Of the four types of experience available to objects in Graham Harman’s four-fold model of the object, one of them—intellectual speculation on an intended object’s real or invariant qualities—is only available to humans. This is an untenable position in a truly flat ontology. This article ‘closes the loop,’ so to speak, by arguing that invariance can be experienced aesthetically without the invariant qualities of an object being identified and divided by a human intellect. While there is no way of telling how a non-human object experiences invariance in the objects it intends, the experience of invariance before intellectual speculation is visible in at least one realm of human activity: genre-based action. This article argues that because the primary mode of generic production is mimesis (an aesthetic mode), certain invariant qualities of the genre may be experienced as significant and reproduced in iterations of the genre before they are analyzed and identified as such by the intellect. Therefore, rather than attributing some degree of intelligence to all objects, a line of continuity is drawn between the aesthetic and the intellect, rendering the latter an instance of the former.