This thesis examines the compatibility of public international law with behavioral economic models on resource extraction, specifically those theories that express what tragedy and fears one ought to expect from such endeavors. The reason behind the analysis is to examine the rigidity and ability of the law to cope with resource extraction in outer space. As will be shown in this thesis, the law as it stands today is inadequate to cope with such fears for primarily four reasons. Firstly, the principle of freedom entitles States to exploit resources in outer space and can thus enable tragedy, i.e. overexploitation of resources. Secondly, sovereignty entitles States to act selfishly when extracting resources because sovereignty at its core amounts to a right for States to conduct any functions they see fit, as long as no violations of international law occur. Thirdly, States are not obliged to cooperate for the sake of resource management, since obligations to cooperate under customary law and treaty law do not stretch that far. And lastly, general international law is the channel for finding solutions in order to prevent tragedy to outer space as a resource domain, but at the present, there are no norms that can cope with the fears expressed in the discourse on the commons.