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Multi-unit common value auctions: theory and experiments
Örebro universitet, Handelshögskolan vid Örebro Universitet.
2012 (Engelska)Doktorsavhandling, sammanläggning (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
Abstract [en]

Research on auctions that involve more than one identical item for sale was,almost non-existing in the 90’s, but has since then been getting increasing attention. External incentives for this research have come from the US spectrum, sales, the European 3G mobile-phone auctions,  and Internet auctions. The policy relevance and the huge amount of money involved in many of them have helped the theory and experimental research advance. But in auctions where values are equal across bidders, common value auctions, that is, when the value depends on some outside parameter, equal to all bidders, the research is still embryonic.

This thesis contributes to the topic with three studies. The first uses a Bayesian game to model a simple multi-unit common value auction, the task being to compare equilibrium strategies and the seller’s revenue from three auction formats; the discriminatory, the uniform and the Vickrey auction. The second study conducts an economic laboratory experiment on basis of the first study. The third study comprises an experiment on the multi-unit common value uniform auction and compares the dynamic and the static environments of this format.

The most salient result in both experiments is that subjects overbid. They are victims of the winner’s curse and bid above the expected value, thus earning a negative profit. There is some learning, but most bidders continue to earn a negative profit also in later rounds. The competitive effect when participating in an auction seems to be stronger than the rationality concerns. In the first experiment, subjects in the Vickrey auction do somewhat better in small groups than subjects in the other auction types and, in the second experiment, subjects in the dynamic auction format perform much better than subjects in the static auction format; but still, they overbid.

Due to this overbidding, the theoretical (but not the behavioral) prediction that the dynamic auction should render more revenue than the static fails inthe second experiment. Nonetheless, the higher revenue of the static auction comes at a cost; half of the auctions yield negative profits to the bidders, and the winner’s curse is more severely widespread in this format. Besides, only a minority of the bidders use the equilibrium bidding strategy.The bottom line is that the choice between the open and sealed-bid formats may be more important than the choice of price mechanism, especially in common value settings.

Ort, förlag, år, upplaga, sidor
Örebro: Örebro university , 2012. , s. 22
Serie
Örebro Studies in Economics, ISSN 1651-8896 ; 22
Nyckelord [en]
Multi-Unit Auction, Common Value Auction, Laboratory Experiment, Game Theory
Nationell ämneskategori
Samhällsvetenskap Nationalekonomi
Forskningsämne
Nationalekonomi
Identifikatorer
URN: urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-26015ISBN: 978-91-7668-893-9 (tryckt)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:oru-26015DiVA, id: diva2:556717
Disputation
2012-11-09, Örebro universitet, Forumhuset, lokal BIO, Fakultetsgatan 1, Örebro, 13:15
Opponent
Handledare
Tillgänglig från: 2012-09-26 Skapad: 2012-09-26 Senast uppdaterad: 2023-01-10Bibliografiskt granskad
Delarbeten
1. Analysis of discrete multi-unit, common value auctions: a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms
Öppna denna publikation i ny flik eller fönster >>Analysis of discrete multi-unit, common value auctions: a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms
(Engelska)Manuskript (preprint) (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
Abstract [en]

This paper proposes a discrete bidding model for both quantities and pricing. It has a two-unit demand environment where subjects bid for contracts with an unknown redemption value, common to all bidders. Prior to bidding, the bidders receive private signals of information on the (common) value. The value and the signals are drawn from a known discrete affiliated joint distribution. The relevant task for the paper is to compare the equilibrium strategies and the seller’s revenue of three auction formats. We find that, of the three auctionformats below with two players, the discriminatory auction always gives the largest revenue to the seller; both the uniform and the Vickrey auction have zero revenue equilibrium strategies that put them further down in the revenue ranking. In equilibrium, bidders bid the same amount on both items in the discriminatory auction; a phenomenon not noted in either of the other auction formats.

Nyckelord
Laboratory Experiment; Multi-Unit Auction; Common Value Auction
Nationell ämneskategori
Ekonomi och näringsliv
Forskningsämne
Nationalekonomi
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-26445 (URN)
Tillgänglig från: 2012-11-16 Skapad: 2012-11-16 Senast uppdaterad: 2023-02-14Bibliografiskt granskad
2. Multi-unit common value auctions: a laboratory experiment with three sealed-bid mechansims
Öppna denna publikation i ny flik eller fönster >>Multi-unit common value auctions: a laboratory experiment with three sealed-bid mechansims
(Engelska)Manuskript (preprint) (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
Abstract [en]

This study addresses a discrete common value environment with independent (one-dimensional) private signals, where the seller offers two identical units and the buyers have (flat) demand for both. Each session is conducted with2, 3 or 4 buyers. Three auction formats are used: the discriminatory, uniformand Vickrey auctions which are all subjected to a variation in the number of bidders and to repeating bid rounds on each subject. The main findings are that there are no significant differences between the uniform and the discriminatory auction in collecting revenue, while the Vickrey auction comes out as inferior. More bidders in the auction result in a greater revenue and level out the performance across the mechanisms. Demand reduction is visible in the experiment, but it is not as prominent as anticipated. Moreover, subjects come closer to equilibrium play over time. Finally, the winner’s curse is less severe than what is reported for inexperienced bidders in other studies.

Nyckelord
Laboratory Experiment, Multi-Unit Auction, Common Value Auction
Nationell ämneskategori
Ekonomi och näringsliv
Forskningsämne
Nationalekonomi
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-26446 (URN)
Tillgänglig från: 2012-11-16 Skapad: 2012-11-16 Senast uppdaterad: 2023-02-14Bibliografiskt granskad
3. Multi-unit common value auctions: an experimental comparison between the static and the dynamic uniform auction
Öppna denna publikation i ny flik eller fönster >>Multi-unit common value auctions: an experimental comparison between the static and the dynamic uniform auction
(Engelska)Manuskript (preprint) (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
Abstract [en]

It is still an open question whether the dynamic or the static format should be used in multi-unit settings, in a uniform price auction. The present study conducts an economic experiment in a common value environment, where it is found that it is more a question of whether the auctioneer wants to facilitate price discovery, and thereby lessen the otherwise pervasive overbidding, or if only the revenue is important. The experiment in the present paper provides evidence that the static format gives a significantly greater revenue than the dynamic auction, in both small and large group sizes. But a higher revenue comes at a cost; half of the auctions in the static format yield negative profits to the bidders, the winner’s curse is more severely widespread in the static auction, and only a minority of the bidders use the equilibrium bidding strategy.

Nyckelord
Laboratory Experiment, Multi-Unit Auction, Common Value Auction
Nationell ämneskategori
Ekonomi och näringsliv
Forskningsämne
Nationalekonomi
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-26447 (URN)
Tillgänglig från: 2012-11-16 Skapad: 2012-11-16 Senast uppdaterad: 2023-02-14Bibliografiskt granskad

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