To Örebro University

International Law of Armed Conflict plays a crucial role in mitigating as far as possible the impact ofarmed conflict on civilians. However, inherent gender biases in the perception of ‘civilians’ persist withinthe law, in large part explained by the fact that this legal regime is comparatively old in its fundamentswhich stem from assumptions about men and women that we now consider outdated. While the Law ofArmed Conflict mandates equal treatment and non-discrimination, certain rules may at face valueinadvertently perpetuate such stereotypes. For instance, this law tends to see women and children in needof (masculine) protection, which makes them passive objects. A further disconcerting fact is that therecognition of diverse identities within the group of women, beyond the binary division of men andwomen, is often overlooked when the law is implemented. This chapter’s analysis is limited to the FourthGeneva Convention and the provisions of general protection enshrined therein. It demonstrates how agender-based intersectional analysis can help in transferring an archaic perception of a hierarchy of thebinary group of women and men, into a more nuanced and inclusive framework that recognizesindividually lived experiences of all women. Such reading of the law is responsive to the lived realities ofall individuals. It also makes it possible to break free from an archaic perception of a hierarchical relationbetween men and women. Lastly, it contributes to the transitional competence of GC IV, namely that ofpromoting a shift from active hostilities towards normal life for all.

With the advent of socio-technical systems that gather and process personal data, the capacity to identify and even locate people in an automated fashion has dramatically increased. This article discusses what militaries need to know about data protection and the right to digital privacy/private life when personal data is processed. The focus in this discussion is on sensitive data that makes individuals identifiable. It is here argued that the right to data protection and the right to digital privacy/private life are distinctive and separate rights and should be treated as such, despite some overlaps. Although the law of armed conflict approaches processing of sensitive data in a topical manner, it remains firm on the delimitation between what is permissible and what becomes unlawful when it comes to processing data. This article illustrates that elements of both data protection and protection of the right to privacy/private life can be traced in the law of armed conflict. In fact, both rights remain distinctive also in times of armed conflict and must be separately protected through obligations of result as well as obligations of conduct.

In the post-truth era (Vazquez, 2021) where “objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief,”[1] the question arises whether protecting the free flow of information is enough to fully safeguard the function of the political debate in a democratic society. Freedom of expression increasingly comes up against a complex socio-technical communications landscape which also harbours various degrees of potentially harmful communication. Nevertheless, freedom of expression is traditionally protected both horizontally (between individuals) and vertically, between State and individuals. From the Enlightenment and onwards, protecting freedom of expression was primarily sought through non-interference by the State. (Argren, 2023, p. 39.) The harmfulness of communication varies depending on several factors and circumstances: Harmful communication directed at individuals may lead to harm that can be physically, socially, economically, or psychologically in nature. Furthermore, harmful communication is often foreseeable. The State here has at least a double role: First, of course, as a regulator, but second, also as a producer and disseminator of information – potentially based on a particular State agenda. (Pentney, 2022, p. 3).

Arguably, the more harmful the result may be and the more foreseeable the risk of such harm is, the greater the positive obligation will be on the State to a) prevent such harm from occurring and b) take action to put an end to such harm, should it materialise. It is argued that preventive mechanisms that can be put into action if and when required should be sought. It is submitted that the public order in a democratic society requires the same scope of protection for freedom of expression as always, but what is required is a “preventive toolbox”, that may be temporarily activated in a regulated manner if or when needed. Such a toolbox needs to take into consideration that the socio-technical process of harmful communication involves multiple actors and parts: such as instigators, agents, a message, intermediaries and targets/interpreters. (Bontcheva &Posetti, 2020, p. 3). In addition to determining what action can lawfully be undertaken, a “preventive toolbox” would as a minimum also have to develop triggers for when respective actions are due.

 [1] Oxford Languages, ‘Word of the Year 2016’ Oxford University Press, available at: www.la nguages.oup.com/word-of-the-year/2016/

The draft European Union artificial intelligence (AI) act, unveiled in April 2021, aims to limit the use of biometric identification systems including facial recognition used for surveillance. This proposed legislation focuses primarily on strengthening rules around data quality, transparency, human oversight and accountability. The draft also proposes new rules governing the use of facial recognition technology (FRTs). In June 2023, European Union lawmakers agreed changes to the draft AI act, to include a ban on the use of the technology in biometric surveillance. The draft act is structured on a differentiation system ranging from minimal or no risk, over limited risk and high risk, to unacceptable risk. The latter gives ground for prohibited means, albeit with certain exceptions. Prohibited means could for example be the use of real-time remote FTR systems in the public domain, under peacetime conditions.

