash of identities due to the heterogeneous character of the Jerusalemites. Planners on the district level express a concern that planning might be too political with too much power in the hands of the local building and planning commission. On the other hand, most of the respondents claim that the public planners are not the most powerful group of planners. The power over the policy goals and the agenda-setting lies elsewhere, among a wide spectrum of actors.

Planning undoubtedly interplays with the hegemonic identity discourse, and this situation has left the planners at both the district and municipal levels as observers and reactionaries rather than initiators, though there are exceptions. In this respect, they are narrowing their own roles on purpose in order not to be accused of being too political, which seems to be the worst possible accusation that can be made against a planner. In a system where informal planning plays such a large role, the municipal and district planners seem to be struggling to find their role in the system. There are exceptions to the planner as a bureaucrat. Individual planners could embrace the role of a mobilizer, an expert, or an advocate as a coping strategy. As a mobilizer you can avoid criticism by pushing plans through the system. As an expert you can hide behind figures and facts, but you can also practice professional planning. As an advocate you can plan for “the other”.

In fact, the planner often has a variety of roles and strategies that are employed in different circumstances.

Intuitively, or as a result of her education and experience, she will command a repertoire of political strategies and will know how and when to deploy them to best effect. (Alexander, 1992:110)
The many roles of the planner show a certain flexibility, which could be positive, but they also point to a general weakness of the system that leaves it vulnerable to irregular and biased planning. There is a contradiction between the awareness of the bias of the planning system, which has led to a focus on being a professional bureaucrat, and the constant return to what is considered good planning. The rational planner, traditionally associated with a modernist view of what is good planning, is also connected to striving for and deciding what is the common good. The question remains: what is “common” in the case of planning Jerusalem. What is the common priority when it comes to political goals and what community is the “common” related to? The planner may be aware of the strong identity politics and the role of planning within them, but every planner constructs his or her view of what this context is and the planner thus becomes rational within her own construction.

To the question of whether the planner is an identity agent or not, the conclusion is that there is no such thing as pure objectivity. Some planners try their very best not to be partial and discriminatory. Others have a political agenda. The bottom line is that planning is political. It is based on certain goals and leads to a change in the “facts on the ground”. Therefore one of the most important words in this context is responsibility. With the role comes the great challenge of being a professional practitioner and of taking responsibility for one’s actions. In the next chapter, the strategies of territoriality and the role of the planner will be analyzed in connection with the “Safdie Plan” process.
8. Challenging identity and planning hegemony – The “Safdie plan” process

My agenda was if there is a place to build in Jerusalem there is no reason to build outside… (Planner and planning consultant Uri Barshishat, interview 2009)

They gave mistaken facts, they were calculating imaginary projects which everybody knows cannot be implemented. (Urban planner and planning consultant Amos Unger, interview 2009)

On February 6, 2007, a determined group of protesters waited outside the offices of the Ministry of Interior in the center of Jerusalem. They stood with banners and slogans hoping that the National Planning Board for Housing and Construction would reject what had come to be known as the “Safdie Plan”. At around 1:30 in the afternoon, a thirteen-year-long process was over and the opponents of the plan had won. For some, this was a sign of a new kind of local involvement and a democratic revolution within the planning system. It was seen as David’s victory over Goliath, the citizens versus the “establishment”, local identity versus a state-controlled identity politics. For others, the rejection was a disaster for the development of Jerusalem, regardless of whether it is the capital or just any other city. They could not understand where the development was supposed to take place instead, and what options were left in order to attract and keep the middle-class in Jerusalem. Is the rejection of the “Safdie Plan” a sign of a new era in the planning of Jerusalem where the hegemonic traditional Zionist identity discourse and the dominant planning actors are challenged by other identity discourses and political interests? The choice to study the “Safdie Plan” rests on the fact that it relates to all five territorialities presented earlier in different ways. It is not the most obvious example when discussing Israeli territoriality but that actually makes it the more interesting.

The chapter focuses on three major issues:
1. What was the role of identity politics in the “Safdie Plan” process?
2. What planning roles are displayed and what effects did the long bureaucratic process have on the outcome?
3. What are the consequences of the rejection of the “Safdie Plan”? Does it challenge hegemony?
8.1 The development of the plan

The massive waves of Jewish immigration to Israel during above all the 1980s had serious consequences for the supply of housing in Jerusalem, particularly affordable housing. There was a desperate need for homes for the new arrivals, and the Jewish neighborhoods in West Jerusalem provided limited opportunities. The large Jewish neighborhoods in East and South Jerusalem, which were mostly established in the 1970s and 1980s, were already filling up. New and expanding settlements outside the new municipal boundary to the East such as Ma’aleh Adumim (established in 1976) met some of the demand, but Jerusalem in the early 1990s was a rather crowded and pricy place. There was considerable growth in the Palestinian neighborhoods as well, but neither the municipality of Jerusalem nor the government of Israel developed similar kinds of large housing projects for the Palestinian Jerusalemites.

One of the major challenges concerning Jerusalem is the lack of land for housing as well as for industrial and commercial development. A growing city needs both, and particularly a city that wants to become a significant economic factor in the region and a major global tourist destination. Even though a number of housing projects are currently under way in the center of the city, they are mostly expensive apartments, and one of the most debated issues right now regarding planning in Jerusalem is how many dwelling units can be built inside the municipal boundary of Jerusalem and how many plots can be used for industrial purposes. According to Amos Unger, Jerusalem will need about 3000 new dwelling units a year during the next 25 years in order to keep up with the growth of the Jewish population. These units cannot all be created through densification inside what is currently the border of Jerusalem (Interview Amos Unger, 2009).

Due to the problem of land scarcity, the Jerusalem municipality requested an inquiry in the early 1990s into the possibility of expanding Jerusalem to the West. The so called Kubersky committee (led by the Director General of the Ministry of the Interior Haim Kubersky) presented a report in 1991 recommending the annexation of 16.5 square kilometers from the Mate Yehuda District, with the condition that before anything could be developed in the annexed area, the opportunities to build within the old borders would first have to be exhausted (Israeli Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2008).

In 1993, the enlargement was approved and the following year the government of Israel, through the JDA, the ILA, and the Ministry of Housing and Construction, with the support of the municipality, commissioned a private planning company led by well-known architect Moshe Safdie, to investigate the possibility of building dwelling units and developing indus-
trial areas in the new parts of West Jerusalem. The company immediately began to produce a number of plans and ideas for the area, as a complement to other plans produced by other companies, and in the daily planning the area was called “West Jerusalem”. Later on, when the Safdie planners submitted the plan, it was formally called Regional Development Plan 37/1, but everybody would come to call it the “Safdie Plan”.

A planning process contains many different components most of them which are continuously affecting each other. It is therefore difficult to separate and study particular parts. This particular planning process is an example of almost every possible planning topic, but it is also unique in many ways. It is an example of the importance of land in and around Jerusalem for individual, local, and national identity. It displays the quest to attract the middle-class to Jerusalem and to regain the sought-after demographic balance. The process illustrates the long and bureaucratic road that a plan regarding Jerusalem has to take in order to get approved or rejected. Time was a vital factor for the outcome. The process also illustrates a unique example of public participation and public protest against a particular plan, a public involvement that was based on the growing interest in Israel for environmental issues. Ultimately the motive behind the governmental request was to strengthen the Jewish Jerusalem, but on the geopolitically correct side of the city. This is connected to the discussion on where the core of the city is and should be, and to a willingness to concede to future territorial concessions. From the new Zionist camp came accusations against the government of playing into the hands of post-Zionists who rejects building to the east. Representative of a secular traditional Zionism was accused of avoiding the city center close to the Old City in order to secure the transition to a two-state solution (Interview Arieh King, 2009).

8.2 The role of identity in the “Safdie Plan” process

In every construction project, the designers often face a conflict between the desire not to interfere too much with the landscape and the local neighborhood identity on the one hand, and designing a plan using the best possible technology available regardless of the context on the other. In a city like Jerusalem, with its historical heritage and its geopolitical implications, planners and architects must try to balance these two aspects.

8.2.1 The planning design and vision

Moshe Safdie and his associates at the Safdie planners had one important demand for accepting the assignment and that was being given a free hand to develop a design that suited the topography of the area and the sur-
roundings regardless of borders, ownership, or detailed guidelines regarding size or shape; i.e. they wanted to express their urban design principles without undue barriers. The Safdie planners prefer to use the concept of urban design rather than urban planning, and support the old British policy of keeping the valleys open and building on the ridges, preferably as a natural continuation of other built ridges. These planning or design ideals were brought into the “Safdie Plan” (Interview Miron Cohen, 2009). Although the planners and designers were more or less given a free hand, the authorities presented very specific goals for the plan, which was mainly based on demographic and economic concerns, i.e. bringing the “right kind of socio-economic target group” back to Jerusalem and creating industrial zones. The Safdie planners presented a first preliminary plan in 1997, mapping some initial ideas, and at that time there were no indications that the plan would be one of the most contested in the history of Jerusalem planning.

There is no question that the planning vision and the ideas of the urban designers working with the Safdie plan are firmly based on a modernist western planning perspective, although they did try to work closely with the civil society, particularly in the neighboring areas. Even though the tools to create a plan are modern, the historic city of Jerusalem still requires a special touch. One of the main principles of the Safdie plan was to avoid building in the valleys, mainly for two reasons: first it would be in line with the design of almost all the neighborhoods in Jerusalem, as this has been a part of the Jerusalem planning policy since the period of the British mandate; and second to protect environmental, historical, and cultural values. This reasoning is connected to the labor Zionist narrative of cultivating the homeland but also cherishing it. It is connected to the mental map of what historical Jerusalem looked like. The outcome was therefore a plan based on building along the ridges adjacent to the already existing communities in the area so that the new neighborhoods would be part of the built structure. By doing this, the new projects would not be suburbs but a continued urban development. The “Safdie Plan” concentrated on building on three ridges (Mount Heret, Lavan Ridge, and Emek Ha’arazim) which was intended to provide around 20,000 housing units for low- and middle-income families. The whole plan covered 26.6 square kilometers and according to Miron Cohen of the Safdie planners, 75% would remain open space, as the plan proposed a metropolitan park in parts of the Arazim, Refaim, and Soreq valleys.
The plan also contained about half a million square meters of industrial commercial areas (Interview Miron Cohen 2009; Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2008).

Figure 8:1. Regional master plan 37/1 (“Safdie Plan”) and its place within the district of Jerusalem. As reproduced in: Israel Ministry of Environment

8.2.2 Politically correct location or destruction of biblical hills?
During the 1980s and the first part of the 1990s it was politically impossible to discuss an expansion of the Jerusalem municipal borders to the east, although Israeli settlements in the West Bank close to Jerusalem were expanded and as previously mentioned there are groups who promotes the idea of a Greater Jerusalem and including the settlement blocs to the north, south, and east (Shragai, 2008). The peace negotiations in the 1990s did not bring a solution to the Jerusalem problem and its future borders. Planners and politicians had to continue to plan while in a sense being blindfolded. Both right-wing and left-wing activists claim that neither the government nor the municipality planned in any way for the eastern part of Jerusalem to be a natural part of entire city (Interview Arieh King, 2009; Interview Meir Margalit, 2007). From a post-Zionist perspective, the neglect of the Palestinians is an integral part of Zionist planning, but West Jerusalem was the “right” location for a new Israeli housing and construction project. The new Zionist argument is that East Jerusalem was neglected by the labor governments throughout history for political reasons, so it would be easier to give up the eastern part of the city, or at least the
Palestinian neighborhoods, in a future peace agreement (Arieh King, 2009). New Zionists were thus critical because the “Safdie Plan” was located on the wrong side of the city, and if approved it would lead to a post-ponement or even cancelling of plans to build in the eastern, northern, or southern parts of the city. These critical points were developed later on in the planning process.

Under these geopolitical circumstances, there were at least two arguments why the initiators wanted to locate the largest planning project to the west. First, it was not considered likely that the desired demographic group would settle in the politically more sensitive eastern parts. It is also probable that many members of this group work in the western part of the city or in the Tel Aviv area, which makes it a good place to commute to and from.

The location of the “Safdie Plan” stretches from Mevasseret Zion in the northwest and south towards Ora and Aminadav, and the area is very much linked to local identity. The area is located in the Jerusalem hills, connected to the so called Judean Hills, and is known for its natural and planted trees and many outdoor opportunities. The hills are a popular place to visit for hiking, bicycling, and similar, which are otherwise not things that Jerusalem is normally associated with. Hiking and trekking are popular Israeli activities, intimately connected with Zionism and can be viewed as an expression of the connection to the homeland. The Jerusalem Hills also constitute a nice view for the residents in the mentioned communities. The area has been referred to as the only larger green area left in the vicinity of Jerusalem and as the green lungs of the city.

This has been the country’s cultural heart from the start of Israelite settlement in the days of the Twelve Tribes through the First and Second Temple periods and the events in the national memory of the Jewish People down the ages. (Jewish National Fund, Position paper, 2007)

The valleys and hills in the area are connected to texts in the Hebrew Bible and contain traces of old agricultural communities, remnants of crusader churches, and valuable springs. This historical connection is reoccurring in the “Safdie Plan” and the planning vision was to preserve the open space as much as possible. The idea of preserving open space is well in line with the open-space policy of NOP 35 and Local Outline Scheme 2000 and particularly the commemorative narrative of the pastoral and picturesque image of Jerusalem. These buzzwords lead us to the concept of Green Zionism based on a religious and cultural mission to preserve the biology and ecology of Israel. Building housing units in a forest area such as the Jerusalem Hills breached the Zionist image of the historic landscape. Both oppo-
ponents and advocates of the plan claim to have the most suitable solution for the preservation of the area as a unique historic, cultural, and environmental location. The opponents argue, from a sustainability point of view, that the best solution is to refrain from building in this area.

