Safeguarding international peace and security, preventing conflicts, upholding values in its relations with the wider world, are the primary objectives the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). These objectives shape the Union’s global actorness, including the imposition of restrictive measures (sanctions) against third countries and foreign actors, while they have not traditionally guided the use of EU criminal law. Nonetheless, this chapter intends to shed light on how recent geopolitical developments, particularly Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the urgent need to ensure an effective response to this full-scale aggression at the border with Europe, have led to new interconnections between CFSP objectives and EU criminal law. In this unprecedented context, the effectiveness and credibility of restrictive measures have been intertwined with the resort to criminal law measures. Since February 2022, the imperative to impose tough sanctions on Russia has, in fact, been translated into the need to approximate national enforcement systems and harmonise criminal rules and penalties to counter violations, including circumvention tactics. In other words, the need to strengthen the impact of EU sanctions (and induce Russia to stop its war of aggression against Ukraine) has resulted into a new emphasis on criminal punishment and deterrence of sanctions breaches.
Although Member States have previously been entrusted with the task of designing ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ penalties for sanctions violations within their respective jurisdictions, in 2022, the EU legislator argued that it could no longer place full trust in national authorities. In light of a pressing geopolitical context, it proposed to enforce restrictive measures by (common) criminal law measures. In this manner, the war in Ukraine, the urgency to ensure the effective application of sanctions against Russia, and to counter the phenomenon of circumvention, has led the Union to conclude, for the first time, that the harmonisation of criminal rules and penalties was a pressing necessity. Undoubtedly, the criminalisation of sanctions violations has been driven by a specific political momentum – where the Union seeks to maximise the effectiveness and credibility of its foreign policy decisions with the view of constraining Russia’s capacity to wage war. Yet, this process amounts to a structural reform that affects EU restrictive measures tout court – not only those related to Russia’s aggression.
This chapter seeks to critically examine the legal and normative justification for criminalising breaches of EU sanctions. It first looks at the fast-track criminalisation process pursuant to Article 83(1) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and the negotiation history of Directive (EU) 2024/1226. Subsequently, it examines the rationale behind this criminalisation process, and illustrates the extent to which the introduction of a new Eurocrime is in line with the legal preconditions for exercising the competence in Article 83(1) TFEU. Then, this chapter analyses, in detail, the approximation of criminal offences and penalties in the new Directive. Finally, the chapter has some broader reflections on the impact and potential for this Directive being transposed into national laws.
Oxford: Hart Publishing Ltd, 2026. p. 161-180