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Deliberative communications ethics, its criticism, and proposal for research on attitudes as expressive acts in risk discourse

Abstract
A debate which crosses over disciplines as philosophy, sociology and media and communication studies, concerns the nature and democratic potential of conversation. This paper begins by outlining some of the arguments that insist that conversation is a particularly democratic mode of communication. Particular emphasis is given to Jürgen Habermas's thinking. The essay will then go through some objections to this deliberative democracy theory, which stress, inter alia, that a subjective and highly democratic dimension is suppressed in it. In order to allow a conversation-focused analysis of this, allegedly, repressed dimension in deliberative democracy theory, I introduce the concept of ‘attitude’. It hardly qualifies among the concepts that signify ideal speech in Habermas' perspective, but nevertheless I argue that it could capture a subjective dimension that critics insist is suppressed in his work. I will use an analytical example to illustrate how the concept of attitude can be used in a discourse analysis.

Introduction
Deliberative democracy theory suggests that public deliberation is fundamental to democracy. Several theorists can be said to have made significant contributions to this tradition which sees democracy and conversation as inseparable, among the most prolific being Jürgen Habermas, John Dewey, John Rawls, and George Herbert Mead. Without going into detail on any differences between these researchers and philosophers, this paper is based mostly from Habermas because he has had the biggest influence on my own discipline of Media and Communication Studies, even if Dewey also has received attention (cf. Carey, 1992) and increasingly so due to a renewed interest in pragmatism (Jensen, 2010).

I wish in this essay to argue that even if the idea of an open and equal discussion that shapes political views is desirable, one must ask whether the concrete analysis of democracy and communication to a greater extent needs tools to deal with the ‘messy’ and non-ideal quality of human communication. If so, we can (a) save Habermas’s speech ideals from being simplified and used as some kind of ‘measuring stick’ for empirical material, and (b) develop conceptual tools that do not unrealistically presuppose that communication is ethically rather than strategically driven, or otherwise.

Thus, it becomes important to decouple Habermas’s communications ethics from its most idealistic notions, for one thing, because he himself did not argue that the ideal speech situation was fully realized even in the ideal period which he focuses on, when, in principal, neither the state nor capital imposed their interests on, and coloured the perceptions of, the bourgeoisie (cf. Habermas, 1962/1998). Actually, in the light of Habermas’s cautious stance, and his view of what subsequently occurred to the public sphere during the 20th century, it is sur-
prising how a discourse on dialogue and consensus has had such an impact in policy documents (see, e.g., Eurofound, 2009) as well as in research (e.g. Gephart, 1992), where these ideals are often treated as self-evident and achievable realities. Although it is outside the purpose of this essay, it is tempting to think that concepts as dialogue have been simplified and taken over by political program that Habermas actually has little in common with, and which is part of, and legitimizes, a new spirit of capitalism (cf. Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005: 139).

What I want to do is, again, to decouple Habermas from the more idealistic notions of how human communication really works. To do that, I build on Habermas's own communication ethics that I would argue rejects at least the most idealistic interpretations. I will take further account of the views expressed by critics of his works (e.g. Dahlgren, 1993; Mouffe, 1993; Thompson, 1995) to thereafter launch a discursive approach to the concept of ‘attitude’, as a complement to Habermasian communication analysis. I see it as positive rather negative that the term hardly qualifies among the ideal concepts of deliberative democracy theory, because then it can be used in analyses of the ‘messy’ communication that gets overlooked or simply is considered inferior in the light of more ideal sounding terms. But to begin, I will do a brief summary of Habermas’s communication ethics.

**Habermas’s communications ethics**

One of the most justifiably famous researchers in the tradition of deliberative democracy is Jürgen Habermas. His pioneering work on the creation and restructuring of the public sphere in Europe (Habermas, 1962/1998) has perhaps more than any other work influenced Media and communication research on the conditions for, and interlinkages between, communication and democracy. Although this theoretical, argumentative case study and historiography is his most famous work, one should not forget the two-part epic piece *The theory of communicative action* which presents, in principle, ideas which we recognize from Habermas’s early work, but which advocates these ideas by way of more universal and philosophical knowledge claims. Habermas thus goes from doing the empirical analysis that the very idea of an open and rational form of communication and political advocacy became influential - albeit not fully realized – in the 18th and 19th century bourgeois societies, to formulate a more universal theory of communicative action that yet emphasizes the same idea of equitable communication.