They are an ecological asset that needs to be looked after for whoever is living there, so there is really a long-term issue of sustainability. It is the central aquifer and the ecological corridor that goes from the Anatolia right down through Israel. There is more at stake than just a bit of real estate. (Interview Naomi Tsur, 2007)

The opinion of the opponents can thus be connected to Green Zionism, which focuses on protecting the environment and ecology of the homeland. This is not a theoretically developed concept but the definition stated in chapter 6, is certainly applicable here. The advocates, on the other hand, claim that the area is bound to be developed sooner or later. In their view it is crucial that the area is developed in a responsible way, with plans connected to each other based on a comprehensive goal. It is vital that the plans include conditions for the best possible urban design and that they at the same time take precautions not to harm nature in an unnecessary way. In a clarification sent to the Ha’aretz newspaper regarding an article published in 2004 (Berman, July 23), the Safdie planners argue that,

Prior to the plan all these areas were subject to land speculations by various bodies that claimed to have an interest in them and in fact submitted building plans for them. The so called “Safdie” plan annulled these plans as they proposed building in historic valleys and mounts in a suburban fashion. […] We see the West Jerusalem plan as adopted and put forth by the authorities as an achievement in controlled open space planning and controlled urbanization. (Statement by the Safdie planners, 2004)

Thus, both sides claimed to be the best guardian of the identity of the area in question in the southwest expansion of the Jerusalem borders, and both sides spoke of the importance of the area for local recreation and for the environment. In any case, the area itself is closely connected to commemorative narratives about the ancient connection to the land. It is also related to one of the prominent policies in Jerusalem – to reconstruct ancestral connections and to rehabilitate heritage. This focus on heritage and ancestry is related to a traditional and new Zionist view of the land from both a national and religious perspective.
8.2.3 A plan to maintain the demographic balance

There are also other indicators of the plan’s importance for national and local identity. There was never any question that the new dwelling units in West Jerusalem were intended for the Jewish population of Jerusalem, and a particular socio-economic group of Jews. The national authorities that had requested the plan were very clear about specifying that the main goal was to develop affordable housing for the middle-class, preferably the secular well-educated middle-class. The main reason for having this target group was to attempt to create a better demographic balance between different groups in Jerusalem and particularly to have more tax-paying citizens within its borders. The micro-discourse of demographic balance is based on ethnicity but also on socio-economy. It has been made clear that those who leave Jerusalem are younger people (see for instance Kimhi, Choshen, & Assaf-Shapira, 2006) who see Jerusalem as a poor, depressing, and peripheral city.

The negative migration trend of Jerusalem is worrisome for the authorities for many reasons. In 2009, 19,700 people settled in the Jerusalem district but 25,200 chose to leave. The central district, including cities such as Petah Tiqwa, shows a positive migration balance and seems to have received many of the migrants. This is not a new trend, but a continuing problem for the authorities, and the people living in the central district of Israel, together with the Tel Aviv district, generally have higher wages and a higher standard of living than those in Jerusalem (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical abstract, 2010). This brings less tax revenues to the Jerusalem municipality and strengthens the image of Jerusalem as a poor, peripheral, political, and religious city, which is not a help when trying to attract the “right kind of people” to the city. In order to construct Jerusalem as a capital city with a chance of economic growth based on demography, the “Safdie Plan” was a necessary addition to the urban fabric.

Bringing more Jews to Jerusalem is also important from a political point of view, with an eye both towards the geopolitical conflict with the Palestinians, the threat of demographic imbalance, and towards the growing number of ultra-orthodox Jews in Jerusalem. The “Safdie Plan” was an important component in trying to create more opportunities for secular or less orthodox Jews to live in Jerusalem. Amos Unger, who was highly involved in the development of the Safdie plan says that:

If we want to keep the nature of the city, which is built on the different communities, Arabs, Jews, Christians, Muslims [...], not to have one group dominate the others, whether it is the Arabs dominating the city or orthodox Jews [...]. If we want to keep the city, with the different communities on more or less the proportions that we have today Jerusalem must grow.
and we have to, yes, it is not a nice word, but we have to control somehow the development and the growth of the city according to different sectors. And that is why we have initiated the “Safdie Plan” – the West Jerusalem plan. (Interview Amos Unger, 2009)

Not only the supporters and designers of the plan argue that the demography of Jerusalem is crucial. Also the manager of the anti-Safdie campaign, Yael Eliashar from the Jerusalem branch of the Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel (SPNI), argues that demography has to be a central aspect in all Jerusalem planning.

... we have learned that in order to preserve the Jerusalem Hills, planning in Jerusalem is so critical. If people in Jerusalem continue to feel that Jerusalem is not good, is dark, is not happy, is impossible to live in, they are going to leave Jerusalem. Either to Tel Aviv or Modi’in or the suburbs, and this is the thing we have to prevent and we have to influence the planning system in Jerusalem... (Interview Yael Eliashar, 2009)

8.2.4 Strengthening the capital city economy

The Safdie plan had to relate to a number of projects in initial or advanced stages of completion and when constructing a completely new neighborhood there are naturally economic interests, since housing projects in Jerusalem today are not public housing but private. One of these projects was the western ring-road. The ring-road was part of an infrastructural program to build both a western and an eastern ring-road (Interview Moshe Cohen, 2007; Interview Naomi Tsur, 2007). The proposed ring-road in the west can be seen on the left map of the Safdie plan shown above. The Safdie planners suggested that the ring-road should be brought from the valleys to and through the ridges in a very advanced structure that would facilitate further densification of the city in the future instead of destroying the precious valleys. Building a ring-road is an important part of making Jerusalem into a metropolitan city (Interview Miron Cohen, 2009). It is also connected to planning and constructing the modern capital, thus claiming the city through infrastructure and physical alterations. On the other hand to claim the western part of the city is not very controversial in a geopolitical perspective. The use of the map above is intended to illustrate where in Jerusalem the project was to take place and not to identify the sites in detail.

Naomi Tsur, who at that time was the head of the Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel (SPNI) and later co-founded the coalition Sustainable Jerusalem, which came to be a central coalition in the campaign against the plan, argues that there was no proof that the western ring-road was at all necessary at this point in the planning of Jerusalem. According to
The ring-road project was argued on the basis of three motives and interests: first, the municipality wanted to attract governmental investments; second, private entrepreneurs saw the ring-roads as profitable projects; and third, the authorities supporting the project argued that the new neighborhoods in West Jerusalem required a ring-road. Both the eastern and the western ring-roads could contribute to Jerusalem sprawling out instead of being densified from within. If you do not need the neighborhoods to the west, there is no reason to build the ring-road. Tsur argued that,

...we are back to urban conspiracy theories, which unfortunately in the real estate world do exist, and have been invented to justify a ring-road, which is where the real money was. (Interview Naomi Tsur, 2007)

On top of that, Tsur also points to the fact that building these kinds of orbital roads has geopolitical implications. “You can’t have a real ring-road in Jerusalem because we are an end-of-the-road city. [...] It is not on the way to somewhere as far as Israel is concerned, it is right at the edge which is another thing that makes it sensitive geo-politically”. (Interview Naomi Tsur, 2007). There were many actors interested in developing the “Safdie Plan”, because without it many other plans would fall. Both Cohen from the Safdie planners and Tsur claim that their way of approaching the issue of ring-roads would facilitate densification and a proper development of all neighborhoods in Jerusalem. The Eastern ring-road, which was a main feature of the early versions of the Local Outline Scheme 2000, has been criticized for being geopolitically motivated and effectively cutting off the Palestinians from any natural growth (Interview Efrat Bar-Cohen, 2007). This is refuted by Moshe Cohen who argues that there were no other options. It is easy to criticize, but difficult to come up with alternatives (Interview Moshe Cohen, 2007).

The initial phase of the “Safdie Plan” process and the request from the authorities show that the plan was seen as an important part of a continued construction of the capital towards what the proponents see as a more economically sustainable metropolitan area. The discussion regarding the plan reveals that it is not only linked to a national identity and planning discourse but also to global economic interests and local identity.

Did the first phase of this policy process give us any clues about the impact of identity politics? The planning process was not surrounded by any greater debate during the first phase. There is no question that the importance of the area for local and national identity certainly had an effect on the design of the plan and on how the housing units would be built to reflect that importance. The promoters of the plan were government authori-
ties with the support of the municipality, and the main purpose was thus to strengthen Jerusalem economically and demographically. Arguments about preserving the open space and the ancestral heritage had to give way to the development of housing intended for a certain population group. Here different planning policies clashed. It was not only a question of new Zionism and post-Zionism challenging traditional Zionism, but also new planning actors challenging the “establishment”.

8.3 Fifteen years of political struggles
In 2000, after a long period of developing master plans, skeleton plans, and detailed plans for the area, the Safdie planners submitted Regional plan 37/1 to the District Planning Commission. Since this was a regional plan involving the municipal borders of Jerusalem and other elements affecting regional and national planning, the plan had to go through the District Planning Commission and the National Planning Board, as well as be scrutinized by a number of other committees, ministries, institutes, and organizations. Since the planning system has these steps, everyone knew that the process would be lengthy, but few guessed that it would take another seven years until the final verdict. During those years the context changed. First of all, the environment had gained ground as a political issue among politicians as well as the public, and environmental movement had grown in strength. The second trend was and is a growing demand for institutional reform, which concerns the structure of the current planning system and also the need for a mechanism to involve the citizens in planning issues. A third development is the constantly changing geopolitical situation. In the early 1990s, when the peace negotiations were at their peak, it was politically correct and perhaps the only option to build in the west. In the recent years the political winds in Israel have blown more to the right, which has had an impact on where it is possible to build.

8.3.1 The mobilization of the green movement
In other planning processes, the most vocal criticism against the construction of the planning system and the consequences of specific plans has mainly come from organizations working with planning rights or anti-discrimination, such as BIMKOM, ICAHD, or Ir Amim. The opposition towards the Safdie Plan was differently composed in many respects. The idea to build to the west was, on the one hand, criticized by new Zionists, who argued that Jerusalem should grow to the east for geopolitical reasons. On the other hand, the criticism of the plan was incorporated into the overall agenda and campaigns of the growing environmental movement in Israel and Jerusalem. From an urban point of view and connected to
everyday-life issues, it was obviously easier to gather public opposition to this kind of plan than to plans involving areas in the eastern part of the city.

There are a number of ways to interpret the support of and opposition to the plan. It has both a left-right aspect and a more issue-based side. The plan was first and foremost promoted by the Israeli government, through the Ministry of the Interior, and the Jerusalem Development Authority, and came to be associated with specific politicians and planners. In the previous chapter we concluded that many of the planning initiatives in Jerusalem depend on individual interest and on the drive of specific persons. It is not possible to conclude that certain authorities are always the main initiators. It shifts depending on the individual and his/her network of contacts. Former Mayor Uri Lupolianski and former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, together with the Minister of the Interior Meir Shetrit, were keen supporters of the plan. They were joined by the City Engineer Uri Shetrit, as well as the Jerusalem Development Authority. Leading planning researchers, such as Arie Shachar, supported the plan. A majority of the planners, architects, politicians, and other interested parties interviewed for this study, were supporters of the plan. This large group of people was also backed by a number of real-estate and construction companies (read more about supporters and opposition in Gibson-Prince, Jerusalem Post, June 25, 2006). The plan was thus supported by a quite substantial group of influential actors, a group that Naomi Tsur of the SPNI calls “the establishment” (Interview Naomi Tsur, 2007).

The opposition to the plan grew stronger around 2003 when the first decisions regarding the plan were on the agenda. In March 2003, the District Planning Commission and the National Planning Board decided to postpone the decision regarding the plan until the summer of 2004. The plan also went through other committees such as the Committee on Agricultural Land and Open Spaces which decided to approve the plan with certain conditions (Israel Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2008). The central actors in the campaign against the plan were various environmental organizations and coalitions. There was the SPNI Jerusalem, which became the hub of the opposition and hosted the coordination for the campaign. The SPNI had been working with this issue since the later part of the 1990s and in 1998, Naomi Tsur of the SPNI Jerusalem, together with Professor Shlomo Hasson, chairman of the forum for the Future of Jerusalem, and around 40 other organizations, created the coalition Sustainable Jerusalem. The coalition presented its own planning vision for Jerusalem with concrete suggestions of how sustainability can be brought into all kinds of
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Inspired by Sabatier’s vocabulary, Sustainable Jerusalem is an advocacy coalition working towards certain common goals over time, and the environmental issue is becoming more and more important in Israeli politics. It is too early to say whether the coalition will remain a powerful actor in the Jerusalem civil society, but it is in a very interesting phase of presenting its own strategic plans, as will be further discussed below. In 2002, 20 of the organizations in this coalition created the Coalition for the Preservation of the Jerusalem Hills and according to one of the descriptions of the purpose of the coalition, its work “…involves disseminating information regarding potentially damaging development plans in the area being promoted by local planning institutions, while simultaneously formulating and advancing alternate proposals to these projects.” (The Green Environment fund website, www.gef.org.il).

