Ever since Elizabeth V. Spelman wrote about the detrimental effects of ”additive analysis ” in Inessential Woman (1988), the term has been circulating in feminist theoretical discourse as something to be avoided. The reluctance on the part of feminist theorists to engage in additive forms of theoretical analyses seems to have some obvious explanations. First, in the literature following up on Spelman’s critique, it is typically associated with mechanisms of exclusion and false universalism. Second, additive approaches are widely considered to be unintersectional; intersectional theories are positioned in opposition to additive ways of conceptualizing the relationship between social categories. With the growing influence of intersectionality within feminist theory during the last 25 years, additive approaches are therefore viewed with an increasing degree of suspicion.
This paper will analyze the objections raised against additive forms of analysis in feminist intersectional theory. First, I will focus on questions like: What counts as an additive analysis? Exactly what is considered objectionable about it, that is, on what grounds do the objections rest? Then I will go on to discuss what these objections can tell us about the more general theoretical climate for conceptual boundarydrawing in feminist theory. What assumptions about adequate and defensible ways of drawing conceptual boundaries underpin the critiques of additive analyses?