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Emergence of monarchies?

A Comparative study of three East European countries

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Abstract

This study aims to find out why there is a growing demand for monarchic forms of governments in some East European transition countries such as Serbia and Romania but not to the same extent in other comparable transition countries like Bulgaria? This study uses two contemporary theories, beginning here with a *historical-institutional* approach which emphasizes path dependency and critical junctures as explanations for support of a monarchy-institutional tradition. The other approach used in this study is not actually a theory in a strict sense but rather an index of explanation values, derived from *Inglehart* & *Welzel's World Value Survey*. It has the ability to show how post-communist countries were facing a revitalization of traditional values such as nationalism, which created a window of opportunity and created a more fruitful environment for monarchy-associated ideals. The study conducts a comparative analysis of a type called most similar systems design (mssd), which is a method used to highlight differences between the objects of a case study, in this case Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria and their domestic monarchy aspirations. As a result of the method described above, the study uses a set of independent variables upon the dependent one in each case, which is support for monarchy. This allows the study identify the key variables that can explain the outcome; differences in monarchy support.

Keywords: *monarchy, support, critical junctures, traditional values.*

Contents

1 Primary focus

Monarchism in post-communist Europe has previously been examined by political scientists *Richard Rose* & *Christian Haerpfer* and their research will be addressed later.[1] The idea here is to continue doing research on monarchy topics and in particular its status and importance in transition countries with an authoritarian history. Global political science research has not however, despite this important exception, been particularly interested in monarchy topics to any extent. One reason for that is of course that the executive powers possessed by the monarchs of Europe today are mostly symbolical. Another reason for the modest research towards topics concerning monarchy and monarchism could, by logic be deficient empirical material basis. The author of this study has in his own study of the Swedish monarchy been forced to draw the conclusion that it is difficult to even assess whether a monarchy has legitimacy since the empirical material source remains weak. To target monarchy as a research topic thus fills a gap as far as scientific knowledge is concerned.

Moreover, it remains relevant and interesting from a societal perspective to address issues related to monarchism. Monarchy is, for example in Sweden, an issue that flares up in public debate every now and then - but it often does so in a rather simplistic manner in which it is all about for or against monarchy as such. It is moreover estimated that the Swedish monarchy is undergoing a formative moment in terms of consent, with declining support for the institution and for the royal family.[2]

In transition countries, which have gone from communism to democracy, recent surveys indicate that public support for monarchy institutions are in fact growing and there is even a poll in Serbia that shows a bigger public support for a monarchic form of government than for the current republican. In Romania, the people have according to recent polls more confidence in the former King than they have for the current prime minister or for the current president.[3] Formative moments, when we suddenly change direction, in relation to support for monarchism, could be important to study in different contexts if we want to comprehend when they expose themselves and also what the long-term impacts could be.

[1] See p. 15.
[2] Nilsson, L.: ”Monarkin och statschefen i Sverige – stöd, förtroende och popularitet” in Weibull, L. et al (ed.) (2012) *I framtidens skugga.* Gothenburg: SOM-institutet, University of Gothenburg. Available from 2014-05-16 at: http://www.som.gu.se/digitalAssets/1391/1391424_i-framtidens-skugga-rev-121129.pdf, p. 163.
[3] Grigoras, A. (2012) *Romanians have the highest confidence in King Michai I.* Available from 2014-03-01 at: http://www.nineoclock.ro/romanians-have-the-highest-confidence-in-king-mihai-i/.

The research background is also that voters in these post-communist countries lose confidence in the presidency institutions and instead, in increasing numbers, look to the traditional monarchy institutions which, according to *Rose* & *Haerpfer* could be regarded as alternatives to the presidency regimes. In 1990, more than 70% of the eligible voters voted in the Serbian presidential elections.[4] This can be compared with a turnout just over 86% in the Romanian presidential election of that year.[5] However in the first round for the Serbian presidential election in 2012, just over 57% of the voters voted and in the second round, not even 50% did.[6] In the 2009 Romanian presidential election, voter turnout dropped to just over 54% in the first round.[7] These declines in voter turnout and in support are evident and additionally virtually delegitimize the presidency institutions in these countries were these developments have been materialized. Research by *Rose* & *Haerpfer* indicates that, with increasing support, monarchy institutions could start to compete with the presidency regimes in these countries.[8]

Shortly after World War II the remaining East European monarchies in Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria were abolished by the newly established communist regimes and the royal families were deprived of properties and citizenships. With the collapse of communism in the 1990's, national symbols such as the Orthodox Church came to regain its traditional position and status. Political theorist *Jon Elster* has concluded that these national revivals did have effects on the abolished monarchies in terms of support.[9][10] During the communist years the royal families were banned from returning but they were all rehabilitated and allowed to return to their countries by the post-communist governments and they were also allowed to reside in their ancient royal castles and palaces.

1.1 Purpose and questions

The intention here is to focus on support for monarchy in East Europe which, in countries such as Serbia is increasing. The study therefore shall explain why the current development is

[4] Andric, G. (2012) *Serbian presidential elections since 1990.* Available from 2014-03-03 at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbian-presidential-elections-since-1990.
[5] Nohlen, D. & Stöver, P. (2010) *Elections in Europe: A data handbook.* Baden-Baden, Nomos.
[6] OSCE (2012) *Republic of Serbia. Parliamentary and early presidential elections - 6 and 20 May 2012.* Available from 2014-03-03 at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/92509.
[7] OSCE (2010) *Romania. Presidential election – 22 November and 6 December 2009.* Available from 2014-03-03 at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/romania/41532.
[8] Rose, R. et al (1998) *Democracy and its alternatives: understanding post-communist societies.* Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 5.
[9] Kuljic, T. (2005) *Monumentalizacija srpske monarhije: o suvremenim debatama oko restauracije monarhije u Srbiji.* Časopis za suvremenu povijest, Vol.37 No.2 Prosinac 2005. Available from 2014-05-24 at: http://hrcak.srce.hr/8406, p. 369.
[10] Elster, J. et al (1998) *Institutional design in post-communist societies: rebuilding the ship at sea.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 15.

that the proportion of people who wants to return to a monarchic form of government there is increasing. With this in mind, the purpose is to examine and comprehend the monarchy's appeal in transition countries with an authoritarian history. Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria will be compared for this purpose.

The first question in order to fulfil the purpose of this study is to what extent it is possible to trace the monarchy's appeal in the institution's historical and contemporary critical junctures in any of the three countries?

A second and equally central question in order to fulfil the purpose is whether the existence of traditional values, such as nationalism goes hand in hand with a preference for a monarchy restoration in any of the three countries?

The third question addresses the issue of whether a preference for a monarchy restoration constitutes a desire to quash the newly established democracy and return to an authoritarian rule in any of the three countries?

1.2 Structure

The introductory chapter has provided a brief presentation of the history of some East European monarchies. It has also provided a modest explanation of why this is an urgent scientific problem to confront. The second chapter provides a theoretical insight into how monarchism in East European transition countries could be logically understood. Here we find the definitional considerations as well as the key concepts such as monarchy and authoritarianism. The following paragraphs in that chapter intend to give a more abstract presentation of the selected and considered scientific theoretical approaches; traditional values and the historical-institutional perspective. These two together constitute the study's theoretical insights of the monarchy topic. In chapter three, we find the study's methodological considerations with the comparative case analysis at the very core. It also introduces a couple of methodological options that are common in comparative case studies as well as the **chosen** *most similar system design* (mssd) approach. It also contains source criticism and discussions about validity and reliability. Chapter four initiates the empirical analysis of this study and it continues until chapter six. Chapter four makes acquaintance with the three strategically selected case study monarchies and their historical and contemporary critical junctures. Further, it analyses contemporary political and electorate monarchy support in each country. Chapter five analyses the possible connection between monarchy support and nationalism and chapter six analyses the possible connection between monarchy support and

democracy. Chapter seven summarizes the results of the empirical analysis. This is followed by a conclusion of the analysis and the study eventually ends with a list of references.

2 Theories, previous research

That the author chose to observe and stick with these two theoretical approaches below in relation to the cases has the following motivation. The understanding of support and confidence of a monarchy has a lot to do with values and the measurement of values. Hence the study operates under a traditional (political science) behavioralistic approach which emphasis citizens and their opinions, attitudes and deeds. The historical-institutional part is explained and motivated by the fact that a monarchy, even an abolished, is by itself an institution and we have to understand the historic roles and critical junctures of the three monarchies in order to understand how they affect individuals and their behaviour (towards the institutions) today.

2.1 Monarchy as an institution

The primary attention of this study will be directed towards the three abolished monarchies in Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria. Monarchies, both contemporary and historical ones, have different characteristics and it has been proved useful to subdivide current and historical monarchies into two categories: *absolute* and *constitutional/parliamentary*. The characteristics of an absolute monarchy mainly points to the fact that all the (executive) power derives from the monarch or from an equivalent person; the king is the law. This arrangement increases the likelihood of a royal dominance or partial control over legislative and judicial branches considerably. Historically, most monarchies either originated as, or were abolished as absolute. The remaining absolute monarchies today are few in number, with Saudi Arabia as the most distinguished example.[11]

In contrast to an absolute, a constitutional monarchy allocates limited power to the monarch by some sort of constitution or basic law; rule of law. To stay within the constitutional designated (nominal) responsibilities thus becomes an important legality aspect for a constitutional monarch. It has become customary to consider constitutional monarchies also as parliamentary due to the practice that their existences have become destined by the support or tolerance by the legislative assemblies. It has also been customary for constitutional monarchs, including in the three compared countries, to remain unattached and to stay away

[11] Roobol, W. (2011) *Twilight of the European monarchy.* European Constitutional Law Review/Volume 7/ Issue 02/June 2011, p. 272-286.

from party politics. An important distinction worth emphasizing is that constitutional arrangement and practices prior to 1945 by no means give a fair image of how the various monarchs of East Europe acted within their constitutional powers. Would a "constitutional" monarch in the 1930s, claimed to have worked within the constraints of a contemporary constitutional (ceremonial) monarch, he would probably have been perceived as both peaceful and (too) mild. Similarly, constitutional monarchies prior to 1945 would probably today have had very difficult task meeting democratic criteria imposed on a modern (democratic) country.[12]

How extensive functions and how much executive power could a monarch or an equivalent person possess under any given constitution for the country in question to still be considered democratic? One answer could be that the conventional ways of measuring nationwide democracy also gives somewhat of an indication of the extent to which mainly executive power can be allocated to a hereditary monarch. The constitutions of Jordan and Morocco both state that they are constitutional/parliamentary monarchies but if we were to look at *Freedom House's* annual ranking of democratic rights and freedoms, these countries are in 2014 attributed with the values "not free" and "partly free". Similarly, *Freedom House's* additionally in the same ranking considers the constitutional monarchies of Liechtenstein and Monaco as "free".[13] This makes it difficult to distinguish democratic from non-democratic monarchies with this measure alone.

Usual in this context is to distinguish the ceremonial from the executive (constitutional) monarchies. The basic principle or norm of a ceremonial monarchy is that the head of state essentially only possesses representative and ceremonial duties while a monarch with executive powers usually has limited formal political power. Monarchs in countries such as Sweden, the UK and Denmark do not possess formal political power and can thus be regarded as ceremonial. The monarchs of the first four countries in the previous paragraph have executive political powers and are therefore classified as executive monarchies in this study. We will now return to the three main countries in this study and subsequently conclude that it is *ceremonial*, constitutional monarchies that people, in varying degree, want to restore and not the executive constitutional monarchies that from time to time until the end of WW2 were

[12] Roobol, (2011).
[13] Freedom House (2014) *Freedom in the world 2014.* Available from 2014-05-22 at: http://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202014%20Scores%20-%20Countries%20and%20Territories.pdf.

the reality.[14] The fact that monarchy institutions over time have evolved from executive to ceremonial has to do with changed socio-political conditions in these countries that today would have made it all but impossible to succeed in persuading people into supporting a future monarch with formal political power.[1516] Membership in the European Union also makes constitutional changes more problematic[17], especially if they aim to allocate further executive powers to a hereditary monarch.[18]

2.2 Authoritarianism

A recognized entrance into defining authoritarianism and authoritarian history is to first take this umbrella term and then categorize countries and regimes within it according to the degree of democracy and human rights and freedoms. Three regime types are customarily used in this context and they are *the democratic, the authoritarian* and *the totalitarian.*[1920]

The authoritarian history that the three countries went through started during the interwar period when they still had monarchs/regents as heads of states. The sometimes extreme multi-party systems without clear power-centres often resulted in state interferences and top-down policies imposed on the civil societies.[2122] After World War II they all fell under the sway of Soviet-backed communism. The "authoritarian" concept nonetheless, there is justification for arguing that the regimes in these three countries between 1945 and 1989/90 were *totalitarian* in that regard. As with authoritarian regimes, totalitarian ones are also lacking democratic rights and freedoms. What separates totalitarian from authoritarian regimes is that the ruling clique uses its power to control not only the state but also society at large. The ruling clique is not content with possessing state power hence it tries to bring about a total mobilization of any society in order to achieve the ideological goals or targets of the ruling clique. Practically