The proposed draft act may have implications for military in security operations (MiSO). Although law enforcement in normal conditions is carried out by law enforcement agencies, armed forces may be called on to support civil authorities in situations where the threat level is elevated, the degree of violence or other operational challenges exceeds the capabilities of the traditional law enforcement agencies. Similarly, deploying MiSO may occur in the context of international armed conflict (including occupation) and non-international armed conflict (NIAC). For these situations, the permissive use of biometrics is regulated by an international legal framework that combines human rights law (IHRL) and the law of armed conflict (LOAC). 

This paper examines what implications the draft AI act will have for military security operations (MiSO), with regards to the use of biometrics in law enforcement operations in normal times, through crisis and emergencies, even crossing the threshold of NIAC. It does so by first outlining in what situations use of biometrics may become an issue in MiSO with law enforcement tasks, examining surveillance, arrest and detention, search and seizure, public order management and border management. Next, it examines the potential implications the draft AI act, may have on the use of biometrics in combination with the existing IHRL/LOAC framework. Third, the paper discusses to what extent the proposed risk-based approach aligns with, complements or contrasts with the approach of the IHRL/LOAC regime, both inherently preventive by nature. Specific attention is given to how the notion of risk is addressed in relation to the use of biometrics in these three legal regimes. Lastly, remaining challenges are pointed out and conclusions are drawn.

By definition, biometrics consists of sensitive data about the individual. Therefore, the Statemust ensure a higher degree of safeguarding measures in all phases of handling such data.This article argues that data-subjects whose biometrics are gathered for identification areprotected through the right to biometric private life under international human rights lawat all times. Furthermore, the law of armed conflict also contains relevant provisions.The European Convention on Human Rights provides detailed rules for the protection ofbiometric private life, subject to limitations and possibly derogations. This protection coversthe whole data life cycle of collection, retention and disclosure of biometrics. Twopoints are of importance here when assessing what is permissible: (1) The original purposefor which biometric data collection was initiated remains decisive. (2) The use of specialmeasures such as limitations or derogations, does not permit States to annihilate the protectionof a person’s biometric private life.The right to biometric private life remains protected during armed conflict, because internationalhuman rights law and the law of armed conflict re-enforce each other. Therefore,armed forces must: (1) define in detail for what purpose biometric data is collected,retained and disclosed, and (2) maintain strict adherence to the originally intendedusage of the biometric data and refrain from any divergence therefrom. This article arguesthat the legal framework under international human rights law in general and theEuropean Convention on Human Rights in particular, is sufficiently flexible to balancethe interests of the rights holder with those of the State or the community at large. Nevertheless,this flexibility makes it harder to predict the outcomes of a legal assessment, and acase-by-case approach must therefore be expected.

Por definición, la biometría consiste en datos confidenciales sobre el individuo. Por lo tanto,el Estado debe garantizar un mayor grado de medidas de salvaguardia en todas las fases delmanejo de dichos datos. Este artículo argumenta que los individuos cuyos datos biométricosse recopilan para su identificación están protegidos en todo momento por el derecho a lavida privada biométrica en virtud del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos.Además, el Derecho de los Conflictos Armados también contiene disposiciones pertinentes.El Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos establece normas detalladas para la protecciónde la vida privada biométrica, con sujeción a limitaciones y, en su caso, derogaciones.

