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Carlén, B., Hultkrantz, L., Liu, X., Lunander, A., Mandell, S., Mellin, A., . . . Vierth, I. (2014). Landbaserade godstransporter, klimat och styrmedel: underlagsrapporter 1-10. Linköping: Statens väg- och transportforskningsinstitut
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Landbaserade godstransporter, klimat och styrmedel: underlagsrapporter 1-10
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2014 (Swedish)Report (Other academic)
Alternative title[en]
Land based freight transports, climate and policy : underlying reports 1-10
Abstract [sv]

VTI notat 28-2014 innehåller de tio underlagsrapporter som ligger till grund för VTI rapport 831: ”Landbaserade godstransporter, klimat och styrmedel – Sammanfattande rapport”. I VTI rapport 831 diskuterar forskarna flera dimensioner av hur växthusgaserna från godstransportsektorn ska kunna minskas, till exempel med hjälp av så kallade Gröna korridorer. Vidare diskuteras hur man ska se på de klimatpolitiska konsekvenserna av överflyttning från väg till järnväg eller elektrifierade fordon på väg.

Abstract [en]

VTI notat 28-2014 contains the ten underlying reports which is the base for VTI report 831: “Land based freight transports, climate and policy – Summary report”. In VTI report 831, the researchers discuss greenhouse gas emissions from freight transport and how they could be reduced. They address these questions from several different angles. For example, they discuss the introduction of so-called green corridors and propose tools to solve the complex coordination problems that are associated with these corridors. Furthermore, there is a discussion on how to view the climate change impact from shifting road to rail or electrified vehicles on road.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Linköping: Statens väg- och transportforskningsinstitut, 2014. p. 196
Keywords
Freight transport, Emission control, Greenhouse gas, External effect, Policy, Tax, Rail bound transport, Road transport
National Category
Economics
Research subject
00 Road: General works, surveys, comprehensive works, 02 Road: Economics; 10 Road: Transport, society, policy and planning, 12 Road: Freight transport; 10 Road: Transport, society, policy and planning, 15 Road: Environment; J00 Railway: General works, surveys, comprehensive works, J05 Railway: Freight transport; J00 Railway: General works, surveys, comprehensive works, J11 Railway: Environment; J00 Railway: General works, surveys, comprehensive works, J13 Railway: Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-62337 (URN)
Note

Contents: 1 - . 2. On assessing climate effects of electrifying the transport sector. Björn Carlén and Svante Mandell. Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm. Working papers in transport economics, 2012:11. 3. Design of a combinatorial bidding market for Green Corridor freight. Lars Hultkrantz and Anders Lunander. Working Papers, School of Business, Örebro University, No 2013:6. 4. Why do CO2 emissions from road freight transports increase in spite of higher fuel prices? Inge Vierth. Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm. Working papers in Transport Economics, 2013:4. 5 Freight transport, policy instruments and the climate. Svante Mandell, Jan-Eric Nilsson and Inge Vierth. Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm. Working papers in Transport Economics, 2014:5. 6. The role of contractual and non-contractual relations between transport buyers and providers, in an environmental context. Anna Mellin and Edith Sorkina. Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm. Working papers in Transport Economics, 2013:5. 7. – . 8. Estimating the additionality of the Swedish climate investment subsidy program KLIMP using sample-selection model. Xing Liu. 2013. 9. Estimating value of time savings for freight transport: a simultaneous decision model of transport mode choice and shipment size. Xing Liu. 2013. 10. Effects from consistent internalization of external effects from transport and manufacturing: a CGE analysis for Sweden. Xing Liu and Lars Bohlin. 2012

Available from: 2017-11-13 Created: 2017-11-13 Last updated: 2018-06-25Bibliographically approved
Lunander, A. & Lundberg, S. (2013). Bids and costs in combinatorial and noncombinatorial procurement auctions: evidence from procurement of public cleaning contracts. Contemporary economic policy, 31(4), 733-745
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Bids and costs in combinatorial and noncombinatorial procurement auctions: evidence from procurement of public cleaning contracts
2013 (English)In: Contemporary economic policy, ISSN 1074-3529, E-ISSN 1465-7287, Vol. 31, no 4, p. 733-745Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Combinatorial procuremnet auctions enable suppliers to pass their potential cost synergies on to the procuring entity and may therefore lead to lower costs and enhance efficiency. However, bidders might find it profitable to inflate their standalone bids in order to favor their packages bids. Using data fraom standard  and combinatorial procuremnet auctions, we find that bids on individual contracts in simultaneous standard auctions, without the option to submit package bids, are significantly lower than the corresponding standalone bids in combinatorial auctions. Further, no significant difference in procurer's cost as explained by auction format is found.