[14] Alianta Nationala pentru restabilirea monarhiei (2014) *Who we are.* Available from 2014-05-22 at: http://www.anrm.ro/CineSuntem.aspx, Kingdom of Serbia association (2014) *About us.* Available from 2014-05-22 at: http://kraljevinasrbija.com/?page_id=214&lang=sr, Dimitrova, S. in *Politika* (2006) *Christo Kurtev, national secretary of the Federation "Kingdom of Bulgaria"* Available from 2014-05-22 at: http://www.politika.bg/article?id=2937.
[15] Thelen, K. (1999) "Historical institutionalism in comparative politics" in *Annual review of political science vol. 2: 396-404*, p. 387.
[16] Roobol, (2011), p. 284.
[17] Roobol, (2011), p. 286.
[18] Veenendaal, Wouter P. (2014) *Ohne Fürst Sind Wir Nicht.* Available from 2014-05-22 at: http://www.ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/30aefb8d-b05a-454a-b741-dcad28e984be.pdf
[19] Hislope, Mughan, (2012) *Introdution to Comparative Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 42-54.
[20]Linz, Juan J. & Stepan, A. (1996) *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe.* Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, p. 60.
[21] Berglund, S. et al:"The Resilience of History" in Berglund, S. et al (ed.) (2013) *The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe.* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, p. 20.
[22] Öhlén, M. (2013) *The Eastward Enlargement of the European Parties: Party Adaption in the Light of EU-enlargement.* Örebro: Örebro Studies in Political Science 31, p. 86.

all the countries of the communist bloc, including the three that are now compared, could during the cold war be allocated to the category of totalitarian regimes.[23] With the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, this type of regime became much rarer however, with North Korea as an important exception.[24]

2.3 Values

Research about monarchy support could benefit from being related to certain existing individual *values* in a specific country with support for a political regime as a function of values. *Inglehart* & *Welzel's World Value Survey* (WVS) includes a secular/traditional dimension were countries are classified according to the degree of secular-rational and traditional values. Secular-rational values are inherently anti-authoritarian in contrast to traditional values which are not. Deviation from secular-rational values and a drift towards a conservative or traditional route in terms of *traditional values* is interesting to study since it could mean that authority no longer necessarily stands or falls with popular consent. *Inglehart* & *Welzel* have, in part of their analysis, concluded that a number of post-communist countries in East Europe, which are going through a democratization process, have become more traditional, in terms of values as illustrated in the table below.[25]

Serbia and Romania are in this regard no exceptions hence they are both classified as European countries with relatively high scores of traditional values. The support for monarchy testifies to that. To be able to rely on traditional values means that the justification for a monarchic state form gets strengthened considerably.

Table 1: Value points on WVS's traditional/secular-rational dimension over time. ***Falling/lower*** *score means more traditional values and* ***rising/higher*** *score means more secular-rational values.*

[23] Rose, R (1997) *Where Are Postcommunist Countries Going? Journal of Democracy* 8.3, p. 92-108. Available from 2014-05-22 at: http://muse.jhu.edu.db.ub.oru.se/journals/journal_of_democracy/v008/8.3rose.html.
[24] Hislope, Mughan, (2012), p. 53-4.
[25] Inglehart, R. & Welzel, C. (2005) *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.



We can see that both Serbia and Romania appears to be moving in a "traditional" direction with a present score of 0.35 and -0.39. The score for Bulgaria is also falling slightly, however not to the same level as Serbia or Romania.

A country, whose citizens in high numbers are emphasizing traditional values, emphasizes the importance of family, authority and religion.[26] It is also a fact that existences of traditional values are more likely in the group of countries that have the characteristic of being nationalistic, which will be addressed later on in this study.[27]

2.4 Historical-institutionalism

An alternative and equally fruitful approach to comprehend East European monarchy support is *historical-institutionalism*. Research on the process of democratizations and constitutional choices in East Europe is considerably more frequent than research about East European monarchism, which from a power perspective is of limited significance. Dissertations concerning the constitutional choices in East Europe have been including theories about historical experiences. *Thomas Sedelius* has written a dissertation that deals with post-communist countries and their choices of semi-presidential political system among others.[28] He highlights that the post-communist countries of East Europe stood at a constitutional crossroad when the communism system collapsed. Instead of selecting one of the two

[26] See p. 26.
[27] See chapter five.
[28] Sedelius, T. (2006) *Tug-of-war between presidents and prime ministers. Semi-Presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europé.* Örebro: Örebro Studies in Political Science 15.

traditional solutions parliamentarianism or presidentialism, the compromises resulted often in semi-presidentialism. Semi-presidential systems have been attractive to several countries in the sense that they combine a historical legacy of a clear "national" figurehead with the opportunity to still anchor the government from parliamentary majorities.

Jon Elster emphasizes that the constitutional crossroad in post-communist countries was characterized by different orientations (paths) based on historical experiences, in which a monarchy restoration was suggested by traditionalists who appealed to religious and ethno-national sentiments.[29] Historical experiences in constitutional crossroads is also highlighted by *Lars Johannsen* who emphasizes that constitutional makers in transition countries have been somewhat limited by historical experiences.[30] Another example of historical-institutional research is the one conducted by *Stark* & *Bruszt*. They used the path-dependency concept, which will be developed below, in order to explain different paths of detachment from socialism in post-communist societies.[31]

The essence and central questions of historical-institutionalism are according to *Peter Hall* & *Rosemary Taylor* that institutions are valuable and in what ways and to what extent they are valuable? Like other approaches of institutionalism, the historical approach is interested in the question of how institutions, both formal and informal, influence individual behaviour. The two-way to answer to this question steam from *the calculus approach* and *the culture approach*. Apart from those two categories there are also three additional seminal questions related to institutional analysis namely; how actors behave, what institutions are doing and why institutions endure over time.[32] The last of these questions can be said to have the utmost bearing on this study.

The calculus approach explains that institutions consist of time because they embody something that can be compared to an equilibrium order, which is that individuals follow a behavioural pattern since any deviation from the pattern makes the situation worse for people than if they accept or tolerate the order of things; the logic of appropriateness. Historical-

[29] Elster, et al (1998), p. 15.
[30] Johannsen, L. (2000) *The Constitution and Democracy: The Choice and Consequence of the Constitution in Post-Communist Countries*. Aarhus: Forlaget Politica.
[31] Stark, D. & Bruszt, L. (1998) *Postsocialist Pathways. Transforming politics and property in East Eentral Europe.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
[32] Hall, P., Taylor, R. (1996) *Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms.* Available from 2014-03-01 at: http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp96-6.pdf.

institutionalists usually however emphasize the importance of historical processes more than equilibrium orders.[33]

The culture approach on the other hand, would explain the consistency of an institution since they often are part of a broader context, social institutions and conventions and consequently individuals do not make active choices regarding them.[34] Additionally, there are institutions that are so taken for granted that they appear to escape direct and explicit scrutiny. A virtue highly desired by a constitutional monarch moreover whose ambition is to possess universal appeal or impartiality by staying away from party politics.

Kathleen Thelen highlights that historical-institutionalists tend to focus on the empirical, which often result in inquiries with few cases with a riches in details instead. That stands in somewhat contrast to rational-institutionalists, who usually seek to explain certain outcomes by theories, even though we should not interpret that suggestion as pure dichotomous. Besides that, the historical-institutionalists tend to favour using micro-foundation, individual behaviour as main explanations to aggregate certain outcomes rather than conducting macro historical research.[35]

2.4.1 Path-dependency and critical junctures

These concepts intend to explain why institutions remain resilient to socio-political changes and why common support or confidence for a specific institution is inherited from generation to generation. The fundamental assumption of path dependency in this context at least is that countries, upon the re-creation or the redesigning of political institutions, are going in different directions pending on the legacies of the institutions and their historical roles; critical junctures.[36] Institutions continue to evolve side by side with the political environments but it happens nonetheless with historical practices as starting points and compasses and the critical juncture literature incorporates sequencing and timing in relations to those interactions.[37] These circumstances can for the sake of it be exemplified in terms of monarchy institutions, as in the countries concerned occasionally were (fairly) constitutional. A logical consequence according to the path dependency approach is therefore appeal for monarchy arrangements for continuity reasons and also because the relevant actors (the people), accommodate to

[33] Thelen, (1999), p. 384.
[34] Hall & Taylor, (1996).
[35] Thelen, (1999), p. 372, 7.
[36] Stark & Bruszt, (1998).
[37] Thelen, (1999), p. 388.

prevailing patterns.[38] If the old regimes today are attributed with sufficient degree of legitimacy is another issue which will be discussed although not fully developed.

For a historical-institutional path-dependency approach, the core of the analysis is not the functionality or the possible anachronism of an institution for that matter but what the analysis essentially boils down to is the historical role and an analysis should therefore, according to *Kathleen Thelen*; clarify what role an institution has played in a certain historical context or political sequence. In order to track the process behind an institution's role and position, we must, according to *Thelen*, highlight various historical economic and political developmental sequences (critical junctures) in a country, which in itself also can explain how institutional arrangements got formed in the first place. What we in addition to that need to look at, in the present context, is which mechanisms that reproduced an institution's endurance over time, until today.[39] An institutions ability to reproduce its own support or tolerance is not easy to comprehend. It is as *Thelen* emphasizes, not a series of visible mechanism that is behind a reproduction but rather a dynamic process, which therefore draws attention to historical sequences upon any given case. *Thelen* particularly accentuates gradual adaption to (environmental) changes as an important mechanism for institutional (support) reproduction. Another important aspect has to do with distributional biases, such as favouring or empowering of certain groups. Political neutrality or impartiality is therefore an important (support) reproduction aspect for this study.[40]

As *Katznelson* accentuates, historical institutionalism has previously regarded institutions as independent variables; that can explain certain political outcomes. However recent analyses have instead preferred to regard institutional changes as *key* (dependent) variables that cause political outcomes.[41] Such progression in institutional analysis supports a variable-centred approach for this study and framing of causal key variables as a function of (support) reproduction mechanisms and values.[42] The use of variables in institutional analysis and in particular in relation to analyses of unfolded (political) sequences is crucial since variables, according to *Thelen* can:

[38] Thelen, (1999), p. 385.
[39] Thelen, (1999), p. 387.
[40] Thelen, (1999), p. 391, 4.
[41] Katznelson, I. "Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics Revisited" in Lichbach, M. & Zuckerman, A. (ed.) (2009) *Comparative Politics. Rationality, Culture and Structure.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[42] See p. 21.

"…capture important aspects of the interactive features of ongoing political processes, and in ways that explain differences in regime and institutional outcomes across a range of cases."[43]

2.5 Legitimacy

A third considered, although **not** chosen theoretical clarification for growing monarchy support in transition countries steams from the word *legitimacy*, which is a concept that has already appeared in this study. Several researchers, among them *David Beetham*, generated a three-dimensional legitimacy structure in order to understand the origins of claimed authority.[44] His model, applied in this context would stipulate that the monarchy in a country like Serbia has tradition to fall back on; hence the legitimacy for a republican form of government or a presidency institution becomes more difficult to track, especially since declining consent apparently makes it increasingly delegitimized. An analysis of legitimacy can thus be made three-dimensional. Legitimacy is in his model about *legality*, *justifiability* and *consent*. *Berggren* adds another interesting dimension to this concept; *symbolic* legitimacy, which presupposes that a (new) constitution has to provide symbols with universal appeal which are in line with traditions as well as history.[45]

Another legitimacy analysis could be built on the work by *Seymour Martin Lipset*. He underlined that if the status of a conservative institution (read monarchy) comes under threat during a transition phase, then a crisis of legitimacy could be made visible since the new order loses the support of important sections of a society, just like what happened after the German revolution which toppled the monarchy.[46]

The difficulty of a legitimacy analysis is which empirical sources are actually available for analysis. The legality or lawfulness of an institution is primarily confirmed by constitutional audit bodies whose task is to assess how public authorities carry out their assigned tasks. However the head of state institutions in monarchies are usually not under jurisdiction of constitutional audits. Values that justify a monarchy are best confirmed or dismissed through surveys with individual level data. If citizens were to uphold traditional family and patriarchal hierarchical structures, then it could be an indicator of values that justify a monarchic form of government. The consent dimension of legitimacy could also be confirmed or dismissed by surveys and individual level data (see table 3, 4 & 6). The difference here is that the questions

[43] Thelen, (1999), p. 390.
[44] Beetham, D. (1991): *The legitimation of power.* Palgrave MacMillan, Hampshire.
[45] Berggren, N. et al (2001) *Den konstitutionella revolutionen.* Stockholm: City University Press, p. 72-4.
[46] Lipset, Seymour M. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy in *The American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Mars., 1959), p. 69-105.*

that must be answered in order for consent to be confirmed must touch upon whether citizens approve with a monarchic form of government.