Esta protección cubre todo el ciclo de vida de los datos desde su recopilación, su conservacióny hasta la divulgación de mismos. Dos aspectos son importantes a la hora de evaluarlo que es permisible: (1) El propósito original por el que se inició la recopilación dedatos biométricos sigue siendo decisivo. (2) El uso de medidas especiales, tales como limitacioneso excepciones, no permite a los Estados dejar sin efecto la protección de la vidaprivada biométrica de una persona.El derecho a la vida privada biométrica sigue estando protegido durante los conflictosarmados porque el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos y el Derecho de losConflictos Armados se refuerzan mutuamente. Por lo tanto, las fuerzas armadas deben:(1) definir en detalle con qué propósito se recopilan, conservan y divulgan los datos biométricos,y (2) mantener un estricto cumplimiento del uso originalmente previsto de los datosbiométricos y abstenerse de cualquier divergencia con respecto a estos. En este artículo seargumenta que el marco jurídico del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, engeneral, y del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos, en particular, es lo suficientementeflexible como para equilibrar los intereses del titular de los derechos con los del Estado o dela comunidad en general. Sin embargo, esta flexibilidad dificulta, a la vez, la predicción delos posibles resultados de una evaluación jurídica inicial en abstracto, por lo que podríaconsiderase idóneo un enfoque previo basado en el caso por caso.

Per definizione la biometria consiste in dati sensibili dell’individuo. Pertanto, lo Stato devegarantire un livello più elevato di misure di salvaguardia in tutte le fasi del trattamento ditali dati. Questo articolo sostiene che i soggetti i cui dati biometrici vengono raccolti perl’identificazione, siano protetti dal diritto alla vita privata biometrica ai sensi del dirittointernazionale dei diritti umani in qualsiasi momento. Inoltre, anche il diritto dei conflittiarmati contiene disposizioni pertinenti.La Convenzione Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo prevede norme dettagliate per la protezionedella vita privata biometrica, passibile di limitazioni ed eventuali deroghe. Tale protezioneè applicabile all’intero ciclo di vita dei dati biometrici, dalla raccolta alla conservazione,fino alla divulgazione.Due punti sono importanti per valutare la liceità: (1) Lo scopo originario per cui è stataavviata la raccolta dei dati biometrici rimane decisivo. (2) L’uso di misure speciali comelimitazioni e deroghe non consente agli Stati di annientare la protezione della vita privatabiometrica di una persona.Il diritto alla vita privata biometrica rimane protetto durante i conflitti armati poiché ildiritto internazionale dei diritti umani e il diritto dei conflitti armati si rafforzano a vicenda.Pertanto, le forze armate devono (1) definire dettagliatamente le finalità per le quali idati biometrici vengono raccolti, conservati e divulgati e (2) attenersi rigorosamenteall’uso originariamente previsto dei dati biometrici e astenersi da qualsiasi divergenza.Questo articolo sostiene che il quadro giuridico previsto dal diritto internazionale deidiritti umani in generale e dalla Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo in particolare,sia sufficientemente flessibile per bilanciare gli interessi del titolare dei diritti con quellodello Stato o della comunità in generale. Tuttavia, questa flessibilità rende più difficile prevederegli esiti di una valutazione dal punto di vista legale preferendo perciò un approcciocaso per caso.

Grundsätzlich bestehen biometrische Daten aus sensiblen Daten über das Individuum.Deshalb muss der Staat in allen Phasen des Umgangs mit solchen Daten ein höheresMaß an Schutzmaßnahmen gewährleisten. In diesem Artikel wird dargelegt, dass

Personen, von denen biometrische Daten zur Identifizierung gesammelt werden, jederzeitdurch das Recht auf ein biometrisches Privatleben entsprechend internationalenMenschenrechtsnormen geschützt werden. Außerdem enthält das Recht der bewaffnetenKonflikte auch relevante Bestimmungen.Die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention verschafft detaillierte Regeln für den Schutzdes biometrischen Privatlebens, vorbehaltlich Einschränkungen und möglicher Abweichungen.Dieser Schutz erstreckt sich auf den gesamten Lebenszyklus der Sammlung,Speicherung und Weitergabe biometrischer Daten. Dabei gibt es zwei Punkte, die wichtigsind bei der Beurteilung dessen, was zulässig ist: (1) Das ursprüngliche Ziel, für dasdie Sammlung biometrischer Daten vorgenommen wurde, bleibt maßgeblich. (2) DieAnwendung von Sondermaßnahmen, wie Einschränkungen oder Abweichungen, erlaubtes Staaten nicht, den Schutz des biometrischen Privatlebens einer Personzunichtezumachen.Während bewaffneter Konflikte bleibt das Recht auf ein biometrisches Privatlebengeschützt, weil internationale Menschenrechtsnormen und das Recht der bewaffneten Konflikteeinander verstärken. Deshalb müssen Streitkräfte: (1) in allen Einzelheiten bestimmen,zu welchem Ziel biometrische Daten gesammelt, gespeichert und weitergegebenwerden, und (2) die ursprünglich beabsichtigte Benutzung der biometrischen Daten strikteinhalten und auf jede Abweichung davon verzichten. In diesem Artikel wird dargelegt,dass der rechtliche Rahmen der internationalen Menschenrechtsnormen im Allgemeinenund der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention im Besonderen ausreichend flexibelist, um die Interessen des Inhabers der Rechte und jene des Staates oder der Gemeinschaftim Allgemeinen auszubalancieren. Dennoch erschwert diese Flexibilität die Vorhersagedes Ergebnisses einer rechtlichen Beurteilung. Es muss somit mit einer Einzelfallprüfunggerechnet werden.

