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As (criminal) law scholars, we are often driven to critically reflect on the boundaries of criminalisation and to examine its very foundations. What does it truly mean to criminalize specific behaviours? What are, or should be, the normative limits of this process? These questions hold particular significance in academic and public discourse, as they resonate even more when considered within the broader societal, cultural, and political contexts in which criminal law operates. By scrutinizing these boundaries, we ensure that criminal law serves justice in a fair and well-ordered society, avoiding overreach that may impinge on individual freedoms, or disproportionately target vulnerable groups.

This book emerges from the intellectual discussions sparked by the conference titled ‘Criminalisation and its Limits: Revisiting Public Goods and Legal Interests in Domestic and Transnational Criminal Law’, held on 22–23 June 2023 at Leiden Law School. The conference, much like this volume, focussed on the concepts of public goods and legal interests, examining their role in justifying, explaining, and limiting criminalisation. By revisiting and rethinking these foundational concepts, we seek to develop a clearer under-standing of their application within national, international, and transnational contexts. This intellectual endeavour is especially pertinent in light of the rapidly evolving landscape of (global) crime in an increasingly interconnected world.

The concepts of public goods and legal interests have become central to criminal law theory, serving as key justifications for legislative intervention in this field. However, their implications often diverge, prompting the need for a critical reassessment of these foundational concepts. Throughout this volume, we engage with these competing perspectives to deepen our understanding of the contemporary significance of public goods and legal interests, in an attempt to critically analyse the scope and limits of national and transnational criminal law.

This chapter reflects on what should be the appropriate normative framework for assessing the legitimacy of EU action in criminal law, moving beyond the justifications prescribed by the Treaties. Here, the term normative is understood broadly, encompassing not only legal rules and principles but also rationales drawn from moral and political philosophy, political economy, public choice theory, and economics. The first part evaluates the legitimacy of EU criminal law through the lens of criminal law theory, with particular focus on the scope of harm-based accounts of criminalisation. Additionally, it considers the constitutional constraints on deeper integration in EU criminal justice, particularly the harm criterion established in Article 83(1) TFEU. While acknowledging its significance as a foundational principle of EU criminal law, he argues that the harm criterion should be complemented by a public goods framework, which provides a valuable perspective for identifying common EU interests that warrant protection through criminal law. Accordingly, the second part of the chapter offers a detailed analysis of European public goods as a justificatory basis for EU intervention in criminal matters, before concluding with a critical assessment of the potential limitations of this approach.

This book challenges how we think about the foundations and boundaries of criminalisation by reimagining the concepts of public goods and legal interests—both nationally and transnationally. Can we identify common public goods and legal interests across borders that warrant protection through criminal law, or are they shaped by diverse national values and principles? To answer this, the book examines how these concepts justify, explain, and constrain the criminalisation of conduct across different legal systems. It blends rigorous academic analysis with practical recommendations to help further shape our ideas on criminalisation and the future of criminal law, making it a must-read for scholars, practitioners, and anyone invested in the future of criminal justice across Europe and beyond.

The principle of proportionality is a key principle in EU law; however, it has distinctive meanings in different contexts. In the field of free movement, proportionality constrains the Member States’ possibilities to diverge from EU law on the basis of the requirement of suitability and necessity. In the area of EU competences it is a principle that guides the relationship between the EU and Member States and requires the EU legislator to use the least intrusive means of regulation/legislation to protect state sovereignty. There is also a third approach to proportionality in the field of EU sanctions and the Court of Justice’s case-law, which entails that the sanction imposed must be commensurate to the gravity of the offence. This more conventional criminal law ‘retrospective’ version of proportionality has now been enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and suggests that ‘the severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence’. 

This entry examines the criminalisation of sanctions violations, which can be defined as the process of establishing breaches of international sanctions as criminal offences under domestic law. One of the key ideas behind criminalisation in this field is to deter individuals and companies from violating the relevant international sanctioning regime. Nonetheless, states around the world adopt very divergent approaches in relation to the extent to which they criminalise breaches of restrictive measures, thus potentially undermining the overall effectiveness of the sanctioning regime. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the European Union (EU) has adopted a very comprehensive sanctioning regime against Russia, including a directive that criminalises the violation of EU restrictive measures. If viewed in terms of its communicative dimension, the criminalisation of sanctions violations can be considered an effective tool in achieving the specific foreign policy objectives of states and international organisations.