2.6 Previous research

No scientific research has in my acquaintance ever been conducted in terms of equivalent (theoretical) approaches, jointly addressed to the issue of monarchy in the three examined countries. There is at least no such completed study conducted in English. *Richard Rose's* studies under the auspices of the *New Democracies/European Barometer* (NDB) must not be overlooked however. These studies could be compared with the equivalent Swedish *SOM* measurements which like the *NDB,* measures values and political affiliations etc. *Richard Rose* et al have conducted some research in different European countries on citizens' preferences for alternatives to the current regimes and monarchy has, luckily for this study, been included as an option in this regime variable's original version.[47] Monarchy has now been removed as an (regime) option and contemporary *NDB* or *WVS* research are subsequently not of any help for this study. *Christian Haerpfer,* a colleague to *Richard Rose* explained that:

> "The greatest lever of support for a return to monarchy all over post-Communist Europe was found in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, where 14 per cent of the population in the 1998 expressed their opinion that a return to a Yugoslav monarchy would be better. In Bulgaria, approximately one-fifth of the population – between 18 and 19 per cent – consistently think in a positive way about the restoration of the Bulgarian dynasty. The desire for the restoration of the Romanian dynasty cooled from 18 per cent in 1994 to 11 per cent in 1998, but is still considerably high."[48]

Contemporary monarchy research that is actually available composes of writings with emphasizes on varying historical-descriptive approaches on various monarchy institutions. With the exception of the writers presented below, this study is forced to submit to the fact that previous research, to the extent it is available for public scrutiny, could not be attached onto this study, and cumulative research thus becomes difficult to achieve.

Dragan Subotic has in two separate writings analysed the Serbian monarchy from a constitutional-legal dimension and how historical developments came shape the perception of it.[49] *Todor Kuljic* is another author who more or less took off where the previous researcher

[47] Rose, et al (1998).
[48] Haerpfer C. (2002) *Democracy and enlargement in post-communist Europe: the democratisation of the general public in fifteen Central and Eastern European countries, 1991-1998*. London, Routledge, p. 39.
[49] Subotic, D. (2004) *Institucija monarhije u Srbiji II.* Politička revija 2004, vol. 3, br. 1. Available from 2014-05-24 at: http://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/1451-4281/2004/1451-42810401159S.pdf., Subotic, D. (2003)

stopped. A possible reintroduction of an institution should in his opinion reasonably be preceded by a public debate. *Kuljic* has, with that prerequisite in consideration, analysed the contemporary monarchy debate in Serbia. A summary of his results emphasizes that monarchy historically has been seen by the Serbs as a rational and functional institution with suitability but when Yugoslavia was formed, the institution came to be increasingly perceived as an anachronism, especially under the dictatorship of King Alexander I.[50] That is something that has been emphasized by historian *Branka Prpa* as well.[51] *Kuljic* however accentuates, just like *Elster,* that contemporary monarchy support expresses a desire for national renewal and consolidation of national identity.[52]

As for Romania, *Keith Hitchins* has written that Romania entered a modern era under the *"Hohenzollerns"* and that the Romanian Kings, particularly the first two, managed to keep the balance between the country's two main political forces; traditionalists, who stressed that Romania's place was "outside" Europe and pro-Europeans who claimed the opposite.[53] *Manuel Gutan* has written extensively about constitutionalism in Romanian and how that tradition was abolished by royal prerogative in 1938.[54]

Rossen Vassilev has in two different articles analysed why the Bulgarian monarchy was not restored after the fall of communism and if it still can be restored.[55] His final fanfare is that it did not have the popular support that proponents wanted to assert that it had when the issue arose to public debate back in 1991. What made matters even more problematic for the Bulgarian monarchy was that the post-communist political elite in Bulgaria, even the staunchly anti-communists, with few exceptions shunned the question as either irrelevant or anachronistic. He concludes that Bulgarian voters did not find (Czar) Simeon's premiership as successful they had expected and therefore the prospect for a future monarchist restoration

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Monarhija u Srbiji u 19. i 20. veku (I). Politička revija 2003, vol. 2, br. 2. Available from 2014-05-24 at: http://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/1451-4281/2003/1451-42810302073S.pdf.

[50] Kuljic, (2005).

[51] Prpa, B. (2011) *"Monarhija ili republika – dilema ili manje važno pitanje u političkom životu Kranjevine SHS", Dijalog povjesničara – istoričara, Zagreb 2001, str. 291-301.*Available from 2014-05-13 at: http://see.uni-sofia.bg/wp-content/uploads/monarhija_ili_republika_branka_prpa1.pdf.

[52] Kuljic, (2005), p. 269.

[53] Hitchins, K. (2009) *The Romania of the Kings.* Studia Universitatis Petru Maior History, issue: 9, p. 59-74.

[54] Gutan, M. (2013) *The Challenges of the Romanian Constitutional Tradition. Between Constitutional Transplant and Cultural Engineering.* Journal of Constitutional History / Giornale di Storia Costituzi;2013, Issue 26, p217.

[55] Vassilev R. (2003) *Will Bulgaria become a Kingdom again?* Southeast European Politics Vol. IV, No. 2-3, p. 157-174.

appears all but easy.[56] *Markus Wien* has emphasized that Simeon's initial appeal to the Bulgarian electorate was made possible as a result of the royal aura he inherited from his father, Boris III and from the fact that he was effectively a foreigner who thus, in contrast to other parts of the political elite had not compromised himself.[57] *Nikolai Tilkidjiev* has analysed what impact the (partisan) Bulgarian monarchy case could have on other transitional countries, in terms of support.[58] He concludes that even though the Bulgarian electorate initially regarded (Czar) Simeon II as their "last hope", they still remained lukewarm to the idea of monarchy.[59]

Previous research by *Rose* & *Haerpfer* about monarchy in post-communist Europe, together with the *WVS* research constitutes a foundation for this study in its effort to fill knowledge gaps regarding contemporary monarchy support, which has not been previously examined. Subsequently this study could contribute to the research regarding changes of East European democracies.[60]

3 Methodology

In terms of methodology, the study can be characterized as a qualitative textual analysis, although statistical analyses of surveys do have an important bearing on this study. In this regard, the study intends to be both qualitative and quantitative in nature.[61] Textual analysis is motivated by the *historical-institutional* approach which requires analysis of texts in order to find and systemize arguments which could be related to certain historical and contemporary critical junctures.[62] The statistical analysis is motivated by the *value* approach to monarchy support. With the help of SPSS statistics, descriptive "crosstab" analysis will be conducted on

[56] Vassilev R. (2011) *Why was the monarchy not restored in post-communist Bulgaria?* East European Politics and Societies, vol. 24, p. 503-519.
[57] Wien M. (2008) *The Bulgarian monarchy: a politically motivated revision of a historical image in a post-socialist transitional society.* Available from 2014 -05-12 at: http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/16350/1/16350.pdf.
[58] Tilkidjiev, N. (2001) *The King as a Prime-Minister: Peculiarity of the Bulgarian Case or a Lesson to Post-Communist Tranformation.* Franfurter Institut für Tranformationsstudien. Avaliable from 2014-05-12 at: http://www.europa-uni.de/de/forschung/institut/institut_fit/publikationen/discussion_papers/2001/01-12-Tilkidjiev.pdf.
[59] Tilkidjiev, N. (2001), p. 24.
[60] See p. five.
[61] Esaiasson, P. et al (2003): *Metodpraktikan. Konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad.* Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik.
[62] Esaiasson et al (2003), p. 233-234.

data from *NDB 5* in order to compare the dependent variables with the independent ones in relation to each country.[63]

3.1 Comparative cases

The study intends to compare three strategically selected East European transition countries with defunct monarchic forms of governments. Increasing support for monarchy in these transition countries is facilitated considerably given fact that they all possess traditional monarchy institutions and undisputed claimants who are alive. The positive aspect of this kind of comparative analysis is that it may be possible to come up with general explanations that may apply to this population of countries with similar characteristic just mentioned, like Albania. The negative aspect is that it is far from certain that the theoretical approaches will apply in other compared cases. Especially since these three cases represent the most-likely category in the population of countries while other, like Hungary do not.[64]

Other challenges that can arise in a comparative analysis primarily involve two areas. The first challenge concerns the influence of specific transnational factors, known as the Galton problem. The second challenge concerns the conceptual and also functional equivalence problems. The advantage of individual case studies is to gain a thorough analysis of why the monarchy breeds right there while the advantage of a more quantitative approach is that it can explain more general patterns.

I have decided to conduct analysis on few (three) countries and committed myself to a particular comparative model called *method of difference* and *mssd.* However there are reasons why we should not turn down other comparative methods and that is because the diverse methods that are available in no way should be seen as dichotomies, hence they can with advantage be combined in a comparative study. Now follows brief descriptions of two alternative, comparative methods given by *Dodds*.[65]

3.2 Method of agreement

In this first method, which is **not** chosen for further development in relation to this study, the researcher chooses out two cases with a common denominator, for instance a high proportion of monarchists and thereafter the researcher testes hypotheses upon the two cases. The idea is to see what hypotheses are supported in both cases and which fall outside the frame. The

[63] Esaiasson et al (2003), p. 385-389.
[64] Ibid, p. 176-84.
[65] Dodds, A. (2013) *Comparative Public Policy.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 321-3.

disadvantage of this method is that it can be difficult to prove causality although some variables correlate.

3.3 Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA)

A second considered, although **not** chosen model, is called c*ombinatorial analysis* and consists of several different sub models. This analysis aims to identify the necessary variables that cause a particular political outcome. That several interlinked variables (combinatorial analysis) may explain a certain outcome is what distinguish this approach from those methods that more emphasize the significance of individual variables. The approach makes use of dichotomous variables which is variables that are either present (coded as 1) or not present (coded as 0). The approach is based on Boolean analysis that in briefly contains codification of logical relationships between dichotomous variables through a logical notation. Codification involves the relationships fall into three categories; (1) " and" (2) "or", and (3) "no/not".

A further step that makes choices among cases in a comparative analysis easier is to divide them by using "fuzzy sets", which briefly means that prior (background) knowledge of a case is explicitly taken into account. This method can be useful whenever a study intends to take into account the frequencies and not just focus on whether the dichotomous variables are present or not. The difficulty with dichotomous variables is that it can be difficult to make distinctions on the basis of them. Let's say that a study intends to categorize countries according to the degree of federalism without having to stop on the assumption that a federal power structure just exists or not. Then "fuzzy sets" can provide assistance when the countries surveyed outside the dichotomous conditions (1) and (0) also can be codified as (0.5).[66]

3.4 Method of difference

This considered and **chosen** method, which can be used favourably within the framework of the concept of *most similar systems design* (mssd), aims to find and compare similar units in order to highlight what distinguish and more importantly for this study; what divides them. The method is particularly suitable when the comparative cases (countries) are few in numbers, which decreed a more intense and possibly more nuanced analysis of them. According to *Todd Landman* this method is used when, as in this study, it concerns the importance of similarities and differences between countries that has led to a certain outcome, and not the analytical relationship between the variables. *Landman* sets up an analytical

[66] Dodds, (2013), p. 321-3.

framework that fits impeccably together with the theoretical approaches used in this study. It is based on the *mssd* method and it illustrates the similarities and differences between the comparative countries.[67] There is however a negative aspect regarding the use of this method and that is if it turns out that more than one key variable explains the outcome; it could then be difficult to assess which one that has the highest explanatory force, given the modest number of compared countries. The study will return the model, in extensive form, when the empirical analysis gets summarized in chapter seven.

Table 2: Outcome model based on the most similar systems design (mssd). **Source**: Landman (2003), p. 30.

	Country 1	Country 2	Country 3
Characteristics	A	A	A
	B	B	B
	C	C	C
"Key" explanation variable(s)	X	X	**Not** X
Outcome to be explained	Y	Y	Y

Observations: Number of matching characteristics and key variables used in this type of model are not binding; hence do not necessarily have to be the same when the model reappears later on in this study.

3.5 A case study approach

This research concerns a case study in which three countries are analysed over time and familiar challenges do get tied to such a study which we unavoidably have to relate to. A challenge that according to *Arend Lijphart* immediately gets sketched out, involves the problem of few units (n) and several explanatory variables (x). Lijhardt lists four proposals to get around this problem and my suggestions in relation each one of those proposals will be discussed below. In this context they are also this study's proposals for facilitate any further successful comparative analysis.

