To Örebro University

Recent incidents have demonstrated the increasing vulnerability of Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) to sophisticated and targeted attacks orchestrated by adversaries with high motivation, resources, and domain knowledge. Among these threats, False Data Injection (FDI) attacks have emerged as one of the main security threats to ICSs, involving the deliberate manipulation or injection of false data into the control system to deceive or disrupt operations. FDI attacks pose a significant risk due to their high capacity of concealment and ability to evade intrusion detection systems that rely on accurate ICS models. In this paper, we present defclon, a novel Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-based Moving Target Defense (MTD) approach against FDI attacks. Defclon proactively replicates network packets across multiple network paths and adaptively selects a single path using a signaling game model to reach the destination end-device. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach through simulations, numerical analysis, and experiments on ICS network traffic and topologies. Experimental results show that defclon is able to not only mitigate the effects of FDI attacks, but also to introduce different levels of uncertainty without degrading network performance, significantly increasing the difficulty for adversaries to gather information and launch attacks.