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Jussila Hammes, JohannaORCID iD iconorcid.org/0000-0001-7864-5982
Alternative names
Publications (3 of 3) Show all publications
Nerhagen, L., Fors, H. C., Hansson, L., Jussila Hammes, J. & Pyddoke, R. (2018). Politiska krav och tjänstemäns roll för analys av och beslut om styrmedel: Sammanfattande slutrapport. Linköping: Statens väg- och transportforskningsinstitut
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Politiska krav och tjänstemäns roll för analys av och beslut om styrmedel: Sammanfattande slutrapport
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2018 (Swedish)Report (Other academic)
Alternative title[en]
Political demand and the role of bureaucrats for analyzes of and decisions on policy measures : Summary report
Abstract [sv]

En hållbar utveckling innebär att samhällets begränsade resurser används på ett effektivt sätt med hänsyn tagen till sociala, ekonomiska och miljömässiga konsekvenser. För att uppnå önskade samhällsmål på ett effektivt sätt behöver olika aspekter vägas in vid utformning av styrmedel. Inom EU föregås beslut om regleringar av en så kallad Regleringskonsekvensbeskrivning (Regulatory Impact Assessment) där samhällsekonomisk analys ingår. Forskning och olika utredningar har visat att Sverige saknar en etablerad praxis för att genomföra denna typ av konsekvensanalyser på miljö, men även energi- och transportområdet. I detta projekt är syftet att undersöka hur Sverige arbetar med de analyser av detta slag som genomförs inom EU inför förhandlingar men också att studera orsaker till att de används eller inte används. Fokus ligger på förutsättningar inom en myndighet, men även vilken betydelse som tjänstemän har för vilka underlag som tas fram inför beslut om utformning av regleringar/styrmedel.

Den övergripande slutsats som kan dras av de tre delstudierna som ingått i projektet, samt diskussionen på avslutningsseminariet, är att detta inte är ett etablerat arbetssätt i det svenska förvaltningssystemet. Detta kan förklaras av brist på kompetens, en etablerad misstro, målstyrning samt avsaknad av ett institutionellt ramverk för när och hur denna typ av bredare konsekvensanalyser ska genomföras. Vid avslutningsseminariet framkom att Naturvårdsverket nu arbetar med en vägledning för att hjälpa tjänstemän att i ett tidigt skede analysera om det finns behov av regleringar från samhällets sida, att inleda arbetet med att ställa frågan ”Vad är problemet?”. Vi bedömer att detta är ett steg i rätt riktning men ser också att de nationalekonomer som arbetar ute på myndigheter ofta är ensamma eller väldigt få och därmed kan behöva olika former av stöd för att kunna utveckla arbetet med denna typ av, ofta komplexa, analyser på sin myndighet.

Abstract [en]

Sustainable development implies that society’s limited resources should be used efficiently, taking into account the various impacts on society – social, economic and environmental. To achieve established societal goals efficiently, various aspects have to be accounted for in the design of policy measures. Within the EU a Regulatory Impact Assessment, where a cost-benefit analysis is included, needs to accompany all major regulatory initiatives. According to research and different policy assessment, Sweden lacks an established praxis regarding this type of analysis in the area of environmental policy but also in the field of energy and transport. The purpose of this project is to investigate how Sweden uses this type of information in the negotiations that take place within the EU regarding policy proposals but also investigate the reasons for use or non-use. The focus is on what role the organization and the bureaucrats play for the collection of this type of information.