Lijphart's first intervention aims to maximize the number of comparative cases, for reasons described in the previous paragraph. That was something that this study had to consider but still could not materialize sufficiently. Had more cases been included in the study, it would have become unsustainable to finish the study within the timeframe that were established from the start given the language barriers that already had appeared in the three current cases.[68]

[67] Landman, T. (2003) *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics. An introduction. 2nd edition.* London, Routledge, p. 30.
[68] Lijphart, A. (1971) "Comparative politics and the comparative method" in *The American Political Science Review, Vol. 65, No. 3, p. 682-693.*

Lijphart suggests that by merging or combining different variables that possess similar underlying characteristics we are thus able to reduce the number of variables and thus facilitate further analysis on the basis of those that remain. This study has taken up this intervention by first of all define the battery of questions regarding traditional values, such as nationalism, defined by *WVS.*[69]

In this way, the study can analyse who the monarchists are in each country; identify if nationalistic and democratic values indeed go hand in hand with a willingness to reintroduce a monarchic form of government.

Lijphart's next intervention to provide a case study with a good passage is all about to ensure that the selected cases are comparable from the beginning, in the sense that they have sufficient characteristics common, which facilitates further comparisons between them. Translated into this study, this measure has been taken into account by having the designated cases strategically selected on the basis of historical facts and characteristics which ought to make them as comparable as possible. For example, the three neighbouring countries abolished their monarchies around the same time, in the aftermath of the Second World War.

They have also (de jure) lived under the same communist regimes that abolished the monarchies up until the Berlin wall came down. Surely we may however raise objections to the exact degree of democracy each country actually developed immediately after the fall of communism, especially FR Yugoslavia.

Finally *Lijphart* accentuates that by having the comparative analysis concentrated on "key" variables with high explanatory force and leaving those with marginal explanatory force unchecked, the analysis might be strengthened considerably. As crass as it may sound, this study has in good faith attempted to ensure that the selected "key" variables at least had a proper theoretical underpinning. For example, the independent (key) variables nationalism and democracy has been operationalized from the category divisions that are made within the framework of the survey measurements of *World Value Survey* and *NDB.*

3.6 Sources and source criticism

In order to comprehend why support for monarchy in Eastern Europe is sometimes growing, it may be worthwhile to study statistics that can provide indications of the underlying reasons, which has proved to be particularly useful in comparative studies. "Expert surveys", with

[69] See p. 26.

experts from different countries is a method that can be interesting in order to have the analyses more insightful and nuanced, even though it will **not** be used in this particular study. Statistics of various types could for example constitute empirical sources in different dimensions of legitimacy. Opinion polls in the selected countries have been carried out by *NDB* on monarchy and democracy issues which additionally are sufficiently comprehensive and wide-ranging to be used in scientific studies such as this. *World Value Survey* provides statistics on traditional values in these countries that can provide indications on to what extent traditional values, such as nationalism actually exist.

Of course we should not proceed without having first of all thoroughly discussed and evaluated the sources used in this study. "Source criticism" uses three rules that have to be taken into consideration before our sources are selected.[70] The content of a (genuine) source must first of all be *independent*, which means that it can be confirmed or verified by another (secondary) source, for example when it comes to historical "facts" such as critical junctures for a particular monarchy institution. Moreover, the study occasionally uses articles that have been published online in newspapers, such as the Romanian daily *Adevarul*. Otherwise, the study relies extensively on first handed sources; "national" and "international" survey data, which will be clarified below. They are usually based on multi-stratified samples with 95% confidence interval. Secondly, it is also of value that the sources are *close (in time)* to a certain event, for example the critical junctures that are analysed and quantitatively assessed in relation to monarchy support.[71] Thirdly, it could admittedly be quite difficult to determine the *tendency* of a source and also if there is a risk of biased results. I do however insist that the sources used to explain monarchy support are neutral and impartial. For example the survey data used to examine monarchy support in relation to nationalism and democracy was produced by a British political science professor.[72] Historical sources originate (here) from another British history professor, among others.[73]

3.6.1 Monarchy opinion

When the intention with this study includes plotting out past and present support for the defunct monarchic forms of governments in the three transition countries Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria, it becomes logical to scrutinize the opinion polls that have been conducted, there and elsewhere. This is done to facilitate a structured overview of the cross national

[70] Esaiasson et al, (2002), p. 303-14.
[71] See tables 3,4,6.
[72] *Richard Rose*, University of Aberdeen.
[73] *Christopher Clark*, University of Cambridge.

support itself and also to display amongst which groups the support presents itself, in relation to the questions of this study. Polls or surveys may for pedagogical reasons be divided into two categories. Firstly; domestic polls, which have been conducted and published nationally and secondly; those who have been conducted on the populations of the three countries but have been published outside them.[74] In the former case, the focus has been on publications in the three specific languages, while in the latter case there are exclusively English language-publications.

Frequently the context in the latter case has been about which alternatives to a "democratic" form of government respondents in a specific country tend to embrace. Initially it must be admitted that international surveys, like the *New Democracies Barometer* are of limited importance, since their publicly available and comparable surveys of monarchy support in the three countries does not extend beyond 1998. This could probably be explained by the fact that monarchy, as an "alternative" to a "democratic" form of government (NDB's regime variable), generated modest results in comparison to other "non-democratic" options, such as the support for communist rule or military rule.[75] By the end of this study, *NDB* may have gotten a reason to evaluate whether their decision to remove monarchy as an alternative from the regime variable in their surveys should be reconsidered.

3.6.2 Serbia

As for Serbia, the *SAS Intelligence Research* has conducted a convincing and rewritten survey in 2013. Respondents were given the chance to say whether they would agree if Serbia were to re-establish a (parliamentary) monarchy. That provides this study with a decent indicator to compare with. More details around this poll, which is the latest to have been carried out in Serbia, are presented in the next chapter. It is by no means difficult to find scientific "international" opinion polls regarding support for the monarchy in Serbia, although none have been published for the past 10 years and are not always available for digital (SPSS) analysis. Serbia has notably for the last 20 years been part of the Yugoslav federation and thereafter in a much smaller confederation with Montenegro which has meant that these countries initially were lumped together (1998). Different institutions have examined how support has developed since then but since none of them have been part of the same series of consecutive matching questions, the results of these measurements cannot graphically be (scientifically) put in time sequence.

[74] For example; *New Democracies Barometer.*
[75] Rose, et al (1998), p. 156.

3.6.3 Romania

Romania has in comparison with Serbia a similarly in substantial variety with respect to national opinion polls. As in Serbia, the latest Romanian opinion polls were conducted in 2013, a year in which two similar surveys were conducted and additionally by the same agency/institution: *Inscop research*. We will leave the details of these surveys to chapter four, apart from the interesting fact that monarchy support in Romania, from that year, differs considerably between the two conducting occasions. If we look at "international" surveys we will in the same chapter see that monarchy questions has been raised by for example *NDB* and covers the years 1993, 1994 and 1998.

3.6.4 Bulgaria

If we finally were to move the gaze the Bulgarian monarchy support we would find that there is an empirical base on a national level that, for linguistic reasons, was considerably more difficult to access than what was the case with the other two countries. Cyrillic script proved to be harder to work with on the internet that the author had anticipated. It has thus been a bit challenging to get a comprehensive picture of support for the Bulgarian monarchy over the years. The study considers, however, that the question of monarchy or republic was significantly more relevant in 1991 and in 2001 than it appears to be today. That is because Bulgaria back in 1991 was in a process of adopting an entirely new post-communist constitution. This is also drawn from the fact that the Bulgarian claimant chose to run for the Bulgarian parliament in 2001. Bulgarian monarchy opinion has been examined, even after those events, and consists of data from both *NDB* and *BBSS Gallup* among others and covers the years 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000 and 2002.

3.7 Validity of indicators

An important issue for this study with regard to what is to be measured is to find suitable and reasonable indicators for the questions that were raised in relation to the purpose. By having the theoretical approaches operationalised into suitable and reasonable indicators, the analysis should be able to proceed without systematic faults. The first question relates to the historical and contemporary critical junctures of the monarchies in these countries and consequently it would be logical to analyse which critical junctures that affected the support; cause and effect. Unfortunately, critical junctures (sequences) with reproduction (support) mechanisms that stretch prior to 1991 cannot be quantitatively assessed using key variables since there are no survey data from that time. The study can and will however explain increases or decreases in

monarchy support (reproduction) based on critical junctures (political sequences) that occurred after 1991 in conjunction with specific values.

As for the second question; since the *WVS* surveys do not include any regime statistics about monarchy support, the study was not able to combine the *WVS* results on the degree of traditional values in the three countries with matching monarchy support.[76] Therefore, the analysis will be based on data from the *NDB* 1998 survey. Below follows a short *WVS* definition of traditional values:

> *"Traditional values* emphasize the importance of religion, parent-child ties, deference to authority and traditional family values. People who embrace these values also reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia and suicide. These societies have high levels of national pride and a nationalistic outlook."[77]

Since the available quantitative material, from the *NDB 1998* survey, makes it easier for this study to measure degree of nationalistic outlook in each country, in relation to the second raised question, rather than traditional values in general, a reasonable indicator in relation to the second question would be whether the respondents are *proud of their own citizenship*. It corresponds to the indicator of nationalism (previously) used in *WVS.*[78] Alternatives to, although **not** chosen indicators to nationalistic outlook could be whether the respondents agree with immigration curbs or were hostile to certain minority groups in general. The fact that all three examined countries have considerable ethnic minorities should not be underestimated in relation to this assessment. It is therefore wise to measure proudness over citizenship rather than proudness over ethnic belonging. These circumstances make this indicator of nationalism valid from a conceptual perspective.[79]

The third research question raises the question whether support for monarchy is an expression of something not in line with the present democratic system. We could and probably should argue that there could be at least a dozen different variables that all could be used as indicators of whether respondents are dedicated to democratic values or principles. Hence we should not settle with an obvious indicator (face validity) when working with an abstract concept like democracy.[80] The study chose to stick with the previously used indicator (variable) from the *NDB 1998* survey that measured how the respondents would react if there

[76] See table one.
[77] World Value Survey (2014) *World Value Survey.* Available from 2014-05-22 at: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp.
[78] See table seven.
[79] Esaiasson et al, (2002), p. 61-4.
[80] Esaiasson et al, (2002), p. 65.

were a *parliamentary suspension and dismantling of the multiparty system* in their countries. From a conceptual point of view, I believe that this indicator is valid and reasonable, given the significance and importance of functional legislative assemblies in democratic countries.[81]

3.8 Reliability

The conceptual validity is an important aspect with regard to the indicators; however it is not the only important aspect of validity. It is also important to have in mind the reliability of the analyses that are about to be conducted based on them. These indicators (independent variables) are subsequently cross analysed (tables 8-19) together with the dependent variable "better to return to monarchy/support for monarchy". The most relevant aspects and results of these tables will be discussed and analysed. These analyses, hopefully without sloppy errors (high reliability), of the conceptually valid indicators should give us valid results. The result of the descriptive (SPSS) cross analyses should be subjected to further examinations; so called "test-retest, to ensure that the reliability of this study's analyses is high.[82] The study shall thereafter draw its conclusions together with the results from the critical juncture inquiry which is now about to begin.

4 History of the monarchy institutions

The positive aspect that comes from integrating the *historical-institutionalism* perspective with the empirical cases is that it allows the study to go from just merely telling stories to analyse these cases from a theoretical point of view.[83] The most appropriate would be to start with the historical/contemporary roles and critical junctures of the monarchy institutions in each country and then move on to how they make individuals behave in relation to their legacies.[84] Additionally these analyses extensively stress (support) reproducing mechanisms.

4.1 Serbia

After being a part of the Yugoslav constellation from 1918 until 2006 when Montenegro declared its independence, Serbia is now independent and has no reigning king. The country has however a long tradition of monarchy which in a post-mediaeval context began with the 19th century despot and freedom fighter *Djordje "Karadjordje" Petrovic*, whose dynasty still claims the defunct Serbian throne.

[81] Ibid., p. 61-4.
[82] Ibid., p. 67, 9.
[83] Thelen, (1999), p. 372.
[84] Thelen, (1999), p. 379.

The Serbian monarchy tradition extends however a longer way back in time. It is envisaged that kings, czars or despots ruled over parts of the area that is now the Republic of Serbia already back in the 7th century. After the liberation from the Ottoman Empire, Serbia set herself up as an independent Slav kingdom and in 1903 the country approved a constitution based on constitutional monarchy and parliamentary principles.[8586] The period from the adoption of the 1903 constitution until the outbreak of the First Balkan War was a critical juncture for the Serbian monarchy since it did change from autocratic to constitutional, well in line with emerging (environmental) democratic principles. After World War I Serbia was made the cornerstone of the newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later to be renamed Yugoslavia), which continued to be ruled by the Serbian royal house of *Karadjordjevic*. The Constitution of 1931 was in many ways a critical juncture and a step (backwards) towards absolute monarchy and dictatorship.[87] The king of that time Alexander I, had for instance the right to personally designate half the senate.[88] Furthermore the monarchy was allegedly biased in favour of Serbian hegemony over Yugoslavia, which aliened it from the other ethnic groups.[89] Alexander I was assassinated in Marseille in 1934 along with the French foreign minister *Bartou*. Alexander's eleven year old son ascended the Yugoslav throne as King Peter II albeit under a regency headed by Alexander's cousin Prince Paul Karadjordjevic.