In order to move forward in this comprehensive and nuanced intellectual tradition, I will highlight three aspects of, or comments on, Habermas’s thinking on deliberation and democracy. The first relates to communication as a prerequisite for rationality. Thereafter, a summary is made of the ethical premises which are a prerequisite for this communicative rationality. Finally, I highlight the benefits of the use of his thinking in relation to other theorists of the Frankfurt School and also vis-à-vis some of the prolific pragmatist thinkers of the Chicago School.
Starting with the first point, to understand Habermas’s view of the importance of deliberation, it is useful to begin by explaining how he defines rationality. Unlike postmodernists, he does not quite want to break with the Enlightenment ideal of reason, although he still criticizes the latter for a view of rationality as something singular and static that awaits ‘discovery’. For Habermas, rationality is never a single, essentialist truth, but rather the result of a dynamic and collective process that must be open and inclusive in nature (Dahlgren, 1993). Rationality arises, for example - though not entirely or completely - in the early bourgeois discussions in the salons about common concerns, and in the communicative acts where views converge on what is a valid claim and what is valid criticism (see, e.g., Habermas, 1962/1998: 33, 115). Furthermore, in the first volume of The Theory of Communicative Action, he states that rationality is the quality that makes speech or action ‘defendable against criticism’ (Habermas, 1984: 16). If one should say that Habermas associates reason with some essential, and not only procedural, quality, it would be that reason should actually do justice to the most important human needs, rather than fulfilling strategic, instrumental goals so as to maximize the efficiency and profitability of institutions (Habermas, 1989). And once again, by rational argument, a particular view can be criticized, and found to be false and reprehensible, which means that knowledge is relatively context-dependent but not entirely relative as some postmodernist epistemology would have it.

Habermas argues that deliberation and communicative rationality depends on a communicative ethics. In his early work on the transformation of the public sphere, Habermas stresses that the various social gathering places of the bourgeois - coffee houses and lounges - despite their differences still shared a number of characteristics (see Habermas, 1962/998: 34-35; 1984, 99f; 2006: 4f).

Firstly, Habermas argues that the idea appeared in these contexts that the interaction would be characterized by indifference to the social position and status of those involved. Statements should be assessed on the basis of their quality rather than on factors such as the differential power that a hierarchical order imposes. There was an idea that equal, private gentlemen would meet, not people whose identities would depend on and be reproduced by communicative inequality (Habermas, 1962/1998: 34).

Secondly, this type of communication ethics is characterized by its expansion of the areas and problems that are possible to discuss; issues that previously had been excluded by the powers or had not been problematised by persons other than those associated with the state, church and nobility. For example, the church and aristocracy had previously had a monopoly on most things concerning the meanings of literature and art, but the communication ethics that Habermas believes takes shape as an idea in the 18th century makes these areas to the subjects for discussion and sense making of a new, relatively large class of private people (Habermas, 1962/1998: 35).

Thirdly, through a commercial distribution of literature, it is in a particularly open way in which an emerging social group can share and discuss concerns that become common. When
a book or newspaper is printed and sold to a literate population that has time to read, there is a principled openness in the way in which matters can be highlighted and discussed. When a person reads and creates understanding around an event, thousands of others do the same thing (Habermas, 1962/1998: 35).

As I mentioned earlier, Habermas (1984) proceeds to make more universal claims regarding communicative rationality. In addition to the ideal conditions for communicative rationality which Habermas refers to in several places (e.g. Habermas, 1962/1998, 2006) – the principled openness, equal conditions for participation which will ensure the impact of the best argument, validity claims that are possible to criticize – he considers speakers’ orientations to three different worlds. Habermas argues that in communicative action propositions should be about, and be measured against, ‘an objective world of existing states of affairs’ (Habermas, 1984, 51; my italicization). He further argues that the statements are oriented towards and measured against a social world of normative rightness, which has to do with such things as causal relationships and health. Finally, he argues that interlocutors should be honest in terms of their subjective world, so that they not only engage in ‘impression management’, but also assures that the ‘intention of the speaker is meant as it is expressed’ (Habermas, 1984: 99). In a little simpler terms he asserts that people should stick to, and be measured against, ‘propositional truth, normative rightness and expressive sincerity’ (Habermas, 1984: 50).