Par définition, les données biométriques comprennent des données sensibles sur l'individu.Par conséquent, l'État doit garantir un niveau plus élevé de mesures de protection danstoutes les phases du traitement de ces données. Cet article avance que les personnesdont les données biométriques sont collectées à des fins d'identification sont protégéespar le droit à la vie privée biométrique prévu par le droit international relatif aux droitsde l'homme à tout moment. En outre, le droit des conflits armés contient également des dispositionspertinentes.La Convention européenne des droits de l'homme prévoit des règles détaillées pour la protectionde la vie privée biométrique, sous réserve de limitations et éventuellement de dérogations.Cette protection couvre l'ensemble du cycle de vie des données, à savoir la collecte, laconservation et la divulgation des données biométriques. Deux points sont importants pourévaluer ce qui est admissible: (1) La finalité initiale de la collecte des données biométriquesreste déterminante. (2) Le recours à des mesures spéciales, telles que des limitations ou desdérogations, ne permet pas aux États d'anéantir la protection de la vie privée biométriqued'une personne.Le droit à la vie privée biométrique reste protégé pendant les conflits armés, car le droitinternational relatif aux droits de l'homme et le droit des conflits armés se renforcentmutuellement. Par conséquent, les forces armées doivent: (1) définir en détail à quellesfins les données biométriques sont collectées, conservées et divulguées, et (2) respecterstrictement l'utilisation initialement prévue des données biométriques et s'abstenir detoute divergence par rapport à celle-ci. Cet article affirme que le cadre juridique prévupar le droit international relatif aux droits de l'homme en général et de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme en particulier est suffisamment souple pour équilibrerles intérêts du titulaire des droits et ceux de l'État ou de la communauté dans son ensemble.Néanmoins, cette flexibilité rend plus difficile de prévoir les résultats d'une évaluation juridique,et il faut donc s'attendre à une approche au cas par cas.

Daarom moet de staat in alle fasen van de behandeling van dergelijke gegevens zorgenvoor een hogere mate van beschermingsmaatregelen. Dit artikel betoogt dat personenvan wie biometrische gegevens worden verzameld voor identificatie, te allen tijde wordenbeschermd door het recht op een biometrisch privéleven in overeenstemming met het internationaalrecht inzake de mensenrechten. Bovendien bevat ook het recht van de gewapendeconflicten relevante bepalingen.Het Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens bevat gedetailleerde regels voor debescherming van het biometrische privéleven, behoudens beperkingen en mogelijkeafwijkingen. Deze bescherming heeft betrekking op de hele levenscyclus van de verzameling,bewaring en openbaarmaking van biometrische gegevens. Bij de beoordelingvan wat toelaatbaar is, zijn twee punten van belang: (1) Het oorspronkelijke doel dataanleiding gaf tot de verzameling van biometrische gegevens, blijft doorslaggevend.(2) Het gebruik van bijzondere maatregelen, zoals beperkingen of afwijkingen, staatstaten niet toe de bescherming van het biometrische privéleven van een persoon teniette doen.Het recht op een biometrisch privéleven blijft beschermd tijdens gewapende conflicten,omdat het internationaal recht inzake de mensenrechten en het recht van de gewapendeconflicten elkaar versterken. Daarom moeten de strijdkrachten (1) gedetailleerd omschrijvenmet welk doel biometrische gegevens worden verzameld, bewaard en bekendgemaakt,en (2) zich strikt houden aan het oorspronkelijk bedoelde gebruik van debiometrische gegevens en zich onthouden van elke afwijking daarvan. In dit artikelwordt betoogd dat het juridisch kader van het internationaal recht inzake de mensenrechtenin het algemeen en het Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens inhet bijzonder flexibel genoeg is om de belangen van de rechthebbende en die van destaat of de gemeenschap in het algemeen met elkaar in evenwicht te brengen. Desalnietteminmaakt deze flexibiliteit het moeilijker om de resultaten van een juridische beoordelingte voorspellen en daarom moet een benadering van geval tot geval wordenverwacht.