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was invaded by axis forces in 1941 and was subsequently military defeated and occupied. King Peter II and the royal family fled the country and eventually set up a London-based government in exile. Meanwhile, there were two resistance groups operating in the country, fighting the occupying forces and each other. There were the communist partisans under *Josip Broz* alias Tito and the royalist chetniks under *Draza Mihailovic.* The government in exile, in conjunction with allied forces, initially supported the royalist resistance but later switched to Tito's partisans.[90]

After being forced to flee upon the invasion, the victorious Marshal Tito had the exiled royal family forbidden from returning to Yugoslavia as he had the monarchy abolished in favour of

[85] Narodna biblioteka Srbije (2014) *Ustav za Kraljevinu Srbiju iz 1903. godine.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://serbia-forum.mi.sanu.ac.rs/wb/?action=getbook&bookkey=32640#page/0/mode/1up.
[86] Clark, C. (2012) *The Sleepwalkers. How Europe Went to War in 1914.* New York: Harper, p. 14.
[87] Prpa, (2011).
[88] Narodna biblioteka Srbije (2014) *Ustav za Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca iz 1921. godine.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://serbia-forum.mi.sanu.ac.rs/wb/?action=getbook&bookkey=32642#page/0/mode/1up.
[89] Prpa, B. (2011).
[90] Kurapovna, Marcia C. (2010) *Shadows on the mountain. The Allies, the Resistance, and the Rivalries That Doomed WWII Yugoslavia.* Hoboken, John Wiley & Sons Inc.

a socialist people's republic. With the approval of the successors to *Slobodan Milosevic*, the royal family was permitted to settle down in the royal residence in Belgrade in 2001. Proponents of the monarchy managed, in the wake of the divorce from Montenegro 2006, to put the question of a return to a constitutional monarchy on the political agenda. A monarchist constitution was published as an alternative to the republican which was subsequently adopted by the Serbian Parliament after a public referendum.[91] Hence present Serbia is a parliamentary republic with an elected president as head of state.[92]

What is to be observed in the case of Serbia is that, unlike the other two countries in this study, there is a noticeably large popular commitment to the monarchy which by no means precludes a return to a monarchic form of government. A poll from 2013, as illustrated below, shows that support for the monarchy is even greater than republican support, although at least as many Serbs remains undecided on the issue.[93] The Serbian claimant (Crown prince) *Alexander Karadjordjevic* is frequently and explicitly engaged in his country's domestic monarchy debate in which he supports a return to a constitutional monarchy in Serbia, something his colleagues in the neighbouring countries do not.[94]

4.1.1 Monarchist parties and organizations

When communist-ruled Yugoslavia collapsed in the early 1990s and the multiparty system reappeared, the centre-right party *Srpski Pokret Obnove* (SPO) positioned itself as the explicitly monarchist alternative to the socialism of *Slobodan Milosevic*.[95] The party has since its formation in 1990 been represented in the Serbian parliament.[96] The party did its best performance in the Serbian general (parliamentary) election in 1997 when it got just over 19% of the votes cast. Today, the party has considerably weaker support among voters but is nonetheless, since the parliamentary elections in 2014, part of the government coalition along with several other centre-right parties, including that of *SPO* split-off, minor monarchist centre-right party *Nova Srbija* (NS).[97] Besides these two parties there is another centre-right

[91] Nikolic, P. (2001) *Ustav Kraljevine Srbije.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://www.clds.rs/pdf-s/UstavPavleNikolic.pdf.
[92] Government of the Republic of Serbia (2004) *Constitution of the Republic of Serbia.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://www.srbija.gov.rs/cinjenice_o_srbiji/ustav.php?change_lang=en.
[93] See table 3.
[94] Karadjordjevic, A. (2014) *Monarhija je za Srbiju najbolje rešenje.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://www.dnevnik.rs/politika/karadjordjevic-monarhija-je-za-srbiju-najbolje-resenje.
[95] Srpski Pokreta Obnove (2014) *Program.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://www.spo.rs/doc/program-spo-eds.pdf.
[96] Todosijevic, B.: "Serbia" in Berglund, S. et al (ed.) (2013) *The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe.* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, p. 527-8.
[97] Nova Srbije (2005) *Program Nove Srbije.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://www.nova-srbija.org/index1.htm.

party that explicitly advocates a monarchic form of government and it is *Demohrišćanska Stranka Srbije* (DHSS), a minor Christian Democratic party, which since the 2014 election is present in the Serbian parliament on the same coalition ticket as *SPO*.[98]

That none of the major parties in the present Serbian parliament are explicitly pushing the issue of monarchy, despite an increasingly favourable opinion climate, has allowed the emergence of a monarchist association as the more or less sole and enthusiastic advocator of a monarchy restoration. *Kraljevina Srbija* has by its own account tens of thousands of members all over Serbia (including Kosovo), and has also established a close cooperation with the Serbian royal family under the patronage of the Crown prince himself.[99]

In 2003, the monarchists received a pleasant morality boost when *Pavle,* the revered Patriarch of the influential and unifying Serbian Orthodox Church declared himself to be a supporter of the Serbian monarchy.[100] The present Patriarch *Irinej* also spoke in favour of a parliamentary monarchy in 2013, when the last king of Yugoslavia was repatriated to Serbia. King Peter II died in exile and was recently awarded a state funeral at the royal crypt in Oplenac, central Serbia to which the highest state representatives came.[101] The clerical support is considered to be a critical juncture for the monarchy support in Serbia given the fact that 75% of the respondents in the 2001 survey below had confidence in the Orthodox Church. Moreover, 89% of the respondents in the same survey had a favourable perception of Patriarch *Pavle*.

4.1.2 Monarchy opinion over time

Table 3: Public support for a return to a monarchic form of government Serbia.

Year	Institution and survey	Monarchists (share of respondents in percent)	Total number of respondents (N)
1996	*Klingemann, Hans-Dieter; Bacevic, Ljiljana (1997): Yugoslav Public Opinion 1996*[102]	**11.16**	1962
1997	*Center for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research,*	**17.73**	1540

[98] Demohrišćanska Stranka Srbije (2012) *Political Principles.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://www.dhss.org.rs/media/POLITICAL_PRINCIPLES.pdf.
[99] Kraljevina Srbija, (2014).
[100] B92 (2003) *Patrijarh Pavle podržao obnovu parlamentarne monarhije.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2003&mm=11&dd=29&nav_category=12&nav_id=126001.
[101] Pressonline (2013) *Patrijarh Irinej: Srbiji nedostaju car ili kralj*. Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://www.pressonline.rs/info/drustvo/259707/patrijarh-irinej-srbiji-nedostaju-car-ili-kralj.html.
[102] Klingemann, H.-D. & Bacevic, L. (1997) *Yugoslav Public Opinion 1996*. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA2911 Data file Version 1.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.2911.

	Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, Serbia (2006): Public Opinion about Legitimacy of the political System in Serbia 1997[103]		
1998 (FR Yugoslavia)	*New democracies barometer 5*[104]	**23**	12643
2001	*Center for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, Serbia (2006): Election Study Serbia 2001*[105]	**11.45**	1860
2013	*SAS Intelligence market research (2013): Opinion poll about reputation of HRH Aleksandar II Karađorđević*[106]	**39.7**	1616

As we can see, the current support for the monarchy amounts to 39 % while the republic is supported by 32 % of the respondents in the 2013 survey. The rest remains uncommitted.

The 2013 survey, which was conducted throughout Serbia (excluding Kosovo) shows that the greatest support for a monarchic form of government is to be found:

• Among the urban respondents (62.8%),

• Among the male respondents (56.6%),

• Among the secondary educated respondents (57.3%)

• Among the unemployed respondents (43.9%)

The highest opposition to a monarchic form of government is to be found:

• Among respondents living in and around the capital, Belgrade (45.8%)

• Among the academically educated respondents (40%)

• Among the senior (65 +) respondents (39.05%)

[103] Center for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, Serbia (2006) *Public Opinion about Legitimacy of the political System in Serbia 1997*. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4276 Data file Version 1.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.4276.

[104] Rose, R. (1998) *New Democracies Barometer V: Serbia and Montenegro, 1998* [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], July 2010. SN: 6505, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6505-1.

[105] Center for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, Serbia (2006) *Election Study Serbia 2001*. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4284 Data file Version 1.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.4284.

[106] Premovic, M. & Popesku, M. (2013) *Obnova monarhije u Srbiji i reputaciji NJKV Aleksandra II Karađorđevića.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://www.intelligence.rs/serb/rezultati-istrazivanja-monarhija-2013/.

4.2 Romania

What separates Romania from the other two countries whose monarchic institution also is under scrutiny here is that the country, just as a state considered, is quite young. It was from the beginning a union of several principalities, including Wallachia and Moldova which, much like Yugoslavia, was made up of several different people, although just like in the case with Yugoslavia were closely culturally related. Secondly, we can argue given this background that the Romanian monarchic tradition strictly speaking only extends about 150 years back in time. When Romania was created and became a unified state in the 19th century, a duke of the German House of *Hohenzollern–Sigmaringen* was elected to be the country's new king. The country's first constitution had, like the Serbian from 1903, taken inspiration from the admittedly liberal Belgian constitution from in 1831.[107] Constitutional monarchy became materialized de jure and the king's constitutional role stipulated that the he, like his Bulgarian counterpart, was to promulgate and sign laws among other designated duties.[108] They way in which King Carol I conducted his duties as a constitutional monarch did strengthen the monarchy as an institution. His successor Ferdinand also had a reputation for carrying out his constitutionally assigned duties successfully.[109]

In 1938, King Carol II changed the monarchy's outlook when he suspended the constitution and introduced a dictatorship, which contributed to his estrangement from the liberal political circles in the Romanian parliament, since it appeared too biased in favour of certain groups.[110] It was claimed that a royal dictatorship, in contrast to the "pseudo-parliamentarian", was the only form of government that could address internal and global challenges that were facing Romania.[111] King Carol II was however deposed shortly thereafter and replaced by his second son Michael I, leaving the monarchy in a despicable place.[112] The house of *Hohenzollern–Sigmaringen* came to rule Romania through the Second World War until 1947 when King Michael was forced to abdicate and leave his Soviet-controlled country. As in the other two countries, the royal family was banned from returning and stripped of their nationality. Unlike King Peter of Yugoslavia, King Michael I survived the years in exile and was allowed to

[107] Roobol, (2011), p. 280.
[108] Rogoveanu (2014) *Constitutiunea din 1866.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://www.constitutia.ro/const1866.htm.
[109] Hitchins, (2009).
[110] Stan, A (1998-9) *Constitutionalism and Legalism in Iuliu Maniu's Political Thinking and Actions*. Annales Universitatis Apulensis, Series Historica, 2-3, 1998-1999, p. 11-13. Available from 2014-05-13 at: http://diam.uab.ro/istorie.uab.ro/publicatii/colectia_auash/annales_2_3/03.pdf.
[111] Gutan, (2013).
[112] Hitchins, (2009).

return permanently in 1997. Today, Romania has a semi-presidential system with an elected president as head of state.[113]

The political situation (sequence) in the country has recently been characterized by a public quarrel between the president and prime minister, which culminated in prime minister's decision to initiate a second impeachment referendum on whether the president should be held politically accountable on a variety of charges. The initiative failed, but the disputes between the executive power holders and the partially widespread distrust of Romanian politicians have resulted in a confidence shift amongst young Romanians towards the ailing King Michael I and the abolished monarchy.[114] In a poll from 2012, 28.8% of the respondents claimed to have confidence in King Michael, compared to 8.9 % for the current President.[115] This is considered to be a critical juncture for the defunct Romanian monarchy, since King Michael appears to enjoy a significant support as a result of his (political) impartiality.

As for the monarchy's future role there are reasons to assume that the monarchy, which was abolished by the communist regime, would have a relatively large support, especially since the last king of Romania is alive and now heads over a national royal house. That King Michael additionally appears to be more popular than both the current President and the current Prime Minister would also speak in favour of a distinct desire among Romanians to return to a constitutional monarchy.[116] Truly the monarchy support amounts to around 27% according to the latest survey from 2013 but proponents still do not manage to seriously threaten the republican form of government, whose support in the same measurement amounts to just over 40%. King Michael I has not got any direct male descendants which could make a possible, future royal succession problematic since the last Romanian monarchic constitution was based on a Salic law and did not sanction females to ascend the Romanian throne.