We have therefore a theory of communicative action that centres around people's capacity to create mutual understanding and improved processes to achieve more rigorous truth claims and agreements. Through these principles, they can ‘mobilize the rationality potential’ (Habermas, 1984: 99). In the broader context of critical theory, these different communication ethics that Habermas (1962/1998; 1984; 2006) proposes should be seen as ideal tools with which private people can establish rational communication that also offers resistance to an instrumental rationality that is growing and spreading through the control systems of capitalism and bureaucracy. In the second part of The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas describes the system world’s expert cultures colonize the life world, and its pre-packaged thinking imposed onto private people. Without a living discourse ethics as defence, the diffuse and uncoordinated ideas in the life world cannot disentangle, problematize and overcome the colonizing forces (Habermas, 1989: 355). Thus, it is a fragile communicative rationality that must be mobilized to threaten various conditions of domination (Habermas, 1962/1998: 33).

In concluding this section, I will compare and demonstrate a few merits of Habermas’ ideas that I have summarized thus far. I want to emphasize two aspects of Habermas’s work that seem particularly worthy of comparison with (1) Adorno and Horkheimer (1947/1997) and (2) John Dewey who has also emphasized the inseparability of democracy and communication (Carey, 1992).

Beginning with the relationship with the older leaders of the Frankfurt School, Adorno and Horkheimer, it is clear that their critical theory is an intellectual fund for Habermas. What unites them seems to be a vision of a modern condition which is seriously threatened by in-
instrumental rationality – a way of thinking as well as a type of action that reduces human beings (and nature) into tools of capital accumulation, bureaucratic systems conservation, and which suppresses or makes irrelevant their individuality, subjectivity, and self-worth. But, to some extent in contrast to Habermas, *The Dialectics of Enlightenment* emphasizes precisely the Enlightenment as a force that has come to dominate people and nature. In its denial of the metaphysical and the non-measurable values, our ontology has, through the enlightenment, become curtailed. The modern reason and positivist science, as the sole truth-teller, has declared metaphysics meaningless and prehistoric, associated with the myths of time. Concepts such as content, value, suffering, being, existence, cease to mean anything. Anything that cannot be calculated and shown to have practical utility, is suspect. They furthermore declares that the enlightenment excludes everything that could be seen as superhuman and encloses everything else in its power. Human beings, as well as nature, become reified and transformed into resources that should be used rationally, that is to maximum effect (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1947/1997). An interesting dilemma that emerges in *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, is that Adorno and Horkheimer argues that alternative knowledge and resistance have been relegated to the margins to the point that, from what I can see, people are not considered to be equipped with some knowledge, disposition, or potential that can be used to create other realities beyond the current undesirable condition. Thus, having reached a dead end, Adorno and Horkheimer turn to the past, to the classical myths. However, given that this work was published in Germany just two years after the end of World War II, the loss of belief in reason might not be so surprising. In comparison, Habermas's faith in the potential of a communicative rationality of private people seems quite encouraging. Where Adorno and Horkheimer reach the end of the road and turn back, Habermas points to a way forward, even if this particular way implies that we are encouraged to accept a partially idealistic principle that assumes that humans can reach agreements on equal terms, and determine questions of truth, ethics, and honesty. This seems, after all, still a viable option if we are to conduct research related to people who in different ways are trying to cooperate but also realize different goals.

Moving on to a brief comparison of Habermas and John Dewey, it is obvious that the two see rationality as totally dependent on interpersonal dialogue, particularly in verbal form. Moreover, democracy is seen as entirely dependent on participatory communications involving citizens. Dewey contrasts in this way the contemporary thinker and commentator Walter Lippmann, (1922/2004) who had a far more aristocratic perspective, in which expert government was ideal. Dewey argues, instead, that the idea of democracy 'remains barren and empty save as it is incarnated in human relationships' (Dewey, 2008: 325). The most important factor and method for creating a better democracy that, so to speak, impregnates human relations is inclusive, participatory communication: 'The essential need, in other words, is the improvement of the conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion’ (Dewey, 2008: 365).

