To Örebro University

The principle of proportionality is a key principle in EU law; however, it has distinctive meanings in different contexts. In the field of free movement, proportionality constrains the Member States’ possibilities to diverge from EU law on the basis of the requirement of suitability and necessity. In the area of EU competences it is a principle that guides the relationship between the EU and Member States and requires the EU legislator to use the least intrusive means of regulation/legislation to protect state sovereignty. There is also a third approach to proportionality in the field of EU sanctions and the Court of Justice’s case-law, which entails that the sanction imposed must be commensurate to the gravity of the offence. This more conventional criminal law ‘retrospective’ version of proportionality has now been enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and suggests that ‘the severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence’. 

The seminal ruling of the Court of Justice in G.K. e.a (Parquet européen) addresses one of the key elements of the EPPO Regulation which is the mechanism for cross-border cooperation between European Delegated Prosecutors (EDPs). This mechanism is designed to enable prosecutors in different Member States to cooperate in an effective manner limiting judicial authorisation for investigation measures undertaken in a certain State at the request of an EDP in a different State to one instance only (‘single judicial  authorisation’). However, the wording of the EPPO Regulation is far from conclusive on this aspect Article 31 being in reality awkward compromise balancing Member States’ views on the scope of judicial review of assigned investigation measures in cross-border cases. This significant provision of the new EPPO Regulation was put to test before the national courts at the case at hand. The CJEU's ruling suggests that the notion of single judicial authorisation has been dealt a blow as we now always will have two forms of judicial control in a cross-border EPPO investigation: one prior on the merits in the State of the handling EDP and one formal in the State of the assisting EDP. In principle, the Court largely followed the Opinion by AG Ćapeta to the extent that the review conducted in the State of  the assisting EDP where a measure requires judicial authorisation may relate only to matters concerning the enforcement of that measure. The CJEU judgment requires us to think more broadly on the EPPO Regulation and the potential need for EU harmonisation in this area. While the establishment of the EPPO is a welcome step towards a ‘federalisation’ of EU criminal law in the specific  area of crimes against the EU budget, the EPPO cannot function effectively with some degree of harmonisation of national criminal procedures. The judgment at hand highlights the implications of this incomplete centralisation of national criminal procedures which makes it more cumbersome for the EPPO to fulfil its task of combating crimes against the EU’s financial interests effectively.

This op-ed intends to briefly analyse the recent opinion by Advocate General Collins in Case C‑292/23 EPPO v I.R.O F.J.L.R.- a seminal preliminary ruling case being the first case ever concerned with the scope and nature of judicial review of procedural acts produced by the EPPO.

EU policy-making in criminal law is a matter of significant public concern for EU citizens and the Member States. The exercise of EU public powers in the fields of criminal law and law enforcement have tangible and adverse consequences for the liberties and well-being of individuals. Furthermore, EU cooperation in the area of criminal law touches upon core functions of statehood including ‘core state powers’ such as the safeguarding of internal security and law enforcement. This raises several questions regarding the rationale underpinning EU criminal policy and its legitimacy within the context of a multi-level polity. This book explores forensically the question whether a compelling normative justification for the EU to regulate criminal justice. It argues that the key justification for supranational action lies in demonstrating the existence of European public goods such as the internal market, the transnational protection of the environment and the provision of security for citizens and other important transnational interests deserving of protection by means of criminal law. It should also be shown that the Union is better placed (given its resources, expertise and incentives) than Member States to protect those interests. This offers a compelling case for EU action in criminal law to address or correct transnational market failures, collective action problems and other externalities arising from the economic and social interdependence between states in the EU

The key question addressed in this chapter is the extent to which the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) is a suitable model for a future ‘federal’ system of European criminal law. The analysis approaches that question especially by studying the relationship between EPPO, national sovereignty and legitimacy. On this basis, the first section of this chapter proceeds to comprehensively analyse the scope, nature and type of enforcement powers enjoyed by the EPPO. The chapter’s second section discusses in detail the ways in which the exercise of the EPPO’s powers may constitute a threat to national sovereignty whilst the third section considers EPPO from the perspective of legitimacy, with a particular focus on judicial review of the EPPO’s activities. The final part of the chapter analyses the pros and cons of establishing the EPPO by means of enhanced cooperation.

With this special issue and as part of the ELJ's endeavour to foster collaborative research projects on European integration, two of its board members, Jacob Öberg and Valsamis Mitsilegas, threw down a challenge to fellow experts in European criminal law: to reflect on the normative foundations of European criminal law. This challenge first took shape with an online symposium organised by Jacob with the support of Örebro University and gathering together the participants in the ELJ special issue. It continued with an exchange on the topic between Valsamis and Jacob hosted by the EU Law Discussion Group at the University of Oxford. It will conclude, following the publication of the special issue, with a conference organised by Valsamis at the School of Law and Social Justice at the University of Liverpool. We hope, nevertheless, that such a challenge will emulate further research and publications on the meaning of European integration through law in other specific fields of EU law as well as transversally.