4.2.1 Monarchist parties and organizations

There is currently one political party in the Romanian parliament that officially supports a return to a monarchic form of government and that is the Christian democratic party *Partidul*

[113] Parliament of Romania (2003) *Constitution of Romania.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=371.
[114] Inscop research (2013b) *Perceptiile romanilor asupra monarhiei.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://www.inscop.ro/iulie-2013-perceptiile-romanilor-asupra-monarhiei/.
[115] Georgescu, R. in Adevarul (2012) *Arafat îi zdrobeşte pe politicieni în sondaje.* Available from 2024-05-23 at: http://adevarul.ro/news/politica/arafat-zdrobeste--politicieni-sondaje-1_50adfd537c42d5a66399b721/index.html.
[116] Georgescu, (2012).

Național Țărănesc Creștin Democrat (PNTCD).[117] The party was rehabilitated in 1989 and has currently a mandate in the lower house of the legislative assembly. There are however political leaders who supports a constitutional monarchy, for example the leader of the liberal *Partidul Naţional Liberal* (PNL).[118] King Michael was at his 90th birthday invited by representatives from the *PNL* to speak for the first time in 60 years to the elected National Assembly. The former Prime Minister *Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu* of the *PNL* has recently expressed sympathies for the former monarchy.[119] The President of Romania, known as a fan neither of the king nor of the abolished monarchy, chose not to participate at King Michael's speech to the elected representatives.[120] There is also in Romania an association working for the monarchy's restoration. The organization calls itself *Alianta Nationala pentru restabilirea monarhiei.*[121] The organization recently (April 2014) demonstrated for the Romanian monarchy in several Romanian cities, which approximately gathered a thousand participants.[122]

4.2.2 Monarchy opinion over time

Table 4: Public support for a return to a monarchic form of government in Romania.

Year	Institution and survey	Monarchists (share of respondents in percent)	Total number of respondents (N)
1993	*Klingemann, Hans-Dieter; Muntean, G. (1996): Romanian Parliament (Population) 1993*[123]	**16.54**	1596

[117] Partidului Naţional Ţărănesc Creştin Democrat (2014) *Programul Politic al Partidului Naţional Ţărănesc Creştin Democrat.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://www.pntcd.eu/programul-politic-al-partidului-national-taranesc-crestin-democrat.
[118] Manciu, A. in Mediafax (2012) *Antonescu: Continui să cred că monarhia constituţională e cea mai convenabilă formă de guvernământ*. Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://www.mediafax.ro/politic/antonescu-continui-sa-cred-ca-monarhia-constitutionala-e-cea-mai-convenabila-forma-de-guvernamant-10254982.
[119] Ziare (2011) *Tariceanu: Monarhia constitutionala, o forma de guvernare mai buna.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://www.ziare.com/tariceanu/pnl/tariceanu-monarhia-constitutionala-o-forma-de-guvernare-mai-buna-1129723.
[120] Antena3 (2011) *Preşedintele Băsescu îl atacă pe Regele Mihai: Abdicarea, un act de trădare.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://www.antena3.ro/romania/presedintele-basescu-il-ataca-pe-regele-mihai-abdicarea-un-act-de-tradare-128926.html.
[121] Alianta Nationala pentru restabilirea monarhiei, (2014).
[122] Antena3 (2014) *Marş pentru reinstaurarea monarhiei, în Capitală şi în alte trei oraşe din ţară.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://www.antena3.ro/romania/mars-pentru-reinstaurarea-monarhiei-in-capitala-si-in-alte-trei-orase-din-tara-249441.html.
[123] Klingemann, H.-D. & Muntean, G. (1996) *Romanian Parliament (Population) 1993*. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA2812 Data file Version 1.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.2812.

1994	*New democracies barometer 3*[124]	**18**	11087
1998	*New democracies barometer 5*[125]	**11**	12643
2008	*Insomar*[126]	**16**	1488
2011	*Avangarde*[127]	**28**	900
2012	*Imas*[128]	**14.4**	1039
2013a	*Inscop research*[129]	**17.7**	1082
2013b	*Inscop research*[130]	**27.2**	1050

The latest three polls show that support for monarchy in Romania is increasing. According to *Inscop research* which conducted the 2013 surveys the greatest support for the monarchy is to be found among people between 18 and 35 years old, which can be explained partly by public disillusionment with the political elite and also because the fact that younger people have received their description of the Romanian monarchy from post-communist educational textbooks (50,6%) which could mean that they have received a somewhat different and more objective depiction of the monarchy than what was offered to the generation that grew up during the communist era. The table below illustrates some other statistics from the latest conducted *Inscop* survey. It shows that the opinion of the King in person is closely linked to the overall opinion of the Romanian royal family.

Table 5: Public opinion about the Romanian royal family and of King Michael 2013b in percent.

	Very good	Good	Neither good or bad	Bad	Very bad	No opinion
Opinion of the Royal family	12.5	28.5	43.5	5	1.4	9.1
Opinion of King Michael I	14	31	40	5	1.5	8.6

[124] Rose, R. & Paul Lazarsfeld Society (Vienna) (1994) *New Europe Barometer III, 1993-1994* [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], June 2010. SN: 6454, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6454-1.
[125] Rose, R. (1998) *New Democracies Barometer I-V: Romania, 1991-1998* [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], July 2010. SN: 6500, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6500-1.
[126] Duca, D. in Cotidianul (2008) *Monarhia, dorită de doar 16% din populaţie.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://web.archive.org/web/20080922134813/http://www.cotidianul.ro/monarhia_dorita_de_doar_16_din_populatie-58787.html.
[127] Grupul Avangarde (2011) *Perceptii asupra Monarhiei.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://www.grupul-avangarde.ro/Rapoarte.cercetare/STUDIU%20AVANGARDE%20octombrie%202011-%20Perceptii%20asupra%20Monarhiei.pdf.
[128] Georgescu, (2012).
[129] Inscop research (2013a) *Revizuirea constitutiei*. Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://www.inscop.ro/aprilie-2013-revizuirea-constitutiei/.
[130] Inscop research, (2013b).

4.3 Bulgaria

Bulgaria's monarchic tradition extends at least as far back as the Serbian one. Even here, historians presume that kings, or czars which is a more accurate term in respect to Bulgaria, ruled the country already from the 7th century onwards. Bulgaria chose, like its neighbour to the north to appoint a German royal house to reign over the country after the liberation from the Ottoman Empire. A king from the house of *Sachen-Coburg-Gotha* was appointed to carry the royal sceptre and to lead Bulgaria onwards.[131] *The Tarnovo Constitution*, adopted in 1879, was based on the separation of powers principle and it gave the czar some powers including authorization to promulgate and adopt new laws.[132] The monarchy changed over time and the power of the regent became more extensive as a result of constitutional amendments. The country was spared the revolutions in the aftermath of the First World War, even though it had fought on the side of the Central Powers. It did however, like Romania end up under Soviet supremacy after World War II. In 1918, King Ferdinand abdicated in favour of his son who became Boris III. He did not practice the role of a constitutional monarch but appeared just as autocratic as Carol II of Romania. Bulgaria eventually joined the axis powers and participated in the military campaign against Yugoslavia. King Boris III died suddenly in 1943 after a meeting with *Adolf Hitler* and subsequently left the throne to his son who was still a minor but nevertheless became Czar Simeon II albeit under a regency led by Prince Kyril.[133] The military defeats in WW1 and WW2 did however discredit the Bulgarian monarchy, which resulted in the rejection of monarchy by the Bulgarian people in a 1946 referendum.[134] The then Czar, Simeon II, was faced with the legacy of his father Boris III and was subsequently forced to go into exile when Bulgaria was changed to a socialist people's republic. The legitimacy and results of the 1946 referendum remain contested, especially among supporters of the now defunct monarchy.

After the fall of communism, a new constitution was adopted which made Bulgaria a republic with an elected president as head of state. The current claimant (Czar) Simeon II got his proponents in the Bulgarian parliament to initiate a referendum in 1991 on whether the country was going to be a monarchy or a republic with regard to the drafting of the new constitution. Eventually it all fizzled out however.[135]

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[131] Clark, C. (2012) *The Sleepwalkers. How Europe Went to War in 1914.* New York: Harper, p. 273.
[132] National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria (2014) *Konstitutsiya na Bŭlgarskoto knyazhestvo, 1879.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://parliament.bg/bg/17.
[133] Tilkidjiev, (2001), p. 6.
[134] Nohlen & Stöver, (2010) p. 375.
[135] Vassilev, (2010).

Despite this constitutional setback, Simeon II continued to enjoy popularity and admiration among numerous Bulgarians.[136] He chose, unlike his colleagues in Serbia and Romania to venture into politics and he did so with its own political party, which did very well in the 2001 Bulgarian parliamentary election. Electoral successes ensured that Simeon was sworn in as Prime Minister of the Bulgarian republic - the first former hereditary monarch to be appointed to such a post ever.

The situation thereafter has not however developed in Simeon's favour. The premiership was, for mostly economic reasons, not a complete success in the eyes of many Bulgarians, even though the country did join both EU and NATO under Simeon's premiership. There were also discussions about the restitution of former royal estates, which have resulted in some negative media coverage for Simeon.[137] These political developments act as a critical juncture for the Bulgarian monarchy, since its impartiality came into question, despite favourable timing in terms of environmental changes.

4.3.1 Monarchist parties and organizations

Simeon Sakskoburggotski's center-right party *Nacionalno dviženie za stabilnost i văzhod* (NDSV) won almost 43% of the vote in the 2001 parliamentary elections. Although it appears to be no direct relation between support for the party as such and support for a return to monarchy. *NDSV* has now lost his place in the Bulgarian parliament. As with Serbia and Romania there is also a Bulgarian monarchist association known as *Federatsiya tsarstvo Bŭlgariya*. It makes however an anonymous existence and do not even by 2014 appears to have an own homepage on the internet. The association claims to have thousands of members and it supports a return to the monarchist *Tarnovo constitution* from 1879.[138]

4.3.2 Monarchy opinion over time

Table 6: Public support for a return to a monarchic form of government in Bulgaria.

Year	Institution and survey	Monarchists (share of respondents in percent)	Total number of respondents (N)
1991	*BBSS Gallup: Bulgarian Post-Election Study October 1991*[139]	**15.55**	984

[136] Groueff, S. (1998) *Crown of the Thorns.* Lanham: Madison Books, p. xvii.
[137] Vassilev, (2010).
[138] Kurtev, H. in Temanews (200-?) *Shtom Tsaryat e pretsenil, che taka e po-dobre, nie sme sŭglasni.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://www.temanews.com/index.php?p=tema&iid=446&aid=10398.
[139] Klingemann, H.-D., Stoychew, K. & Raichev, A. (1994) *Bulgarian Post-Election Study October 1991*. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA2469 Data file Version 1.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.2469.

1994	*New democracies barometer 3*[140]	**19**	11087
1998	*New democracies barometer 5.*[141]	**18**	12643
2000	*Political culture in central and eastern Europe: PCE 2000*[142]	**21**	1000-1500
2002	*Alpha research: State of society 2002*[143]	**9**	1975

Support for monarchy fell between the last to polls, presumably as a result of (Czar) Simeon's political entry in 2001. That the claimant chose to take a step into his country's party politics in 2001 is a critical juncture, in terms of distributional bias and has meant that he subsequently came to be evaluated partly with different standards than his politically neutral counterparts in the neighbouring countries. This is not least reflected by the support for the monarchy which, after Simeon's political entry dropped to a negligible level.

4.4 Conclusion

Some important aspects have been observed in relations to critical junctures for each country. For Serbia, it appears that explicit support from the influential and unifying Orthodox Church did boost the monarchist cause given the fact that monarchy support has more than tripled between the latest measures which were conducted before and after this sequence. The Romanian monarchy has not received any official clerical support as yet although it has experienced a popularity boost, partly as a result of the nationalization of the Romanian royal house. In contrast to both Serbia and Romania, monarchy support in Bulgaria has not increased, seemingly as a result of political party involvement.

5 Monarchy and nationalism

As what was highlighted in chapter two, there is a connection between nationalism and a high prevalence of traditional values. Existing data does not allow any comparison between monarchy support and (conventional) traditional values. We will therefore turn our focus away from conventional traditional values and instead compare monarchy support with nationalistic values. What is particularly interesting in this context is the ways in which the domestic monarchies in each country are seen as expressions of revival of nationalism, the

[140] Rose & Paul Lazarsfeld Society, (1994).
[141] Rose, R. (1998) *New Democracies Barometer I-V: Bulgaria, 1991-1998* [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], July 2010. SN: 6494, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6494-1.
[142] PCE (2000) *Political Culture in Central and Eastern Europé*. Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://sasd.sav.sk/en/data_katalog_abs.php?id=sasd_2000001.
[143] Alfa research (2002) *Sastoianie na obshtestvoto.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://minaloto.org/images/contentdocs/TransArchive/OSI/OPEN-SOC_ActReport-Sastoyanie-na-obsht.pdf.

nation and the history of the nation. The study has already mentioned that Serbia, in contrast to both Romania and Bulgaria do have a royal family that descended primarily from Serbia. The other two royal houses originate from Germany which, according to Professor *Wim Roobol*, sometimes has proved to be unfortunate.[144] The Romanian royal family did however recently severe all their dynastic ties to Germany to give the impression of a more "Romanian" dynasty.