According to Yael Eliashar, an associate at the SPNI Jerusalem, and the campaign manager of the anti-Safdie campaign, the campaign accelerated after the decisions in the planning committees in 2003. It concentrated on a number of measures, one of which was to gather objections to the plan, and on July 25, 2004, 16,000 objections were presented to the National Planning Committee. They were gathered in all kinds of places, on the hiking trails, in nearby neighborhoods, and at demonstrations. Also important were the lobbying efforts directed towards the public, politicians, media, and all other actors that could possibly be interested in this issue, particularly from an environmental point of view (Interview Yael Eliashar, 2009). The coalition had people lobbying in the Knesset and the campaign ultimately came to be supported by a majority of the Knesset members (Interview Naomi Tsur, 2007). The most outspoken MKs opposing the plan were; Dov Chenin, Michael Melchior, Colette Avital, Omri Sharon, and Yuri Stern. This was a very diverse group of opponents, who normally do not share the same political visions. What brought them together in this case? It was everything from environmental concerns to a fear of abandoning the city center.

Thus, all kinds of actors from the right-wing to the left-wing came out in opposition to the plan as well as supporting the plan, but one disturbing issue still lingers. Is the protest only about the environment, or can it be connected with the status of the neighboring areas? Mevasseret Zion is a suburb of Jerusalem and borders on the area of the plan, and many of the objections to the plan came from citizens and organizations in this and nearby areas. Is it possible that they were also objecting because the new plan would ruin their view and that having low- and middle income resi-
dents living so close would reduce the property values in their neighborhood?

Mevasseret Zion, it is a nice neighborhood surrounded by hills. They don’t want the people to live by there, so I can understand them, but don’t justify them, I understand them, because everyone wants to preserve his convenience, have a good life and are not willing to share it with other people. With poor people, with young people. [...] The people of Mevasseret Zion, from their selfish interest, they were afraid that the price of their houses will go down... (Interview Amos Unger, 2009)

This part of the opposition can be an instance of a phenomenon apparent in many planning issues, with many people agreeing, on the overall policy goal but not on the way of getting there. This reluctance to have a development project in your own direct vicinity is commonly referred to as NIMBY – Not In My Backyard (Davy, 1997).

8.3.2 Why sprawl when you can densify?
A crucial part of the anti-Safdie campaign was to present an alternative view of Jerusalem’s housing unit capacity inside the old municipal boundaries and particularly in the city center. Former head of the policy department in the Jerusalem municipality, Uri Barshishat volunteered to work with the SPNI and the green coalitions on such a report. The Jerusalem Development Authority and the other promoters claimed that the Safdie plan was needed because there was not enough space to develop housing inside the city in order to attract people and make them stay in Jerusalem. Naomi Tsur and Uri Barshishat were puzzled by this statement and claim that only a few years earlier, government authorities had stated that there was room for an additional 80,000 housing units within the municipal borders (Interview Uri Barshishat, 2009; Interview Naomi Tsur, 2007). Where had this space gone?

Barshishat and his planning team produced a number of reports focusing on available land on which to build in Jerusalem, and they were questioned and criticized by various actors. It was important for the team to work in a transparent way but at the same time to be very careful with the figures before going public. As a former municipal planner, Barshishat also had the opportunity to use his network to get information on the figures from the opposing camp. “I got pressure all the time from the SPNI and from Sustainable Jerusalem, publish it, publish it and I said no. I will publish only when I finish it and be sure that I am right”. (Interview Uri Barshishat, 2009). As their final conclusion, the team claimed that it was possible to build 58,000 housing units within the city by 2020, and that
these plots could be found all over Jerusalem. Together with building more floors on certain buildings, this would meet the housing needs for a long period (Interview Uri Barshishat, 2009). If it is possible to build closer to the city center, it is unnecessary to sprawl into the outskirts. This became the core argument of the opposition from a planning point of view, but for some also from a geopolitical point of view. Protecting the green Jerusalem Hills was a core argument in attracting support from mainly the public and other actors who were normally not that involved in planning issues.

The reports from the Barshishat team were contested by the promoters of the plan, mainly the JDA, but also by individual planners involved in the project, who came up with much lower densification figures. The supporters of the plan accused the opponents of presenting unrealistic projects and figures, such as by including areas that were slated for parks, or private land where the cooperation of the owners was not certain.

I would say it simple and loud, they misled the public. They gave mistaken facts. They were calculating imaginary projects which everybody knows cannot be implemented. So it is science fiction. So it is fiction. [...] Anybody who is professional, even beginner, could have seen that it is based on false information. …let’s say this site can have 500 units but I see that this is the land owned by the church and the church has other plans and they are not willing to give to them. (Interview Amos Unger, 2009)

According to Barshishat, the arguments to densify the city from within do not necessarily come from a green perspective but rather from an urban development approach. “I am not doing it from a green point of view. I am afraid for Jerusalem development. If you build inside Jerusalem […] let’s say for the light rail, if you do not add density it is not going to work economically”. (Interview Uri Barshishat, 2009). On the other hand, the supporters of the plan argue that Jerusalem needs both densification and larger development projects at the same time. There is no contradiction in this (Interview Miron Cohen, 2009).

When the campaign against the plan managed to gather the support of a large number of MKs such as Colette Avital, who at that time was also chairperson of the Jerusalem lobby (an organization within the Knesset) and who called the plan a disaster for Jerusalem, the promoters of the plan, above all the mayor and the municipality, found themselves in a tricky PR-situation. On top of that, the arguments of the campaign leaders became more and more convincing to the public and to the National Planning Board. Basically, both camps wanted to develop the city, and both saw the demographic problems that the city was facing, but they presented very different methods of getting there. Planners on both sides were both mobi-
izers and advocates. In the end, the project became infested with prestige and bad publicity for the supporters and a great deal of positive was attention directed towards the opponents. Planning committees that were not used to public pressure of this magnitude were taken by surprise and the opponents saw the opposition not only as a campaign against the plan itself but also against “the establishment”.

So who is right and who is wrong and if it’s a small group of NGOs that have no political clout taking on the establishment, you might think that the odds are against us and they were. The odds were against us and I think it is one of the most fascinating cases, looked at in 20 years time, people look back on what happened here and see how it created a turning point in the way civil groups run their business and deal with the establishment. It sort of took us a step higher in the way we were perceived, in the way we perceive ourselves and in the way the whole system runs itself from the point of view of public participation. (Interview Naomi Tsur, 2007)

The question is whether the environmental coalitions somewhat forgot their core issues and locked themselves into the possibility of “defeating the establishment”. Was it really for the sake of the environment, or did the Jerusalem environmental movement sell a piece of its soul?

8.3.3 The political turn and the victory of advocacy planning

The massive number of objections to the plan pressured the National Planning Board to appoint an independent investigator to look into the detailed information in the objections from the Coalition for the Preservation of the Jerusalem Hills. Tomer Gothelf presented his report in the fall 2005, but before that there was a hearing which included both the opponents and the promoters of the plan. Gothelf concluded that it was possible to build around 45,000 housing units inside the Jerusalem borders by 2020. Within both camps, Gothelf got credit for his report, but both sides claimed that there had been a lot of pressure from the other side. Now the National Planning Board had received an independent report claiming that it was possible to build more units closer to the city center than estimated by the promoters of the plan, particularly the JDA, but its meeting in December 2005 did not result in a decision. A final decision was instead scheduled to be made in October 2006, and during this interval the campaign against the plan continued to lobby for its cause. The national committee again postponed its decision due to differences in the estimates of available land for development in Jerusalem (see for instance Israeli Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2008 for time-frame).

Due to the success of the campaign and the postponement of the decision, Mayor Uri Lupolianski declared that the city was withdrawing its
support for the plan. This move was one of the most crucial events during the process, if not the most important. The JDA still supported the plan, together with a number of key municipal employees, but without the support of the mayor it would be almost impossible to implement such a plan.

So we got objections to the plan from every kind of, a lot of politicians that didn’t want to expand to the west to the expense of the east. Environmentalists and people that really live in West Jerusalem, in Mevasseret Zion that were neighbors. So we got amazing things and then eventually it was one of the first real public well-organized campaigns. It was a well-organized campaign against the plan and eventually the city pulled the plug and said we are not going to fight this. The minute the city said that you know forget it, the plan was basically abandoned and that’s what happened. (Interview Miron Cohen, 2009)

There are of course many reasons why promoters of the plan changed their minds. There were those who heard the arguments rather late in the process or were not convinced by them until the final hour. There is also a clear political motive for actively opposing the plan and changing one’s mind. For the first time, the public became a decisive component in a planning process and the politicians had to consider the demands of the potential voters. Colette Avital said to the Jerusalem Post in June 2006, “It is clear that the public opposes this plan, and we must make sure that the public’s voice is heard”. (Gibson-Prince, Jerusalem Post, June 14, 2006).

Ahead of the decision of the National Planning Board in the fall of 2006 to postpone the decision and the final verdict in February 2007, the campaign reached its peak, which also meant quite a lot of public disputes. The man behind the plan, Moshe Safdie, had held a low profile during the first phase of the campaign, but he came to be very critical of both the public hearings and the environmental movement. In an interview Safdie said,

I decided not to get involved in the decision-making process, that I would not defend the plan or respond to the attacks on it. The attacks and public discourse contain several relevant points, but also some demagoguery. I felt there was a lot of unfairness in the public hearing. [...] I said I was willing to accept the job on three conditions: that all the previous plans be canceled, that I would determine the nature of the plan and the density rate, and that I would work with all the relevant green organizations. And I really did work with them. I had dozens of meetings and site tours with them. And only after they agreed did we submit the plan. Afterward they changed their minds, and demagoguery is rampant. (Moshe Safdie in Zandberg, Ha’aretz, October 14, 2006)

The campaign against the “Safdie Plan” displays a number of unique features. First of all it managed to mobilize the public in support of environ-
mental issues, against destroying an expensive view and against the decline of the old city center; and second it led to the creation of unexpected coalitions between actors, from left to right, who do not normally cooperate. Third, the campaign was a success for advocacy planning, in this case advocating for the environmental movement. The planners were both advocates, mobilizers, and when presenting figures, they were also regarded as experts. Non-governmental planners were successful in presenting plans and ideas that gathered the support of a large number of actors from all sectors of the Jerusalem society. Fourth, the campaign was a challenge against mainly the national and municipal actors who had long dictated the city planning. This was a challenge towards mainly secular traditional Zionists and leading planning actors. The environmental movement gathered support from both the left and right on the political scale which strengthened the cause. There were left-wing groups protesting how “the establishment” tried to push through a plan for economic gains at the expense of the citizens. There were groups belonging to the new Zionist camp who opposed the plan because it diverted attention from development in the eastern part of Jerusalem and moreover focused mainly on the secular middle-class which is not the target group of new Zionism. This group of Jews is even considered unwelcome and is regarded by some as “the other”. Economic and acute demographic concerns stood against nationalist and religious views on where to build and who to build for.

8.4 “An atom bomb in the Israeli planning system” – Challenging hegemony?

The rejection of the “Safdie Plan” on February 6, 2007 by the National Planning Board with a vote of 24 to 3, shocked the planners, urban designers, and architects who supported the plan, but the decision also came as a surprise to many opponents. Was it really possible that the relatively young environmental movement in Jerusalem had defeated the “establishment” and significant economic interests? The campaign against the plan is an example of how a protest movement gains both political and public support against the actors that are identified as “the establishment”. This is described as unique in the planning history of Jerusalem but also in another sense. Naomi Tsur describes the victory as “an atom bomb in the planning system” and the fact that is was a campaign run mainly by women made the explosion resound all the louder. The JDA and the government

…lost the fight to a lot of stupid green people led mainly by women. No one had ever thought that a group of yuppie green people who really don’t
know what is what and have no understanding of the system or what the city needs or what is good for our future and they are probably left-wing anti-patriots... (Interview Naomi Tsur, 2007)

In a society where women still are fighting for political representation, this is quite an accomplishment. In any case, the rejection of the “Safdie Plan” led to a growing interest in the environmental movement. It was a success of Green Zionism – to protect the environment and the ecology of Israel. Green Zionism is not automatically connected to the right or to the left, although one organization adhering to the concept has clear religious connotations (Green Zionist Alliance, www.greenzionism.org). In the aftermath there were speculations about the right-wing inclination of the leading figures in the opposition, particularly after the appointment of Naomi Tsur as deputy mayor after the local elections in 2008.

8.4.1 Experts versus experts

“They blocked a plan that could give welfare and opportunity and help to 20 000 families...” (Interview Amos Unger, 2009). The urban designers behind the “Safdie Plan” maintained that Jerusalem had lost an important contribution to its development. The project was unique in that sense that it would have provided housing for a target group that is now leaving Jerusalem in large numbers. The plan was closely linked with the secular Zionist elite. The risk of concentrating on building more densely and closer to the city center is that the prices will be too high for this category of residents. The opponents of the plan recognize that it will cause problems if the development process inside the city is too slow. Uri Barshishat and his team have been working intensively since 2007 with proposing detailed plans based on their earlier report on land reserves. This means that advocacy planning seems to be a way of bypassing the bureaucratic problems of Jerusalem planning. The question is whether these plans are scrutinized more closely and more critically when they do not come from the planning “establishment”. According to Barshishat, the rejection of the plan has led to a broader view of planning, even though he believes that the municipality should be the driving force in developing plans for each neighborhood and not the NGOs (Interview Uri Barshishat, 2009).