The overall conclusion that can be drawn from the three sub-studies included in the project, as well as the discussion at the closing seminar, is that this is not an established way of working in the Swedish government system. This can be explained by lack of competence, an established mistrust, management by objectives and lack of an institutional framework for when and how this type of broader impact assessment is to be conducted. At the closing seminar, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency presented that it is now working on a guide to help officials to analyze at an early stage whether there is a need for regulation by society, to initiate the work by asking the question “What is the problem?”. We think that this is a step in the right direction, but we also see that the economists working out in government are often alone or very few and may therefore need different forms of support to develop the work on this kind of, often complex, analysis.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Linköping: Statens väg- och transportforskningsinstitut, 2018. p. 27
Keywords
Cost benefit analysis, Decision process, Organization (association), Tax, Environment protection, Policy
National Category
Public Administration Studies
Research subject
10 Road: Transport, society, policy and planning; 10 Road: Transport, society, policy and planning, 15 Road: Environment
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-76242 (URN)
Available from: 2019-09-13 Created: 2019-09-13 Last updated: 2025-02-21Bibliographically approved
Jussila Hammes, J. & Nilsson, J.-E. -. (2016). The allocation of transport infrastructure in Swedish municipalities: Welfare maximization, political economy or both?. Economics of Transportation, 7-8, 53-64
Open this publication in new window or tab >>The allocation of transport infrastructure in Swedish municipalities: Welfare maximization, political economy or both?
2016 (English)In: Economics of Transportation, ISSN 2212-0122, E-ISSN 2212-0130, Vol. 7-8, p. 53-64Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This paper compares models for explaining the volume of transport investments in Swedish municipalities: 1. by the planned projects’ welfare consequences, 2. in terms of the district demand (the common pool) model, namely a municipality's share of the cost towards the investment and 3. electoral concerns and/or lobbying, as described by a swing voter model. We find that the welfare only hypothesis has little explanatory power. The district demand model explains the investment volume in rail projects, while the swing voter model explains road investment better. Lobbying does not seem to have any impact on the investment volume. Finally, we find that including a measure of the welfare in the political economy models greatly enhances the models’ explanatory power. Our main conclusion is that future analyses of what drives the allocation of resources for transport infrastructure should consider aspects related to both political economy, welfare, and the transport mode.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier, 2016
Keywords
Distributive politics, Lobbying, Party competition, Political economy, Transport infrastructure, Welfare
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-76235 (URN)10.1016/j.ecotra.2016.11.002 (DOI)000390991600004 ()2-s2.0-85006324373 (Scopus ID)
Note

Funding Agency:

Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm, CTS  297

Available from: 2019-09-13 Created: 2019-09-13 Last updated: 2019-12-13Bibliographically approved
Jussila Hammes, J. (2015). Political economics or Keynesian demand-side policies: What determines transport infrastructure investment in Swedish municipalities?. Research in Transportation Economics, 51, 49-60
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Political economics or Keynesian demand-side policies: What determines transport infrastructure investment in Swedish municipalities?
2015 (English)In: Research in Transportation Economics, ISSN 0739-8859, E-ISSN 1875-7979, Vol. 51, p. 49-60Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This paper examines investment in transport infrastructure in Swedish municipalities according to the three National Transport Infrastructure Plans of 2004, 2010 and 2014. The plans cover 12 years each. The test of a swing voter model, combined with variables relevant to the Keynesian model of demand side policies, supports the proposition that there is less investment in municipalities with highly partisan electorates. The model seems to work better for road than for rail investments. Municipalities with a high density of voters at the ideological cut-point (middle of the ideological distribution) got more investment in the 2010 plan but not in the other plans. The impact of the elasticity of output on public service provision raised investment in road projects in sub-plan period 1 compared to later sub-plan periods. The tax elasticity of output may influence the volume of investment downward. The Plan for 2010-2021 seems to be the most politically determined of the plans considered here.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier, 2015
Keywords
Demand side policy, Investment, Keynes, Political economy, Transport infrastructure, Sweden, Swing-voter model
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-76236 (URN)10.1016/j.retrec.2015.07.007 (DOI)000366076500007 ()2-s2.0-84947041862 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2019-09-13 Created: 2019-09-13 Last updated: 2019-12-13Bibliographically approved
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ORCID iD: ORCID iD iconorcid.org/0000-0001-7864-5982

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