This chapter begins however, with defining and measuring the actual existence of nationalism in the three respective countries. Since the authors of *WVS* emphasized that presence of traditional values also facilitates the existence of nationalism, it could therefore be logically to make their survey of 2005 the initial (conceptual) basis for further analysis. Their variable involves "how proud a respondent feels over their own nationality", which will be illustrated in the table below. This acts as a well-adjusted indicator of whether nationalistic values exist or not. It is so especially since it captures maybe the essence of nationalism - affection to one's own national identity.

Table 7: 2005 degrees of nationalism (pride of one's own national identity) in each of the countries in percent.

	Very proud	Relatively proud	Not so proud	Not proud at all
Serbia	48.53	37.46	12.3	1.7
Romania	38.34	45.84	13.63	2.19
Bulgaria	43.61	37.67	13.66	5.07

The table above shows that Serbia has the highest score in 2005, 48.53%. The respondents who are not proud of their national identities are mostly Bulgarians, 5.07%. If the hypothesis is that (only) nationalism facilitates monarchism, the latter should according to the numbers in table seven remain excessive in all the three countries. That is not the case yet however; hence there must be some other explanation for how a monarchic form of government can be seen as an expression of nationalism alongside these patriotic expressions.

The royal claimants were not able to rely on support from the nationalist camp in any of the national parliaments. Of course we might argue that since these countries express a rather

[144] Roobol, (2011), p. 285.

high degree of patriotism in general, for the domestic voters, the parties that they consider being nationalistic or patriotic would probably to an outsider be consider ultra-nationalistic.[145]

The Romanian and Bulgarian monarchies were "imported" from Germany back in the 19th century and has not, as far as Bulgaria is concerned, been able to act as a national symbol in the same way as the Serbian monarchy, whose dynasty's founder is attributed, if not to an institutionalized position, then at least to an iconic one. *Karadjordje* was one of the "fathers" of the First Serbian Uprising in 1804[146] and every year on the Serbian National Day, the Serbian Prime Minister places a wreath on his grave to commemorate his role in modern Serbian history.[147] The tables below are based on data from *"New democracies barometer 5"* survey from 1998 and consist of the questions (1) *better to return to a monarchy?* And (2) *how proud of citizenship?*

5.1 Romania

The year 2011 represented a turning point for the Romanian royal house. King Michael I then decided to cut all the dynastic ties with the *Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen* dynasty and he furthermore decided to change the name of his family to the royal house of *Romania*. Thus, he and his successors may no longer claim any other throne, possession of the house of *Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen*. What we can conclude from the illustration in table four is that this naturalization process of the Romanian royal family has had an impact on monarchy support, which after this change has risen considerably.

Table 8: 1998 relationship between monarchy and citizenship in Romania in percent.

	Very proud of citizenship	Somewhat proud of citizenship	Not very proud of citizenship	Not at all proud of citizenship	Double answer
Strongly for monarchy	62.5	27.5	7.5	0	2.5
Partly for monarchy	51.52	32.32	10.1	4.04	2
Partly for republic	43.71	36.53	12.57	2.4	4.8
Strongly for republic	57.52	29.74	7.58	1.84	3.3

[145] BBC News (1999) *Vojislav Seselj: Milosevic's hard-line ally.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1999/03/99/kosovo_strikes/316198.stm.
[146] Clark, (2012), p. 5-6.
[147] B92 (2012) *Serbia celebrates Statehood Day.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2012&mm=02&dd=15&nav_id=78802.

According to this table, the respondents who are strongly for monarchy in Romania are also very proud of their citizenships, 62.5%. If we add "somewhat proud" the percentage would instead be 90. The next table below shows that there are no (strongly) monarchists among the respondents who are not proud of their Romanian citizenships. Nevertheless 16.67% of those respondents are partly for monarchy.

Table 9: 1998 share of monarchists and views on citizenship in Romania in percent.

	Strongly for monarchy	Partly for monarchy	Partly for republic	Strongly for republic
Very proud of citizenship	3.85	7.85	11.23	77.08
Somewhat proud of citizenship	3.03	8.82	16.8	71.35
Not very proud of citizenship	3	10	21	66
Not at all proud of citizenship	0	16.67	16.67	66.67

5.2 Bulgaria

The Bulgarian monarchists are not only more anti-democratic as the next chapter will demonstrate. They are also a bit more nationalistic in contrast to the respondents who prefer a republican form of government. That is illustrated by the table below, which is also based on the *NDB* 1998 survey.

Table 10: 1998 relationship between monarchy and citizenship in Bulgaria in percent.

	Very proud of citizenship	Somewhat proud of citizenship	Not very proud of citizenship	Not at all proud of citizenship	Double answer
Strongly for monarchy	56.6	35.85	3.77	0	3.77
Partly for monarchy	38.28	35.94	10.94	7.03	7.81
Partly for republic	26.91	34.53	21.52	4.93	12.11
Strongly for republic	47.29	28.88	10.11	3.43	10.29

In Bulgaria, the respondents who are strongly for monarchy are also very proud of their citizenships, 56.6%. The percentage would be 92.45 if we were to add the "somewhat proud" respondents. The table below shows that there are no (strongly) monarchists among the

respondents who are not proud of their Bulgarian citizenships. 23.08% of the same respondents in the table below are however partly for monarchy.

Table 11: 1998 share of monarchists and views on citizenship in Bulgaria in percent.

	Strongly for monarchy	Partly for monarchy	Partly for republic	Strongly for republic
Very proud of citizenship	7.48	12.22	14.96	65.34
Somewhat proud of citizenship	6.29	15.23	25.5	52.98
Not very proud of citizenship	1.67	11.67	40	46.67
Not at all proud of citizenship	0	23.08	28.21	48.72

5.3 Serbia

As for Serbia, the respondents who favour monarchy are at least as nationalistic as the respondents who prefer the republican form of government.

Table 12: 1998 relationship between monarchy and citizenship in Serbia in percent.

	Very proud of citizenship	Somewhat proud of citizenship	Not very proud of citizenship	Not at all proud of citizenship	Double answer
Strongly for monarchy	55.06	34.83	7.87	2.25	0
Partly for monarchy	47.52	31.91	12.06	1.42	7.09
Partly for republic	58.78	22.9	8.4	0.76	9.16
Strongly for republic	63.71	21.87	5.55	2.69	6.18

The table above shows that the respondents who are strongly for republic are also very proud of their Serbian citizenships, 63.71%. The percentage for the "strongly for monarchy" respondents are 55.06. However if we add the "somewhat proud" respondents to the "strongly for monarchy" category, then the percentage would be 89.89. The corresponding percentage for the republicans is 85.58. The table below shows that 34.29% of the "not very proud" respondents are monarchists.

Table 13: 1998 share of monarchists and views on citizenship in Serbia in percent.

	Strongly for	Partly for	Partly for	Strongly for

	monarchy	monarchy	republic	republic
Very proud of citizenship	8.24	11.26	12.94	67.56
Somewhat proud of citizenship	12.7	18.44	12.3	56.56
Not very proud of citizenship	10	24.29	15.71	50
Not at all proud of citizenship	9.09	9.09	4.55	77.27

5.4 Conclusion

As both Serbia and Romania display a noticeable increase of traditional values while Bulgaria does not, we might maintain that variables such as "importance of family" or "respect for authority" have a greater bearing (causal effect) on monarchy support than nationalism or patriotism, even though nationalism (proud of citizenship) did influence the monarchists in all three countries.[148] Unfortunately, with existing material, there are no ways to test that hypothesis. That hypothesis is facilitated by the fact that the national political parties that have been labelled nationalistic occasionally display an animosity towards the former monarchies.[149] For a political party to be anti-communist is obviously not the same as to be pro-monarchist. It appears moreover that the monarchists assumed it that way, at least in Serbia where an overwhelming 83 % of the explicitly monarchist respondents had little or no confidence in the nationalistic *Sprska radikalna stranka* (SRS) in the 2001 survey.[150] Still, proudness of citizenship, as an indicator of nationalism and traditional values, does go hand in hand with monarchy support.

6 Monarchy and democracy

A common objection to a monarchic form of government is that it is undemocratic. That a monarchic form of government is undemocratic is usually explained by the fact that the head of state-institution in a monarchy often is regulated by a hereditary lineage. The Vatican may indeed be regarded as an exception here since they do not practice any hereditary lineage. Such a hereditary succession is usually applied by absolute primogeniture or by agnatic primogeniture. There are however monarchies where the practice is that a new monarch is selected, as in Cambodia.

[148] See tables 8,10 & 12.
[149] Arsic, V. (2008) *Da li nam treba monarhija?* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://www.pressonline.rs/zabava/life-style/48804/da-li-nam-treba-monarhija.html.
[150] See table three.

The hereditary monarchies in Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria were abolished at a time when the three countries were in effect under Soviet occupation. In Yugoslavia which Serbia up until 2006 was part of, the institution was abolished by the communist-controlled Constituent Assembly in 1945. In Romania, King Michael I abdicated under Soviet pressure in 1947. The Bulgarian monarchy was abolished by a Soviet instigated referendum in 1946. Whether the decisions to abolish these monarchy institutions were preceded by open and democratic processes and procedures is not inquiries that this study shall pursue answers to, nor if it existed popular support for those decisions. However, there are reasons for the study's purpose's fulfilment to analyse whether the support to reinstate the monarchic state forms in the three countries are expressions of distrust of the current elected forms of governments.

One indicator that this would actually be the case is whether the respondents in the *NDB* surveys that advocate monarchy in front of the current arrangements also would welcome suspensions of the parliamentary- and the multiparty systems in the three countries. The tables below are based on data from *"New democracies barometer 5"* survey from 1998 and consist of the questions (1) "better to return to a monarchy?" and (2) "approval of parliament suspension and abolishment of multiparty system?".

6.1 Bulgaria

What we may add in relation to Bulgaria is that the respondents who in the 1998 survey considered themselves monarchists were not particularly supportive of the parliamentary system. We can even see in table 14 is that (strong) support for the Bulgarian parliamentary system increases the further away from monarchy the respondents place themselves. The result of table 15 confirms that assumption. This is not unimportant given the fact that over 75% of the total number of respondents in the *NDB 1998* survey would not approve of a suspension of the parliamentary system.

Table 14: 1998 relationship between monarchy and parliamentary system in Bulgaria in percent.

	Strongly for parliamentary system	Partly for parliamentary system	Partly against parliamentary system	Strongly against parliamentary system
Strongly for monarchy	29.63	20.37	27.78	22.22
Partly for monarchy	38.58	25.98	28.35	7.09
Partly for republic	40.54	42.34	13.51	3.6
Strongly for republic	57.53	21.6	16.88	5.35

The table above illustrates that only 29.63% of the respondents who are strongly for monarchy are strongly for the parliamentary system. It also shows that the respondents who are strongly for republic tend to be most favourable (57.53%) of the parliamentary system. In fact, merely half of the "strongly for monarchy" respondents favour the parliamentary system. The next table shows that as many as 41.18% of the respondents who are strongly against the parliamentary system are monarchists.

Table 15: 1998 share monarchists and views on the parliamentary system in Bulgaria in percent.

	Strongly for monarchy	Partly for monarchy	Partly for republic	Strongly for republic
Strongly for parliamentary system	3.39	10.38	19.07	67.16
Partly for parliamentary system	4.28	12.84	36.58	46.3
Partly against parliamentary system	8.62	20.69	17.24	53.45
Strongly against parliamentary system	23.53	17.65	15.69	43.14

6.2 Romania

If monarchism in Bulgaria to some extent could be regarded as an expression of anti-democratic values in the 1998 survey the situation was not quite the same in Romania. What is evident in table 16 is that those respondents who identified themselves as monarchists are also the ones that most strongly took the side of the parliamentary system. The 1998 survey indicate that more that 70% of the total number of respondents would not approve of a parliamentary suspension.

Table 16: 1998 relationship between monarchy and parliamentary system in Romania in percent.

	Strongly for parliamentary system	Partly for parliamentary system	Partly against parliamentary system	Strongly against parliamentary system
Strongly for monarchy	47.5	15	20	17.5
Partly for monarchy	42.42	26.26	23.23	8.08
Partly for republic	43.11	31.74	14.97	10.18
Strongly for	43.96	29	20.6	6.44

republic				

The table above shows that the respondents who are most strongly for monarchy are also the ones who are most favourable of the parliamentary system, 47.5%. If we add the "partly for parliamentary system" respondents to the same category then the percentage stays just over 60. The next table shows that 17.04% of the (strongly) opponents of the parliamentary system are monarchists.

Table 17: 1998 share monarchists and views on parliamentary system in Romania in percent.