The environmental movements and the coalition gained a great deal of recognition for their work and have achieved what Naomi Tsur calls civil credibility. The problem, according to Tsur, is that the plans that they are presenting are being thwarted by...

... powerful forces within the establishment who are so annoyed with this outcome that they were going to block any inner city development so as to
prove after another year or two that we were wrong. They are so eaten up with having their plans foiled that they will do almost anything. I don’t know how far they will go. (Interview Naomi Tsur, 2007)

One question that modernist planners are asking is whether some particularly important decisions can be left to the public to decide. Participatory, deliberative, or democratic planning (Forester, 1993; Healey, 1996) has not been a significant part of the Israeli planning system, mainly due to the legal construction of the decision-making process. The law states that the citizens have the right to object to a plan after it has been submitted, but it says nothing about involvement during the process leading to that point and in the preparation (Planning and Building law, 1965). Miron Cohen argues that it could be difficult for the public to fully grasp the long-term effects of a certain decision. A professional planner or someone with insight into the planning system may think in a broader perspective, connecting various planning practices. In Cohen’s view there were many opponents to the plan who knew the risks of cancelling it, but did not speak openly about it.

It is up to the public to decide what is more important but you can’t say that let’s solve the problems, we will make the city poorer and at the same time more expensive to live in, which is what happens to cities that can’t grow. Nobody had the guts to say that we want to keep the hills green, but we know what the price will be. What they said was that we are going to keep the hills green and solve the problems by densifying the whole city center and as a result there is no, in my opinion, there is no real housing solution right now in Jerusalem... (Interview Miron Cohen, 2009)

In this view, there was a risk that the public was uninformed about the details of the plan and of the planning needs, but their massive protest nonetheless led to a situation where politicians and planners were afraid to lose the support of the public and thus rejected the plan. On the other hand the protracted nature of the process and the campaign against the plan resulted in the public actually becoming very well informed about the project, and it is totally misleading to speak of an ignorant public (Interview Yael Eliashar, 2009).

What are the lessons in this case regarding public participation? Do we embrace participation early on in the process at the risk of losing some of the efficiency, or is it better to create a more technocratic system, particularly when it comes to planning, with professionals as the dominating actors? The previous chapter concluded that planners and others working with planning issues in Jerusalem highlight the importance of professionalism in an extremely sensitive political situation, and if politicians and the
public have too much influence on planning there is a risk that they will support decisions that are “too political”.

So too much involvement of the citizens, too much debate and debate and questions and answers and objections and committees and appealing to court and things, so you have to find a balance. […] …but on the other hand you have to make sure that you can be efficient. It is not working, deficiency. So I am for the involvement of citizens up to a certain point because otherwise there is no limit. It is not nice to say but this is the truth, the professional truth as I see it. (Interview Amos Unger, 2009)

Some of the proponents of the plan thus describe the rejection as more or less catastrophic for the development of Jerusalem. Many prominent planners have expressed their disappointment, such as former district planner Binat Schwarz who calls the plan “One of the most important plans for Jerusalem. If the mayor had not objected to the plan, it would have been approved”. (Interview Binat Schwartz, 2007). According to Moshe Cohen, the “Safdie Plan” was originally included into the Local Outline Scheme 2000 and Cohen states that, “…West Jerusalem or the western neighborhoods in the “Safdie Plan” are very important, if not now, if not in the next five or ten years, but in 15 or 20 years it is very important for Jerusalem.” (Interview Moshe Cohen, 2007). Although Cohen expresses the urgency regarding housing needs, the most devastating effect of the rejection in his view is its effect on industrial and commercial development.

8.4.2 Alternative options for Jerusalem development

So in what direction does the rejection of the plan lead Jerusalem concerning identity politics? The rejection of the plan is related to the city from an internal Israeli perspective as it was located in West Jerusalem, but it could also be connected to the geopolitical conflict. Jerusalem still needs housing units, new commercial, as well as industrial sites, to make Jerusalem the attractive, cosmopolitan city that municipality and the current Israeli government want to attain. If maintaining a demographic balance is a major policy goal for anyone working with issues related to Jerusalem, what are the planning strategies to achieve that goal?

After his withdrawal from the Safdie project, former Mayor Uri Lupolianski was keen to support other plans inside Jerusalem. One example was the expansion of the Ramot neighbourhood, which was a part of the whole West Jerusalem development project. Due to objections from the public, that plan was also withdrawn (Rinat, Ha’aretz, September 5, 2008). Analyzing the interviews in this study and various other statements by planning actors, we find four major options for developing Jerusalem. First, the
campaign against the “Safdie Plan” was based on the issue of densification, and this is now the main option. Densification can be seen as a way to strengthen the city center, from a tourist and a demographic perspective, but also from a geopolitical point of view, because strengthening the city center is a way to reinforce the control of Jerusalem as a whole. The densification process will inevitably lead to more high-rises and adding floors to existing buildings, and in a world heritage city this is a rather sensitive issue.

The second strategy is to continue to build in the outskirts of existing neighborhoods, but this strategy has encountered problems because the residents of some neighborhoods do not want new neighbors, just as in the case of the Safdie plan, or because the new development destroys green areas.

A third option which in a sense is related to densification but deserves attention in its own right, and that is urban renewal and renovation of old neighborhoods. This is both related to densification and to Jerusalem as a world heritage site. A planner has to be innovative to meet the calls for both additional housing units and preserving Jerusalem’s historic appearance.

The fourth strategy is to build completely new neighborhoods, which is tricky as there are few large land areas left to develop, hence the rationale to develop areas in West Jerusalem. The remaining option is therefore to build new neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, but that will probably lead to the expropriation of private Palestinian land, or at least disputed land, and cause planning strategies to become entangled with the geopolitical conflict. The city and the leading municipal planners have until now not promoted such an idea, but Mayor Barkat has indicated that he is ready to support such plans (Lis, Ha’aretz, October 26, 2008).

8.4.3 Developing E1– The rejection and new Zionism

One such option of building a completely new neighbourhood and that has been on the table for many years, is developing the so called E1 area (East 1), located roughly between Ma’aleh Adumim, and the Palestinian villages of Anata and Izzariya. It is located just outside the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem and inside the boundaries of Ma’aleh Adumim.
This area would become part of Jerusalem if the vision of making Jerusalem into a large metropolitan capital (Greater Jerusalem) were to come true. A plan to develop the area was approved by the municipality of Ma’aleh Adumim in 2005 but has been halted due to heavy international criticism. The area comprises approximately 12,000 square meters and would include around 3,500 housing units. The area is for some actors crucial for connecting Ma’aleh Adumim with Jerusalem in order to create a Jewish contiguity. The rejection of the “Safdie Plan” immediately brought the EI plan on to the agenda again and the possibility to develop new areas to the East. According to Nadav Shragai, the plan to develop the area both for housing units and as a nature reserve is supported by politicians from all corners of the political spectrum.

An almost total consensus prevails in Israel regarding the need to connect Maale Adumim to Jerusalem via construction in E-1. Yet, aside from building the police headquarters of the Judea and Samaria District in the area, no further construction has occurred due to American opposition. (Nadav Shragai, 2009)
The criticism against developing this area has been severe, particularly from the USA, and is mainly motivated by geopolitical concerns. The disapproval concentrates around the issue of Palestinian contiguity and that the E1 project would cut off the northern West Bank from the southern part (Interview Amos Gil, 2007). Even though there are additional plans to create a new high-way for the Palestinians east of Ma’aleh Adumim which thus refutes the argument that the development plans would cut the West Bank in two, the plan would mean a final Israeli territorial victory over the Palestinian aspiration to make East Jerusalem its future capital. If this was a covert goal some years ago, it is today no secret within Israeli society or in its image outwards that right-wing elements are creating new facts on the ground in order to keep Jerusalem united as the capital of Israel.

The “Safdie Plan” and its fate can be interpreted in the light of identity politics. Supporters of the plan could uphold a more post-Zionist view of not building in the east and building in the “right” part of the city. The plan may also be supported a secular but right-wing view as the plan strengthens the Jewish population in Jerusalem, thus maintaining the demographic balance. The opposition was accused of following the right-wing plan to build in the east instead of in the west, but on the other hand, the environmental movement in Israel is sometimes regarded as consisting of left-wing radicals, as it focuses more on “softer” values than on developing projects for economic gain. One of the leaders of the campaign interpreted it as follows: “It was the left-wing political camp that fought the “Safdie Plan”, for ecological reasons and it was the right-wing camp that promoted the “Safdie Plan” to strengthen the Jewish population of Jerusalem”. (Interview Naomi Tsur, 2007).

Even though well-known planners such as Moshe Cohen say that building to the east or creating Greater Jerusalem are old slogans and the only direction to build is towards the west (Interview Moshe Cohen, 2007), due to the right-wing political climate in Israel today the issue of building to the east and in East Jerusalem is back on the table. The replies from both Prime Minister Netanyahu and Mayor Barkat regarding the pressure from the US President Obama to freeze all construction projects related to occupied territory, show a strategy to focus on developing all parts of Jerusalem and to keep Jerusalem an open city under Israeli sovereignty. “Legally, Jerusalem is a sovereign city in Israel and the sovereignty is not going to change. We will resist any attempt to try to divide Jerusalem. It is not practical to divide a city”. (Nir Barkat in Solomont, Jerusalem Post, July 23, 2009).
8.4.4 Back on the table?

“We know what Ehud Olmert thinks. Where he is, he will try to do it again”. (Interview Yael Eliashar, 2009). The planning actors consulted for this dissertation all believe that the main promoters of the plan want to bring it back onto the agenda. According to Guy Kav Venaki, a plan can be brought back after five years but only after considerable revisions (Interview Guy Kav Venaki, 2007). One reason for bringing it back would be that it is still more geopolitically correct, at least in the eyes of the international community, to build to the west. Another opportunity to bring it back may arise if plans for densifying the city and the city center should fail. They could fail if the calculations regarding land reserves are severely mistaken or if the planning system continues to push through plans at a slow pace. The question is whether there are any deliberate attempts to make sure that the alternative plans fail as claimed by one of the leader of the anti-Safdie campaign. “The establishment will not prepare these plans because they are so sure that is the way to bring the “Safdie Plan”, back to make sure that nothing else works, so now we have an equally serious issue on our hands not to lose what we have gained…”. (Interview Naomi Tsur, 2007). The environmental movements are not the only ones to feel that their plans are delayed, criticized, and rejected. Similar problems are faced by other NGO:s trying to perform advocacy planning, such as BIMKOM.

Another reason for bringing back the plan would be a changing geopolitical situation. If Jerusalem were to be divided into two capitals with two areas of jurisdiction, the view of land reserves would be quite different. Miron Cohen from the Safdie planners says,

> It is possible to bring it back. In this city, things can change and if tomorrow morning the city will be divided again this thing will immediately come back. If there is another huge immigration wave or if the West Bank will be given back, we need to accommodate hundreds of thousands of people, these things might come back. (Interview Miron Cohen, 2009)

According to an article in the newspaper Ha’aretz, the Prime Minister’s office sent a letter to city engineer Shlomo Eshkol in July 2008, asking him to “...do everything possible to promote a construction plan for West Jerusalem...” (Rinat, Ha’aretz, July 14, 2008). The question is whether it really is possible to bring back the plan in any form, despite there obviously still being support for developing to the west, at least in combination with developing other parts of Jerusalem as well. In any case the massive protests opened a window for the public onto the planning process, and attracted the attention of the media who realized that planning is political and thus an area of power struggles between different interests.
8.5 Conclusion – Challenging hegemony

The rejection of the “Safdie Plan” brought a number of issues to the fore. The plan itself was a challenge to the growing influence of right-wing opinions in Israeli society. Its focus was to develop the “wrong side” of Jerusalem from a new Zionist perspective. Trying to develop a green area became a challenge towards Green Zionism and the role of the historic and cultural landscape. The rejection itself challenged the planning hegemony and the planning doctrine as other identity discourses managed to challenge the hegemonic national discourse. The rejection and the ensuing debate connected the proponents of the plan dubious investors, political decision made on the basis of economic profit, and old-fashioned leadership well anchored in traditional Zionism. The opponents of the plan came across as representing the people, and a more modern political perspective. The “Safdie Plan” process in its entirety illustrates the constant shifts in Israeli identity politics, political alliances, and power relations, as well as illustrating the contradictions political choices. This concluding discussion focuses on three issues: the challenge to planning hegemony, the interplay between identity politics and this particular planning project, and the role of the bureaucratic planning process.