This anthology is a collection of scholarly articles drawn from a series of digital webinars entitled The Rule of Law Series, hosted by Juridicum at Örebro University Sweden, during the corona pandemic in 2021. In December 2022, participants from the webinars were invited to anonsite workshop at Örebro University entitled The Rule o fLaw in a 2022 Year’s Context – Unpredictability, Digitalisationand Crises. At the workshop additional scholars interested in aspects of rule of law joined the discussions. A second round of webinars was convened in the spring 2023, which extended the network of interested researchers even further.

In this book, the rule of law kaleidoscope is examined thoroughly, and called into question. The volume contributions range from tax law, the role of the courts (specifically the EU and Strasbourg courts), digitalisation, environmental law, criminal law, and civil law. The collective enquiry undertaken in this book is guided by curiosity and a sincere desire to widely explore the adjustment and recalibration of the concept ’rule of law’ that may be required today. All is done with a desire to ensure that the rule of law remains viable in a transitional spectrum.

The use of virtual reality has increasingly come within reach of regular teaching in academia. The cost of the required hardware has dropped significantly, and the technique is simple enough for a layperson to use. The accelerating development of new teaching technologies prompts the question of to what extent new means and methods of teaching may make a complex topic such as the international law of armed conflict more digestible to students.

This chapter analyses both the opportunities and constraints of using virtual reality as a teaching method in international law of armed conflict courses. It provides some points of reference for teachers in international law who wish to introduce the use of new technology in their teaching methods. There are several specific questions that need to be addressed. What can applying the means and methods of virtual reality bring to a course on the international law of armed conflict? What are the necessary considerations for teachers to consider beforehand? How does one ensure that pedagogical considerations determine the use of technical tools rather than allowing technology to drive pedagogic decisions? As will be revealed in this chapter, the latter question is of particular concern in relation to the international law of armed conflict. In order to answer these questions, it is first necessary to establish a theoretical framework for teaching law at university. Next, this chapter discusses learning objectives for the international law of armed conflict and how they can be reconciled with virtual reality paradigms. Then the paper highlights some precautions to consider regarding introducing virtual reality in classes. Lastly, concluding remarks are provided.

The Law of Armed Conflict is an inherently male-normative branch under international law. Taking effect in situations of armed conflict, a context traditionally associated with masculinity, the law serves the purpose to: (a) set rules for conduct of warfare, and (b) ensure legal protection for those who are not taking actively part in the conflict. There are several distinct legal provisions that require States to take measures beforehand, that is, preventive measures, where the aim is to prevent future violations (including grave breaches) of the Law of Armed Conflict, should armed conflict erupt. The purpose of this paper is to explore what insights a feminist reading of the obligation to prevent war crimes might bring to the table. The analysis applies thoughts from feminist legal theory to the Law of Armed Conflict as a preventive legal regime. Furthermore, with regards to the preventive features, it is discussed how gender perspectives can purposefully be included in training and education for the civilian population and for members of the armed forces. In this paper, it is argued that a gender-sensitive reading of the law is required to ensure that war crimes are duly prevented. This would have to include war crimes other than acts of sexual violence, as arguably, the impact of certain war crimes, such as indiscriminate destruction of homes and the destruction of livelihoods may have an unduly heavy impact on women, obscured by hegemonic masculine perceptions. Therefore, particular mechanisms that enable gender-sensitivity should be established beforehand, in order for a State to fully fulfill its obligation to prevent all war crimes.