Den Europeiska åklagarmyndigheten (Eppo), som alldeles nyligen påbörjat sin verksamhet är en symbol för omvandlingen av unionens samarbete på det straffrättsliga området från ett mellanstatligt till ett överstatligt paradigm. Inrättandet av Eppo representerar inte bara en symbolisk handling utan är en enastående rättslig och politisk bedrift som sannolikt kommer innebära ett grundläggande systemskifte i vår syn på unionens samarbete på det straffrättsliga området. Den Europeiska Åklagarmyndigheten avviker markant från den konventionella uppfattningen bland medlemsstaterna som är att mellanstatligt samarbete är den dominerande principen på detta område. Genom att inrätta Eppo har ett överstatligt organ i praktiken antagit sådana exekutiva straffrättsliga befogenheter som traditionellt hör till den suveräna statens grundläggande uppgifter. Den övergripande frågan som analyseras i kapitlet är till vilken utsträckning Eppo är en eftersträvansvärd förebild för hur en framtida ’federal’ Europeisk straffrätt kan gestaltas. Kapitlet belyser frågeställningen genom att särskilt granska relationen mellan Eppo, statssuveränitet och legitimitet. Den första delen av detta kapitel analyserar räckvidden av Eppos befogenheter. Analysen handlar i första hand om karaktären av Eppos befogenheter samt typen av de verkställighetsbefogenheter som myndigheten åtnjuter. Den andra delen av kapitlet diskuterar i detalj på vilket sätt Eppos befogenheter och utövandet av dessa kan anses utgöra ett hot mot den statliga suveräniteten. Den tredje delen av kapitlet diskuterar Eppo utifrån ett legitimitetsperspektiv, med särskilt fokus på domstolsprövning och granskning av organets verksamhet. Särskilt diskuteras vilka krav som bör ställas på en centraliserad europeisk åklagare när den faktiskt utövar offentlig straffrättslig makt på en medlemsstats territorium. Kapitlet argumenterar för att Eppo – i syfte att stärka legitimiteten av dess verksamhet hos medlemsstaterna (och deras myndigheter) – behöver visa att den säkerställer grundläggande rättigheter för tilltalade samt ger möjlighet för granskning och överprövning av dess verksamhet. Slutligen analyseras om Eppo är ett exempel och i sådant fall ett eftersträvansvärt sådant på en ”federal” europeisk straffrätt.

There has been a public debate among academics and politicians of whether Hungary should be required to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office as a condition to receive EU funds according to the different milestones. As the EPPO is tasked with investigating fraud and mismanagement of EU funds, it is well-placed to address the allegations of serious corruption that the Hungarian Government is accused of. Joining the EPPO would thus send a clear message that Hungary takes ending public corruption seriously and a more general sign that it wishes to be a part of the European family. The analysis here, however, suggests that this proposal will not be legally possible to implement, thus illustrating the key problem with enhanced cooperation as a form of European integration. Under primary EU law, Hungary cannot be required to join the EPPO. Whilst Hungary generally benefits from the work of the EPPO as it receives EU funds recovered by the agency, it does not contribute with personnel our resources for the EPPO to function effectively.

The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), which has just commenced its operation (EPPO Press Release) is a milestone for EU integration (Öberg, 2021). The fashioning of the EPPO has nonetheless been a contested process, encumbered by very complex political negotiations in the midst of a battleground between intergovernmental and supranational visions for this body (Harding and Öberg, 2021). Member States have voiced fierce opposition towards the establishment of such an office, viewing the EPPO as a further encroachment on national sovereignty (Commission Communication of 2013). Furthermore, prior to Lisbon, there was no Treaty mandate to defend the establishment of such a body. Nevertheless, the prospect of creating a European Public Prosecutor derived real impetus from the successful negotiation of the new Article 86 TFEU, which was enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty. Whilst Article 86 TFEU does not in itself establish the EPPO, it provides the legal basis for the Council Regulation which subsequently created the EPPO by means of enhanced cooperation (EPPO Regulation). Whilst leaving out the complex details of this body, the following briefly reflect on the rationale of having a European Public Prosecutor, its importance and the main future challenges for this body.

As in other areas of social engineering, Sweden is considered as world-leading in creating systems that address social inequality. One of the cases in point is the Swedish day-fine system which has been considered as pioneering by systematically considering both the wealth of the offender and the seriousness of the offence when imposing the penalty. This chapter analyses in detail the Swedish day-fine system. The case study of Sweden sheds light on the pros and cons of day-fines by recalling the discussion in Sweden prior to introducing the system and the recent academic debates on extending the use of day-fines. The chapter also offers an account of the comprehensive prosecutorial guidelines as well as an analysis of the relevant case law, particularly in relation to adjustment of day-fines. The chapter argues that the Swedish day-fine system overall must be considered as a largely successful project which holds high esteem among courts and practitioners. The common view is that it is a merit of the system that it forces the courts to consider the economic circumstances of the accused and to articulate openly for the way in which such consideration has been done.