Collective action by community groups: solutions for climate change or different players in the same game? Show others and affiliations
2023 (English) In: Climate and Development, ISSN 1756-5529, E-ISSN 1756-5537, Vol. 15, no 8, p. 679-691Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]
Community groups are taking initiatives to adapt to a changing climate. These organizations differ from businesses and governments by being non-profit, often informal, resource limited, and reliant on volunteer labor. How these organizations facilitate collective action is not well known, especially since they do not necessarily solve common pool resource governance, but rather improve common pool resources through collective action. In fact, at first glance, community groups seem to not have the means for solving collective action problems used routinely in industry and government, such as paying people for cooperation or punishing them for lack of it.This article investigates how community groups solve collective action problems though data gathered across 25 organizations in three sites - Sitka, Alaska, USA; Toco, Trinidad; and a global site of distributed citizen science organizations. We found that community groups used positive reinforcement methods common to industry and used little punishment. Groups also engaged in mechanisms for collective action, such as relying on altruistic contributions by few individuals, that generally are not considered commonplace in businesses and governments. We conclude by discussing implications from this study for collective action theory and for how policymakers might learn from community groups to address climate change.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages Taylor & Francis, 2023. Vol. 15, no 8, p. 679-691
Keywords [en]
Collective action, community resilience, prisoner's dilemma, snowdrift, game theory, punishment, ethnicity, volunteerism, climate change adaptation
National Category
Human Geography
Identifiers URN: urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-110927 DOI: 10.1080/17565529.2022.2149254 ISI: 000943505100001 Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85150344497 OAI: oai:DiVA.org:oru-110927 DiVA, id: diva2:1830210
Funder The Research Council of Norway, 312046
Note This work was supported by NSF: [Grant Number 2028065]; Research Council of Norway: [Grant Number 312046]; National Environment Research Council (UK): [Grant Number NE/T013656/1].
2024-01-222024-01-222024-01-23 Bibliographically approved