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Using spatial econometrics to test for collusive behavior in procurement auction data
Södertörn university.
Umeå university.
Umeå university.
Södertörn University.
(English)Manuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-46152OAI: oai:DiVA.org:oru-46152DiVA: diva2:861381
Available from: 2015-10-22 Created: 2015-10-16 Last updated: 2017-10-17Bibliographically approved
In thesis
1. Essays on quality evaluation and bidding behavior in public procurement auctions
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Essays on quality evaluation and bidding behavior in public procurement auctions
2015 (English)Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

In this dissertation, I investigate how different aspects of the procurement process and evaluation affect bidding behavior.

In essay 1, we attempt to map public procurements in Sweden by gathering a representative sample of procurements. We find that framework agreements and multiple-contract procurements represent a very large share of total government spending. The total value procured by government authorities, municipalities and counties accounts to 215 BSEK yearly, which we believe is an underestimate due to data issues.

Essay 2 suggests a simple method for of estimating bidding costs in public procurement, and are empirically estimated to be approximately 2 percent of the procurement value using a comprehensive dataset and approximately 0.5 percent for a more homogeneous road re-pavement dataset. Our method provides reasonable estimates with, compared to other methods, relatively low data requirements.

Essay 3 investigates the effect of quality evaluation on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Contrary to common belief, SMEs’ participation does not increase when evaluating quality, and their probability to win procurements decreases compared with that of large firms.

In essay 4, the bidders’ decision to apply for a procurement review “appeal” is investigated. Contrary to procurers’ beliefs, evaluating quality is found not to have any statistically significant effect on the probability of appeals. Instead, I empirically confirm theoretical prediction of the 1st runner-up’s decision to claim the evaluation to be redone, as well as free-riding in appealing.

In essay 5, we test whether spatial econometrics can be used to test for collusion in procurement data. We apply this method on a known cartel and test during and after the period the cartel was active. Our estimates support the proposition that spatial econometrics can be used to test for collusive behavior.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Örebro: Örebro university, 2015. 20 p.
Series
Örebro Studies in Economics, ISSN 1651-8896 ; 29
Series
Södertörn Doctoral Dissertations, ISSN 1652-7399 ; 113
Keyword
public procurement, quality evaluation, bidding behavior, cartels, SMEs, transaction cost, litigation, spatial econometrics
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-45833 (URN)978-91-7529-095-9 (ISBN)
Public defence
2015-11-12, MB503 Södertörns Högskola, Alfred Nobels allé 7, Flemingsberg, Huddinge, 10:00 (English)
Opponent
Supervisors
Available from: 2015-09-18 Created: 2015-09-18 Last updated: 2017-10-17Bibliographically approved

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Citation style
  • apa
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Language
  • de-DE
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  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
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  • Other locale
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Output format
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