To Örebro University

In the wake of fast-burning crises ( ’t Hart & Boin, 2001) information-sharing and communication, within and between organizations, as well as between organizations and the public, pose perennial challenges (Boin et al., 2016; Quarantelli, 1988). This is primarily because fast-burning crises are rife with uncertainty about causes, consequences, and intervention options (Ansell et al., 2010). With communication increasingly being seen as an ongoing challenge in the actual management of crises, crisis communication has emerged as a distinct and cohesive field producing a large body of research in the last ten years (Diers-Lawson, 2017). Still, the fields of crisis communication and crisis management view the role and function of communication differently. Crisis communication researchers often focus on the external aspects of crisis communication, for instance crisis-response strategies, public relations, and image-repair efforts, rather than the internal aspects: the communication within the organizations handling the crisis (Frandsen & Johansen, 2011). Consequently, limited efforts have been made to theoretically and empirically reflect upon communicational conditions, processes, and activities during an ongoing crisis (Bundy et al., 2017). Crisis management research, on the other hand, tends to play down the role of communication during ongoing crises, paying more attention to issues such as decision-making, organizational learning, and organizational cultures (Johansen, et al., 2012). 

This chapter addresses this paradoxical situation through in-depth analysis of the terrorist attacks in Oslo on July 22, 2011. The analysis relies on Karl Weick’s (1976, 1979, 1988) sensemaking theory, which provides a valuable starting-point for understanding the role of information-sharing and communication during ongoing crises. Furthermore, the concept of collective crisis sense-making (Frandsen, 2020; Stieglitz et al., 2018), has the potential to bring together insights from crisis communication and crisis management research. During an ongoing crisis, collective sensemaking processes concern how social actors create their environment by (en)acting and paying attention to some information while ignoring other information (Young, 2018; Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010). Hence, sensemaking pertains to the process of clarifying what is going on and bracketing cues from the environment (Stieglitz et al., 2018). Sensemaking is about attributing meaning to environmental stimuli, and it necessitates communication to connect cues to frames (Young, 2018). As crises typically consist of unexpected and incomprehensible events and situations, sensemaking is of the utmost importance for reducing confusion and guiding action (Waller & Uitdewilligen, 2008). Still, the actual processes whereby individuals put their different pieces of information together jointly and collectively have thus far largely been neglected (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014, 102). 

The aim of this chapter is to contribute to filling this gap by theorizing about how collective crisis sensemaking and the actual practice of putting together pieces of information within and outside organizations might contribute to the crisis communication and crisis management literatures respectively. More specifically, we elucidate how power, culture and polyphonic communication have roles to play in sensemaking processes. We ask the following research questions: (How) are individuals who holds different pieces of information during an ongoing, fast-burning crisis able to collectively construct meaning? What challenges are involved in the processes of collective crisis sensemaking? 

The empirical basis of the chapter comprises three communicative situations related to the so-called “car tip” during the two terrorist attacks in Oslo, 2011. In the aftermath of the crisis the police were strongly criticized (NOU, 2012). A quintessential example of what was widely perceived as a flawed police response was its handling of the “car tip.” This tip included detailed information about an armed person in uniform who was observed leaving the government complex only minutes prior to the explosion. In the chapter, the following situations are analyzed. First, we look at how an operator assistant at the Oslo police communicated with the operations commander by a written note, causing important information to go missing for significant amount of time. Secondly, we analyze the situation related to information about an armed man, which three separate operations operators received but did not link together. None of the operators had an overall picture, nor did they have the technology to combine the incoming information. Thirdly, we will focus on how information shared by the Oslo police operations center was decoded differently by different police districts close to Oslo. Using unique, real-time data, we map in detail how the police handled and shared information and how they tried, but, with one exception, failed to collectively make sense of witness reports.