To Örebro University

Autonomous weapon systems raise fundamental questions about the attribution of criminal liability to natural persons in international criminal law, casting new light on conventional concepts of criminal law and the understanding of the elements of international crimes. One of the most pressing issues is whether the characteristics of autonomous weapon systems create an accountability gap as these systems can select and engage targets without further human intervention. This thesis addresses these concerns by examining the characteristics that may impact the attribution of criminal liability in international criminal law and the extent to which the elements of war crimes can be established and individual criminal liability attributed to natural persons in light of the characteristics of autonomous weapon systems. The thesis identifies several factors relating to the characteristics and use of autonomous weapon systems that are relevant to the attribution of individual criminal liability and finds that the main characteristics of autonomous weapon systems that have an impact on the attribution of criminal liability, as they touch upon aspects of human control, awareness and foreseeability over a system’s behaviour, concern two critical functions: the selection and engagement of targets without further human intervention. This thesis observes that the degree of control, awareness and foreseeability that is retained once an autonomous weapon system is launched depends on several factors such as the extent to which an operator can intervene in the processes of identifying and engaging a target, the sophistication of the system, and the operational environment. By taking account of these factors in analysing the material and mental elements as well as the modes of liability under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, it is argued that the actus reus can be established based on the act of launching the autonomous weapon system although recognising that difficulties can arise in establishing the material element relating to the object of the attack. The thesis recognises that the characteristics of autonomous weapon systems primarily raise concerns in determining the mens rea considering the threshold of the general mental element under the Rome Statute that requires intent and knowledge. While the thesis recognises that there are scenarios in which it can be difficult to determine whether a natural person has acted with the requisite mental element, it is argued that the mental element can be fulfilled and that liability can be attributed to natural persons, also in the context of the use of autonomous weapon systems.