	Strongly for monarchy	Partly for monarchy	Partly for republic	Strongly for republic
Strongly for parliamentary system	3.69	8.16	13.98	74.17
Partly for parliamentary system	1.78	7.72	15.73	74.78
Partly against parliamentary system	3.4	9.79	10.64	76.17
Strongly against parliamentary system	7.95	9.09	19.32	63.64

6.3 Serbia

The study has previously mentioned that Serbia at the time of the *NDB 1998* survey still was in a federation with Montenegro. Moreover, the federation had by no means to the same extent as Romania or Bulgaria completed free and fair elections. It was still presided over by the ex-communist and socialist *Slobodan Milosevic* when it was imposed to UN sanctions in 1992 and just a year after the 1998 survey was conducted, the country was subjected to a NATO bombing campaign in light of the war in Kosovo.[151] In relation to these circumstances, it was particularly appealing to see whether there was any cleavage between monarchists and republicans in the attitude towards the fragile Serbian parliamentary- and multiparty system. Table 18 and 19 do provide support for the suggestion that there were numerous monarchists among the opponents to the leadership of *Slobodan Milosevic*. That is in line with the 70% of Serbians who, in the 1998 survey, would disapprove if there was a parliamentary suspension.

Table 18: 1998 relationship between monarchy and parliamentary system in Serbia (FR Yugoslavia) in percent.

[151] Todosijevic, B. (2013), p. 548.

	Strongly for parliamentary system	Partly for parliamentary system	Partly against parliamentary system	Strongly against parliamentary system
Strongly for monarchy	75.28	6.74	15.73	2.25
Partly for monarchy	63.83	14.89	14.89	6.38
Partly for republic	43.08	29.23	20.77	6.92
Strongly for republic	48.49	19.18	25.04	7.29

The table above clearly shows that the respondents who strongly favoured monarchy also favoured the parliamentary system, 75.28%. If we add the "partly for parliamentary system", then the percentage stays at 82.02. Among the strongest supporters of the parliamentary system, 30.25% are monarchists, as the table below shows. In fact, only 16.67% of the respondents who are strongly against the parliamentary system are monarchists.

Table 19: 1998 share monarchists and views on parliamentary system in Serbia in percent.

	Strongly for monarchy	Partly for monarchy	Partly for republic	Strongly for republic
Strongly for parliamentary system	12.91	17.34	10.79	58.96
Partly for parliamentary system	3.23	11.29	20.43	65.05
Partly against parliamentary system	6.36	9.55	12.27	71.82
Strongly against parliamentary system	3.03	13.64	13.64	69.7

The 1998 survey additionally points out that the support for monarchy was noticeable higher (37.43%) among the respondents that claimed to have *no trust* in the President, than the overall support for monarchy which at that time was around 23%. The Crown prince voiced criticism of *Slobodan Milosevic* and worked actively against him.[152] The *SPO* did however for a while join the socialist's unity government in 1999 as the situation in Kosovo began to deteriorate. Unfortunately, since there are no "post-Milosevic" surveys with adequate

[152] The Public Relations Office of HRR Crown Prince Alexander II (1998) *Seventh Anniversary of renewed democracy in Serbia.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://www.royalfamily.org/pre2013/statements/state-det/state-1725.htm.

variables available, there are no ways to measure whether the monarchists became more scattered across the spectrum after the democratic changes in October 2000.

6.4 Conclusion

What we might say about monarchists in the three countries at the time of the 1998 survey is that they first of all were relatively few in numbers.[153] Secondly, one cannot help but notice that the Bulgarian case in table 14 illustrates that monarchists were more anti-democratic in their attitude then what was the case with the monarchists in Serbia. In Serbia, the monarchists were far more supportive of the parliamentary, multiparty system. In Romania there was a slight overweight among monarchists for the parliamentary, multiparty system, if we cross the two "strongly for…" categories in table 16. Monarchy sentiments in Serbia and in Romania were therefore much more in line with the present democratic system that most (around 70%) respondents in the 1998 survey preferred.

7 Results

This final chapter will summarize the empirical results of this study. The purpose of this study was to examine and comprehend the monarchy's appeal in countries with authoritarian history. The three countries that were subject to this analysis were Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria and the study has been particularly interested in sorting out how monarchies have emerged from historical and contemporary critical junctures. The study has been able to demonstrate mainly significant differences in the support for monarchies between Serbia/Romania on one hand in contrast to Bulgaria on the other.

Table 20: (Individual) monarchy support in Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria over time in percent.

Year	Bulgaria	Romania	Serbia
1991	15.55		
1993		16.54	
1994	19	18	
1996			11.13
1997			17.73
1998	18	11	24
2000	21		
2001			11.45
2002	**9**		
2008		16	
2011		28	
2012		14.4	

[153] See also monarchy support for each country.

2013a		17.7	**39.7**
2013b		**27.2**	

Serbia has the highest monarchy support in 2013; 39.7%. Monarchy support in Romania is at 27.7% in 2013, while support for a monarchy restoration in Bulgaria is at 9% in 2002. What we additionally recognize from the table above is that there are more or less clear critical junctures or formative moment-sequences for each country. For Bulgaria, we can clearly see that the support for monarchy fell significantly in the sequence between the 2000 and 2002 surveys which can only be explained by the fact than that claimant (Czar) Simeon II in 2001 chose to stand for election to the Bulgarian parliament with a newly formed political party, which moreover resulted in him becoming the next Bulgarian prime minister. This political sequence shows that the "institution" failed to reproduce, in terms of support, because it failed to appear neutral/ impartial in relation to the distributional mechanism.[154] One conclusion that can be drawn from that is that a monarchy which is considered (too) politicized runs the risk of losing public support. The support for the Bulgarian monarchy is at 9% in 2002.

As for Romania, their critical juncture (sequence) occurred between 1998 and 2011. Some restraint in the interpretation of support is important for obvious reasons, since it is quite huge gap between the measurements and more decisive factors or mechanisms may have contributed to the difference in monarchy support. One possible explanation is however one that was furthermore highlighted by the Romanian press and that was that the political establishment during the period between 1998 and 2013 suffered an apparent crisis of confidence.[155] This study has not got any verifiable tools for such a critical juncture however. A second and more measurable critical juncture for the increased support of the Romanian monarchy, which may have contributed to the just mentioned formative moment, in terms of support for the Romanian elite, is that the royal family since 2011 has renounced their dynastic links to the (originally) German house of *Hohenzollern – Sigmaringen*.[156] The support for the Romanian monarchy stands at 27.2% in 2013.

If the study finally were to turn its attention to Serbia, which by far displays the highest support for a monarchic form of government in 2013 (39.9%), then we would see a distinctly sharp critical juncture in the sequence between 2001 and 2013. The only two events that can

[154] See p. 14.
[155] Grigoras, (2012).
[156] Adevarul (2011) *Regele Mihai I a rupt legăturile istorice şi dinastice cu Casa de Hohenzollern.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://adevarul.ro/news/bucuresti/regele-mihai-i-rupt-legaturile-istorice-dinastice-casa-hohenzollern-1_50bde9347c42d5a663cfcc03/index.html.

possibly explain this development (reproduction) is that the Serbian claimant chose to move to his native Serbia in 2001 and also that the Serbian Orthodox Church has chosen to openly support a monarchy restoration since 2003, which was explained in chapter four. Otherwise Serbia, like Romania has had a development which has meant that the individuals in those countries have gotten attributed with more traditional values in *WVS* measurements over time.[157]

7.1 Conclusion

Now that the results of the study have been summarized, the only remaining task for the study is to summarize what it has contributed monarchy research with. This is done with assistance of the model which was introduced in chapter three.

Table 21: Outcome model based on the most similar systems design (mssd). **Source**: Landman (2001), p. 30.

	Serbia	**Romania**	**Bulgaria**
Characteristics	Post communistic	Post communistic	Post communistic
	Monarchic tradition, abolished around 1945	Monarchic tradition, abolished around 1945	Monarchic tradition, abolished around 1945
	Undisputed claimant	Undisputed claimant	Undisputed claimant
”Key” explanation variable(s)	Non-political monarchy	Non-political monarchy	**Not** Non-political monarchy
	”National” royal family	”National” royal family	**Not** ”National” royal family
	Increase in traditional values	Increase in traditional values	**Not** Increase in traditional values
	Monarchy support in line with democratic values	Monarchy support in line with democratic values	**Not** Monarchy support in line with democratic values
Outcome to be explained	Increase in the share of people that prefers a return to a monarchic form of government	Increase in the share of people that prefers a return to a monarchic form of government	**Not** Increase in the share of people that prefers a return to a monarchic form of government

Observations: The number of key variables differs from the previous time this model appeared. Nevertheless they explain why the outcome has not been the same in Bulgaria as it have been in Serbia and Romania.

What the study has been able to show is that there is a significant difference between the three compared countries, in terms of monarchy support, partly as a result of various critical junctures. Support for monarchy could furthermore be described as a craving for a national and cultural “revival”. In both Serbia and Romania there are expressions of that in the current royal dynasties who claim the thrones for the now defunct monarchic institutions. In Bulgaria

[157] See table 1.

however, not only does the royal house fail to act as an expression of national identity and unity. The claimant furthermore chose to take the plunge into partisan politics, at a time when his descendants were still relatively anonymous to many Bulgarians.[158] What has furthermore complicated the royal succession in Bulgaria is the fact that Simeon's eldest son remains in a coma after a car accident.[159] The claimant's political entry has meant that the Bulgarian monarchists practically lost their only front man and candidate for the ceremonial head of state in a possible future return to a monarchic form of government, especially since his allegiance to the republican constitution was widely seen as a fresh abdication. Moreover, the support for a monarchic form of government in Bulgaria could (in 1998) be interpreted as a willingness to return to an authoritarian rule, while it in Serbia on the contrary was more of an expression of eager to complete the democratic transition. Furthermore, traditional values such as nationalism do go hand in hand with monarchism in all the three countries, although it has not increased in Bulgaria.

The study has thus resulted in four main differences as to why support for a monarchic form of government has gained more ground in Serbia and Romania than in Bulgaria. In Serbia, a monarchic form of government is in a 2013 survey attributed with an even greater support than the current republican form of government, while in Romania public opinion for a monarchic restoration has so far not risen above the current support for the republic. Future empirical research will indicate whether these achievements in opinion will lead to an increased commitment to the monarchist cause in any of the countries or whether an increase in support for a monarchy restoration instead will lead to a mobilization amongst republican minded citizens or amongst the political elite, whom in vast numbers in the two countries remain committed to the republican forms of governments. Future research should also include other cases in order to verify which of the "key explanation variables" that has the highest explanatory force in relation to the different outcomes.

8 Swedish summary

Vad studien har kunnat påvisa är att det finns en betydande skillnad i monarkistöd de tre länderna emellan som skulle kunna beskrivas, som en efterfrågan på nationell och kulturellt ”väckelse” som delvis påverkas av olika ”critical junctures” eller sekvenser. I både Serbien och i Rumänien finns tydliga uttryck för det i de ”nationella” kungaätterna som var för sig gör

[158] Tilkidjev, (2001), p. 8.
[159] Novinite (2010) *Bulgaria Prince Kardam Deteriorates Year and Half after Hellish Crash.* Available from 2014-05-23 at: http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=112473.

anspråk på de nu avskaffade monarkiska institutionerna. I Bulgarien uppfattas inte kungafamiljen riktigt på samma sätt som ett uttryck för nationell identitet och kulturellt ”revival” då *Sachen-Coburg-Gotha* alltjämt är en tysk fursteätt. Att tronpretendenten (Tsaren) valde att ta steget in i partipolitiken gjorde att de bulgariska monarkisterna förlorade sin främsta frontfigur och kandidat till posten som monark och statschef vid en eventuell återgång till en monarkisk statsform. Simeons trohetsed till den republikanska författningen ansågs allmänt vara en färsk abdikation. Analysen av 1998 års data kan därutöver visa att de bulgarer som önskar en återgång till monarki i grunden har en mer skeptisk inställning till det parlamentariska och pluralistiska systemet, vilket också kan förhindra att fler (demokratiskt sinnande) människor sluter upp bakom den monarkiska saken. Även om traditionella värderingar, såsom nationalism går hand i hand med monarkistöd så har inte dessa värderingar ökat i Bulgarien.

Studien har således utkristalliserat fyra huvudsakliga skillnader till varför förslaget att återgå till en monarkisk statsform vunnit större terräng i Serbien och Rumänien än i Bulgarien. I Serbien har monarkin i en survey från 2013 ett större stöd än den nuvarande republiken, medan den i Rumänien än så länge befinner sig i ett opinionsmässigt underläge. Framtida forskning får visa om dessa framgångar i opinionen leder till en ökad uppslutning bakom monarkisterna i de respektive länderna eller om det istället leder till en republikansk mobilisering, antingen bland medborgare eller bland den politiska eliten som, till övervägande majoritet i de bägge länderna, av olika skäl förblir sina republikanska statsformer trogna. Framtida forskning bör också inkludera andra länder med syftet att verifiera kraften i de olika förklaringsvariablerna.

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