Additionally, like Habermas stresses the importance of the participation and connection of private people through a public sphere, Dewey (2008: 325) advances, again and again, a view
of society as a totality – in search of ‘the great community’ as he puts it – which stresses the idea of creating intersubjectivity and understanding of self and other that bridge the large gaps between strata of society in the U.S. We can actually understand Dewey’s emphasis on communication and togetherness based on the context that the state was perceived as weak, that the relatively new nation lacked unity between communities, and for the social liberal Dewey, income gaps between rich and poor were considered very high. It is this context - a kind of threatening fragmentation and disintegration - which also impregnates the thinking of another pragmatist, George Herbert Mead (Deetz, 1992) who also focuses on the importance of interaction and intersubjectivity.

One advantage of the combination of traditions that Habermas brings together, is that the critical theory helps with a healthy scepticism regarding the opposite of fragmentation and fragmented groups, i.e. social control and the entrapment of ideology through communication. There is an idea of a dialectic, where for example the State's involvement for the sake of human well-being can turn into instrumental rationality, or that the unified character of an audience can be a sign of the hegemonic effect of the ideologies of the system world. The lack of this type of critical theory in Dewey may be said to make him a target for criticism that centres around the problem that too much reliance is dedicated to communication as a positive and unifying force, while social control as an effect of communication is ignored. A probably unintended effect is that the Chicago school’s social psychology regarding interaction, roles and groups has become cornerstones in management theories about how a work force and workgroups can be normalized and shaped for maximum human resources utilization. One can therefore say that the fear of disintegration, lack of tradition and cohesion overshadowed the impact that communication also may have, i.e. normalization, social control and uniformity (Deetz, 1992: 258). Habermas’s combination of traditions, such as pragmatism and critical theory, is better equipped to detect signs of such development.

**Criticisms of Habermas**

It is not surprising that Habermas’ work and ideas have been thoroughly criticized, since they also have had widespread influence, and have constituted a mandatory corpus for so many. I'll start here by talking about the criticism that I believe is less valid, and then go into the most prominent critics, including, e.g., John B. Thompson and Chantal Mouffe.

A typical and frequently voiced criticism concerns Habermas's alleged idealism regarding the period that constitutes his case study in his work on the transformation of the public sphere. As an example, Dahlgren (1993) presents criticism of Habermas, and allege, inter alia, that ‘it might be argued that [...] the discourse of the bourgeois public sphere even at its zenith never manifested the high level of reasoned discourse he suggests’ (p. 5). He criticizes Habermas further because he only presents a formalized, seemingly non-empirical understanding of communication: ‘References to the complexities and contradictions of meaning production, and to the concrete social settings and cultural resources at work, are absent’ (p. 6).
Regarding the claim that Habermas idealizes the 18th and 19th century bourgeois era, it is interesting to see that he does not claim that the ideals of a communication ethics is realized in the meetings of the bourgeoisie. On the topic of the realization of communication ethics, he writes:

Not that this idea of the public would actually be realized in the coffee houses, salons and societies, but rather that it is institutionalized as an idea in them and is therefore presented as an objective claim, and so far has been, if not real, however, operating (Habermas, 1962/1998: 34; my translation).

This clearly shows that Habermas himself hardly idealized the period as much as people sometimes claim (e.g., Dahlgren, 1993, see also Littlejohn and Foss, 2009: 411). If this criticism may capture some of the broad outlines of the argument, it is apparently not so subtle that it takes note of the limitations that Habermas still admits existed.

In terms of Habermas’ alleged ignorance regarding the complex, real and everyday communication for the benefit of ‘systems theory’ of communication, it is interesting to note the following passage on everyday interaction in The Theory of Communicative Action:

Stability and absence of ambiguity are rather the exception in the communicative practice of everyday life. A more realistic picture is that drawn by ethnomethodologists – of a diffuse, fragile, continuously revised and only momentarily successful communication in which participants rely on problematic and unclarified presuppositions and feel their way from one occasional commonality to the next (Habermas, 1984: 100f).

Again, it seems that the criticism does not take note of the fine print and instead stays at a level of generality that is a bit unfair. Furthermore, it is not something new or something odd that Habermas is a researcher who essentially did not sit all day with his nose in empirical data, and thus is the application of his theories in more empirically saturated research the responsibility of those researchers and not Habermas.

