To Örebro University

The aim of this paper is to shed light on the economic and epidemiological trade-offs that emerge when choosing between different vaccination strategies. For that purpose we employ a setting with three age groups that differ with respect to their fatality rates. The model also accounts for heterogeneity in the transmission rates between and within these age groups. We compare the results for two different contact patterns, in terms of the total number of deceased, the total number of infected, the peak infection rate and the economic gains from different vaccination strategies. We find that fatalities are minimized by first vaccinating the elderly, except when vaccination is slow and the general transmission rate is relatively low. In this case deaths are minimized by first vaccinating the group that is mainly responsible for spreading of the virus. With regard to the other outcome variables it is best to vaccinate the group that drives the pandemic first. A trade-off may therefore emerge between reducing fatalities on the one hand and lowering the number of infected as well as maximizing the economic gains from vaccinations on the other hand.

This field experiment investigates the effect of first-time inspections of restaurants' waste sorting and explores whether motivational interviewing (MI) training of inspectors in this specific setting enhances the propensity of restaurants to be compliant with regulations. Our results show strong positive effects of first inspections with an average improvement of 55%. Also, the MI training of inspectors seems to affect compliance. However, this may also be a combined effect of the first inspection, MI training and more days between inspections. Further research is needed.

This paper discusses how incidences of unit taxes and ad valorem taxes are related to various market characteristics under imperfect competition. Incidence is higher the more competitive markets are. More specifically, it is higher the wider the firms' product ranges, the lower the degree of market concentration and the lower the degree of product differentiation, and higher in Bertrand markets compared to Cournot markets. Furthermore, the incidence is higher for unit taxes than for ad valorem taxes. The relative difference between unit and ad valorem tax incidence is larger the lower marginal costs and taxes are.

We present a model of the interaction between firms agreeing on a degree of collusion and a competition authority that simultaneously determines the allocation of resources to enforcement of anti-trust legislation. An increase in demand is associated with tougher enforcement and a lower degree of collusion. A stronger competitive pressure first decreases the degree of collusion and increases the level of enforcement, then increases both the degree of collusion and the level of enforcement, and eventually increases the degree of collusion and decreases the level of enforcement. Simulation results indicate that a move from the EU penalty regime to the tougher US standard with treble damages would mainly impact on the enforcement intensity and to a much lesser extent affect the degree of collusion.

This paper analyzes the epidemiological and economic effects of quarantines. We use a basic epidemiological model, a SEIR-model, that is calibrated to roughly resemble the COVID-19 pandemic, and we assume that individuals that become infected or are isolated on average lose a share of their productivity. An early quarantine postpones but does not alter the course of the pandemic at a cost that increases in the duration and the extent of the quarantine. For quarantines at later stages of the pandemic there is a trade-off between lowering the peak level of infectious people on the one hand and minimizing fatalities and economic losses on the other hand. A longer quarantine dampens the peak level of infectious people and also reduces the total number of infected persons but increases economic losses. Both the peak level of infectious individuals and the total share of the population that will have been infected are U-shaped in relation to the share of the population in quarantine, while economic costs increase in this share. In particular, a quarantine covering a moderate share of the population leads to a lower peak, fewer deaths and lower economic costs, but it implies that the peak of the pandemic occurs earlier.

This paper presents a model of environmental regulations with firms that are heterogeneous with respect to the cost for reducing emissions to the legally permitted level. Given that the enforcement capacity is limited due to budgetary constraints and that each firm's inspection probability depends on its emissions relative to other firms’ emissions, the likelihood of being punished for violations is endogenously determined and multiple equilibria may therefore arise. Hence, both good outcomes with high compliance rates and bad outcomes with many violations are possible. Multiple equilibria are most likely to emerge at intermediate levels of deterrence and at low permitted emission levels. However, it is generally not straightforward how stricter legislation impacts on equilibrium outcomes, indicating that behavioral expectations among regulated firms are an important factor to consider when adapting enforcement to changes in the law.

This paper models the current pandemic to analyze vaccination strategies in a setting with three age groups that differ with respect to their fatality rates. The model also accounts for heterogeneity in the transmission rates between and within these age groups. We compare the outcomes in terms of the total number of deceased, the total number of infected, the peak infection rate and the economic consequences. We find that fatalities are almost always minimized by first vaccinating the elderly, except when vaccination is slow and the general transmission rate is relatively low. In this case deaths are minimized by first vaccinating the middle-aged as this group is responsible for substantial spreading of the virus to the elderly. With regard to the other outcome variables it is always best to vaccinate the middle-aged group first. A trade-off may therefore emerge between reducing fatalities on the one hand and lowering the number of infected as well as maximizing the economic gains from vaccinations on the other hand.

This study develops a framework for the strategic interaction of firms that have to decide between adhering to and violating legislation. Depending on how deterring enforcement is various degrees of compliance with the law will arise in equilibrium. For an agency that targets a certain compliance rate more resources per firm should be allocated to industries with strong demand and high costs for adhering to legislation. Whenever some degree of non-compliance among competing firms can be expected, more inspection resources are needed in markets where products are highly differentiated and/or the number of firms is small.

Flera olika studier har utförts inom ramen för forskningsprojektet Utvärdering av tillsynen som styrmedel för att uppnå miljökvalitetsmålen (rapport 6912, 2019). Tre av studierna handlar om hur metoden Motiverande samtal kan användas i samband med inspektioner som rör avfallssortering och djurskydd. Den fjärde studien sammanställer forskarnas erfarenheter av att analysera tillsyn, med fokus på hur en tillsynsmyndighet kan mäta effekten av sina olika metoder.

High hygienic standards are essential to avoid the spread of infectious diseases, not least in environments with many children. This paper uses an experimental design to examine the impact of feedback information following a public health safety inspection on future behavior of pre-schools in three Swedish municipalities. We find no effects of information at the municipality level. However, we find that pre-schools that were informed about a bad result improved more than comparable pre-schools that received no feedback. Conversely, informed pre-schools with a good result worsened their results compared to similarly performing uninformed pre-schools. Our results thus lend support to the so called boomerang effect.