8.5.1 Challenging traditional Zionism

The “Safdie Plan” process shows that Jerusalem has not lost its importance for the state as a capital or for individuals as a place of residence. Both the promoters and the opponents of the plan claimed that they had the best ideas and solutions for creating a strong political capital and stimulating economic development. They also both argued that they were the best guardians of the historic Jerusalem Hills, one through responsible urban development and the other by hindering any exploitation of the land whatsoever. The five territorialities presented in chapter 6, are therefore all related to the motives behind the plan and to the consequences of the rejection. One intention of the plan was to facilitate the creation of a proper political capital, a Jewish capital, an economic capital, an exclusive capital, as well as strengthening ancestry and heritage. The process illustrates that these strategies of territoriality were interpreted and prioritized in different ways by the two sides. What finally became the focus of the campaign against the plan was a combination of the role of the Jerusalem Hills in Jewish nature-related heritage – Green Zionism, other ecological concerns, and the location of alternative projects. In the rhetoric of the proponents and opponents, Zionist identity discourses were combined with everyday life issues.
The plan was itself a challenge to new Zionism as it was located on the “right side” of Jerusalem from an ethnic coexistence perspective, but on the “wrong side” from a national-religious point of view. The rejection of the plan was thus a victory for those who concentrate on “winning” the geopolitical struggle over Jerusalem in its entirety, and outmanoeuvring the Palestinians. The plan focused on attracting secular population groups, which are not the primary constituency of the parties and groups with new Zionist views, and it clashed to a certain extent with the open space policy that is partly based on the role of land in Jewish heritage and an image of pastoral and picturesque landscapes. On the other hand the plan can also be seen as a nationalist project aiming at bringing Jews to the city in large numbers. Promoting the plan did not necessarily in conflict with developing settlements in the east.

From a post-Zionist perspective, the plan and its rejection is even more complicated to analyze. There were opponents of the plan with clear connections to post-Zionist views, such as focusing on the environment as a one of the large-scale global problems in the world superseding national interests. On the other hand, the plan focused on the right side of town according to a post-Zionist view that the solution to the Israel–Palestine conflict is reached through a shared city.

The planning process and the rejection illustrate the conflict between the prevailing traditional Zionism, and other identity discourses based on individual interests, environmental concerns, or nationalistic ideals. The alliance between “new” forms of identity perspectives, both related to post-Zionism and new Zionism was not necessarily a conscious construction, but rather an effect of the broad range of criticism directed towards the plan. The rejection of the plan was a great blow to those who considered it the only solution to the demographic and economic problems, based on good and modernist planning and not on temporary political whims and trends. This process shows a significant interplay between identity politics and city planning. For the opponents of the plan, the rejection was a unique blow to the establishment and a victory for the people. For them it had very little to do with high-level politics. It was rather a local rejection of nationally imposed identity and planning hegemony. It was not only a question of bringing heritage and pastoral landscapes back in as central arguments but also of bringing the local back in.

Therefore the consequences of the rejection can lead to a shift from bringing well-educated secular or moderately religious Jewish middle class back to the city en masse, to a focus on territorial gains in East Jerusalem through small-scale settlement projects. Another consequence could be the continued creation of so called ghost towns or luxury apartments for the
few in the city center. This is one the challenges of the municipality today. The collective planning ideal was perhaps more relevant during the days of massive immigration and has thereafter transformed into different planning for different groups. The “Safdie Plan” process has shown that the idea of sustainability does not have to be detached from Zionism nor the idea of making Jerusalem into both a stronger capital of Israel geopolitically. The coalition Sustainable Jerusalem claims, on the other hand, that their agenda could be a way forward for all the residents of Jerusalem, not only the Jewish population.

8.5.2 Challenging the collective planning ideal
This planning process is one of the most significant power struggles in the planning history of Jerusalem, if focusing on construction projects not immediately connected to the Israel–Palestine conflict. Planning Jerusalem is an intimate part of constructing the state of Israel and this chapter has shown that also a project on the west side leads to repercussions for Israeli identity politics. The top-down planning system, inherited from the British Mandate, has suited the governments of Israel as it allows the national level to have the final say in most of the city planning. The planning system does not facilitate the involvement of citizens, NGOs, or other kinds of actors. Planning Jerusalem has thus been an effort of a few to construct collective solutions to collective Jewish problems, and according to Arie Shachar (1998), planning is today evolving from a collective-based planning focused on building the state of Israel to an individual-based planning based on economic priorities, mainly neo-liberal, but also on specific issues. How can the rejection of the plan be interpreted in the light of Shachar’s changing planning doctrine from an identity perspective? The rejection was both a break with the collective ideal of large-scale projects for a large target group. The question is whether collectivism has been knocked off its throne altogether as the rejection was also a blow to neo-liberal values and strong economic interests.

According to Naomi Tsur, one of the accomplishments of the “anti-Safdie” campaign was to challenge the established planning patterns and to promote sustainability in all forms in the planning process. The campaign introduced global environmental issues onto the agenda, but also the local opinion. For the opponents, Jerusalem must first and foremost be developed into a sustainable city for those who live their everyday lives there, and this is intended to also strengthen Jerusalem as a the capital of Israel and, in a certain perspective, the entire Jewish nation.

The rejection of the Safdie plan was a challenge to the planning hegemony – planning actors who hitherto had been left undisturbed in their
work of developing the city. Few projects have ever led to such a public outcry except those related to the ethnic conflict. The government, through the Ministry of Housing, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Jerusalem Development Authority, has over the years been able to promote a number of projects that have gone through the system rather smoothly. There have, of course, been disagreements among politicians and among planners with regard to certain plans, but very few cases have been brought to the attention of both the media and the public. The cancellation of this plan was also a blow to the economic interests and influential construction companies who saw their long-awaited projects in this part of West Jerusalem vanish. This planning process was characterized by planners as mobilizers and advocates for a certain cause. Once in a while they were also regarded as experts, particularly when presenting figures of housing needs and densification. There were of course bureaucratic planners on the formal side of the project such as in the different commissions, but one conclusion from the interviews is that they find it sensitive to talk about the “Safdie plan” and the consequences of the rejection. We can only speculate as to whether the plan will be brought back and for what reason, but there is no question that the proponents of the plan in leading positions feel challenged, especially when more and more voices are raised demanding institutional change, above all in order to increase the influence of the citizens.
9. Jerusalem in identity discourse and planning practice

Jerusalem is the most fascinating place. Because, of course, it combines all the great things... (Interview Dalit Zilber, 2009)

A study on Jerusalem is always a work-in-progress. New input is constantly being produced. There is no such thing as an objective truth about Jerusalem. The city is truly what discourse theorists call an *empty signifier* filled with just as many meanings as there are interpreters. Some of these meanings have greater repercussions than others. This study shows that Jerusalem has gone in and out of Zionist focus, but today, there are signs of a growing focus on the development of the city. Based on capital city theory, Jerusalem is, from an Israeli perspective, a capital undergoing a reconstruction process, but for whom is the city being reconstructed? Is it developed as a national symbol or for the people who are living their everyday lives in the city?

This dissertation focuses on the interplay between the role of Jerusalem in Israeli identity politics and city planning. The main conclusion is that there is a considerable interaction and that city planning reproduces both commemorative narratives and identity discourses. City planning policy becomes strategies of territoriality. The purpose of this final chapter is to analyze and discuss the conclusions of the dissertation in connection with the analytical models and other theoretical perspectives.

9.1 Jerusalem in Israeli identity politics

Jerusalem has a central position in Israeli national identity construction. The status and importance of the city is one of the issues that binds Jewish communities together both in Israel and in the Diaspora, but at the same time it is also one of the most illustrative points of division. A deconstruction of national identity discourses discloses unity and conflict, as well as historical roots. Israeli identity politics has both an external and an internal expression. The external expression focuses on stating a claim towards the Palestinians and the entire international community. The internal identity politics has during the last decades concentrated on debates based on three Zionist identity discourses: traditional, new, and post-Zionism. The construction of Jerusalem exhibits both primordialist and modernist features. In the political rhetoric, there are frequent references to ancestry and heritage in an attempt to establish primordial roots. These roots have strong
ethno-symbolic connotations. On the other hand, the reconstruction process also employs modernist methods in order to break with the Diasporic past and create a modern, cosmopolitan city. This section concentrates on two themes from chapter 5, the role of commemorative narratives and the growing focus on Jerusalem in its entirety in Israeli identity politics and practice.

9.1.1 Commemoration as narrative cosmetics?

Rogers Brubaker emphasizes that identity is best studied as a process of identification (Brubaker, 2004). Jerusalem has been important for Jewish identity over time, but that the expression and enactment of this importance has taken different forms throughout history. The main conclusion of the analysis in chapter 5 is that the Israeli claim to Jerusalem is articulated through a number of commemorative narratives with the purpose of legitimizing the Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem. These commemorations are linked to the master commemorative narrative of Jerusalem as the eternal indivisible capital of Israel, which constitutes a common Zionist narrative base. Anyone who wants to discuss the role of the capital inevitably has to relate to the master narrative. The analysis of the political debate and the speeches by Prime Ministers on Jerusalem Day show how the master narrative, supported by a number of commemorative narratives, is used by leading political figures in order to stake a claim on Jerusalem and to forge the commemorations into political arguments. Few speeches omit examples of struggles over the city such as the events in 1967, the years of yearning for Jerusalem in the Diaspora, or the creation of a state by King David 3000 years ago. The commemorative narratives are clearly connected to the five aspects of territoriality – as the narratives are used as arguments to control the territory. Relating back to the definitions of territoriality of Robert Sack (1986) and George White (2000), the narratives play a part in giving meaning to Jerusalem and to a group’s determination of to hold on to a territory.

Some of the commemorative narratives are directly constructed in relation to “the Palestinian other”. In traditional and new Zionism, one commemorative narrative related to the Palestinians is that they are not to be relied upon when it comes to the management of the city, a viewpoint based on examples in history such as the period of division 1948–1967. Many respondents in this study, as well as other actors, highlight the refusal of the Palestinians to become Israeli citizens after 1967 and to participate in the local elections. In a post-Zionist perspective and for the Palestinians themselves, these are not options because they legitimize the occupation. The Palestinian claims to Jerusalem are regarded as anachronistic
and have appeared only in relation to Jewish claims, such as for instance the narrative about the age of the city. Post-Zionist debaters claim, on the other hand, that the Palestinians should be considered as neighbors and not as potential terrorists or a security threat. Post-Zionists have been accused of underestimating this threat. Regardless, the Palestinians find themselves in a Catch 22 situation where the choice is whether to participate in the Israeli system in order to achieve some basic rights but at the risk of legitimizing Israeli sovereignty. The question is whether these commemorative narratives have any significance for the role and development of Jerusalem today or are they pure cosmetics?

Collective commemorations have penetrated into every area of Israeli society and they are being reproduced in education, army, social movements, etc. These commemorative narratives are firmly based in traditional Zionism, but they are not necessarily a problem for a post-Zionist or a new Zionist. The basic narratives of traditional Zionism such as creating a homeland as a refuge; the connection between territory, heritage and ancestry; and the romanticism of labouring upon, exploring, and developing the land, go beyond contemporary divisions. The development of post-Zionism is rather a reaction to how the narratives are prioritized and used, for example as a weapon directed against “the other” or favoring specific Jewish groups. New Zionists, on the other hand, criticize what they call “the political establishment” for relating too little to these narratives, particularly their national-religious features. On the other hand, Israeli columnist Gideon Levy claims that right-wing parties have dominated Israeli politics since 1977, but that the representatives of these parties refuse to admit to it because it is easier to cling to victimhood.

The right has never admitted that it took power 34 years ago and has hardly been out of power since. It has never acknowledged that the country has been galloping to the right for years; neither does it recognize that Israel today is ruled by the most rightist-nationalist government in its history, one of the most right-wing, nationalist governments in the world, and the parliament barely rests between one piece of anti-democratic legislation and the next. (Levy, Ha’aretz, July 3, 2011).

The consequences of the use of commemorative narratives as political arguments in the case of Jerusalem, is that they constitute a clear hegemonic framework to which Israelis must relate. They are also a hegemonic interpretation of history. Diverting from them has a cost and in the current Israeli political climate you risk being labeled non-patriot. The narrative framework is thus created in order to meet the claims of other groups to Jerusalem, and as glue keeping the Jewish nation united. There is a risk
that the framework is too static and difficult to change. It can therefore become a liability if other political priorities are needed swiftly.

9.1.2 Bringing Jerusalem back in
The current popularity of the right has led to pressure from new Zionists on leading politicians to engage actively with the Jerusalem question and to actually implement the city policy that has been around for quite a while. These leading politicians, often referred to as the establishment, have even been accused of keeping the status quo of the city in order to make concessions in the peace negotiations. For many new Zionists, Jerusalem is not only indivisible, but it should be dominated by Jews in every respect, particularly by Jews with the correct national-religious inclination. Jews with differing views are treated as “the other”. The arguments are firmly based on the commemorative narratives such as ancestral rights and duties, as well as on security. The post-Zionist challenge to the political establishment, which is seen as representing traditional Zionism, is based on Zionism as an inclusive and not exclusive ideology. Jerusalem should be a shared, open city from a physical point of view, but there are different opinions as whether to promote a two-capital solution or a shared secular state with Jerusalem as its capital. In any case, the inclusive approach is portrayed as a sustainable solution.

The accusations of an absent state policy in the case of Jerusalem have led to several local initiatives. We have seen new actors enter the agenda-setting process in the case of the “Saftie Plan”, and the election of Nir Barkat as mayor has led to a more outspoken and comprehensive city policy. Is it really a new policy or is it just the old policy packed in a different and more transparent form? The conclusion to be drawn from policy documents, interviews, literature, and debates is that the city policy is not new but more clearly articulated and prioritized through concrete projects. The city policy nonetheless interplays with identity politics. The main goals is to strengthen the city as the capital of Israel and as a cosmopolitan city. An analysis of the material, by applying the five territorialities, shows that the commemorative narratives are translated into strategies of territoriality such as the policy of making Jerusalem a proper Israeli capital and not the poor, peripheral city with no future; of retaining a demographic balance; of bringing the “right” people in, and of strengthening Jerusalem in economic and educational terms. There is no doubt that these strategies are intertwined with the role of Jerusalem in a wider national identity perspective, but they are not necessarily steered by actors on the national level, despite being supported by the current government. At a special Knesset session on Jerusalem Day, June 1, 2011, Netanyahu praised the municipal initiatives.
As Israeli nationalism has taken a considerable step to the right, with the growing influence of new Zionism, Jerusalem has come into full focus. The consequences are possibly more “facts on the ground” in East Jerusalem and unilateral actions on both the Israeli and Palestinian side. There are also those who point to the positive development, and that something is actually happening in the city, leading to the creation of a proper capital.