Keywords
Combinatorial procuremnet auctions
National Category
Social Sciences
Research subject
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-32207 (URN)10.1111/j.1465-7287.2012.00317.x (DOI)000323381900006 ()2-s2.0-84882876240 (Scopus ID)
Projects
Effektivare offentlig upphandling med ny metodik
Funder
Swedish Competition Authority, 603/2008
Available from: 2013-10-31 Created: 2013-10-31 Last updated: 2018-05-21Bibliographically approved
Lunander, A. & Lundberg, S. (2012). Combinatorial Auctions in Public Procurement - Experiences from Sweden. Journal of Public Procurement, 12(1), 81-109
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Combinatorial Auctions in Public Procurement - Experiences from Sweden
2012 (English)In: Journal of Public Procurement, ISSN 1535-0118, E-ISSN 2150-6930, Vol. 12, no 1, p. 81-109Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Combinatorial procurement auctions are increasingly being employed in the private and public sector as an alternative to simultaneous single contract auctions. This mechanism has the advantage that it enablessuppliers to express synergies across bundles of public contracts. This mitigates the exposure problem and also has the potential to both lower the price paid by the procuring authority and enhance efficiency. Thispaper provides stylized facts of recently performed combinatorial public procurements in various markets in Sweden.

Keywords
Combinatorial bidding, public procurement
National Category
Social Sciences
Research subject
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-28876 (URN)2-s2.0-84870271811 (Scopus ID)
Funder
Swedish Competition Authority
Available from: 2013-04-30 Created: 2013-04-30 Last updated: 2018-09-06Bibliographically approved
Lunander, A. & Lundberg, S. (2012). Different design - different cost: an empirical analysis of combinatorial public procurement bidding of road maintenance. Journal of Public Procurement, 12(3), 407-422
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Different design - different cost: an empirical analysis of combinatorial public procurement bidding of road maintenance
2012 (English)In: Journal of Public Procurement, ISSN 1535-0118, E-ISSN 2150-6930, Vol. 12, no 3, p. 407-422Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This paper is an empirical analysis of firs-price sealed bid procurement auctions in Sweden, with and without combinatorial bidding. The data comprises procurement auctions of identical contracts (road resurfacing) with identical bidders under the same time period (2009-2011) in two different regions in Sweden. Given the comparison of the suppliers' offered price per tons of asphalt, we cannot reject the hypothesis of identical distribution of standalone bids generated in both types of auction. The distribution of package bids within the combinatorial format is significantly lower than the distribution of standalone bids within the non-combinatorial format, suggesting substantial cost reduction of allowing package bidding. Also, within the combinatorial format, our analysis od data indicates higher costs when packages are predetermined by the purchaser rather than chosen freely by the suppliers.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Academic Press, 2012
Keywords
Offentlig upphandling
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-28875 (URN)2-s2.0-84876228469 (Scopus ID)
Projects
Effektivare offentlig upphandling
Funder
Swedish Competition Authority
Available from: 2013-04-30 Created: 2013-04-30 Last updated: 2018-05-12Bibliographically approved
Hultkrantz, L. & Lunander, A. (2011). Design of a combinatorial bidding market for Green Corridor freight. In: : . Paper presented at Kuhmo Nectar, Annual conference of the International Transportation Economics Association, Stockholm June 31 - July 1, 2011.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Design of a combinatorial bidding market for Green Corridor freight
2011 (English)Conference paper, Oral presentation only (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

The Green Corridor (GC) initiative, pursued by the Swedish government and the European Commission, is intended to be a platform for innovation for long-distance freight transport aiming for more green and efficient solutions by enhanced use of economies of scale and development of new technologies. However, scale has to be traded off by two other aspects (i) freight transport time and reliability, and (ii) economies of scope. In this paper we present an already existing rail corridor case that highlights the need for tools (and/or markets) for making more efficient tradeoffs between economies of scale and scope in long-distance freight transport. This involves making very complex coordination of shipments that are differentiated with respect to origins-destinations, shipment size, time, time reliability requirements, regularity of shipments and involving both ex ante transport planning and real-time control. A market-based method that in principle could be used to solve such complex coordination is combinatorial auctioning and we briefly review a number of Swedish public tendering cases where this is done in practice. However, this raises questions on whether a fragmented vertically separated European rail industry can mobilize the "soft" market infrastructure needed to support a Green Corridor.