Thompson’s critique is the one that seemingly is most relevant for media and communication studies, although other critics (e.g. Fraser, 1992; Mouffe, 1993) possibly attack Habermas’s theory on more fundamental points. In short, Thompson (1995) argues that Habermas is peddling a false view of the media. The mass media, for Habermas, is displacing the oral dialogue, it also makes, in commercialized form, the people into a culture consuming rather than culture reasoning audience. By contrast, Thompson does not share this pessimistic view. Thompson presents a more nuanced view of communication, in model form, which contains (a) face-to-face interaction that is dialogical and occurs at the same time and same place, (b) mediated interaction, which is dialogical, but may be extended in time and place, and (c) quasi-mediated interaction, which is monological, but which can be extended in time and place,
and has an unlimited number of recipients. Thompson also believes that Habermas, in his lack of understanding of the importance of mass media, and thus the last category described above, exaggerates the importance of a direct, participatory democracy, and underestimates what the media does. As an effect of the mass media those in power become visible to the masses in a new way, which means that both positive and negative behaviours in a very short time frame may become known to millions of people and get very serious consequences. Knowledge of a leader – say George W. Bush’s inability to answer questions in a live broadcast – is an example of stuff that the media can spread that was impossible prior to the mass media (Thompson, 1995). However, this may also play in favours of Habermas’s argument, because a consequence of the visibility is that those in power are trying to meticulously plan and be careful when they are in the public spotlight.

In addition to this clear political significance, the mass media and other relatively new communications technologies have social consequences in the sense that we, despite the large geographical distance, can be influenced by and interact with other geographically remote cultures (Thompson, 1995). The significance of the ‘Mohammed cartoons’ could be an example, even if this led to escalating disputes.

Continuing to the last criticism I wish to mention, one of Chantal Mouffe’s (1993) basic ideas is that politics and the world is always marked by conflict, by pluralism, which means that there is never a single rational position. With a view of power as omnipresent, in the style of Foucault, a situation that allegedly is characterized by consensus is thus regarded with great skepticism. Mouffe (1993) argues with her theory of a radical pluralism - and the key notion of agonistic democracy - that a democratic consensus is not what is desirable, but rather that people should be enabled to organize themselves around different identities, and take different positions on political issues. Of course, politics is about the existence of a consensus on the ‘rules of the game’, but, to push the metaphor further, there ought to be clear alternatives on the political ‘playing field’. Where Habermas wants to establish a forum for inter-subjective effort and hopefully consensus, Mouffe rather see an irreducible pluralism and forums that do not alter the differences, but rather clarifies the differences and allows diverse political positions to be contested, with the result that power relations can be challenged (Mouffe, 1993).

Furthermore, Mouffe (1993) argues that Habermas, in his belief that people should move beyond their own interests to create something new together with others, completely miss that passions are involved in politics and in its related, collective identity formations. However, the fact that Habermas does not value the friendly feeling of being part of a political collective - and the productive passions that are connected therewith - is perhaps not surprising considering his historical context which is post-war Germany. Still, the claim seems valid, that a vibrant democracy needs different distinct parties that collide with each other in such a way that an impetus for collective identification is created. Such identification mobilizes people politically in a way that consensual or ‘impartial’ debates and solutions cannot do (Mouffe,

1993; in order to compare with the partly similar reasoning of a media researcher, see Schudson, 1997).

One way of analyzing the subjective dimension, that Mouffe argues is suppressed in liberal, deliberative democracy theory, is to analyze attitudes as political and expressive acts. In the following I will describe what it might mean.

Analyzing attitudes in discourse
To revitalize a subjective dimension, I would like to join Mouffe’s criticisms with the discourse psychological take on attitudes. The idea is to follow Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) classic argument and analyze attitudes in a discourse analytical manner, which is, as distinctive, performative, and yet shifting views. A useful definition says that ‘attitudes and so on are all working descriptions of states of affairs […] Their expression promotes some end. Yet one is always on the watch that that end isn’t too obvious or challengeable (van den Berg, Wetherell and Houtkoop-Steenstra, 2003: 86). For analyses of deliberation, this seems to be a tradition, and conception of attitudes, to draw from to a greater extent, and within which there are also many empirical analysis to use as inspiration.

Yet there are similarities with Habermas’s work, which I have dwelled upon previously in this essay. For example, from the definition above of attitudes, we can draw a parallel to Habermas who emphasizes that deliberation is about the exchange of claims and counter claims. These are claims and criticisms regarding facts (the objective world), morality (the normative world) and one’s intentions (the subjective world) (Habermas, 1984). An understanding of attitudes may be organized similarly, that is as oriented toward different goals.