9.2 City planning policy and strategies of territoriality
The conclusion drawn in chapter 6 is that identity politics, through the lenses of the specific strategies of territoriality, without doubt interplays with planning. This is not a case of one-way communication, but rather a constant flow back and forth, affecting the development and the planning policies related to the city. Planning is undoubtedly also a force in itself. Creating new “facts on the ground” has far-reaching consequences that are not so easy to modify. The question is how identity discourses and narratives interact with city planning today. The fact that the state does not have any land reserves left in the city creates an opening for new actors and new planning trends. The right-wing movements in Israel try to influence the Jerusalem politics with an aim to construct settlements in East Jerusalem. Nir Barkat or Benyamin Netanyahu have criticized opposition to this development and have described it as trying to discriminate or hinder Jews from building in their own capital. The bottom line is that Jerusalem is not just another capital. It is a highly contested territory.

9.2.1 Locating Jerusalem
Land-use planning is a major tool in constructing the political capital of the state, but this development has also created a number of contemporary problems. One is the location of the government buildings quite far from the center, as compared to the old city center located closer to the Old City. City center renewal is today mainly concentrated both in theory and practice to the area around Ben Yehuda and Jaffa Streets. From a local and also a new Zionist perspective, the center of the capital should be geographically closer to the heart of the city. Otherwise it is viewed as giving up on the claims to that area and portraying the city as divided into a western and an eastern part. Connected to theories on capital cities, the return to the old heart of the city is a way to strengthen the role of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. One of the aims of the urban renewal projects is also to make Jerusalem more representative as a capital. The “Safdie Plan” was therefore a problem for these ambitions.

A second problem related to the theme of state-building is the enlargement of Jerusalem after the de facto annexation in 1967. The question is
what Jerusalem is and how it could be linked with the historical capital. Jerusalem after 1967 was a considerably larger city than it had ever been before. This created a completely new situation which is not very logical from any infrastructural perspectives. Planners active during that period say in hindsight that this political decision was unfortunate from a planning point of view. Even though these opinions are quite widespread, “giving away” any of the neighborhoods in Jerusalem in a peace agreement seems to be a total breach of all mental maps. Jerusalem, as we see it today, is a construction both mentally and physically. According to Meron Benvenisti, the planning definition of Jerusalem is anachronistic (Interview Meron Benvenisti, 2007). The enlargement of Jerusalem has thus created great challenges concerning demographic balance, infrastructure, but also for Israeli legitimacy. A new Zionist would say that there is a Jewish link to all land in Eretz Israel, thus strengthening legitimacy, but a post-Zionist would not generally put Jewish claims above Palestinian claims.

9.2.2 Picturesque planning and green Zionism
A prioritized territorial strategy is to highlight ancestry and heritage. This has been translated into a focus on history, archeology, open landscapes, and the rehabilitation of important places, such as the Old City and the Holy Basin. It is connected to constructing the capital city, to religious ideas, but also to the development of the tourist industry. These projects are examples of a discursive practice based on geopolitical concerns and a strategy to control the development within and around the Old City. One reason for this strategy is the social practice within above all the Muslim Quarter to build illegally. This activity is based on the fact that it is a very poor neighborhood within the Palestinian community and therefore illegal construction has become a practice. Right-wing groups claim that this is a Palestinian strategy to regain control over large parts of the Old City, mainly under the influence of Hamas and Palestinian nationalism. In any case, strengthening the Jewish heritage is a major city policy that has been promoted by both national and local actors. The consequence of this planning policy goal is that it risks creating conflicts over the holy sites and a race for the control over the Old City. It is also connected to the strategy of “keeping the Palestinians happy” and thus less nationalistic. The positive side is that something is being done about the poor infrastructure of the Old City.

Another issue is the focus on open landscapes and open spaces, such as for instance the visual basin around the Old City. This also relates to the rejection of the “Safdie Plan” and green Zionism. These landscapes are seen as an important part of the ancestral bond with the land, and the
popularity of hiking in Israel takes on another dimension when it is related to the role of open space. This dissertation has introduced green Zionism as a description of the Jewish attachment to land and ancestral landscapes. Green Zionism can also be considered a theoretical concept based on the responsibility of a Zionist enterprise to also think green. It is connected to sustainable development, but also to the conservation of historical landscapes and forests. We have a tendency to see green politics as something alternative and global, but in this case it coexists with Zionist aspirations for the homeland. This is an aspect of responsibility. It is not just a question of thinking green in general, but of taking a particular responsibility for the future of the ancestral homeland. One consequence of the renewed focus on maintaining open spaces and the development of areas into parks is that less land is available for housing. Several Israeli NGOs have criticized Israeli authorities for labeling land open spaces and parks in order to limit Palestinian natural growth. On the other hand, land is a scarce resource which motivates environmental movements to protect open spaces, landscapes, and nature reserves.

9.2.3 The controversial policy of demographic balance
For many years, maintaining a demographic balance of 70% Jews and 30% Palestinians in the city has been one of the most significant but controversial city policies and strategies of territoriality. It is used in the daily vocabulary of planners and in planning documents. The house demolitions performed by the municipality have been described as an indirect implementation of this political goal. Demographic balance is also connected to Zionist narratives of the homeland as a refuge. Being in the majority strengthens the sense of security. Any disturbance in the demographic balance creates fear and suspicion. Research on demography generates great interest and debaters portray the development of the balance as the beginning and the end of Israeli influence over Jerusalem. From a post-Zionist perspective, the demographic “hysteria” could be remedied by thinking differently about coexistence. A new Zionist on the other hand could go so far as to say that this is about the survival of the Jewish nation and that the best method is to encourage other groups in Jerusalem to leave. Statistics have pointed out that there has been a negative out-migration from Jerusalem for quite a while, and politicians on both the local and national level are actively promoting political strategies to get the right socio-economic groups to move back into the city. Jerusalem is in dire need of taxpayers, and therefore ultra-orthodox groups are not prioritized by the current national and local administration as many of them do not work. This kind of
planning policy goal strengthens the perception of a strong interplay between identity politics and planning.

The 30–70 balance has come and gone and there are widespread discussions about when the Palestinians will outnumber the Jewish population. This is seen as a threat even among more left-wing debaters. Most planners in the interview study agree that it is a legitimate policy goal to attract the right socio-economic group to the city, but some admit the difficulty of working with the overall goal of demographic balance based on ethnicity and religion. It has created discussions about discrimination and intentional ethnic segregation. Anyhow, this city policy, based on identity politics, has found its way into planning and has led to concrete strategies to make Jerusalem an attractive city. For the proponents of this goal and of eternal Jewish sovereignty, ethnic territoriality is a necessary strategy, though criticized. It is connected to a political opinion that segregation is positive in an ethnically divided city.

9.2.4 Economic development as a tool for ethnic territoriality?

One conclusion of chapter 6 is that Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu and Mayor Nir Barkat put a great deal of political effort into making Jerusalem attractive to investors and creating a proper capital in an economic sense. Economic aspects of planning Jerusalem are related to Anthony D. Smith’s theories about creating a common economic base, and the importance of having a capital in an economically good shape. National and local politicians have pushed for a development of the tourist industry, and one way to accomplish this is to provide land for hotels and other venues. The scarcity of public land and the slow bureaucratic processes have led to few major initiatives by the public authorities, and the projects that we have seen in the last 10–15 years have mainly been initiated by private investors. These investors use the importance of Jerusalem in the national identity construction as a marketing tool. This has created ghost towns all over the city, because many of the luxury apartments have been bought by people who visit Jerusalem infrequently. The mayor has even come up with a proposal to force or alleviate for owners to lease out their apartments when they are not visiting the city. In this respect there are clear signs of local or international actors getting more involved in the initiation and development of planning and construction projects. The focus on making Jerusalem more attractive for investments, and for tourism, is an aspect that many actors can agree upon. Economic development could be beneficial for all groups in the city. The empirical material shows that many planning actors see these economic aspects as a separate field, but the analysis also clearly shows that these economic strategies are intercon-
nected with ethnic territoriality. One reason for promoting tourism is that it is important to convey an image of the Jewish Jerusalem to the world. This is seen as strengthening the legitimacy of the claims to sovereignty. Economic development is one strategy of maintaining control over the city.

9.2.5 The oriental “other” as untrustworthy and unstrategic

The image of both the internal and external “other” is an important part of identity politics and the image of the “Palestinian other” is incorporated into the Israeli strategies of territoriality – of maintaining control over Jerusalem. Since the establishment of the state of Israel, the policy area of planning has emphasized rational and modernist planning ideals and what could be considered good planning. The oriental, village-like construction pattern was pointed out as problematic. The very existence of a native people was incompatible with the traditional Zionist slogan of developing the “land without people for the people without land.” On the other hand it is interesting that the image of the small village on the slopes of Jerusalem is used as an ideal in advertisements for housing projects. The difference is that the latter image is one of a controlled, small-scale, idyllic housing project, and the former one of uncontrolled chaos.

The Israeli planning focus on heritage and ancestry, and particularly the Old City and the holy sites have created tensions. The Israeli national identity reconstruction is performed on top of the existing layer, or beneath as in the case of the Western Wall tunnels. The general image among mainstream and right-wing Israeli politicians is that the Palestinian population cannot manage the holy sites and that a move in that direction would only strengthen Hamas. This is connected to a narrative about the Palestinians as irresponsible and furthermore connecte to their rejection of participating in any Israeli system. These narratives are strong also among the planners, particularly the alleged wish of the Palestinians to remain under Israeli control. On the other hand, new strategies have come to the fore such as strengthening the economic development in East Jerusalem, which could potentially weaken the nationalist aspirations of the Palestinians. These aspects were further emphasized by Knesset speaker Reuven Rivlin when he said, “We promised a united Jerusalem but we failed to deliver” and pointed to the disparity of West and East Jerusalem (Speech by speaker Rivlin at Knesset special session on Jerusalem Day, June 1, 2011).

The consequences of using these narratives is that the Palestinians are not regarded as having the best claim to the city as they are described as not trustworthy. In an Israeli view, the Palestinian strategies over the years have strengthened Israeli claims on eternal sovereignty of an undivided city.
9.3 Planners between agency and structure

According to Jeffrey T. Checkel (1999), one of the problems of post-modern or post-structural approaches focusing on constructivism, is that agency is often neglected in favor of structure. This is perceived as giving less depth to a study, as the role of the actor within the structure is downplayed. This study employs a constructivist perspective on identity discourses and the empirical study shows that there is no contradiction between using a constructivist approach and being able to recognize the rationality of actors within specific constructions. On the contrary, a planner can be aware of the different identity discourses influencing the planning policy area and choose a strategy based on this knowledge, something Fritz Scharpf refers to as intentional action. Based on contextual knowledge, the planner possesses a specific situational power.

9.3.1 Blame it on the system

Jerusalem planners are generally aware of the impact of identity politics on planning and of their own potential role in strengthening the ideational influence. Current and former public planners have developed various coping strategies when it comes to managing the ideational context. Most planners accuse the top-down decision-making system of being vulnerable to the impact of identity politics and ideas. They identify two main problems: the complicated bureaucracy is halting the development of Jerusalem, and that the system is too slow. The relationships between the authorities and their main areas of responsibility are not clear-cut and the system is seen as a relic from another era. Another bureaucratic problem is the multitude of planning actors, with unclear areas of responsibilities. New initiatives depend on who sits in what position. There is an ongoing discussion about making the system more flexible and clear. If the top-down planning system was about to change, it could potentially challenge the national planning hegemony or the collective planning doctrine. The main argument for change is that more power should be given to the local commissions because they know their municipality and important local issues. Local identity politics, which is not necessarily different from national identity politics, would have more influence over the planning process, and since the local commission is made up of politicians, there is a risk of planning becoming a political tool.

The rejection of the “Safdie Plan” is an illustration of the long time-frames and has led to renewed calls for reform. The thirteen year long process of the “Safdie Plan” came during a period when many things were changing in the Israeli planning system. New actors were entering along with new issues. What was seen as a clear-cut and uncomplicated plan in
the mid-1990s became environmentally impossible in the end of the 2000s. A swifter process would probably have resulted in an approved plan. On the other hand, the long process afforded the public and the media time to really learn about the plan and its benefits as well as negative consequences. An interesting comparison can be made with the case of the new outline scheme. This was developed by the municipality in a certain context and was accused of having guidelines that were too political. During 2009, the outline scheme was profoundly changed following the shift in leadership after the local elections in 2008, and the new plan follows in many ways the agenda of the new leaders. Over time policy goals change and we see today much more focus on environmental planning, transparency in the planning process, planning for economic progress, and planning for tourism.