National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-23996 (URN)
Conference
Kuhmo Nectar, Annual conference of the International Transportation Economics Association, Stockholm June 31 - July 1, 2011
Available from: 2012-07-06 Created: 2012-07-06 Last updated: 2019-04-11Bibliographically approved
Lunander, A. (2009). En logisk fälla: Relativ poängsättning av pris vid anbudsutvärdering i offentlig upphandling. Stockholm: Konkurrensverket
Open this publication in new window or tab >>En logisk fälla: Relativ poängsättning av pris vid anbudsutvärdering i offentlig upphandling
2009 (Swedish)Report (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: Konkurrensverket, 2009. p. 41
Series
Konkurrensverkets uppdragsforskning, ISSN 1652-8069 ; 2009:12
National Category
Social Sciences Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-39936 (URN)
Funder
Swedish Competition Authority
Available from: 2014-12-19 Created: 2014-12-19 Last updated: 2017-10-17Bibliographically approved
Lunander, A. & Nilsson, J.-E. (2006). Combinatorial Procurement Auctions: A Collusion Remedy?. Rivista di Politica Economica, 1-2, 65-90
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Combinatorial Procurement Auctions: A Collusion Remedy?
2006 (English)In: Rivista di Politica Economica, ISSN 0035-6468, Vol. 1-2, p. 65-90Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This paper presents the outcome of an experiment where the standard one shot sealed bid procurement auction for two identical goods provides the benchmark. Inducing scale economies a combinatorial auction is applied on the situation with non-linear costs. The mechanisms are first run without, and then with the possibility for subjects to communicate prior to bidding. There are two human and one computer bidder in each period. It is demonstrated that the combinatorial mechanism is able to enhance efficiency and that subjects are less inclined to cooperate under the combinatorial auction than under the standard bidding format. [JEL Classification: D44, D78]

National Category
Social Sciences
Research subject
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-39918 (URN)
Available from: 2014-12-19 Created: 2014-12-19 Last updated: 2017-12-05Bibliographically approved
Lunander, A. (2004). Konsten att jämföra pris och kvalitet. Ekonomisk Debatt, 32(3), 3-5
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Konsten att jämföra pris och kvalitet
2004 (Swedish)In: Ekonomisk Debatt, ISSN 0345-2646, Vol. 32, no 3, p. 3p. 3-5Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.)) Published
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: Nationalekonomiska Föreningen, 2004. p. 3
Keywords
Offentlig upphandling
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-40112 (URN)
Available from: 2015-01-02 Created: 2015-01-02 Last updated: 2017-12-05Bibliographically approved
Lunander, A. & Andersson, A. (2004). Metoder vid utvärdering av pris och kvalitet i offentlig upphandling: En inventering och analys av utvärderingsmodeller inom offentlig upphandling. Stockholm: Konkurrensverket
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Metoder vid utvärdering av pris och kvalitet i offentlig upphandling: En inventering och analys av utvärderingsmodeller inom offentlig upphandling
2004 (Swedish)Report (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: Konkurrensverket, 2004. p. 81
Series
Konkurrenverkets uppdragsforskningsserie ; 2004:1
National Category
Social Sciences
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-39920 (URN)
Funder
Swedish Competition Authority
Available from: 2014-12-19 Created: 2014-12-19 Last updated: 2017-10-17Bibliographically approved
Lunander, A. & Nilsson, J.-E. (2004). Taking the Lab to the Field: Experimental Tests of Alternative Mechanisms to Procure Multiple Contracts. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 25(1), 39-58
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Taking the Lab to the Field: Experimental Tests of Alternative Mechanisms to Procure Multiple Contracts
2004 (English)In: Journal of Regulatory Economics, ISSN 0922-680X, E-ISSN 1573-0468, Vol. 25, no 1, p. 39-58Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The first part of the paper reports the results from a sequence of laboratory experiments comparing the bidding behavior for multiple contracts in three different sealed bid auction mechanisms; first-price simultaneous, first-price sequential and first-price combinatorial bidding. The design of the experiment is based on experiences from a public procurement auction of road markings in Sweden. Bidders are asymmetric in their cost functions; some exhibit decreasing average costs of winning more than one contract, whereas other bidders have increasing average cost functions. The combinatorial bidding mechanism is demonstrated to be most efficient. The second part of the paper describes how the lab experiment was followed up by a field test of a combinatorial procurement auction of road markings.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer, 2004
Keywords
multiple units, non-constant costs, asymmetric redemption values, alternative procurement mechanisms
National Category
Social Sciences
Research subject
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-39917 (URN)10.1023/B:REGE.0000008654.68169.08 (DOI)000187320500002 ()2-s2.0-4043067200 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2014-12-19 Created: 2014-12-19 Last updated: 2017-12-05Bibliographically approved
Organisations
Identifiers
ORCID iD: ORCID iD iconorcid.org/0000-0002-1746-7884

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