Now I want to conclude by making a brief analysis of an interview excerpt to demonstrate how I imagine that an analysis of attitudes could be done. The interview was done as part of a study on how different employees in industrial workplaces discursively constructed occupational health and safety. In the coming, an operator embraces the naming of health and safety risks as behaviour based, and we will see how he accomplishes this in talk.

IR=interviewer, IEE=interviewee

IR: I understand that behaviour-based safety is something that you work with.

IEE: Yes, well, where do I start? I have read about this of course, and even gone a little training program. We’ve talked about this stuff many years ago as well. And this is definitely not new to me and… I have already written down how all operations in production should be performed in a safe way hah. But then it’s just to get everyone to do it. This with the behaviour-based safety, I am totally with it, I am, absolutely, no problem. But it’s very new for many, yes, managers and line managers, and so. But there’s absolutely nothing new to us who are working with it, you know. But it will require enormous efforts and energy of people, and also staff to handle it… No, but it’s, if one succeeds with it one hundred percent, then we do not have any devia-

tions, risks and incidents, so that’s... No, it’s great. It’s only positive. But there will be a tremendous job. It’s one thing if you have one person who always makes a risky operation, then we can discuss and improve for that person. But now, of course, as I said, there are 29 others who have more... ideas on how to do things hah hah hah

IR: heh umhm

To begin with, we can note that the respondent expresses a strong attitude to behavior-based safety as a good thing (‘if one succeeds with it one hundred percent, then we do not have any deviations, risks and incidents, so that’s... No it’s great. It’s only positive’). However, the talk turns dilemmatic when it regards the possibilities of implementing the particular safety strategy. Already from the start, the respondent uses a humorous understatement to declare that with having written the instructions the easy part is done, and now comes the hard part of convincing and adjusting everyone to follow them (‘it’s just to get everyone to do it’ my italicization). Moreover, in conjunction with the enforcement of standardization – a ‘one best way’ of working – knowledge-claims on part of the ones who need to adjust to standardization become the ‘hard part’, and a problem rather than something positive (‘But then, of course, as I said, there are 29 others who have more ... ideas on how to do things hah hah hah’). Both the ironic understatement and laughter during this sequence manifests a dilemma, which consists in that the respondent on the one hand seems to give his full support to a rather hierarchical behavioural-safety program, while at the same time recognizing that workers have a right to speak up about how their work should be carried out, a right that is based on notions of equality and professional discretion.

To sum up, by expressing these attitudes, you could say that the respondent is oriented towards three goals: (a) to provide descriptions of objective circumstances indicating his role as the expert and the importance of his views (‘I have read about this of course... this is definitely not new to me’); (b) to normatively determine what is good (and bad) preventive safety work (‘No, it’s great. It’s only positive’), while also responding to implicit objections to these claims by softening them through irony and laughter; and (c) to demonstrate to the interviewer that he answers the questions honestly (‘I am totally with it, I am, absolutely, no problem’).

**Concluding remark**

This paper has intended to describe and analyze elements of Habermas’s works to illustrate a communication ethics, to further explain the prominent criticisms of it, and try to propose something myself that can contribute to this research tradition. Not least, it seems that the ideal of impartiality and the separation of emotion and reason in the conduct of communicative rationality, is what some theorists have objected to (e.g. Mouffe, 1993; see also Schudson, 1997). The paper found a bridge between these ideals of ‘impartial rationality’ and ‘passionate’ pluralism through the use of the attitude concept of discourse psychology (cf. Potter
On the one hand, it seemed that this concept could be used to highlight a subjective dimension that is said to be suppressed in Habermas’ deliberative democracy theory, and therefore meet a mindset that we find in Chantal Mouffe (1993). On the other hand, the analysis of attitudes also seemed to be possible to combine with Habermas' argument that deliberation contains claims and counter claims relating to three 'worlds': the objective, the normative and the subjective. As was shown in a brief analysis of an interview excerpt on workplace safety, the respondent performed attitudes in relation to all these worlds. Finally, I feel that further discussion and research is needed on these – for society and the relevance of the research – important and interesting questions.

References