9.3.2 Professionalism and responsibility

The other main coping strategy described by the planners in this study, is to uphold some sort of professionalism, and many have adopted a rather low profile to avoid being accused of discrimination. Professionalism comes in different forms, and these strategies have two main aspects. One is to espouse a reactive stance and the other is to act in order to make a difference. The planner can assume the role of a mobilizer and entrepreneur gathering support for a plan and pushing it through the system. Although claiming to adopt a professional stance, the mobilizer could be steered by political motives. The most common coping strategy is to cling to the role of the bureaucrat who follows rules and regulations and strives to take the best possible decision under the circumstances. This role becomes more reactive than active. This stance is fully legitimate if the system is based on democratic ideas but if not, the planner risks being involved in questionable decisions. Another strategy has been to concentrate on being an expert or an advisor to politicians based on one’s long experience and knowledge of the field. The decision-making responsibility falls on the politician. A final strategy on the part of some planners has been to work with advocacy planning. These planners have reacted to what they see as planning discrimination against a group in society and decide to plan for this group. The planners conclude that planning Jerusalem is difficult but that it also interesting and unique.

Many of the planners do not consider their own responsibility within the planning system and as identity agents. From a geopolitical point of view, they do not reflect on the legitimacy of the Israeli planning system and have internalized some of the narratives about “the other”, such as the perceived unstrategic moves of the Palestinian Jerusalemites not to partici-
Planners are identity agents, as all planning comes with a political motive. Any plan or project also has an identity aspect. Planning projects create new “facts on the ground” and alter the identity of place. If a planner adopts the role of the bureaucrat, he or she carries out tasks with a potentially problematic motive from the perspective of good planning. The planner can on the other hand adopt a more active role when trying to find the best possible solution for all inhabitants under the circumstances. It is possible that other cities provide an opportunity to work more traditionally with so-called good planning without risking being accused of being an identity agent.

Public administration is traditionally associated with working for the common good and not for individual gains or in favor of specific groups. The administration is often financed by taxes, which means that every public administrator has a duty toward, or is expected to act in the best interest of all the inhabitants. On the other hand, it is also connected to knowing – through education and experience – what is in their best interest, even if the inhabitants might not agree. Many of the Israeli respondents in this study express a wish to remain as neutral as possible in the conflict with the Palestinians. On the other hand they are of the opinion that the Palestinian inhabitants have themselves to blame for not getting their piece of the planning effort, due to their refusal to get involved in local politics. There is no reflection among these respondents concerning on what grounds the collective Palestinian decision has been made.

9.4 Challenging hegemony

Several planning researchers such as Arie Shachar (1998) have argued that the hegemonic planning doctrine is changing, or at least that the collective Zionist planning is being challenged by a new focus on economy, particularly a neo-liberal agenda. In the long-run this is challenging the top-down Israeli planning system, as new planning actors are promoting partly new issues. The “Safdie Plan” process led to a widening of the groups engaged in planning issues and to include actors such as private investors, social movements, and groups of citizen. Issues such as the environment and green Zionism; transparency and political culture; and urban renewal and rehabilitation are high on the political agenda. The Barkat administration has encouraged this development, and the appointment of Naomi Tsur, head of the SPNI, as the deputy mayor after the local elections in Jerusalem in 2008 is a sign of the growing importance of the environmental movement. The establishment of a specific local building commission for environmental issues is another example. Many of the respondents in this study have described the rejection of the plan as a challenge to the national plan-
The “Safdie Plan” process is particularly interesting as it relates to all the questions above in a detailed and illuminating fashion. The question is whether this development also challenges traditional Zionism as a hegemonic identity discourse.

9.4.1 The force of rejection

The plan was rejected due to a combination of factors. One is the focus on the environment, which has become an important force within Israeli society. Focusing on the environment does not necessarily challenge traditional Zionism, but instead points to certain Zionist narratives such as green Zionism, focusing on open landscapes, nature as heritage, and saving particular areas that are important for Jewish culture and natural history. Another reason for the success of the opponents is the time-frame. Because too much time had gone by and the context was changing, the plan simply became controversial and was considered outdated. A third reason is that strong actors were abandoning the project for political reasons, whether they really opposed it or not. This left many of the public administrators and hired planners disillusioned and feeling abandoned. A fourth reason for the rejection is that the plan was seen as an attempt by national actors to impose changes to the local environment without consideration for local opinion. This planning process provided a chance for the public to show that they were not happy with the political and planning “establishment” in general, and more specifically with the fact that the citizens were not invited into the planning process from the beginning. The rejection of the plan was also the result of opposition from right-wing groups who thought that the proposed developments were located on the wrong side of the city. Settler groups propagated for the development of Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem and the E1 area. The establishment, here meaning both leading politicians and “strong” planners connected to traditional Zionism, were dealt a heavy blow. From a professional planning point of view, the planners representing the opponents managed to present a plan focusing on densification rather than urban sprawl, and this planted a seed of doubt in the National Planning Board as to whether the development of the “West Jerusalem project” really was necessary. Time will tell whether there is enough room to build within the city or whether plans to build in the E1 area will be pushed through.

The rejection was a challenge to both traditional Zionist identity discourse and the national planning doctrine by new actors working with slightly new issues. The anti-Safdie campaign created an unlikely coalition of actor and interests. The rejection was a considerable blow to planners and politicians who had invested years and a lot of prestige in the project.
The consequences are described by the proponents of the plan as severe for the housing needs of Jerusalem, particularly if trying to achieve a 30 to 70% demographic balance. The opponents to the plan doubts whether Jerusalem really needs all those units and promote instead a denser city. What is visible after 2007 is also a stronger rhetoric regarding developing the core of the city and the rejection seems to have stirred things around regarding both local and national involvement in developing Jerusalem. The rejection came at a time where very few big projects were going through the system, and most respondents agree that not enough housing units are being built today. The opponents of the plan say that this is because their ideas are not supported by the “establishment” which is waiting for the right moment to bring the plan back on to the table. Other actors claim that there is not enough state land to launch any ideas that could lead to a substantial number of housing units and that the plans for densification and development of available land inside the city cannot come close to satisfying the housing needs. According to Prime Minister Netanyahu, land in Jerusalem will be allocated for economic development, but little is being said about land for housing. Has demographic balance been dropped as a policy goal in favor of development of industrial areas and land for business purposes?

9.5 Lessons from identity and policy analysis

One overall purpose of this dissertation is to produce a theoretical and analytical framework that ties context to political practice and that can be applied on other cases where place identity is an important factor. The problem that sometimes arises when studying identity politics without analyzing concrete empirical material is that it easily becomes too abstract. Critics have questioned whether it is possible to transform this abstract and theory-driven research into results useful in practice. On the other hand, practice-oriented studies can become too empirical and concrete. The context is lost and this research gives us few tools to use when looking for solutions to serious societal problems. Both these approaches, of course, have a place within research. As scientists we need to limit ourselves to a reasonable range of methods, material, and analytical models. One contribution of this dissertation is that it attempts to combine the abstract with the concrete, because the case of Jerusalem has shown that they are interconnected and intertwined. The research contribution is to identify a core area where Israeli national identity discourses meet planning as a policy area. This approach reveals something about the role of identity discourses in the planning practice of Jerusalem and also something about planning policies and practices in identity politics. The models presented by Barry
Buzan (1991) and Dvora Yanow (2000), show a link between a structural framework and actors within the political practice. One model is related to International Relations theory on security, which is relevant in the case of Israel, and the other is policy oriented with a focus on ideas, goals, and actors. The models constitute an overall framework for the disposition of the study and particularly helpful as they connect several parts of a policy area to ideas or discourses.

**9.5.1 Territoriality as an analytical concept**

In cases where territory, identity, and power play large roles, the conclusion from this study is that the concept of territoriality is useful in creating an understanding of how identity and territorial practice are interlinked through strategies of territoriality.

What conclusions can be drawn from the use of this approach? First of all it has led to an awareness of the importance of contextualization. The establishment of political goals and policies can be more closely scrutinized when they are related to a wider context. It gives a basic understanding of potential intentions and ideological foundations. It provides an explanatory framework for the decisions made and roles adopted by actors within the public administration, in this case planners. In the case of Jerusalem, this has been a fruitful approach as focusing only on planning practice fails to recognize the complexities of the city, while only analyzing identity discourses would not lead to an understanding the role of planning in the physical development of Jerusalem. Although I find the broad approach applicable particularly when trying to assess several parts of a policy area,
but the risk is a more shallow analysis. The broad framework was necessary in light of the aims of this study.

The five territorialities presented in this study are inspired by Anthony D. Smith’s model on national identity. I find Smith’s focus on ethnosymbolism useful as well as the incorporation into the framework of both nation and state, although recognizing that this is not an appropriate model for all cases of national identity. Smith has removed the economic component from his model but this study shows that focus on economic development can be a central part of identity politics. Developing tourism, bringing investments, and allocating land for industry, does not only create economic opportunities, but also helps to spread an image about Jerusalem. It is related to stating a claim to the city. Respondents in this study states that a capital should be an economic role model and thus generate safety, security, and hope. Economy is often used as a separate category, although it may be connected to other issues, and for this reason it is helpful to reinclude it in the analytical framework.

9.5.2 The structure-agency approach
Although based on a constructivist perspective, I find the discussion by Jeffrey T. Checkel on structure and agency useful. We could continue for a long time discussing the role of actors in the constructivist approach where the traditional interpretation has been that structures steer actors in certain directions. Therefore actors have in constructivist studies been viewed as uninteresting. This is based on the assumption that actors are not aware of the structures or are not able to distinguish between structural pressure and their own role. I find that interpretation limited as it is of interest to understand how actors relate to structures and context, because we all do in one way or the other. Actors may not be aware of all the implications that structure and context have for on their own actions, but in a highly contested context many actors are aware of the sensitivity of the situation and of their own potential impact. There are also structures that we are not aware of and both these conscious and unconscious aspects are interesting.

9.6 The city back in focus
The physical development of Jerusalem has been influenced by a number of events in history, but the Israeli planning system as it looks today is mainly the result of three major influences in history: first of all the British mandate period; second, the establishment of the Israeli state; and third, global economic processes. The empirical material in this study shows that we may now be witnessing a fourth period, with growing influence from local politicians, groups, and organizations.
9.6.1 Constructing the capital city
The conclusions and key findings in this study include a number of issues related to the city as a category. First of all, the city is connected to identity in a number of ways. A capital city is a central part of the identity of the state and is constructed in order to represent that particular state. This aspect is mainly connected to a more top-down approach of locating government buildings, places for public gatherings, and symbols such as monuments and works of art. In an ideal situation, this is performed in cooperation with local actors. In a contested situation this relation may be a cause for conflicts. Jerusalem is in this respect a unique city, as two nations claim the city as their capital. The first years of building the Jewish-Israeli capital concentrated on West Jerusalem, but after 1967, a completely new city was developed. Today there are clear signs of a growing determination to control the entire city, and it relates to legal-political, ethnic, historical and religious, and exclusive territoriality. Constructing a capital on top of another national claim is not the best recipe for a sustainable solution for a city. Some attempts have been made to induce the Palestinian Jerusalemites to drop their national claims on the city, by discussing economic development and citizenship. If Jerusalem is ever going to be the “city of peace” or the “religious capital” the dual claims need to be addressed in one way or the other.

Jerusalem is also a city where local politicians try to put their mark on the development. In a contested context, local and national opinions might clash. Looking at city identity from a broader perspective, there is a growing trend to market the city on the international arena, both from an economic perspective and in a cultural sense, to draw both investments and tourists. It is natural to assume that local representatives have the best knowledge about the qualities of the particular city and would present the most efficient city policy. The case of Jerusalem illustrates the potential clash between a more national capital city policy and local priorities. There is a tendency that this risk has diminished during the final years of the first decade of the 21st century. Jerusalem as a national project exists side by side with the local city policy goals. The hegemonic Israeli vision is a Jewish Jerusalem that has shaken off the label of poverty and represents good education, business opportunity, culture, and heritage.

9.6.2 The city as microcosm
The city is also a place where the political practice is played out. Land use planning has a profound effect on the physical development and identity of the city. A landmark building soon becomes incorporated into the image, and housing projects decide whether the city is attractive or not from a
migration point of view. The question is whether to focus on city or urban planning. Do the planners focus on the image of the city or on its life and its inhabitants? The planning of Jerusalem has been criticized for not having a clear planning strategy. The absence of a local outline scheme is one explanation. Another is the constant movement of planners in key positions. Every planner is promoting his or her ideas with few connections to larger policy goals. Therefore one conclusion is that Jerusalem has succumbed to ad hoc city planning. During the Barkat administration in city hall, the city planning goals have become more emphasized. It is too early to say whether the planning has also a more urban focus, but a quick walk through downtown Jerusalem shows a city under construction and reconstruction. Restaurants, shopping malls, and green areas are developed, which indicates also more urban projects. It will be interesting to follow the developments in the city.

A city is not just a place where city policies are played out, but also one where the inhabitants live their everyday lives. For them, personal identity is closely linked with the history of the city, the conflicts, and particular neighborhoods. Whether or not the politicians and planners focus on the inhabitants and their immediate surroundings, their lives go on. The infrastructure has to function, and employment opportunities steer the inhabitants as well as education. Although this is not the focus of the study, these aspects also construct the city, regardless of political measures or conflicts. Without the inhabitants and their actions and choices, the city would lose its heart. It is precisely this interaction between individual, local, national, and global identity that makes the city a particularly interesting object to study in relation with identity politics.