This article offers a critical analysis of the evolution, structure and functioning of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) based on the three interrelated concepts of supranationalism, sovereignty and legitimacy. The first part of the article critically analyses the current design of the EPPO’s powers and how they have been exercised in practice, seeking to establish the nature of this body along the supranational-intergovernmental spectrum. The second part examines the operating structure and management of the EPPO, attempting to ascertain the extent to which Member States have been capable of maintaining control of its operation. Arguing that the EPPO to date is the pinnacle of supranational criminal justice, the article considers to what extent the establishment of this body and the wielding of significant law enforcement powers can be reconciled with the dictates of state sovereignty. Finally, the article considers the EPPO from the perspective of legitimacy and argues that the EPPO needs to demonstrate not only a successful track record in its law enforcement actions, but also that the operational actions of this new supranational body are encased within a strong legal framework with robust judicial remedies and safeguards for individual defendants.

The seminal ruling of the Court of Justice in G.K. e.a (Parquet européen) addresses one of the key elements of the EPPO Regulation which is the mechanism for cross-border cooperation between European Delegated Prosecutors (EDPs). This mechanism is designed to enable prosecutors in different Member States to cooperate in an effective manner limiting judicial authorisation for investigation measures undertaken in a certain State at the request of an EDP in a different State to one instance only (‘single judicial  authorisation’). However, the wording of the EPPO Regulation is far from conclusive on this aspect Article 31 being in reality awkward compromise balancing Member States’ views on the scope of judicial review of assigned investigation measures in cross-border cases. This significant provision of the new EPPO Regulation was put to test before the national courts at the case at hand. The CJEU's ruling suggests that the notion of single judicial authorisation has been dealt a blow as we now always will have two forms of judicial control in a cross-border EPPO investigation: one prior on the merits in the State of the handling EDP and one formal in the State of the assisting EDP. In principle, the Court largely followed the Opinion by AG Ćapeta to the extent that the review conducted in the State of  the assisting EDP where a measure requires judicial authorisation may relate only to matters concerning the enforcement of that measure. The CJEU judgment requires us to think more broadly on the EPPO Regulation and the potential need for EU harmonisation in this area. While the establishment of the EPPO is a welcome step towards a ‘federalisation’ of EU criminal law in the specific  area of crimes against the EU budget, the EPPO cannot function effectively with some degree of harmonisation of national criminal procedures. The judgment at hand highlights the implications of this incomplete centralisation of national criminal procedures which makes it more cumbersome for the EPPO to fulfil its task of combating crimes against the EU’s financial interests effectively.

This op-ed intends to briefly analyse the recent opinion by Advocate General Collins in Case C‑292/23 EPPO v I.R.O F.J.L.R.- a seminal preliminary ruling case being the first case ever concerned with the scope and nature of judicial review of procedural acts produced by the EPPO.

EU policy-making in criminal law is a matter of significant public concern for EU citizens and the Member States. The exercise of EU public powers in the fields of criminal law and law enforcement have tangible and adverse consequences for the liberties and well-being of individuals. Furthermore, EU cooperation in the area of criminal law touches upon core functions of statehood including ‘core state powers’ such as the safeguarding of internal security and law enforcement. This raises several questions regarding the rationale underpinning EU criminal policy and its legitimacy within the context of a multi-level polity. This book explores forensically the question whether a compelling normative justification for the EU to regulate criminal justice. It argues that the key justification for supranational action lies in demonstrating the existence of European public goods such as the internal market, the transnational protection of the environment and the provision of security for citizens and other important transnational interests deserving of protection by means of criminal law. It should also be shown that the Union is better placed (given its resources, expertise and incentives) than Member States to protect those interests. This offers a compelling case for EU action in criminal law to address or correct transnational market failures, collective action problems and other externalities arising from the economic and social interdependence between states in the EU

The key question addressed in this chapter is the extent to which the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) is a suitable model for a future ‘federal’ system of European criminal law. The analysis approaches that question especially by studying the relationship between EPPO, national sovereignty and legitimacy. On this basis, the first section of this chapter proceeds to comprehensively analyse the scope, nature and type of enforcement powers enjoyed by the EPPO. The chapter’s second section discusses in detail the ways in which the exercise of the EPPO’s powers may constitute a threat to national sovereignty whilst the third section considers EPPO from the perspective of legitimacy, with a particular focus on judicial review of the EPPO’s activities. The final part of the chapter analyses the pros and cons of establishing the EPPO by means of enhanced cooperation.