### 9.7 Further research

The empirical material of this dissertation is vast and it can be used to analyze various issues in upcoming articles. Besides giving input to further research on the empirical material at hand, this framework will also be used as a starting point for further research. It would be both possible and interesting to use the narrative framework as a foundation for future studies, as well as the identity discourse, and strategies of territoriality. The five territorialities could be analyzed more closely as political goals, but also in connection with actual processes or events.

The material also provides an input for further studies on institutional reform, particularly in contested contexts. The various roles of the planners could be developed into more in-depth studies. Although quite a lot of research has been performed about advocacy planning, there are a number
of ongoing cases that constitute interesting and available empirical material
in Jerusalem.

From a more general perspective, the development of Jerusalem today is
an intriguing process to study. The political goals are more outspoken,
particularly from the municipality and the focus on Jerusalem as a city is
more specific than before, both from a local and a global perspective. One
interesting topic would be to focus on the role of the citizens and how they
relate to both identity politics and city planning. How do the inhabitants
interpret the identity rhetoric of national and local politicians with regards
to Jerusalem?

The Catch 22 of the Palestinian Jerusalemites is a controversial but a ne-
cessary issue to discuss. For over 40 years, the situation of the Palestinian
population in Jerusalem has been problematic. Can participation in Israeli
political and administrative systems be a key to some sort of Palestinian
autonomy? Many of the Israeli respondents in this dissertation claim that
the Palestinians would alter the future of Jerusalem if they participated in
the local elections. Can Palestinian Jerusalemites remain outside the domi-
nant system for another 40 years? In any case, Palestinian political identity
in Jerusalem is a crucial topic to elaborate on.

9.8 And now what?

“There are no facts on the ground that cannot be reversed.” This is an
argument supported by many of the respondents from both the Palestinian
and Israeli communities in Jerusalem. Their perspective is that the map can
always be redrawn and buildings knocked down. This is also the perspec-
tive of the Israeli authorities concerning the security barrier. In contrast,
many of the representatives of the Israeli civil society seem to believe the
contrary, presenting a more post-Zionist view. The Israeli settlements in
East Jerusalem, settlements near Jerusalem, and the security barrier have all
together created “facts on the ground” that could be taken into considera-
tion. Very few of the respondents in this study claim that a two-state solu-
tion with two capitals is totally impossible, but only a few believe in a solu-
tion based on the so-called green line – the 1948 armistice line separating
East from West Jerusalem.

This study reveals that identity politics and the policy area of planning
are closely related. Identity is important for the political practice in Jerusa-
lem and a conclusion is that the traditional Zionist identity hegemony is
being challenged. Global, local, group, and individual identities are chal-
lenging the hegemonic identity discourse often related to the political estab-
ishment. We can only speculate as to what will happen when these “new”
actors, such as new Zionists, become “the establishment” themselves.
Internationally, Jerusalem is mainly viewed in the light of its role in the Israel–Palestine conflict and in the peace process. The Israeli identity politics of Jerusalem have been constructed to a large extent as a reaction to the peace process and the claims of the Palestinians. It is clear that new strategies are constantly being developed in order to reiterate the claim to Jerusalem. There are a number of scenarios and visions regarding the future status of Jerusalem (see for instance International Peace and Cooperation Center, 2007):

- **the contested or occupied city**, which is the current situation with Israeli control over Jerusalem and where the relations between the Israeli and the Palestinian residents are tense;
- **the swiss cheese city**, meaning a unilateral Israeli disengagement from unwanted parts of Jerusalem with Palestinian population;
- **the multi-national city**, where Israel controls Jerusalem and the Palestinian population participates in municipal elections and politics, and due to the size of the Palestinian group, its influence increases;
- **the community-based city**, which means a division of Jerusalem into three boroughs, one Palestinian, one secular Jewish, and one religious Jewish, and this scenario is seen as part of an interim agreement between the Palestinian authority and the state of Israel;
- **the city of bridges**, a Jerusalem with a permanent status agreement with two capitals with clear political borders, but in which the city remains open;
- **the divided city** where Jerusalem becomes two capitals of two states with a visible wall or border running through it, with little contact between both sides; and,
- **the one city approach** where there is one Municipal council in charge of everyday affairs such as planning, garbage collection, and so on, and two separate political units – one for Israeli Jerusalem and one for Palestinian Jerusalem. The vision of a one-state solution with Jerusalem as one city is mainly promoted by actors under the post-Zionist umbrella.

In their personal visions of Jerusalem, a majority of the respondents in this study state that they would like to see an open city, and they also agree on some sort of autonomy for the Palestinian areas, but they deeply disagree about the ultimate control over the city. No one believes in the old vision from the 1947 partition plan that Jerusalem, or at least the Old City should be part of an international entity. In any case, for any solution to
succeed, it must be grounded in local opinions and be sustainable for the Jerusalemites who lives their everyday lives in the city.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position or Role</th>
<th>Interview Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kleibo, Mounir</td>
<td>UNDP, Jerusalem</td>
<td>September 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klein, Menachem</td>
<td>Senior Lecturer of Political Science, Bar-Ilan University</td>
<td>August 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuhn, Charles</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Department of Policy Planning, Municipality of Jerusalem</td>
<td>February 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manor, Ofer</td>
<td>Chief Architect, Department of City Planning, Municipality of Jerusalem</td>
<td>September 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margalit, Meir</td>
<td>Coordinator, The Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) and current City Council member, Meeretz with East Jerusalem portfolio</td>
<td>August 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasrallah, Rami</td>
<td>Head of Board of Directors, International Peace and Cooperation Center</td>
<td>September 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odeh, Yacoub</td>
<td>Land &amp; Housing Research Center. Jerusalem HR. &amp; Housing Supervisor</td>
<td>September 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pinski, Reuven</td>
<td>Development Manager, The Old City. The Jerusalem Development Authority</td>
<td>February 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post, Osnat</td>
<td>Architect. Head of Planning Division, Municipality of Jerusalem</td>
<td>February 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabbah, Michel</td>
<td>Former Latin Patriarche, Jerusalem</td>
<td>September 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salem, Walid</td>
<td>Jerusalem Office Director, The Palestinian Center for the Dissemination of Democracy and Community Development (PANORAMA)</td>
<td>September 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schwartz, Binat</td>
<td>Former District planner</td>
<td>September 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schwartz, Ruth</td>
<td>District planner, District Planning Bureau, Israeli Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>February 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seidemann, Daniel</td>
<td>Israeli Advocate</td>
<td>September 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seligman, Jon</td>
<td>Jerusalem Regional Archaeologist, Israel Antiquities Authority</td>
<td>February 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stav, Dan</td>
<td>Former planner, Israel Land Administration</td>
<td>February 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Tourjman, Meir (2009) City council member, Municipality of Jerusalem. Interview conducted February 17.


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Appendix 1. Interview themes
The 63 interviews made within this dissertation project have been guided by an interview form based on general themes. These themes, with follow-up questions, have been modified for each interview depending on the role of the respondent. Therefore the interview form will be presented thematically below.

Description of contemporary Jerusalem
The respondents were asked to describe how they interpret Jerusalem today, both from a personal and a professional view. This highlights the many interpretations of the city. The respondents were asked to describe the city in just a few sentences.

Identity politics and professional planning
This theme concentrates on relating identity politics to Jerusalem and particularly the policy area of planning. The respondents had an opportunity to develop both their professional and personal opinions about Israeli, Palestinian or international aspects of identity, and the geopolitics of Jerusalem. This theme also relates to religion, culture, and ethnic division, as well as Israeli identity discourses. The Palestinian respondents also related to Palestinian identity discourses.

Planning Jerusalem since 1967
The respondents were asked to describe what they regard as the most important events and projects related to the physical development of Jerusalem since 1967. Many respondents chose to go further back in history.

Contemporary planning projects, planning policies, and the role of statutory and non-statutory plans
This theme relates to contemporary planning policy and specific projects. The respondents discussed all kinds of issues, where some concentrated on actors, others on plans, and a third category on Israeli discrimination of the Palestinian inhabitants.

Planning regulations and decision-making system
The respondents were asked how laws and planning decision-making in Jerusalem relate to the policy area of planning, and to identity politics. This theme aims at analyzing the role of the planning structures as a context and discursive framework. Many respondents came to discuss the need for reforms in the planning system.
Actors with an influence on planning
This theme concentrates on identifying the main planning actors of Jeru-
alem and focuses on power over planning, and power over the general de-
velopment of Jerusalem.

The “Safdie Plan”
The respondents were invited to relate to the “Safdie Plan” both from a
personal and professional perspective. They concentrated on describing the
background and motivation for the plan, the actual bureaucratic and ad-
ministrative process, the protests against the plan, the roles of the actors
involved, and the consequences of the rejection on both the Israeli and
Palestinian communities in Jerusalem.

The Local Outline Scheme “Jerusalem 2000”
One of the themes of this dissertation is the ongoing process of approving a
new Local Outline Scheme for Jerusalem. As the plan is not yet approved
at all levels, the answers have to be interpreted in that light. The respon-
dents discussed both positive and negative aspects of the plan, as well as
the role of a Local Outline Scheme in the development of Jerusalem.

Other statutory and non-statutory plans
This theme aims at targeting the role of statutory and non-statutory plans
in general, although the follow-up questions related mainly to National
Plan 35 (TAMA 35). Some of the issues discussed were the role of ideas in
the plans and ideational trends over time, the influence plans in general,
and the set-up of the planning teams in charge of the plans.

The role of social movements and alternative planning organizations
The role of the civil society in the planning of Jerusalem is scrutinized
through the interviews. The respondents were asked to elaborate on the
positive and negative aspects of the involvement of social movements in
planning.

The role of the inhabitants
Few studies have focused on citizen participation in the planning of Jerusa-
lem and therefore this issue was highlighted in some of the interview in
order to get a picture of the planning system in a broader perspective. The
respondents related mainly to power issues, transparency, and conflicts.
This theme is particularly relevant related to the “Safdie plan”.

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Effects of planning on the development of Jerusalem
The respondents were asked to elaborate on the role of planning in the politics of Jerusalem, mainly concentrating on identity politics and the Israel–Palestine conflict.

Personal vision of what Jerusalem should be in the future
This concluding theme relates to the many visions and ideas about the future development of Jerusalem. It concerns everything from the question of a divided city to neighborhood councils. Many of the respondents departed from their professional opinion during the interview and landed in strict personal views. Some of the respondents were reluctant to state their opinions and others related to their personal visions, but did not want to be quoted.
## Appendix 2. Jerusalem through history

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3200 BCE</td>
<td>First traces of a settlement in Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3200–1800 BCE</td>
<td>Jerusalem inhabited off and on by Canaanites and Amorites. Egyptian rule over the region. Close relations with the Hittites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800 BCE</td>
<td>Jebusite family or tribe inhabitants of Jerusalem. Fortress-like structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1004–596 BCE</td>
<td>The Israelite King David makes Jerusalem the capital of Israel and Judah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>596–539 BCE</td>
<td>The destruction of Jerusalem by the Babylonians and the exile of the city-dwellers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>539–332 BCE</td>
<td>Babylon is destroyed (539) and the exiles return to Jerusalem. Jerusalem loyal to Persia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>332–63 BCE</td>
<td>Hellenistic period. The Maccabean revolt in 164 BCE led to relative independence in the Hasmonean Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63 BCE–637 CE</td>
<td>The Roman and Byzantine period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>638–1099 CE</td>
<td>Early Islamic period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1099–1187 CE</td>
<td>Crusader Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1187–1516 CE</td>
<td>Jerusalem under Ayyubids and Mameluks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1516–1831 CE</td>
<td>The Ottoman period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1831–1840 CE</td>
<td>Egyptian occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840–1917 CE</td>
<td>The second Ottoman period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917 (1922)–1947 CE</td>
<td>The British military administration and mandate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948–1967 CE</td>
<td>East Jerusalem under Jordanian rule West Jerusalem part of the state of Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967–</td>
<td>Jerusalem under Israeli rule</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 3. Israeli national election results, Jerusalem 2006 and 2009 (% and seats)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Jerusalem</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Number of seats (120 total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kadima</td>
<td>12,23</td>
<td>22,0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>10,10</td>
<td>15,1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shas</td>
<td>15,14</td>
<td>9,5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likud</td>
<td>10,74</td>
<td>9,0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yisrael Beiteenu</td>
<td>6,55</td>
<td>9,0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Union (Ichud Leumi/Mafdal)</td>
<td>12,40</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensioners party (Gil)</td>
<td>4,29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Torah Judaism (Yahadut Ha’torah)</td>
<td>19,02</td>
<td>4,7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meretz-Yahad</td>
<td>3,18</td>
<td>3,8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab List (Ra’am Ta’al)</td>
<td>0,18</td>
<td>3,0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Assembly (Balad)</td>
<td>0,27</td>
<td>2,3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadash</td>
<td>0,34</td>
<td>2,7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habayit Hayehudi (Jewish home)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Israel has a 2% threshold
### Appendix 4. Local election results, Jerusalem 2003 and 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Torah Judaism (Yahadut Ha’Torah)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem will succeed</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shas</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Religious Party (Mafdal)-National Union</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meretz</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shinui</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likud</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wake up Jerusalem</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yerushalaim Beitenu</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Jerusalem</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pisgat Ze’ev in on the map</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter turnout</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>Uri Lupolianski, Yahadut Ha’Torah</td>
<td>Nir Barkat, Jerusalem will succeed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The threshold is 5%.
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